Gulf War Air Power Survey
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- Figure 15 MAC Strategic Airlift Missions by Destination in AOR August 1990 ‑ February 1991
- Figure 16 Mission Capable (MC) Aircraft and Aircraft Flown (Daily Averages)
- Material Handling Equipment (MHE)
- Increasing Capability Activating CRAF and the Reserves
- Reducing Use of Augmented Crews
- Using Tankers as Airlifters
- Figure 17 19 Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Cargo: Unit and Sustainment
Capability Shortfalls Command and Control Command and control deficiencies contributed to route structure saturation. MAC did not have the capability to determine where aircraft were on a real-time basis. The Global Decision Support System (GDSS), a distributed networking system supporting MAC's command and control structure, was supposed to provide such a capability. However, most units had no capability to enter information into the system. GDSS served as an after-the-fact source of data. Further, no single element of the MAC command and control system had the communications necessary to control the airlift fleet.208 Figure 15 MAC Strategic Airlift Missions by Destination in AOR August 1990 ‑ February 1991209 17
For commercial aircraft, the carrier's own operations center was responsible for monitoring mission progress and updating the MAC numbered Air Force. There were some problems with this arrangement. Commercial aircraft sometimes arrived unannounced or on very short notice, causing confusion and occasional congestion at locations throughout the airlift system. Disruption was especially significant at onload locations when aerial port personnel had to drop what they were doing to prepare loads for unexpected arrivals. Sometimes no parking spots were available for unexpected arrivals. Such communication breakdowns frustrated the deploying units, the commercial carriers, and MAC.210 Many commercial aircraft had difficulty communicating with their operations centers while between Europe and the AOR. Aircrews were particularly concerned that they would be unable to receive orders to divert in the event their destination airfield was under attack.211 Computers and communications weren't the only problems. MAC command and control organizations needed extra people to perform several vital tasks. Examples include the requirements augmentees cell at the MAC CAT and the augmentees who helped process the massive number of diplomatic clearance requests at 21st Air Force.212 MAC also tasked its airlift wings to augment command and control functions at nearly all levels. Wing augmentees deployed with the ALCC to the AOR and with ALCEs to the CONUS, Europe, and the AOR. Wing augmentees also performed aircrew management and mission planning functions at numbered air force headquarters and en route staging bases. In addition, the increased workload at homestation was more than wings could accomplish with their assigned operations staff personnel. In many cases, aircrew members were a wing's primary source of personnel for these additional taskings.213 Aircraft and People From the beginning, MAC had access to all of its military aircraft, including those belonging to unit-equipped Air Reserve component units. Figure 16 illustrates how heavily those aircraft were tasked. For the most part, if a C-5 or C-141 was mission capable, it flew. Not every aircraft was committed to Desert Shield and Desert StormMAC flew a limited number of other high-priority missions during the same time period. When an aircraft was committed to a Desert Shield or Desert Storm mission, it flew hard. C-5s flying on these missions averaged over nine daily flying hours, and C-141s averaged nearly eleven daily flying hours.214 Figure 16 Mission Capable (MC) Aircraft and Aircraft Flown (Daily Averages)215 18
Material Handling Equipment (MHE) CENTAF took two weeks to release prepositioned MHE for MAC operations. According to CENTAF, one factor in the delay was that MAC couldn't specify quantity and type needed by location. According to MAC, that was impossible because a war plan detailing the information had not been implemented. During the standoff, the Airlift Control Center experienced serious difficulty in meeting offload requirements and frequently had to move material-handling equipment (MHE) around within the AOR. No shoring was stored with the MHE prepositioned at Thumrait, Seeb, and Masirah, so shoring had to be obtained before MHE could be distributed by C‑130s.217 Onload and offload operations were hampered by MHE shortages and breakdowns. For MAC organic aircraft, the biggest problem was the 25K loader. For KC‑10s and commercial wide bodies, the biggest problem was the wide body loader.218 On 10 September, the COMALF reported that the poor condition of MHE was limiting the throughput capacity of some key bases. When the MAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations visited Dhahran in late September, five of ten 25K loaders were broken. The MHE spare parts kits shipped from storage sites in the AOR and through normal CONUS channels were inadequate in number and contents. Although providing and supporting MHE was a theater responsibility, MAC prepared an MHE spare parts kit for Dhahran.219 To preclude adverse mission impact, wide‑body loaders and staircases required intensive management and movement between air terminals. At the start of Desert Shield, the equipment was scattered around the world to support both peacetime and contingency requirements. It was limited in supply and difficult to move. Availability of wide-body equipment limited the number of airfields that could be used for Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and KC‑10 missions.220 The availability of pallets and nets also came close to limiting airlift operations. At one point, only 35,000 pallets (out of 140,000 known to be in use) could be accounted for. AFLC directed release of all war readiness stocks worldwide to MAC and initiated emergency buys. The problem was that deploying units kept pallets as they moved forward. The units then abandoned the pallets, used them for construction material or storage, or retained them for redeployment. Recovery efforts met with limited success.221 Increasing Capability Activating CRAF and the Reserves Recognizing that airlift requirements were outstripping the combined capability of the MAC organic force and volunteered commercial aircraft, CINCMAC activated CRAF Stage I on 17 August. This marked the first time that any stage of CRAF had been activated. Aircraft activated included seventeen passenger and twenty-one cargo aircraft. Because commercial carriers were already volunteering most of these aircraft, only ten were actually added to the total available. More importantly, however, twelve of the thirty-eight aircraft were Boeing 747 wide bodies, and activating Stage I gave MAC unilateral authority to schedule the aircraft.222 On 22 August, the President approved a limited callup of reserves. Between 25 August and 4 September, the Air Force activated all eight Air Reserve Component C‑5 squadrons (one ANG unit equipped, two AFRES unit equipped, and five AFRES Associate). Between 25 August and 10 September, the Air Force activated six Air Reserve Component C‑141 squadrons (one ANG unit equipped, one AFRES unit equipped, and four AFRES Associate). This callup came just as some aircrew members were reaching their maximum flying time limits. On 21 September, a limited contingent of reserve strategic airlift maintenance personnel were activated to help support increased operations at their home stations. Only one aerial port squadron was activated during Phase I, and it was deployed to Dover AFB.223 Reducing Use of Augmented Crews In early October, MAC instituted a procedure that eliminated the need to use augmented crews on CONUS onload missions. The key feature was having C‑5s depart for Europe from Westover AFB and C‑141s from McGuire AFB. From their CONUS onload locations, C‑5s and C‑141s proceeded to these bases for refueling and a crew change. On the westbound leg from Europe to the CONUS, C‑5s returned to Dover AFB and C‑141s normally returned to Charleston AFB.224 The new pattern of eastbound staging complemented another aircrew management policy begun in early October. To slow the rate at which aircrews were accruing flying time, MAC created C‑5 and C‑141 pilot pools at Torrejon, Zaragoza, Ramstein, and Rhein‑Main. C‑5 and C‑141 pilots from throughout MAC went to European stage bases on three‑week TDY assignments. From there, they augmented missions between European bases and the AOR.225 Eastbound staging from Westover and McGuire coupled with pilot pools eliminated routine use of augmented crews, except on mission legs between Europe and the AOR.226 The cumulative impact of activating reserve crews and establishing pilot pools was that crew burn‑out was no longer a significant issue after September.227 Using Tankers as Airlifters SAC tankers played a vital role in cargo and passenger movement. KC‑10s and KC‑135s moved more than 4,800 tons of cargo and 14,200 passengers in SAC self-support operations. KC‑10s flying dual‑role missions moved more than 1,600 tons of cargo and 2,500 passengers while providing air refueling support for deploying Air Force and Marine Corps fighter units. At times, up to twenty KC‑10s were allocated to MAC for airlift missions, moving more than 3,800 tons of cargo and more than 4,900 passengers.228 Because of heavy air refueling requirements, the full twenty KC‑l0s were not made available to MAC until January. Even then, it took CINCMAC's personal intervention to get twenty KC‑10s committed to MAC airlift. After the air war began in mid-January, MAC didn't again get twenty KC‑10s for airlift until late April 1991.229 SAC was not manned to operate the KC‑10 in a dedicated airlift roleit had not called up reserve crews and lacked experience in operating an aircrew stage.230 Desert Express On 30 October 1990, MAC inaugurated a special mission called Desert Express. A C‑141 flew daily from Charleston to Torrejon to the AOR, providing overnight delivery of “show stopper” logistics parts. The Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines each had a quota of pallet positions for each day's flight. Allocations were adjusted periodically as missions and force compositions in the AOR changed. Initially, Dhahran was the only offload point, but Riyadh was added after one week. Arriving parts were taken to their final destinations by surface transportation or theater-based C‑130s.231 From 19 January to 14 March 1991, Desert Express operated twice daily out of Charleston AFB. On 15 April, the Desert Express operation moved to Dover AFB, where it continued until 19 May. Desert Express cut response time for high-priority shipments from as much as two weeks to as little as seventy-two hours.232 There was a tradeoff cost, however, for providing this support that made up for the serious problems with priorities and asset intransit visibility. To assure Desert Express reliability, missions had priority to delay other flights, C-141s were placed on alert to assure departure deadlines, and missions occasionally went with less than full loads. Desert Shield Phase II MAC's Phase II concept of operations incorporated many lessons from Phase I. Commercial air carriers remained the primary means for moving troops. Commercial cargo aircraft and KC‑10s were used principally on channel cargo missions. Wide‑body loaders needed to support these aircraft were most readily available at major aerial ports where the channel missions originated: Dover, Tinker, and Travis AFB and Naval Air Station at Norfolk, Virginia.233 The Phase II strategic airlift flow to the AOR was built around the following maximum daily missions per location: sixty to Dhahran, twenty to Jubail, sixty to King Fahd, and twenty to King Khalid Military City.234 The daily average of airlift missions offloading in the AOR grew from 88 in December to 106 in January and 109 in February.235 While some of these extra missions were routed to places like Bahrain and King Khalid Military City, eighty-two percent still offloaded at the same four bases: forty-two percent at Dhahran, twelve percent at Riyadh, fifteen percent at King Fahd, and thirteen percent at Jubail. Average arrivals at Dhahran were up to forty a day in December.236 The increased throughput was primarily a result of a concerted effort to reduce ground times.237 CENTCOM's 15 January deadline for troop deployment made passenger movement MAC's greatest challenge in Phase II. During December and January, MAC carried over 237,000 passengers. Most traveled on commercial aircraft, but CRAF Stage I and contracted aircraft couldn't meet the total requirement. In late December and January, MAC converted some C‑141s to passenger configuration. The numbers of passengers carried on C‑5s, C‑141s, and commercial aircraft all increased in December and January.238 As Desert Shield and Desert Storm progressed, sustaining forces became increasingly important. Between 7 August 1990 and 10 March 1991, airlift delivered approximately twenty-three percent of all sustainment cargo moved by TRANSCOMslightly over twice the amount anticipated before the crisis.239 Figure 17 illustrates the breakout of unit and sustainment cargo during the deployment. Figure 17 19
Discussions about a stage base in the AOR began again at the beginning of the Phase II deployment. CENTCOM proposed Cairo West but stipulated that if war broke out, MAC would have to leave within twenty- four hours so that higher priority weapons could base there. MAC didn't consider it prudent to adopt a concept of operations that would have to be abandoned at such a critical time. The pilot pools were already operational and working well, so MAC declined CENTCOM's offer.240 During Phase II, additional reserve activations included six aerial port squadrons, three mobile aerial port squadrons, and one mobile aerial port flight. Also activated were over 600 personnel from the 439th Military Airlift Wing (AFRES) at Westover AFB.241 Extensive staging of eastbound C-5s through Westover would not have been possible without activation of those maintenance personnel.242 The Phase II buildup drew a large number of American forces from Germany, creating a need for overnight delivery of high‑priority spare parts from Europe to the AOR. MAC responded by initiating the European Desert Express on 8 December 1990. This daily C‑141 mission onloaded cargo at Rhein‑Main and offloaded at Dhahran. The European Desert Express was discontinued on 9 March 1991.243 Desert Storm The start of the war certainly didn't diminish the requirements for airlift. January was MAC's busiest month for both cargo and passengers. February was MAC's second busiest month for cargo.244 Because of additional cargo requirements, the Secretary of Defense activated CRAF Stage II on 17 January, providing access to another fifty-nine passenger aircraft and seventeen more cargo aircraft. Because commercial air carriers were volunteering more aircraft than required by Stage I, activating Stage II actually made only nine more cargo aircraft available.245 During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, DOD also received donated commercial airlift support from South Korea, Kuwait, and Italy. Japan provided funding to lease commercial airlift from U.S. carriers.246 The possibility of chemical attacks on airfields in the AOR concerned both MAC and commercial carriers. At first, civilian crews didn't have chemical warfare defense ensembles, and MAC didn't issue them any. MAC's plan was to give chemical gear to civilian crews when they landed in the AOR. After the outbreak of hostilities, MAC began issuing chemical gear to civilian crews before they left Europe.247 Once Scud attacks started, several commercial carriers refused to fly to Dhahran, and several major carriers refused to fly to the AOR at night. No commercial aircraft were flying to King Khalid Military City because it was too far north. MAC scheduled all commercial flights to avoid the “Scud window” of 1600Z‑2100Z. (Organic aircraft were scheduled during those times.) Because of restrictions at German civil airfields, MAC had difficulty in matching acceptable commercial aircraft departure times from Europe with acceptable arrival times in the AOR.248 Early in the war, Iraq launched Scuds against Israel. President Bush responded by ordering deployment of Patriot missile batteries. MAC and the Army had the first fire units deployed and ready for operation within twenty-nine hours of verbal notification. MAC used thirty-seven C‑5s (for the outsize equipment) and eight C‑141s (for missiles and other equipment) to support the move.249 Other vital cargo airlifted during January included heavy mobility equipment transports (HMETs) and heavy equipment transports (HETs) needed by armored units to prepare for the ground war. C‑5s onloaded these outsize items in Peoria, Illinois, and moved them quickly to the desert. In February, MAC organic airlift moved the newly developed GBU‑28 guided bomb to the Gulf. Throughout the war, strategic airlift regularly demonstrated its flexibility and responsiveness by moving high priority items on short notice.250 During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, MAC accounted for over ninety-nine percent of all passengers and nearly fifteen percent of all dry cargo delivered by TRANSCOM.251 MAC strategic airlift was clearly the predominant source of air transportation for deploying units, but it wasn't the only source. MAC C-130s provided most of the airlift for their own deployments. For some fighter deployments, SAC KC-10s provided both airlift and air refueling support. SAC tankers sometimes carried cargo and passengers to support tanker and bomber deployments. SAC's RC-135s carried passengers to support their own deployments. With the exception of carrier-based air power, airliftwhatever the sourcewas a common thread running through all the deployments described below. Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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