Gulf War Air Power Survey
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- Airlift Execution
- Figure 12 Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Missions 7 August 1990 ‑ 10 March 1991 Figure 13
- Passengers 7 August 1990 ‑ 10 March 1991 15 Desert Shield Phase I
- Maximizing Availability
- Route Structure Saturation Onload Base Saturation
- Sustainment cargo stored on flightline at Dover AFB
- En Route Base Saturation
- Offload Base Saturation
Strategic Airlift Airlift Planning The primary goal of strategic airlift planning was to satisfy CINCCENT's requirements by employing airlift resources effectively. To meet the goal, planners had to consider the entire airlift system and its interrelated parts. Aircraft had to arrive where they were needed when they were needed. Each stop along the way had to have adequate runways, taxiways, ramps, and support facilities. Nonproductive ground time had to be minimized. The necessary equipment and trained personnel had to be on hand to load and unload passengers and cargo. Likewise, the necessary supplies, equipment, and trained personnel had to be on hand to service and maintain the aircraft. Where crew changes were required, a sufficient number of qualified and properly rested aircrews had to be available. If a necessary en route stop was denied, missions had to be air refueled. Command and control needed to be capable of monitoring mission progress, adjusting for problems, and responding to crises. On 2 August, a Crisis Response Cell (CRC) assembled in the MAC Command Center at Scott AFB, Illinois, to prepare for possible deployment operations. On 3 August, the CRC developed several routing options to the Gulf using Torrejon Air Base in Spain and Rhein‑Main and Ramstein air bases in Germany as the principal en route bases. To check the status of the airlift system, the Cell inventoried strategic airlift aircraft and aircrews assigned to the active duty force, the Air Force Reserve (AFRES), and the Air National Guard (ANG). The Cell also checked on resources belonging to commercial airlines participating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).160 MAC activated its full Crisis Action Team (CAT) on 5 August. The pace of activities picked up when the MAC liaison officer at Headquarters CENTCOM advised the CAT Director to anticipate deployment for “a very large air campaign.” CINCMAC reviewed and approved plans to flow the airlift through Torrejon, with missions operating as required through Rhein‑Main and Ramstein plus Zaragoza Air Base in Spain. He also wanted the first airlift missions be air refueled en route and flown nonstop to the Gulf.161 To begin a large deployment to the Arabian Peninsula, the airlift system needed additional support capability at several key locations. Airlift control elements (ALCEs) were tasked for Pope and Langley AFBs and for Dhahran and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. Manpower augmentation was tasked for Torrejon.162 JCS advised the CAT to expect a deployment order at approximately 2400Z on 6 August. The CAT Director suggested that the numbered air forces put their aircrews on alert; 21st Air Force placed all its aircrews on BRAVO standby, and 22d Air Force placed fifteen C‑141 crews and five C‑5 crews on BRAVO standby. The order was dated 7 August at 0050Z and directed that the deployment begin on 7 August at 1700Z.163 CENTCOM airlift movement priorities flowed to the CAT through TRANSCOM. The CAT then determined the number of military and commercial airlift missions required, including any advance missions necessary to position ALCEs and cargo handling equipment. After assessing the availability of military and commercial aircraft, the CAT developed a daily airlift mission schedule. Assigning missions to commercial aircraft was handled at the MAC level. The schedule for military aircraft was relayed to the numbered air force CATs to obtain necessary diplomatic clearances, task wings for aircraft and crews, and ensure that extra crews were properly positioned to keep missions moving without interruption. The 21st Air Force at McGuire AFB, New Jersey, executed the airlift with support from 22d Air Force at Travis AFB, California. Responsibility fell upon 21st Air Force to manage the flow through European stage bases. A subordinate unit of 21st Air Force, the 322d Airlift Division at Ramstein, acted as the “spigot,” attempting to limit the flow from Europe to levels that would not exceed the capacities of offload bases in the AOR. The massive airlift effort also required organizations to coordinate movements in the AOR. The first Commander, Airlift Forces (COMALF), was Brigadier General Frederic N. Buckingham, the Vice Commander of 21st Air Force. The COMALF managed theater‑assigned airlift forces for CENTAF through an airlift control center (ALCC). From the ALCC, he also monitored MAC strategic airlift flights transiting the AOR. Under the ALCC, he had a number of ALCEs from various airlift wings.164 Once the airlift began, execution planning problems fell into two major categories: requirements and priorities. Of the two, requirements problems were more pervasive, persistent, and harder to understand. Hundreds of Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine units were submitting data or making entries that wound up in the TPFDD. Entries contained so many errors that they were unreliable as a basis for determining airlift requirements. Common errors were major differences between stated and actual tonnage and passengers to be moved, failures to properly identify oversize and outsize cargo, wrong onload locations, and wrong available‑to‑load dates.165 As a result, some missions were sent to locations having no cargo or passengers to transport, other missions were scheduled and then cancelled because there were no real requirements, and numerous missions had to be added to cover understated requirements.166 To improve the accuracy of requirements data, the CAT established a “requirements augmentees” cell which telephoned deploying units and attempted to verify their TPFDD requirements before MAC scheduled their airlift. Information obtained by telephone was more reliable than JOPES information, but several units still couldn't project their airlift requirements accurately. Near the end of its deployment, one major unit cancelled over sixty missionsthen shortly thereafter requested that some be reinstated.167 While some inaccuracies in TPFDD airlift requirements can be attributed to JOPES, others can be attributed to the joint operation planning process itself. Because of the work involved, no more than the first thirty days of OPLAN air and sea movement requirements normally undergo the intensive management needed to ensure database accuracy.168 Consequently, rapid response units (such as Air Force fighter squadrons, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 1st and 7th MEBs) were the only ones for which current transportation feasibility information was available.169 Priority problems also disrupted airlift execution planning. Understandably, CINCCENT's movement priorities were established, reconsidered, and changed on the basis of the situation in the AOR. For example, between 13 and 16 August, the 82d Airborne Division's priority dropped from first to thirteenth. Such rapidly changing priorities disrupted efficient use of airlift. At times, MAC was ordered to divert airborne missions to respond to new priorities. Under such conditions, MAC could not provide users adequate warning of arriving sorties, causing delays in marshalling loads. Previous planning efforts were sometimes negated and aircrews, aircraft, ALCEs, and material handling equipment ended up in the wrong location. Some units received unexpected airlift support; the airlift support of others was preempted in mid‑deployment.170 At first, MAC could project ahead only about twelve hours. There was not enough time to set up, load, and schedule missions using MAC's FLOGEN model. FLOGEN, an airlift flow generator, is a computerized tool for preparing and deconflicting airlift mission schedules. Unable to use FLOGEN, MAC and its numbered air forces resorted to personal computer spreadsheets and pencils to produce airlift schedules. While the situation improved somewhat, MAC could never look ahead more than three to five days.171 Additionally, MAC's computer models could not provide reports to analyze the schedule and determine where the flow exceeded the throughput capacity of the base structure.172 Consequently, too many aircraft were passing through some parts of the system at one time, and bases became backlogged. MAC had to halt the flow on several occasions.173 In one effort to reduce backlogs, MAC and 21st Air Force planners developed “slot times” for departures from Europe to the AOR. The number and frequency of slot times were based on the throughput capacity of individual offload locations. Planners then matched missions against slot times to establish flow control.174 Airlift Execution A typical mission departed a MAC home station (such as McGuire, Dover, Charleston, McChord, Travis, or Norton) and proceeded to its CONUS onload location. After onload, the aircraft continued to a base in Europe. If more fuel was necessary to reach Europe, the aircraft either air refueled or stopped en route. In Europe, the aircraft was serviced, repaired as necessary, and provided a different crew.175 The aircraft then flew to the AOR, offloaded, and returned to Europe. For the trip from Europe to the CONUS, the aircraft was again serviced, repaired as necessary, and provided a different crew. Figures 12, 13, and 14 characterize the MAC airlift effort in terms of missions flown, short tons delivered, and passengers delivered. The workhorses of the airlift were the C‑141 in terms of missions flown, the C‑5 in terms of tons delivered, and commercial air in terms of passengers delivered. All three figures reflect the initial surge to establish a defensive posture, a brief respite, and a larger surge to build an offensive capability and support combat operations. Figure 12 Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Missions 7 August 1990 ‑ 10 March 1991 Figure 13 Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Cargo 7 August 1990 ‑ 10 March 1991 Figure 14 Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Passengers 7 August 1990 ‑ 10 March 1991 15
From mid‑August to mid‑September, MAC was challenged to deploy combat units as rapidly as possible. The pace slowed on 19 September, when deployments of the largest troop contingents were completed. By the end of September, the focus had shifted from deploying forces to sustaining the forces already deployed. During the reduced Desert Shield flying activity between 1 October and Thanksgiving, MAC caught up on deferred maintenance. The Command also used a limited number of C‑5s and C‑141s to fly missions to other areas of the world.176 Maximizing Availability To meet the extraordinary demands for airlift at the start of Desert Shield, MAC took a number of steps to maximize aircrew availability. Premission crew rest was cut from 24 to 12 hours; postmission crew rest was waived altogether; the maximum crew duty day for a basic aircrew was extended from 16 to 20 hours;177 the crew qualification requirement for the extra pilot on an augmented crew was reduced from first pilot to copilot;178 the maximum flying for a consecutive thirty‑day period was raised from 125 to 150 hours;179 and after completing 12 hours of premission crew rest, all crews were placed on permanent BRAVO standby.180 All “aircrew training requirements, currency events, and flight evaluations” were also waived for the duration of Desert Shield and Desert Storm and for sixty days thereafter. The waivers applied to aircrew members current and qualified as of 1 August 1990. On a case‑by-case basis, the MAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations could grant waivers for crew members not current and qualified on that date.181 The backlogs that plagued the airlift system at the start of Desert Shield meant that crews were working long duty days. Most C‑5 and C‑141 missions from the CONUS to Europe lasted between sixteen and eighteen hours, but some missions were longer.182 Discussing the missions from Europe to the AOR and back, the MAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations said: . . . if everything went perfectly it was about a twenty-two hour crew duty day. Then you throw in a nine hour wait for fuel . . . you just went past the twenty-four hour crew duty day. We had people, in the initial stages, who went up to thirty-six hours.183 The length of the round trip from Europe to the AOR necessitated the use of augmented aircrews on every mission. Using augmented crews was a mixed blessing. It gave Headquarters MAC considerable scheduling flexibility because it enabled an aircraft to onload at virtually any CONUS location and fly to Europe without a crew change. It also caused crew members to accrue flying time so rapidly that many were projected to exceed the ninety-day limit of 330 hours. (Some actually did and were temporarily grounded.)184 A rear area recovery base in the Middle East region would have eliminated the need to use augmented crews between Europe and the AOR, thereby increasing the capability of the aircrew force. The MAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations worked with CENTCOM for nearly a month attempting to arrange for a staging base in Saudi Arabia for crew changes and aircraft refueling. For various reasons, CENTCOM denied MAC's request, so MAC continued to investigate other options for alleviating crew burn‑out problems.185 MAC also took a number of maintenance management actions to maximize availability of its organic aircraft. (See Chapter 8.) Route Structure Saturation Onload Base Saturation Because airlift operations continue around the clock in peacetime, MAC can shift to its wartime operating tempo on short notice. In the early stages of most deployment operations, MAC can generate airlift missions faster than deploying units can generate loads. Desert Shield produced two noteworthy examples of airlift missions arriving at locations faster than cargo loaders could handle, resulting in ramp saturation and extensive loading delays.186 16
Loading problems developed at Langley AFB during deployment of the initial F‑15 squadron from the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing. MAC had scheduled aircraft arrivals every half hour. Nine C‑141s and three C‑5s arrived in the first six hours, and delays started with the first mission. By 0500Z on 8 August, ten aircraft (three C‑5s and seven C‑141s) sat waiting to be loaded, and it took between six and twelve hours to launch them. Over a day and a half, eighteen of twenty-two missions experienced delays attributed to the deploying unit.187 To deploy the second F‑15 squadron from Langley, MAC and the Tactical Air Command (TAC) reduced the arrival rate to approximately one airlift aircraft per hour; departure reliability improved significantly.188 The 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) received enough airlift to deploy completely during the first few days of the operation. Aircraft were diverted from Pope AFB to Langley when Army units weren't ready to deploy. With extra airlift, the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing was able to move two C‑5 loads of munitions plus its identified deployment requirements.189 MAC began deploying the 82d Airborne Division from Pope on 8 August. The initial plan was to send one airlift aircraft an hour into Pope. Beginning at 1700 EDT on 10 August, MAC increased the flow to two an hour. Over the next few hours, the unit couldn't generate cargo fast enough to keep pace with the arriving aircraft.190 By 0600 EDT the next morning, sixteen strategic airlift aircraft were on the ramp. Most had already exceeded their scheduled ground times; all eventually missed their scheduled departure times. Fifteen of the sixteen delays were attributed primarily to the deploying unit. Adding to the confusion was the fact that a squadron of C‑130s also deployed from Pope on 11 August. To reduce the congestion and confusion, MAC began diverting aircraft to other fields. After interrupting the flow for about twelve hours, MAC resumed flying one mission an hour into Pope. Delays became less frequent and less severe.191 Experiences at Langley and Pope helped convince MAC that scheduling more than one aircraft an hour into an onload base was counterproductive.192 In some instances, MAC contributed to congestion problems at its own bases. The Command initially planned to route all resupply cargo through Dover AFB. In August, it also started routing mail through Dover. However, Dover's aerial portby far MAC's largest in terms of tonnage processedwas already saturated with other high priority cargo. The added tasks made the situation untenable. The photograph below shows cargo stored on the flightline at Dover AFB because no other acceptable place was available. To alleviate some of the congestion, MAC established additional resupply routes through Charleston, McGuire, and Tinker AFBs as well as Norfolk Naval Air Station. In October, MAC made McGuire the major east coast mail departure point.193 MAC's CONUS aerial ports were the onload bases for most sustainment cargo. Because of CINCCENT's decision to deploy combat units ahead of logistics support and sustainment cargo, CENTCOM did not allocate airlift to channel operations until 24 August, when it allocated four C‑141s per day.194 Consequently, backlogs of sustainment cargo frequently built up at CONUS aerial ports. Compounding the problem was lack of in-transit visibility over cargo in the airlift system. Cargo in these sustainment backlogs was often assumed lost and subsequently reordered by users.195 MAC took periodic initiatives to keep sustainment cargo from backing up at CONUS aerial ports. The initiatives highlighted the fact that peacetime criteria used by airlift clearance authorities to enter cargo into the airlift system are not responsive to a combatant CINC's tonnage allocations and sustainment priorities. One check in early September revealed that over half of all sustainment cargo awaiting air shipment was coded at the top priority level. Much of the cargo in the aerial ports really didn't need to go by air. In December, CENTCOM established “SWAT teams” headed by O‑6s that went into aerial ports, identified cargo that didn't need to go by air, and designated it for sea transport.196 En Route Base Saturation From August 1990 through January 1991, eighty-four percent of MAC's C‑5 and C‑141 missions from the CONUS to the AOR staged through just four European bases: Torrejon, Rhein‑Main, Zaragoza, or Ramstein. The remaining missions either staged through other European bases or air refueled en route to the AOR. During the period, approximately 8,000 C‑5 and C‑141 missions transited the bases: forty-four percent through Torrejon, twenty-seven percent through Rhein‑Main, twenty percent through Zaragoza, and nine percent through Ramstein.197 On 15 August, Rhein‑Main supported 138 arrivals and departures. At one point, sixty-eight aircraft were on the ramp even though Rhein‑ Main had parking spaces for only fifty-six aircraft. The wing CAT responded by parking aircraft “everywhere they would fit safely.” Frequently, aircraft had to be towed into and out of parking spots.198 Billeting and food service facilities at European stage locations were also quickly overwhelmed. Emphasizing that extraordinary measures were required, CINCMAC personally intervened at some locations to get better support for airlift aircrews. By mid‑October, billeting and food service had improved considerably.199 Offload Base Saturation While congestion was bad in the CONUS and at en route bases, it reached critical proportions on the Arabian Peninsula. From August to November 1990, eighty-two percent of all MAC missions offloaded at just four locations: sixty-one percent at Dhahran, eleven percent at Riyadh, seven percent at Jubail, and three percent at King Fahd (which did not open for MAC use until September). In those first four months, Dhahran handled slightly over thirty MAC aircraft a day. Ground forces preferred to arrive at Dhahran because its location facilitated onward movement of troops and cargo into the theater.200 Airlift throughput capability at Dhahran was constrained by refueling problems. The main problem was getting fuel from storage to the aircraft. Not enough fuel pits, fuel trucks, or drivers were available. Once the problem was recognized, CENTCOM sent a storage system and fuel trucks to Dhahran. After the U.S. trucks arrived, it was discovered that their couplings did not match Saudi couplings; however, the problem was soon overcome.201 On 21 August, refueling capacity was saturated; a backlog of twenty aircraft awaited fuel. Departure delays were as long as eight hourseven longer if crew rest was required. European departures were held to alleviate saturation.202 To reduce the strain on Dhahran's refueling capacity, MAC scheduled some missions to offload at Dhahran, then depart for refueling at another base in the AOR.203 To further reduce ground refueling delays, C‑5s and C‑141s were sometimes air refueled just before landing or shortly after takeoff. However, a relatively small number of strategic airlift missions were actually air refueled during the first two weeks because Strategic Air Command (SAC) tankers were heavily committed to refueling fighter aircraft deploying to the Gulf.204 Dhahran was saturated with cargo as well as aircraft. Because locations and units involved were classified, a considerable amount of cargo shipped early in the operation was marked only “Desert Shield.” Most of this cargo ended up at Dhahran. Due to CENTCOM deployment priorities, limited support forces were available to sort and distribute arriving cargo.205 Chapter 4 of this report addresses cargo distribution problems within the theater. Both aircraft and cargo congestion could have been relieved if arriving airlift missions had been granted access to a larger number of offload bases. MAC lobbied for more offload bases from September to November. CENTCOM and the host nations made some new offload bases available, most notably King Fahd in September, but deploying ground forces were reluctant to use them.206 Figure 15 shows offload base distribution in the AOR from August 1990 through February 1991. For this period, fifty percent of all strategic airlift missions offloaded at Dhahran.207 Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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