T-TIP - Black Sea=Russia war
Grotzky & Isic 08 - Research Fellows @ Center for Applied Policy Research (C·A·P)[Daniel Grotzky & Mirela Isic, “The Black Sea Region: Clashing Identities and Risks to European Stability,” CAP Policy Analysis, No. 4 · Oct 2008]
One of the major Black Sea regional challenges is the well functioning of state sovereignty. Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia are all parties to “frozen conflicts” that date back to the collapse of the Soviet Union and have created pocket of unrecognized republics around the Black Sea area. The conflicts over Moldova’s breakaway separatist region of Transnistria and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia are further complicated by the presence of Russian so called “peacekeeping” troops and Moscow’s continued interest in keeping the separatist situation unresolved in order to retain a pressure instrument towards its “near abroad” neighbours. The recent military encounter between Georgia and Russia has clearly demonstrated the risk that such “frozen conflicts” pose.
Pg. 8-9
Russia will exploit their domestic instability
Huterer 10 – Political Counselor @ Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany [Manfred Huterer (Visiting Fellow @ Center on the United States and Europe), “The Russia Factor in Transatlantic Relations and New Opportunities for U.S.-EU-Russia Cooperation,” Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS, WORKING PAPER Number 4, May 2010]
Further Russian muscle-flexing and continued political fixation on upholding its international status enables the political elite to conceal its weakness and preserve its power. For the foreseeable future, Russia will try to talk up its remaining advantages (nuclear weapons, energy, UNSC permanent membership) as a reaction to its less prominent role in the G-20 process. Russia will also continue its efforts to capitalize on the vulnerabilities of its weaker neighbors exploiting, for example, domestic instability in Ukraine. Pg. 9
Russia’s willing to go to war – Georgia proves
Huterer 10 – Political Counselor @ Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany [Manfred Huterer (Visiting Fellow @ Center on the United States and Europe), “The Russia Factor in Transatlantic Relations and New Opportunities for U.S.-EU-Russia Cooperation,” Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS, WORKING PAPER Number 4, May 2010]
First, although the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, as Robert Kagan prematurely depicted, was not “a turning point no less significant than November 9, 1989,”5 it was an important development. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in response to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia and Russia’s consequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have considerably damaged relations between the West and Russia. The war demonstrated Russia’s willingness to apply military means in a disproportionate manner when it feels its vital security interests in its immediate neighborhood are threatened, even at the risk of self-isolation. As the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, led by Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, concluded in 2009, if Georgia fired the first shot by attacking South Ossetia, then Russia created and exploited the conditions that led to war.6 pg. 4
T-TIP - Coop solves global economy
Cooperation key to prevent the collapse of global markets
Kelley 11 – School of International Service @ American University [John Robert Kelley, “Keep calm and carry on: appraising the transatlantic relationship from iraq to Obama,” European Political Science: 10 2011]
The trouble with this logic is one part overestimation and one part underestimation. It overstates the supposed permanence of the transformations affecting both sides while mistaking such transformations as an irreversible paradigm shift, demonstrated by the qualification of there being ‘something new’ to behold. It invests in the notion that the end of the Cold War removed a fundamental binding force and therefore eliminated the primary source of the alliance’s raison d’etre. And here is where the alarmists are guilty of underestimation: America and Europe enjoy not only a security relationship (with some degree of multilateralism now restored), but an economic one as well (Pollack and Shaffer, 2006; Wallace, 2008). The predominance of the liberal economic model in the world today requires above all else continued cooperation across the Atlantic. A fractured relationship would severely undercut prospects for the system’s long-term survival and impair coordination required to keep world markets humming. To put the centrality of this coordination in perspective, let us not forget that Europe remains America’s largest trading partner by a wide margin, and in the aggregate the alliance commands nearly half of the world’s gross domestic product. When the fortunes of one actor are so enmeshed in those of another, that is binding on an unparalleled order of magnitude. Pg. 22-23
T-TIP - Coop solves US heg
Kelley 11 – School of International Service @ American University [John Robert Kelley, “Keep calm and carry on: appraising the transatlantic relationship from iraq to Obama,” European Political Science: 10 2011]
Without a reliable measure of what constitutes an exceedingly good or bad period in the relationship, talk of tipping points or soaring confidence, or any narrative that tells us we have ventured into the extreme seems inconclusive. I choose instead a more moderate perspective that rests on a few simple understandings. First, it is evident to me that the set of issues-areas in the contemporary international system dictate the necessity of the transatlantic partnership. Though they may order their priorities differently, it is by now quite clear that Europe and America share the same international agenda (de Vasconcelos, 2009). More than anyplace else, America’s standing relies on Europe. For even in an age of non-Western assertiveness in high politics, it is Europe that still enables America’s grand strategy to go global. America cannot pursue its goals in Afghanistan or keep Iran in check without European support. Pg. 25
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