Gulf War Air Power Survey
Table 27 Desert Storm Fuel Status
Download 5.55 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- 8 Maintaining the Force
- Maintenance of Aircraft in the AOR
- (Re)establishing Maintenance Capability Once in the AOR
- Table 28 ILM
- Off-aircraft (Intermediate) Maintenance
- Table 30 Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Team Deployment
- Table 31
- Departure Date Return Date Number of Personnel
Table 27 Desert Storm Fuel Status Storage Equipment Location USAF/HN (MIL GL) R-9 R-14 Cairo .95/1.09 0 4 Tabuk 1.5/2.45 9 5 King Khalid Int'l .035/10.5 6 2 King Fahd Int'l 2.8/10.7 25 17 Jeddah 1.75/3.1 11 12 Taif 2.5/.3 9 14 Dhahran 1.76/3.9 13 5 Al Kharj 4.17/0 24 15 Al Dhafra 4.75/2.16 15 6 Thumrait 5.6/0 9 6 Khamis Mushait .34/2.5 8 3 Shaik Isa 2.9/.056 20 8 Bateen .97/.32 4 3 Doha .24/.245 8 2 Sharjah .215/.5 3 1 Al Jubayl .62/0 0 2 Al Ain .53/.19 6 2 Seeb 1.1/5.2 7 5 Masirah 7.8/2.1 9 2 Al Minhad 1.2/.25 10 5 Riyadh .635/5.0 21 5 Al Jouf 1.8/0 2 2 Ships 114.2/130.5 TOTAL 153.9/191.1 219 126 (Source: AF/LRC) Concern over the ability of resupply to keep up with fuel usage was equally well founded. At locations such as Jeddah New and King Khalid (major tanker beddown locations), where large amounts of fuel were expected to be consumed, only one to three days supply of stock were on hand at each base. Resupply would be vital to avoid runouts. CENTAF and CENTCOM staffs monitored closely daily inventories to see if resupply would keep up. Fortunately, resupply never became a problem at these or any other of the beddown locations. Redeployment At the conclusion of the Desert Storm Campaign, approximately 35 million gallons of fuel were in Army and Marine Logbases and 38 million gallons in Air Force bladders.595 The stocks were used to support redeploying forces and to refuel MAC aircraft. As the stocks were drawn down, some were replenished to support continuing redeployments; others stocks became unavailable as the fuels mobility support equipment was taken down. 8 Maintaining the Force Chapter 2 described the state of overall logistics preparation for a Southwest Asia contingency on the eve of the Gulf War. This chapter will relate the maintenance situations as it actually unfolded throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Areas to be covered include: • Reestablishment of maintenance capability during deployment to the AOR • Maintenance activity in the AOR during Desert Shield and Desert Storm • Maintenance support from outside the area of responsibility • Maintenance indicators such as mission capability rates, break rates, and fix rates, and • Maintenance footprinthow the requirements for maintenance personnel in the AOR were determined, how the number of personnel in AOR was tracked, and how the number in the theater compared with prior expectations. Generally, the discussion that follows will be aligned in terms of design and mission, highlighting where appropriate the influence of policy and external factors. Conflicts among data from different sources will be examined. Our review of how the maintenance concept of operation was actually practiced, produced both positive and cautionary lessons to be learned from the Gulf War. Major findings of the chapter are as follows: • The tooth-before-tail nature of the deployment had a differential effect on mission-capable rates that varied with maintenance concept.596 During the first month of deployment, F‑15 forces suffered a drop in combat-ready aircraft of between nine and fifteen percent as compared to peacetime rates. The F‑16 and A-10 forces, for which intermediate maintenance is less of a concern, did not experience this drop. • Maintenance during Desert Shield and Desert Storm was, in general, without critical, mission-limiting problems. With some exceptions, mission-capable rates during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm were roughly the same as in peacetime or slightly lower, although the rates varied from month to month and from one type of aircraft to another.597 Other Services had similar experience with their flying units. • Both the industrial-level and base-level maintenance capacities exceeded the demands generated by the Gulf conflict. • When the maintenance concepts used during Desert Shield and Desert Storm sharply differed from anticipated methods (e.g., establishing intermediate maintenance support in Europe rather than in theater), imbalances between maintenance and other logistics factors appeared quickly. The most prominent imbalance was with transportation. • Even when problems arose, they were ameliorated by a relatively healthy supply stock and innovative procedures. • The desert environment appears to have had little persistent effect on reliability. The major exceptions to sustained high reliability involved T-64 and T-700 helicopter engines (used on the CH/MH-53 and MH-60 helicopters, respectively), which, as a result of sand erosion problems, achieved reliability levels approximately 1/10th that of peacetime levels. The T-64 unreliability was compounded by a two-level maintenance concept predicated on the normal reliability level. • The 17,000 maintenance men and women in the area of responsibility (AOR) accounted for approximately thirty-eight percent of the Air Force population in the AOR and in terms of numbers constituted the single largest manpower element.598 The actual tail-to-tooth ratio was larger, since Desert Shield and Desert Storm maintenance was also supported from the USAFE theater, from Guam, and from the continental United States. Additionally, the evidence suggests that there were approximately one-third fewer maintenance people in the theater than would have been expected on the bases of normal wartime planning factors. • Automated maintenance management support was not available until late in the gameapproximately Dec 1990.599 Absence of aircraft-status information hampered the various headquarters in their attempts to ascertain the health of the fleet (although this was worked around via phone calls and messages). Absence of configuration data, especially on engines, compromised ability to do maintenance itself, although again other factors such as healthy spares stocks prevented critical shortfalls. Maintenance of Aircraft in the AOR [DELETED]600 The actual beddown split the intermediate maintenance capability between the AOR and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and was a compromise between the need to limit population in the AOR and the desire for self-sufficiency. The desire for self-sufficiency was more than a “we always do it that way” reaction and reflected concern over potential interruptability of the lines of communication if intermediate maintenance were to be located outside the AOR.601 A chronology of the tactical forces beddown illustrates how a balance was struck between a desire for self-sufficiency and the limited number of personnel the theater could support. • 24 Aug 1990: USAFE Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, citing the extended logistics pipelines between SWA and the continental United States (CONUS), places intermediate-level repair capability at the disposal of U.S. Air Forces, Central Command (USCENTAF). • 28 Aug 1990: USCENTAF Rear acknowledges USAFE offer and plans to use USAFE avionics capability when deployed avionics intermediate shops are down and until shops are up and running in the AOR. Emphasis remains on “developing all the forward capability we can.” • 6 Sep 1990: USCENTAF provides first consolidated game plan for intermediate-level maintenance (ILM) beddown. Avionics is essentially the same as shown in the 9 Sep 1990 column in table 8-1a and has all avionics ILM earmarked for the AOR. • 9 Sep 1990: USCENTAF Forward notes that “Base populations continue to increase and every effort must be made to limit deploying populations.” • 17 Sep 1990: Only in-theater avionics intermediate maintenance capability is at Dhahran, Tabuk, and Thumrait, as it has been all along, but the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing will now be supported from Ramstein, Hahn, & Torrejon. • 5 Oct 1990: In addition to in-theater F-15C support, A-10 intermediate support is still planned for King Fahd; all other support will come from the USAFE theater. The evolution of the beddown is traced in Tables 28 and 29. (Re)establishing Maintenance Capability Once in the AOR If one activity characterized maintenance after arrival in theater, it was foraging for support. Because the tooth (combat forces) was deployed before the tail (support forces), organic capability to support operations beyond refueling and simple removal and replace actions was Table 28 ILM (Avionics) Beddown Table 29 ILM (Engine) Beddown almost nonexistent.602 The foraging ranged from vehicles to forklifts to liquid oxygen to basic shop-level repair capability.603 The effort was successful because of the presence of host nation support (in some cases leading to collocation) and contract-operated aircraft repair capability. It was this preexisting capability that carried the day until lines of communication were established and started forwarding the “gotta-have” and “ought-to-have” parts and equipment from home units. The units were in a position to overcome these sorts of initial problems as a result of getting ahead on scheduled inspections, goldplating war reserve spares kits, and robbing parts from nondeploying aircraft in the days or weeks from initial warning until they actually deployed.604 Additionally, after arrival they employed what is sometimes called “shade-tree” repair to work around limitations in test equipment and repair parts.605 Although collocation with the host nations may have been a significant factor in other areas, it played a minor role in maintenance. Maintenance collocation in the sense of shared maintenance capability was limited to (1) those few instances when U.S. and Allied forces maintained the same type of aircraft (e.g., F-4Gs and F-15s) and (2) sharing of common shop equipment such as simple machine tools, battery chargers, parachute rigging, tubing benders, and the like.606 Off-aircraft (Intermediate) Maintenance Off-aircraft intermediate maintenance of avionics, as described earlier, was split between locations in the AOR and the USAFE as part of a move to hold down the number of personnel in the theater. The desert environment had no appreciable adverse effects on the avionics intermediate shop test stations, whether they were housed in shelters or tents. Because initial demand on F-16 test stations was light and they were holding up well, one avionics intermediate shop per base was deployed rather than the expected one per squadron.607 The F-15E mobile electronic test set was a clear avionics success story.608 This set of suitcase-sized automated test equipment was functionally similar to the room-sized equipment procured with earlier model F-15 aircraft. But at one-eighth the volume and one-seventh the weight, it deployed on a single pallet.609 During the Desert Shield deployment, it was set up within ninety minutes of arrival, and in the first three months of desert operation, experienced one failure, a TACAN test package adapter. One of the few documented instances of lost sorties due to avionics maintenance occurred in late January 1991 when Al Kharj reported a backlog of twenty-six electronic countermeasures pods in maintenance.610 The final ILM configuration had two jet engine intermediate maintenance (JEIM) facilities set up in the AOR; USAFE Queen Bee sites or other external sources (see Table 32) provided all other JEIM maintenance.611 One in-theater site at Dhahran AB in Saudi Arabia repaired F‑100PW‑100 engines from the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional) F‑15C aircraft. The second, at Shaikh Isa AB in Bahrain, repaired 79‑GE‑17 engines from F‑4G Wild Weasel aircraft.612 In addition, a C‑130 propeller repair capability was set up at Al‑Ain because of the difficulty of moving assembled propellers by airlift; C‑130 engines themselves were repaired at Rhein Main.613 It would be inaccurate, however, to describe Air Force engine maintenance as a completely smooth operation. Tactical Air Command (TAC) reported, as an example, that most of their units deployed without engine records or otherwise lost track of engine status during the conflict.614 Further, no engine management system was deployed.615 The result was that many serviceable engines sat in limbo until the records were forwarded from the United States or were otherwise reconstructed.616 Paperwork was not the only thing lost: engines themselves were lost in the transportation system. The result of lost engine histories and lost serviceable and repairable engines was, of course, extended pipeline times, although the extent of the lost engine availability has not been quantified.617 The Army provided intermediate- and depot-level support for the T‑700 helicopter engine; the Navy provided similar support for T‑64‑7A/ 100 engines. Cross-Service support was poor.618 However, at least for the Army, the support it received was not worse than it was able to provide for its own aviation units. The Army Aviation Center After Action Report states flatly that the Army aviation logistics system broke down, and at one time, over 1,700 SeaLand vans of aviation repair parts sat idle at sea ports in Saudi Arabia.619 Additionally, Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD), the depot-level repair center for both Army and Air Force T-700 engines, had just undergone a manpower cut (in FY 1990). To respond to both the much-higher-than-expected failure rate and the loss of manpower, CCAD went to two seventy-hour-per-week work shifts, which reduced depot flow days from seventy to fifty.620 The T-700 engine illustrates the dependency between repair concepts and reliability. It was commonly understood that a two-level maintenance concept required high reliability to work,621 and the T-700 confirms the point. The T-700 was under a two-level maintenance concept predicated on the normal peacetime reliability. To offset the support shortfall caused by unexpectedly high failures and the long pipeline from Texas to the AOR, CCAD, in addition to surging, implemented a limited in-theater repair capability essentially two and one-half levels of maintenance.622 Counterintuitively, the desert environment appears to have had a limited persistent effect on engine reliability, with the exception of T-64 and T-700 helicopter engines.623 The helicopter engines experienced significant degradation, averaging 100 to 150 hours of operation between removals for cause during Desert Shield and Desert Storm; peacetime periods between removal were 700 hours for the T-64 and 1200-1500 hours for the T-700. Major problems were severe erosion of compressors and clogging of turbine cooling ports. These helicopter engine reliability problems were, of course, shared by the Army and Marine Corps units flying the same engines. However, sand-induced engine reliability problems were not shared by Air Force engines. The General Accounting Office credits an unnamed “Air Force Logistics Command Official” with the observation that in the Air Force “ . . . continuous actions had been taken to monitor, prevent, and/or eliminate problems [with fixed-wing aircraft engines].”624 The theater was served by a transportable “FAST CAL” precision measurement equipment laboratory (PMEL) established at Riyadh AB, although RAF Kemble, Moron AB, and the Royal Saudi Air Force provided some limited support.625 The Riyadh location had the advantage of being at the hub of the intratheater airlift system. The CENTAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics considered the laboratory highly successful in supporting Air Force, Army, and Marine requirements.626 However, other evidence suggests that the Deputy Chief's view was overly positive. One Strategic Air Command (SAC) unit, for example, reported that after the first sixty days, almost all of its equipment was overdue because it had no PMEL support.627 Additional reports indicated that, although the laboratory's calibration standards were available, the laboratory personnel lacked technical data and spare parts.628 Battle Damage Repair Air Force Logistics Command deployed forty-two aircraft battle damage repair (ABDR) teams, a total of 621 personnel, to the AOR in the first war-time test of the ABDR concept.629 The split between active duty and reserve was as shown in Table 30. Individual teams ranged in size from five to thirty-four personnel; each team comprised an aeronautical engineer and specialists in engines, structures, egress systems, electrical systems, guidance and control systems, and other fields.630 The first team, from Warner Robins AFB and trained in F-15 repairs, deployed simultaneously with the first F-15 squadron. Additional ABDR teams and/or individual personnel deployed as CENTAF saw the need. For instance, Logistics Command offered to send additional teams in late September 1990, but CENTAF declined with a request that they remain on-call in the United States.631 The deployment experience of the 2951st Combat Logistics Support Squadron from Sacramento Air Logistics Center is probably indicative of the overall deployment of ABDR personnel and is illustrated on Table 31. Table 30 Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Team Deployment
Table 31632 2951 Combat Logistics Support Squadron (CLSS) Deployment to Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Note that two of the A-10 teams arrived in the AOR as the war was starting. . By various counts, approximately thirty aircraft sustained battle damage.633 A listing of the Air Force battle damage and repair activity, obtained from the Survivability and Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC), is in Appendix 8-A to this chapter, and shows overall trends.634 Figure 63 shows the number of ABDR events by aircraft type.635 Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
|