Gulf War Air Power Survey
Table 3 Civil Air Carrier Volunteers
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- Table 4 Aircrews Available for Desert Shield on 2 August 1990
- Aircrews Aircraft Active Duty
- Table 5 Worldwide Status of Prepositioning
- Command Army Air Force Navy USMC
- Table 6 Harvest Falcon Storage
- Planning Processes
- Figure 6 Deliberate Planning Process
Table 3 Civil Air Carrier Volunteers Before CRAF Stage I Activation58
Aircrews_Available_for_Desert_Shield___on_2_August_1990'> Table 4 Aircrews Available for Desert Shield on 2 August 1990
Source: CATD Log (S/Decl OADR), Entry for 032200Z Aug 90. Reserve manpower augmentation actually exceeded that of the active duty force in some Air Force specialty codes. In the entire Military Airlift Command, for example, approximately 18,000 aerial port specialists were authorized. Of those, nearly sixty percent were assigned to units of the Air Reserve Components (ARC).59 Similarly, more than ninety percent of MAC's aeromedical evacuation specialists were assigned to the ARC, while sixty percent of MAC tactical airlift personnel belonged to the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.60 Before the invasion, twenty percent of reserve associate aircrews were flying MAC missions on a typical day. It should be clear that activating large portions of MAC's ARC resources during a major conflict was both necessary and expectedfailure to do so would have imposed an immediate constraint on airlift.61 The third part of the mobility triad was prepositioning. In the absence of established bases, having material close at hand diminished the need to stoke a long pipeline. All military services and theaters participated in some form of prepositioning as a strategy to reduce air and sealift dependencies. Table 5 presents the worldwide status of prepositioned equipment and supplies.62 A special set of housekeeping equipment and facilities designed for the CENTAF austere desert environment was called Harvest Falcon. It included hardwall shelters, tent expandable modular personnel tents, equipment, and vehicles; provided power, water, facilities, and vehicles; and was air transportable. It could support up to 55,000 people and 750 aircraftthirteen bases and one forward operating location.63 According Table 5 Worldwide Status of Prepositioning64
to the last CENTAF Operations Plan (OPLAN) in place before the beginning of Desert Shield, Harvest Falcon storage and aggregation units were located as shown in Table 6.65 Table 6 Harvest Falcon Storage66 [DELETED] In the summer of 1990, eighty-two percent of the assets were in the CONUS, but by 6 August, seven sets were located in the AOR in sufficient quantities to support five squadrons totalling 10,800 people along with two more squadrons totalling 4,400 personnel if the last two squadrons had some other augmentation.67 The Marine Corps concept of operations for deploying aviation forces was to send the aircraft and personnel packages forward and then marry them with spares and sustainment on board specially prepositioned ships. The Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) program involved thirteen ships, which were organized in three squadrons. MPS squadrons had tanks, artillery, vehicles, supplies, food, fuel, and water to sustain a single 16,500-man brigade for thirty days.68 MPS-1, the first squadron, was deployed in 1984 to the Eastern Atlantic and was later associated with the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).69 MPS-3 was deployed in December 1985 and sent to the Western Pacific to be associated with the 1st MEB. MPS-2 deployed in 1986 and was sent to Diego Garcia and aligned with the 7th MEB.70 Without the use of the MPS, the Marine Corps estimated that 4,400 C-141 sorties would have been required to airlift each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) of the type associated with the MPS plus 250 C-141 missions to carry MEF personnel.71 The Navy indicated that contents of three prepositioning ships from MPS-2 were equivalent to 3,000 C-141 flights for the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Had all equipment on the MPS ships destined to sustain the 1st Marine Division been used, 2,100 C-5A sorties would have been required.72 Planning In contrast to the Marine Expeditionary Force concept, the Air Force organization for both peace and war revolved around the wing/base and, hence, its planning for war did also. The wing was the primary self‑ sustaining operational unit in the Air Force. All U.S. Air Force main operating bases (MOBs) and most collocated operating bases (COBs) were run from a wing support structure.73 A base would typically support one wing, although some supported two. The wing commander exercised command over all wing activities on the base through deputy commanders, a support group commander (who was responsible for the airfield, personnel, and similar common functions), subordinate division chiefs, squadron commanders, and section and detachment commanders. The Air Force's most common combat wing/base organization form was the trideputy organizational structure comprising a wing commander, deputy commander for operations, deputy commander for maintenance, and deputy commander for resources.74 Volume V discusses the purely operational preparationthose actions pertinent to the deputy commander for operations. The squadron was the deployable unit in the Air Force. War plans tasked organizations by squadron, not by wing,75 and support revolved around providing for, employing, and sustaining squadrons. A typical aircraft squadron usually required the equivalent of twenty C‑141s for transporting the personnel and equipment. For purposes of deployment, squadrons were organized as dependent or independent units. Independent squadrons could deploy to form a wing at a given location, or dependent squadrons could deploy to augment existing wings and independent squadrons. In this manner, the Air Force planned to share resources to avoid redundancies in deploying equipment and personnel. Each Air Force operational squadron maintained a designed operational capability (DOC). In simple words, the DOC described the mission of the unit. For fighter squadrons, a DOC statement might indicate air-to-air combat, or air-to-ground combat. In addition to DOC statements, squadrons, along with all other units, were aligned in unit type codes (UTCs). The codes represented specific capabilities. Each unit had a UTC, units did not normally possess unique UTCs, and all units having the same code had notionally identical characteristics. As an example, the unit type code HEDAL represented intermediate maintenance support for sixteen C-130E aircraft. It included 244 passengers and 32.9 short tons of equipment.76 Above the wing level in peacetime were numbered air forces and major commands. On the eve of the Gulf War, the Tactical Air Command (TAC), as part of the tactical air forces, had three numbered air forces, three specialized centers, and the 28th Air Division (controlling the Airborne Warning and Control Center) with which to “organize, equip, and train” tactical air forces. U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) maintained tactical units and bases in their respective theaters. Air Reserve Components augmented active duty forces to fill out tactical air forces capable of being sent to unified commands for employment against various threats. One of the numbered air forces, the Ninth Air Force at Shaw AFB, was specifically dedicated to supporting SWA operations. The Ninth AF had ten wings but did not have air divisions like other TAC numbered air forces. Ninth AF was expected to “employ” and “support” during wartime as CENTAF, the Air Force component of Central Command (CENTCOM). During peacetime, the role of the Ninth Air Force was to plan for the transition from peacetime to wartime. The transition would prove quite difficult, and at least some of the seeds of this difficulty can be appreciated in retrospect. In accordance with AFP 400-77, USAF Wartime Logistics Organization and Decision Making, CENTAF was responsible for tracking the deployment plan and monitoring the reception, beddown, and regeneration of forces.77 However, it does not clearly identify the activity responsible for the actual beddown, reception, and regeneration of forces.78 Like TAC, MAC was required to “organize, equip, and train” forces that could deploy to the AOR in support of MAC missions. This was a dual role. MAC was a supporting activity to CENTCOM because it was required to provide airlift for all CENTCOM forces. It did so as the air component of Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of MAC dual-hatted as CINCTRANS. In the deployed AOR, MAC's senior officer in CENTCOM was the Commander, Airlift Forces (COMALF). The COMALF, however, was not an organizational commander, since the term “airlift forces” did not connote a clear and distinguishable unit. The COMALF was responsible for coordinating airlift activities in theater. He was a member of the CENTAF's staff, but in planning, he had no administrative control over deployed MAC forces.79 The Strategic Air Command was tasked for two types of missions. Logistics preparations for the first, involving the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), differed from those involving SAC's other mission, conventional warfare as required for support of CENTCOM. Most tasking for SIOP entailed in-place fighting using the homestation as a base of operations. This had important deployment implications. Units tasked only for the SIOP did not have deployable war readiness spares kits (WRSKs).80 The net result was that fewer tanker WRSKs were available than deployed tankers and employment locations. The few available were configured for five, ten, and fifteen primary authorized aircraft (PAA) deployment packages.81 Combinations of the packages were formed to support deployments of varying sizes at the numerous operating locations.82 Bomber WRSKs were also in short supply and did not have good fill rates. Mission support kits (MSKs) would need to be formed for both bombers and tankers from other peacetime operating stocks and AFLC stocks to support aircraft in their deployments. Planning Processes The time available determines the planning process used. Deliberate planning for the Gulf War was used when time permitted; preparation and coordination of a deliberate plan took eighteen to twenty-four months. Time-sensitive or crisis action planning took place during emergencies. The time-sensitive planning process paralleled deliberate planning, but was more flexible to changing events.83 Figure 6 lists the five formal phases of the deliberate planning process. Figure 6 Deliberate Planning Process
Origin: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) To support initiation of planning involving a SWA scenario as required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), commanders-in-chief (CINCs) prepared operation plans in abbreviated concept format (CONPLAN) or84 full concept format (OPLAN). CONPLANs were developed because many situations did not warrant detailed preparation. They were tasked when the contingency was not crucial to national security, great demands on U.S. resources were not expected, the probability of occurrence was low, or flexibility was desired.85 The logistics summary was abbreviated in a CONPLAN.86 Computer support was usually not required, since detailed support was not calculated and strategic movements were not simulated.87 An OPLAN fully developed the CINC's concept of operations. It specified the forces and support needed to execute the plan and the transportation schedule required to move those resources. OPLANs were required when the situation was critical to U.S. national security, or when the military response would tax U.S. force, supply, or transportation capabilities.88 In the plan development phase, the combatant CINC's staff and service component staffs developed a detailed flow of resources into the theater to support the approved OPLAN concept. After forces were selected and timed-phased, support requirements determined, and transportation computer simulated, the detailed planning information was generated and stored as a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file.89 If the strategic transportation simulation indicated that forces and support could not be moved in time, then planners developed and incorporated compromises.90 Once concepts of operations were documented, the CINC forwarded them to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.91 The Joint Staff reviewed the concepts for sufficiency to accomplish the assigned task, valid plan assumptions, and compliance with guidance.92 CONPLANs and OPLANs received different reviews. The final review of each CONPLAN determined adequacy and feasibility. For each OPLAN, the Joint Staff performed a concept review to determine adequacy; concepts were approved for “continued planning only.”93 Each subordinate and supporting commander assigned a task in the plan prepared a supporting plan, which was submitted for review and approval. The CINC's plan was not ready for implementation until the supporting mobilization, deployment, and employment plans were complete.94 In the SWA case, the deliberate planning process never ended because the plans were regularly updated. The joint deployment system (JDS) was designed to support the joint deployment and execution committee (JDEC).95 Although the JDS was designed for both deliberate and crisis planning, it was of most use during crisis planning because it allowed rapid translation of operations plans and associated time-phased force deployment documents into executable operations orders. Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between crisis and deliberate planning. It shows that the JDS is used in both types of planning but that deliberate planning stops at Phase V, while crisis planning goes through to execution. During planning to support postulated scenarios involving SWA, information was entered into JDS terminals using preformatted screens, that could be updated via tape or computer disk. Output was received in the form of reports, scheduling messages, or TPFDD tapes. The JDS database was the prime repository of deployment-related information. It was maintained at Scott AFB, Illinois (although other sites could serve as a backup or have additional information pertaining to unique site requirements). The database contained narrative information on plan scope, concept, and status; time-phased force and sustainment requirements; hypothetical information for notional taskings; actual unit information; and movement requirements that could be used to prepare a transportation schedule and manifest. Accessing various databases and reference files, planners created TPFDDs to support proposed COAs. TPFDDs could also be accessed via the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS). JOPS was designed for deliberate planning, but the JDS could access some of the JOPS files for other planning purposes. Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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