Hhs debate 10-11 Japan 1ac- baylor rr

1AC- Alliance

1AC- Alliance

1AC- Alliance

1AC- Alliance

The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario, billions will die of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation. If the U.S. significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions, other countries will follow. One hopeful sign is the recent EPA announcement that it intends to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act. Unfortunately we are going to have to put tremendous pressure on elected public officials to force the EPA to crack down on GHG polluters (including industrial farms and food processors). Public pressure is especially critical since "just say no" Congressmen-both Democrats and Republicans-along with agribusiness, real estate developers, the construction industry, and the fossil fuel lobby appear determined to maintain "business as usual."

1AC- Alliance

1AC- Naval Power

Contention 2 is Naval Power
First, rising public protest threaten complete elimination of US bases

O’Hanlon 01 (Michael, Director of Research and a Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Come Partly Home, America: How to Downsize U.S. Deployments Abroad,” http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/0301forceandlegitimacy_ohanlon.aspx)PS
Keeping so many marines on Okinawa also places a major strain on U.S.-Japan relations, as George Washington University Professor Mike Mochizuki has argued and as an increasingly broad swath of the U.S. defense community now recognizes. In terms of acreage, three-quarters of U.S. bases in Japan are on Okinawa, taking up almost 20 percent of the land of an island that is small and, as home to more than a million people, densely populated even by Japanese standards. Changes to the base structure agreed to in the 1990s will reduce the acreage of the U.S. bases on Okinawa by only about a fifth, even if they are carried out in full. (Local resistance to moving the marines' Futenma air base has stymied efforts to enact much of the plan.) Meanwhile, marine flights continue in and out of Futenma—located right in the middle of Ginowan City—with the associated risks of accidents. Polls in recent years showed that more than 80 percent of all Japanese consider the Okinawa arrangement undesirable and unfair to local citizens. By trying to hold on to all of its bases in Japan, the United States risks causing a backlash and ultimately losing everything, including those facilities with the greatest military benefit for crises in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, or elsewhere—notably, the Kadena Air Force base on Okinawa and U.S. Navy and Air Force facilities on Japan's main islands.

1AC- Naval Power

And, if not appeased political protesters will kick the US out of Yokosuka

Auslin 2010 (Michael ; Resident scholar at AEI; AEI's director of Japan Studies, was an associate professor of history and senior research fellow at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University prior to joining AEI. He has been named a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum, a Marshall Memorial Fellow by the German Marshall Fund, and a Fulbright and Japan Foundation Scholar; “The Real Futenma Fallout”; http://www.aei.org/article/102196; Wednesday, June 16th)AB

A great sigh of relief erupted in Washington and Tokyo Friday when Prime Minister Naoto Kan reaffirmed his commitment to the United States-Japan security alliance. In particular, defense officials focused on Mr. Kan's promise to stick with a 2006 agreement with the U.S. to move a Marine air wing from one part of Okinawa Island to another. But even so, there remain fissures in the U.S.-Japan relationship that could erupt into further crises for the alliance. Senior Japanese military officials I've recently interviewed believe former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama set back Tokyo's relations with its own citizens in Okinawa by at least a decade by waffling on the 2006 deal, and that the opposition to U.S. bases in Japan, emboldened by the former prime minister's position, could endanger much broader bilateral military relations between the two countries. This bigger story has received almost no attention in domestic or foreign press, but needs to be understood by those dismissive of the recent spat's importance. The 2006 agreement to move the Marine air wing at Futenma to Camp Schwab in the northern part of the island, and 8,000 Marines to Guam from Okinawa, was just one part of a broader realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. In the view of senior Japanese military leadership, however, the actual centerpiece of the 2006 agreement is the expansion of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, located in Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the west of Japan's main island, Honshu. MCAS Iwakuni already hosts several Marine air squadrons, including the only American F/A-18 Hornet squadron permanently based abroad. Under the 2006 agreement, the USS George Washington's fighters, which comprise the navy's only permanently forward-deployed air wing, will relocate to Iwakuni by 2014 from the more congested Naval Air Facility Atsugi, located close to Tokyo. In addition, a squadron of Marine Corps KC-130 tankers will also vacate Futenma for Iwakuni. In their stead, a squadron of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces surveillance planes, P-3s, will leave Iwakuni for Atsugi. All this might sound confusing, but the planned realignment will in essence reduce the chances of catastrophic accidents happening in heavily populated areas at both Futenma and Atsugi, and will build up the less-populated Iwakuni base. Here's the rub: The U.S. Department of Defense has made it clear that, unless the entire 2006 realignment plan goes forward, no individual pieces will be set in motion. And it all depends on moving the Marine helicopters out of Futenma, which has long been a source of political contention between Tokyo and Washington. The Japanese government, moreover, is committed to moving its surveillance planes to Atsugi, but that move probably won't happen if the American carrier air wing stays put. Japanese military officials worry that this year's protests in Okinawa could have spillover effects, inspiring protesters around Atsugi to demand a reduced American presence, and possibly even agitating against the government plan to move Japanese planes there. Moreover, Iwakuni's mayor might reject the new burden of potentially hosting the George Washington's air wing. That, in turn, would embolden antinuclear protesters in Yokosuka, the U.S. Navy's main base, to step up their ongoing pressure to move the nuclear-powered George Washington, the Navy's only permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, out of Japanese waters. This worst-case scenario would be a series of simultaneous, grassroots movements against the U.S. military presence in Japan that could potentially put fatal stress on the bilateral security alliance and effectively isolate Japan militarily in the western Pacific. Given Mr. Hatoyama's fate when he botched this issue, politicians now are more likely to respond to public demands or they will be replaced by those who do. The resulting political clash would either reaffirm tight ties with Washington or lead to endemic paralysis in

1AC- Naval Power

Japan's national security establishment. Given that the U.S. has permanently forward

deployed ships and planes only in Japan, any scenario like the one sketched out above could significantly weaken U.S. capability to operate in the western Pacific, and thus call into question U.S. credibility as the underwriter of regional stability at a time when a crisis is brewing on the Korean peninsula and China continues to flex its naval and air muscle. Anyone concerned about that scenario, even if unlikely, realizes that the next half-decade of U.S.-Japan relations will have to go back to basics: rebuilding trust in the relationship, agreeing on a common set of objectives in Japan's waters and throughout Northeast Asia, and strengthening a commitment to upholding the alliance's military capabilities. The good news is that Japan's bureaucrats and military leaders remain more committed than ever to revitalizing the alliance. Whether politicians on both sides of the Pacific are willing to follow them, however, is another matter. No one believes that Washington and Tokyo are about to end their half-century-old alliance over an airstrip on an island in the middle of the ocean. But no one imagined, either, that a carefully crafted, decade-long negotiating process would be so carelessly upended by short-term political calculations. Prime Minister Kan can't afford to ignore the fissures opened by his predecessor and should work to heal them.

1AC- Naval Power

Yokosuka is independently key to handle regional naval conflicts and deter China; withdrawal will unravel US regional dominance

Yoshihara 2010 (Toshi Yoshihara, associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department and an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College, “Chinese missile strategy and the U.S. naval presence in Japan: the operational view from Beijing,”http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Chinese+missile+strategy+and+the+U.S.+naval+presence+in+Japan:+the...-a0233607054)PS


. Dai Yanli warns, “Clearly, if Aegis systems are successfully deployed around China’s periphery, then there is the possibility that China’s ballistic missiles would be destroyed over their launch points.” 25 Ji Yanli, of the Beijing Aerospace Long March Scientifi c and Technical Information Institute, concurs: “If such [seabased BMD] systems begin deployment in areas such as Japan or Taiwan, the effectiveness of China’s strategic power and theater ballistic-missile capabilities would weaken tremendously, severely threatening national security.” 26 Somewhat problematically, the authors seemingly assume that Beijing would risk its strategic forces by deploying them closer to shore, and they forecast a far more capable Aegis fl eet than is technically possible in the near term. The indispensability of the ship-repair and maintenance facilities at Yokosuka emerges as another common theme in the Chinese literature. Analysts in China often note that Yokosuka is the only base west of Hawaii that possesses the wherewithal to handle major carrier repairs. Some have concluded that Yokosuka is irreplaceable as long as alternative sites for a large repair station remain unavailable. Li Daguang, a professor at China’s National Defense University and a frequent commentator on naval affairs, casts doubt on Guam as a potential candidate, observing that the island lacks the basic infrastructure and economies of scale to service carriers. 27 China’s Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships) published a translated article from a Japanese military journal, Gunji Kenkyu Yoshihara Yoshihara.indd, to illustrate the physical limits of Guam as a permanent home port for carriers. 28 Chinese analysts also closely examine Sasebo, the second-largest naval base in Japan. Various commentators call attention to its strategic position near key sea-lanes and its proximity to China. (29) As Yu Fan notes, "This base is a large-scale naval base closest to our country. Positioned at the intersection of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan, it guards the southern mouth of the Korea Strait. This has very important implications for controlling the nexus of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan and for blockading the Korea Strait." (30) It is clear, then, that Chinese strategists recognize the importance of U.S. naval bases in Japan for fulfilling a range of regional and extraregional responsibilities. Indeed, some believe that the American strategic position in Asia hinges entirely on ready military access to bases on the Japanese islands. Tian Wu argues that without bases in Japan, U.S. forces would have to fall back to Guam or Hawaii. Tian bluntly asserts: If the U.S. military was ever forced to withdraw from Okinawa and Japan, then it would be compelled to retreat thousands of kilometers to set up defenses on the second island chain. Not only would it lose tremendous strategic defensive depth, but it would also lose the advantageous conditions for conducting littoral operations along the East Asian mainland while losing an important strategic relay station to support operations in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East through the South China Sea. (31) This emerging discourse offers several clues about Beijing's calculus in regard to U.S. naval basing arrangements in Japan. Chinese strategists see

1AC- Naval Power

these bases as collectively representing both a threat to Chinese interests and a critical vulnerability for the United States. Bases in Japan are the most likely locations from which the United States would sortie sea power in response to a contingency over Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese are acutely aware of the apparent American dependence on a few bases to project power. Should access to and use of these bases be denied for political or military reasons, they reason, Washington's regional strategy could quickly unravel. While the commentaries documented above are by no means authoritative in the official sense, they are clearly designed to underscore the strategic value and the precariousness of U.S. forward presence in Japan. Perhaps no other place captures the Chinese imagination as much as Yokosuka, which analysts portray as the centerpiece of U.S. basing in Asia. (12) One analysis depicts a "Northeast Asian base group [??]" radiating outward from Yokosuka to Sasebo, Pusan, and Chinhae. (13) Writers provide a wide range of details about the Yokosuka naval base, including its precise location, the surrounding geography, the number of piers (particularly those suitable for aircraft carriers), the types and number of maintenance facilities, and the storage capacity of munitions, fuel, and other supply depots. (14) Wu Jian, for instance, finds the geographic features of Yokosuka comparable to those of Dalian, a major base of the Chinese navy's North Sea Fleet. (15) Beyond physical similarities, Yokosuka evokes unpleasant memories for the Chinese. One commentator recalls the U.S. transfer of 203 mmheavy artillery from Yokosuka to Nationalist forces on Jinmen during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis. (16) Tracking more recent events, another observer notes that the Kitty Hawk Strike Group's deployments from Yokosuka to waters near Taiwan invariably coincided with the presidential elections on the island, in 2000, 2004, and 2008. (17) As Pei Huai opines, "Yokosuka has all along irritated the nerves of the Chinese people." (18) Moreover, Chinese analysts are keenly aware of Yokosuka's strategic position. As Du Chaoping asserts: Yokosuka is the U.S. Navy's main strategic point of concentration and deployment in the Far East and is the ideal American stronghold for employing maritime forces in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions. A carrier deployed there is akin to the sharpest dagger sheathed in the Western Pacific by the U.S. Navy. It can control the East Asian mainland to the west and it can enter the Indian Ocean to the southwest to secure Malacca, Hormuz, and other important thoroughfares. (19) Ma Haiyang concurs: The Yokosuka base controls the three straits of Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima and the sea and air transit routes in the Indian Ocean. As the key link in the "island chain," it can support ground operations on the Korean Peninsula and naval operations in the Western Pacific. It can support combat in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions while monitoring and controlling the wide sea areas of the Indian Ocean. Its strategic position is extremely important. (20) It is notable that both Du and Ma conceive of Yokosuka as a central hub that tightly links the Pacific and Indian oceans into an integrated theater of operations.

1AC- Naval Power

Naval power is the very foundation of U.S. hegemony. American dominance invisibly deters myriad challengers and conflicts

Friedman, founder, CEO, and chief intelligence officer of Stratfor, 2007 (George, April 10th, “The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power”, http://www.stratfor.com/limitations_and_necessity_naval_power; msolice)

The argument for slashing the Navy can be tempting. But consider the counterargument. First, and most important, we must consider the crises the United States has not experienced. The presence of the U.S. Navy has shaped the ambitions of primary and secondary powers. The threshold for challenging the Navy has been so high that few have even initiated serious challenges. Those that might be trying to do so, like the Chinese, understand that it requires a substantial diversion of resources. Therefore, the mere existence of U.S. naval power has been effective in averting crises that likely would have occurred otherwise. Reducing the power of the U.S. Navy, or fine-tuning it, would not only open the door to challenges but also eliminate a useful, if not essential, element in U.S. strategy — the ability to bring relatively rapid force to bear. There are times when the Navy’s use is tactical, and times when it is strategic. At this moment in U.S. history, the role of naval power is highly strategic. The domination of the world’s oceans represents the foundation stone of U.S. grand strategy. It allows the United States to take risks while minimizing consequences. It facilitates risk-taking. Above all, it eliminates the threat of sustained conventional attack against the homeland. U.S. grand strategy has worked so well that this risk appears to be a phantom. The dispersal of U.S. forces around the world attests to what naval power can achieve. It is illusory to believe that this situation cannot be reversed, but it is ultimately a generational threat. Just as U.S. maritime hegemony is measured in generations, the threat to that hegemony will emerge over generations. The apparent lack of utility of naval forces in secondary campaigns, like Iraq, masks the fundamentally indispensable role the Navy plays in U.S. national security. That does not mean that the Navy as currently structured is sacrosanct — far from it. Peer powers will be able to challenge the U.S. fleet, but not by building their own fleets. Rather, the construction of effective anti-ship missile systems — which can destroy merchant ships as well as overwhelm U.S. naval anti-missile systems — represents a low-cost challenge to U.S. naval power. This is particularly true when these anti-ship missiles are tied to space-based, real-time reconnaissance systems. A major power such as China need not be able to mirror the U.S. Navy in order to challenge it. Whatever happens in Iraq — or Iran — the centrality of naval power is unchanging. But the threat to naval power evolves. The fact that there is no threat to U.S. control of the sea-lanes at this moment does not mean one will not emerge. Whether with simple threats like mines or the most sophisticated anti-ship system, the ability to keep the U.S. Navy from an area or to close off strategic chokepoints for shipping remains the major threat to the United States — which is, first and foremost, a maritime power.

1AC- Naval Power

And, US hegemony is critical to preventing global warming, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism
Owen Harries, visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, 10/19/07, “Bush not the only problem” < http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22609649-7583,00.html>

But perhaps the most dangerous consequence of a continuing loss of confidence in and by the US is that we would be left with a leaderless world. For there is no alternative leader in sight in the foreseeable future. The other developed Western countries lack the energy, confidence and will for the job. So does Japan. China has great potential, but has limited recent international experience and for some time it is going to be preoccupied coping with the consequences of its extraordinary economic growth and the urgent problems that presents. The same is true of India. Russia possesses great destructive power and huge energy reserves, but although it has re-emerged as a serious player, it has no global leadership credentials. The UN? Even if one ignores its many grievous faults, that institution is a forum, not a principal actor. A concert of powers? But the creation and functioning of such a concert requires authority and leadership on someone's part, so the problem remains. There is no other immediate plausible candidate for leadership if the US can no longer fill the role. But there is going to be an urgent need for leadership in a world that is changing rapidly and is already experiencing serious tensions. Globalisation requires new economic and political ground rules, and providing them is going to be more complicated than merely extending or tinkering with existing Western ones. There is the specific and urgent issue of global warming. The problems associated with mass, uncontrolled human migration are mounting. Many experts believe that nuclear proliferation is now a more urgent matter than it has ever been, and that the prospect of weapons in the hands of an increasing number of states with weak governments and poor security and control systems is imminent. And, of course, there is the continuing problem of global terrorism, which is real enough even if it is sometimes grossly exaggerated.

1AC- Territorial Disputes

Contention 3 is Territorial Disputes
First, Public Resentment Triggers Japanese Political Instability—this prevents Japan from taking active roles in crisis de-escalation

Kapila 10(Subhash, International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group, 2010 “Japan’s Political Instability & Its Strategic Impact,” pg online @ http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers39/paper3848.html msolice)

 Apolitically unstable Japan could create a strategic vacuum in East Asia in which China could assertively step in to fill the vacuum to the strategic discomfiture of the United States. Japan’s Political Instability: Impact on Japan’s Crises Management in North East Asia  North East Asia comprises the region China-Taiwan- Japan-Korean Peninsula, Russia and USA. This region today is overwhelmed by a number of strategic crises endangering regional stability and peace.  The crises today are focused more on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its military provocative adventurism e.g. sinking of South Korea. Navy ship by a North Korea Navy submarine. Over-arching over all this is the US-China rivalry, this US-Russia rivalry the Japan- China regional rivalry and Japan’s territorial disputes with all its neighbors. Each one of these issues are potential flash points in North East Asia. Japan gets drawn into all these strategic flash points in one way or the other.  Japan’s capacity to manage crises and crisis-response manoeuvrability gets seriously impaired if it is plagued by domestic political instability Japan's crisis management capacities get further impaired when political instability emerges from Japan-US Security Relationship which so far has provided Japan and USA a combined strategic weight to handle regional crises.  More than a healthy and stable Japan-China relationship, there is a greater strategic imperative and a call on the United States that American approaches to China and overbearing American approaches to contentious Japan-US security issues does not render Japan vulnerable to China's strategic and political coercion. Political Instability Impact on Japan-China Relations  Simply put, to the Chinese obsessed with strategic assessments based on estimation of ‘Comprehensive National Power’, in Chinese perceptions, Japan's strategic power gets that much more devalued by Japan's political instability and the growing American ambiguities on Japan’s value to US strategic interests.  Briefly, this could lead to China adopting more pressure tactics against Japan on contentious issues and China’s attempts to isolate Japan in North East Asia.  More than a healthy and stable Japan-China relationship, there is a greater strategic imperative and a call on the United States that American approaches to China and over-bearing American approaches to contentious Japan-US security issues does not render Japan vulnerable to China’s strategic and political coercion.  The strategic spin-off for China from such exploitation of Japan’s vulnerabilities could result in re-emergence of Japanese nationalism, a nuclear weapon and missiles arsenal and an independent military posture. That could impinge on the United States too. 

1AC- Territorial Disputes

Second, Okinawa is killing Japan’s diplomatic credibility

Hirano 2010 (Ko Hirano, Analyst on East Asian affairs for Japan Times, November 4, 2010, “Rumored China-Russia Tieup testing DPJ’s Ability,” http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101104a4.html)PS
BEIJING — As a fresh diplomatic tiff brews with Russia over President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to the disputed islands off Hokkaido, Beijing appears to continue playing hardball with Tokyo over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea."Japan is unable to afford having tensions with China and Russia at the same time," Liu Junhong, a researcher at the Institute of Japanese Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, was quoted as saying Tuesday in the Global Times, a sister publication of the Communist Party-controlled People's Daily. "It's time for Japanese politicians to reflect on their diplomatic policy and sort out a solution," Liu was quoted as saying, a remark seen as suggesting Tokyo should compromise on the Senkaku Islands. Calling the Japan-Russia row a "bilateral issue," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told journalists Tuesday that Beijing hopes the two countries will deal appropriately with the dispute over the Russian-held islands claimed by Japan "through a friendly dialogue." But some analysts suspect China and Russia may have built a "tacit tieup" against Japan to take advantage of the Democratic Party of Japan's diplomatic inexperience and deterioration in Japan-U.S. ties over the relocation of the Futenma air base in Okinawa. Behind such speculation was a meeting between President Hu Jintao and Medvedev in Beijing on Sept. 27 during which they signed a joint statement calling for "mutual support for each other's core interests, including national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity." Japan-China relations were already under strain over Tokyo's arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain following maritime collisions Sept. 7 near the Senkakus, which China calls the Diaoyu. Japan eventually freed the captain and relations don't appear to have worsened since.

1AC- Territorial Disputes

This is specifically true in the context of Futenma – Political instability ensures Russia and China will test Japan in the form of territorial disputes

Japan Times 2010 (Masami Ito And Kanako Takahara, Staffwriters, Japan Times, “Rows pull diplomatic shortcomings to fore,” pg lexis msolice)

First China, and now Russia. Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his administration's apparent lack of experience is allowing neighboring nations to take territorial advantage over Japan to the alarm of experts. As China tests the waters over the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and as Russia looks to strengthen its rule of the islands it holds off Hokkaido, it looks like Japan once again has no one else to turn to but the United States. Since September 2009, when the Democratic Party of Japan took power, it has focused on exerting "political leadership" to hobble the role of bureaucrats in setting policy, but so far Kan's administration has failed to wield any diplomatic clout, said Takashi Kawakami, a professor of security issues at Takushoku University. "Political leadership has been the key (for the DPJ) and the bureaucrats were excluded," Kawakami said. "But the prime minister's office has no clear organization yet and has not been able to function." On Monday, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev became the first leader of his country to visit Kunashiri Island, one of the four Russian-held islands off Hokkaido that Japan wants returned, triggering bilateral tensions. Japan meanwhile also engaged in the diplomatic spat with China over the Senkaku Islands since a run-in near the islets involving a Chinese trawler and Japan Coast Guard vessels in September. One key reason why Japan is struggling over these diplomatic issues is the lack of a strong communications pipeline with these countries, critics said. "The connections with other countries are falling apart," Kawakami said. "Our territories are (at risk) . . . and everything is a mess." Ever since the DPJ took power last year, confusion has characterized diplomacy. The first DPJ prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, made it a campaign pledge to push for relocating U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma outside Okinawa, only to renege and dash the prefecture's expectations. This strained ties with the U.S. and was seen as offering China and Russia an opportunity to challenge the security alliance.

1AC- Territorial Disputes

These conflicts go nuclear

Chakraborty 2010 (United Service Institution of India“The Initiation & Outlook of ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus Eight,” pg online @ http://www.usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Strategic%20Perspective&pubno=20&ano=739)

The first ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight (China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and the USA) was held on the 12th of October. When this frame work of ADMM Plus Eight came into news for the first time it was seen as a development which could be the initiating step to a much needed security architecture in the Asia Pacific. Asia Pacific is fast emerging as the economic center of the world, consequently securing of vulnerable economic assets has becomes mandatory. The source of threat to economic assets is basically unconventional in nature like natural disasters, terrorism and maritime piracy. This coupled with the conventional security threats and flashpoints based on territorial disputes and political differences are very much a part of the region posing a major security challenge. As mentioned ADMM Plus Eight can be seen as the first initiative on such a large scale where the security concerns of the region can be discussed and areas of cooperation can be explored to keep the threats at bay. The defence ministers of the ten ASEAN nations and the eight extra regional countries (Plus Eight) during the meeting have committed to cooperation and dialogue to counter insecurity in the region.  One of the major reasons for initiation of such a framework has been the new face of threat which is non-conventional and transnational which makes it very difficult for an actor to deal with it in isolation. Threats related to violent extremism, maritime security, vulnerability of SLOCs, transnational crimes have a direct and indirect bearing on the path of economic growth. Apart from this the existence of territorial disputes especially on the maritime front plus the issues related to political differences, rise of China and dispute on the Korean Peninsula has aggravated the security dilemma in the region giving rise to areas of potential conflict. This can be seen as a more of a conventional threat to the region. The question here is that how far this ADMM Plus Eight can go to address the conventional security threats or is it an initiative which would be confined to meetings and passing resolution and playing second fiddle to the ASEAN summit. It is very important to realize that when one is talking about effective security architecture for the Asia Pacific one has to talk in terms of addressing the conventional issues like the territorial and political disputes. These issues serve as bigger flashpoint which can snowball into a major conflict which has the possibility of turning into a nuclear conflict.

1AC- Solvency

Contention 4 is Solvency
No disads-- we keep 31st MEU

O’Hanlon 01 (Michael, Director of Research and a Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Come Partly Home, America: How to Downsize U.S. Deployments Abroad,” http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/0301forceandlegitimacy_ohanlon.aspx)PS
Washington should therefore scale back the number of marines on Okinawa to about 5,000. The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit should remain, as should enough forces to maintain storage and staging facilities for use in a crisis. But most other marines should go elsewhere in the region or return home, and most Marine Corps facilities and training ranges should be returned to Japanese use. Compensating steps should be taken, notably increased storage of U.S. military supplies on Okinawa or on ships in Japanese ports to facilitate rapid deployments in the region. Tokyo might well pay for the necessary equipment and many of the redeployment costs. Ideally, Japan would also increase its direct military contributions to the alliance. But major reductions in the marines on Okinawa need not await the normalization of Japanese security policy.
No risk of deterrence collapse—marines are useless

O’Hanlon 01 (Michael, Director of Research and a Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Come Partly Home, America: How to Downsize U.S. Deployments Abroad,” http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/0301forceandlegitimacy_ohanlon.aspx)PS
But the advantages of the deployment—a diplomatic show of U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific, the lack of Marine Corps opposition, and its cost-effectiveness—do not add up to a strategic rationale for keeping the marines there. And the Okinawa mission carries downsides as well that are not commonly recognized. The marines, with their expeditionary philosophy and capabilities, provide too valuable an asset to squander on a deployment that is not militarily or strategically essential. By default, putting them on Okinawa effectively consumes operational resources that could be used elsewhere: peace operations in the Balkans (to give the Army a break, for example), a humanitarian intervention or peace operation (should another genocide occur in Africa or elsewhere), exercises with foreign militaries, or responses to crises. In addition, the marines on Okinawa are not so much forward-deployed as they are marooned. Okinawa itself is not at risk, and Japanese forces have the capacity to defend it even if it were. Furthermore, the three amphibious ships based in Japan can transport only the 2,000 marines of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which patrols the region, to areas of actual threat elsewhere in the Pacific. The other 15,000 marines on Okinawa could not quickly deploy elsewhere with their equipment. In the event of a war, these troops could be flown to Korea without their heavy weaponry to help in noncombatant evacuations or similar missions. But they would have no advantage over infantry soldiers airlifted from the United States or local South Korean infantry troops.

1AC- Solvency

Withdrawal NOW is the only way to solve— without it, ALL of our military will be pushed out and makes alliance collapse inevitable

Higa 2010 (Yoshihiko Higa, former policy adviser of Okinawa Prefecture, POINT OF VIEW/ Yoshihiko Higa: Tentatively shift Futenma functions to Henoko, 2010/11/26, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201011250308.html)PS
Concrete and effective solutions to problems can only be arrived at by returning to their starting points. The issue of relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, started with the urgent need to "eliminate the danger" posed by the air base located in a densely populated city area. With that in mind, the only possible prescription for Futenma's relocation is to close the base on the premise that its functions will be moved to a site outside Japan, specifically Guam. During the transition, a provisional facility should be built within the prefecture to replace Futenma. This is the gist of a proposal I made when Keiichi Inamine was governor of Okinawa Prefecture. The relocation of U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa to a site outside Japan meets the purpose of the U.S. military transformation--rational and integrated operations of U.S. forces. It would also contribute to alleviating the burden on Okinawa and enable the Japan-U.S. security alliance to work in a more stable fashion. Furthermore, when we take into consideration the costs needed to maintain existing U.S. bases in Japan, I believe it is economically reasonable to shoulder a fair share of the costs for the relocation of the Marines. "Deterrence" is a problem that concerns U.S. forces in Japan as a whole. As for building a provisional facility to replace Futenma, a minimum necessary installation can be accommodated in the land portion (area for barracks) of Camp Schwab in the Henoko district of Nago as an emergency measure. The plan does not require the construction of a new base nor does it cause environmental destruction of the ocean. Since it is assumed that the functions will eventually move out of Japan, the facility will not be a permanent fixture. Traditionally, there have been two alternatives for the Okinawan side to choose from. One is to stick to relocation outside the prefecture and turn its back on compromise with the government. The other is to give in to a compromise and shift gears to relocation inside the prefecture. But in today's Okinawa, the second option is tantamount to political suicide. The Democratic Party of Japan scored a landslide victory in the 2009 Lower House election with its promise to relocate Futenma "outside the prefecture or the country." But the DPJ-led government incurred the wrath of Okinawan residents by reneging on its promise and going back to "relocation to Henoko." In the Upper House election in July, it could not even field a candidate in Okinawa. Also, in the Nago mayoral election in January and the municipal assembly election in September, candidates opposing the acceptance of the relocation won. Without exception, candidates in the ongoing gubernatorial race are calling for "relocation outside the prefecture." However, the administration of Naoto Kan completely fails to take into account such Okinawa sentiment. In addition, it expects the new governor to change positions after the election, saying it would "sincerely explain the government's position." As a result, local residents have further hardened their attitude. Meanwhile, the U.S. government is sitting like a bystander, regarding the stalemate between the Japanese government and Okinawa as Japan's "domestic problem." It intends to maintain the status quo unless an alternative facility is completed. Thus, Washington overlooks the fact that such a situation could threaten the stable presence of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese public, except for Okinawan residents, also regards the Futenma issue as an exclusively Okinawa concern. They are not aware that the situation could lead to a serious crisis that could undermine national security. Given the circumstances, Okinawa is justified in completely turning down compromises and insisting on relocating Futenma base outside the prefecture. However, in reality, such an attitude could result in the Futenma base permanently remaining in the current location. Is the Okinawan side really prepared to accept such an outcome? The prefecture once again faces a tough test. The most serious crisis that may arise from the deadlock over Futenma relocation issue is the breakup of the Japan-U.S. alliance. The worst scenario could turn into reality with a recurrence of the U.S. military helicopter crash at Okinawa International University in Ginowan six years ago. If a similar accident were to occur, it would trigger a prefecture-wide movement to demand withdrawal of U.S. military forces as a whole, not the Marines alone, from the prefecture. There is no time to waste. An effective solution must be found. The Japanese government needs the ability to strategically negotiate with the U.S. government, while the public is expected to develop a sound awareness for national security and equality. Meanwhile, the Okinawan side must have the capability to squarely face reality and Washington is urged to re-acknowledge the purpose of reorganization of its military and have the courage to part with vested interests.

1AC- Solvency

Even if we don’t get kicked out of bases the public is key to deterrence and a healthy relationship with China

Michaeli 10 ( Research Associate in Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 5-10-10 (Daniel Michaeli, “Give Up the 2006 Futenma Agreement: There’s More to the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” http://www.asiaruminations.com/2010/05/10/give-up-the-2006-futenma-agreement-theres-more-to-the-u-s-japan-alliance/

In negotiations between democracies, the atmosphere and public perceptions of the negotiations can matter even more than their paper outcome. In negotiations with Japan over relocating Futenma, the U.S. Marine Corps air station in the middle of Ginowan City, it’s time for the United States to recognize that. Maintaining an effective relationship with the Japanese public requires a policy change on Futenma relocation. The U.S. bases much percent of its presence in Japan on Okinawa, an island strategically located near the Taiwan Strait. The tactical arguments for why the U.S. marines need to be in Okinawa province are compelling, even if the public relations effort at explaining it has been inept. Marines operate as a combined air-land-sea force and these different elements would have to be brought to bear together, and quickly, in the event of a crisis–such as an attack on Taiwan from the Chinese mainland. The new V-22 Osprey transport aircraft the Marines plan to deploy there can take off and land vertically, but apparently requires a new long runway “just in case” due to reliability issues. But the reason the U.S.-Japan relationship works is, more than anything else, strategic rather than tactical. Japan–and, for that matter, Taiwan (as I noted here)–are able to develop closer ties with mainland China because they understand the United States is committed to ensuring their security. The reason the United States is able to protect its allies and economic interests in the region is because commitments have been made in treaties and are consistently repeated at the highest levels. That is a strategic, not a tactical, matter. Tactical coordination and basing in the region perform two primary tasks, from the American perspective: 1) they help demonstrate how serious the United States is about its commitments; and 2) they prepare U.S. forces to respond in any contingency scenario. But from the perspective of Asia’s strategic elites, the nature of the U.S. presence matters for a different reason, too. Much better than Americans, they recognize that public support for these alliances in both the United States and its Asian allies is necessary for the strategic message of the U.S. presence to be credible in the long run. So here’s where we are now: Some 90,000 Okinawans came out from across the political spectrum last month to protest the 2006 plan–and, in many cases, the U.S. presence on Okinawa altogether. Yukio Hatoyama, elected to Japan’s prime ministership last summer; Susumu Inamine, the new mayor of Nago City, elected this January; and the governor of Okinawa depend on public opinion for their political futures. But as of very recently, the U.S. has simply chanted over and over again that the Futenma relocation agreement, signed in 2006, is a done deal and “it is time to move on.” The agreement would build new runways on reclaimed land in Nago City to enable the Marines to maintain a substantial forward-deployed presence in Okinawa. The 2006 deal was also intended to lighten the load on Okinawa, shifting 8,000 Marines to Guam and closing Futenma, which is in the middle of a busy city. Still, Okinawans aren’t satisfied. When the tactical value of a certain kind of deployment could begin undermining the strategic stability of the alliance, it’s time to scrap the idea and come up with something else. The United States should start coming up with new ideas and stop chanting the old ones.

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