Integrating the University of Mississippi

4.6Integrating the University of Mississippi

Schools in Mississippi were still strictly segregated and the University of Mississippi, commonly known as Ole Miss, was not an exception. Therefore when James Meredith, twenty eight years old air force veteran and native Mississippian, applied for admission in January 1961,⁵² he was rejected solely on the basis of his skin color. Meredith contacted Medgar Evers, NAACP⁵³ field secretary, for legal assistance (O’Brien 603). On May 31, 1961, NAACP and James Meredith filed a lawsuit at the Federal Court in Meridian, Mississippi. (“Integrating Ole Miss”). Kennedy administration intervened in the case for the first time on August 31, 1962, when the Justice Department asked the Supreme Court Judge to put aside stays issued by Judge Ben F. Cameron.⁵⁴

After a series of court contests, on September 10, 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the University of Mississippi to admit James Meredith. Three days later, on September 13, Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett expressed his strong stand against the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in a statewide television and radio speech. He refused to ever allow the integration of a single school. In his proclamation he said: “We must either submit to the unlawful dictates of the federal government or stand up like men to tell them no” (Barnett par. 6). He also encouraged the people of Mississippi to fight against integration by claiming that he had no doubts that “the overwhelming majority of loyal Mississippians…will never submit to the moral degradation, to the same and the ruin which have faced all other who have lacked the courage to defend their beliefs” (ibid).

Although publicly Barnett strongly opposed the idea of Meredith’s enrollment, he had been negotiating with Attorney General Kennedy. On September 15, 1962 Robert Kennedy called Governor Barnett to seek a solution to the crisis and since then until September 28, they had over twenty phone conversations (Dallek, Unfinished Life 514). According to Williams, Barnett suggested in one of their phone calls that Meredith was led to school by army troops. Such situation would have suggested that Barnett was forced to allow his enrollment. He did not want to be blamed by Mississippians for allowing integration of Ole Miss, He did not want to “appear to capitulate to the federal government” (Kenney 104). However, his suggestion was rejected by Robert Kennedy. They did not reach an agreement and Barnett personally blocked Meredith’s second attempt to get registered.

When President Kennedy came to realize that the peaceful way (telephone conversations with Governor Barnett and actions at courts⁵⁵), in which they were trying to solve the problem was not efficient, he federalized the Mississippi National Guard on September 30, 1962. James Meredith was escorted to the campus, where he stayed overnight guarded by twenty-four federal agents (Williams 216). President Kennedy delivered a speech on nation-wide television, in which he announced that Meredith had been “in residence on campus of the University of Mississippi” (Kennedy, “President Kennedy’s Speech with notes” p.1). He stressed the importance of law as “eternal safeguard of liberty” and he also stated that “Americans are free…to disagree with law but not to disobey it” (ibid.). During the President’s speech, the situation at Ole Miss deteriorated considerably. A large crowd protesting against Meredith’s enrollment had gathered at campus and violent rioting broke out. At approximately eight o’clock, when Kennedy was beginning his speech, French journalist, Paul Guihard, was murdered.

Later that night, Kennedy ordered twenty-three thousand troops “to proceed to Oxford” (Rorabaugh 102). The President had no other possibility than to order the Army to Oxford because gunfire spread and the situation at the campus became very violent. Government officials worried about Meredith’s life and his security. Nicholas Katzentbach, Deputy Attorney General, who was present at the campus, demanded the troops in order to get the situation under control. The U.S. Army soldiers arrived in Oxford on October 1 between two and three a.m., which was rather late after the order was issued. Army officials later provided numerous explanations for their delay. Nevertheless, at this point the relations between the White House and Pentagon sank very low. Kennedy and his team were deeply disturbed by the Army’s indifference to presidential orders. “The Kennedy brothers and their advisors sensed something sinister in the military’s farcical incompetence” (Talbot 155).

On October 1, 1962, James Meredith was escorted to Lyceum Hall for registration. He was followed by marshals everywhere he went in order to protect him from physical violence. During the rioting two people died, three hundred and seventy- five were injured, including a hundred and sixty-six federal marshals (O’Brien 608). Two hundred people were arrested (Kenney 107).

The Mississippi Crisis was followed very closely by media in foreign countries. Most of their reactions to the presidential response were positive. A Swedish newspaper claimed: “There is hardly to be found a corresponding example in the world of a Government so powerfully protecting the rights of a minority. In the midst of tragedy, this is a victory for American democracy and for the ideas upon which it rests” (Dudziak 164). Most media abroad, even in Africa, praised Kennedy administration for the way in which he handled the crisis. The manner in which the federal government handled the crisis positively affected the image of the USA abroad.

President’s solution to the problem seemed to have more supporters than opponents in the USA. The Ole Miss crisis did not hurt Kennedy politically. Brauer confirms that “Mississippi confrontation did not seriously hurt Kennedy’s standing among white Southerners” (201). In addition Schlesinger reports that “in the fall election the Democrats won more Negro votes than ever” (948). The Kennedy’s stance was regarded by Americans as a sign that the President was willing to support the rights of all Americans citizens, including African American minority, even though it might have weakened his popularity.

However, the Democratic Party members were not in an agreement about Kennedy’s conduct. According to Talbot, the Mississippi Crisis “drove a permanent wedge between the Kennedy administration and the white South” (158). He also suggests that Kennedy realized that “the attempt to reach some sort of consensus with Southern states, with its congressmen and senators” was at its end (159). Kennedy expressed clearly that regardless of the problems inside the Democratic Party, he was determined to carry out the duties expected from president. When a reporter asked President Kennedy whether he believed that Ole Miss Crisis would have an impact on enforcement of his administrations programs in Congress, Kennedy explained that he believed that “the majority of southerners recognized that his duty is “to carry out the court order..” (“Transcript of Interview”).

Integrating Ole Miss was a great achievement for the civil rights leaders and it gave African Americans hope and belief that there was a certain possibility they might be able to receive the support from federal government in their struggle for equal rights. However, some civil rights leaders were not satisfied with the manner in which the Kennedy administration handled the crisis. For instance, Martin Luther King criticized John F. Kennedy for failing to praise Meredith in his speech. According to Dr. King, Kennedy only summoned “the nation to obey law” (O’Brien 608). The fact is that Kennedy did not express any support to James Meredith, he did not appeal directly to the consciences of the Southerners as he did during the Albany crisis, however, he expressed much stronger support to civil rights than in any previous case.

John and Robert Kennedy both tried to avoid the use of troops as long as it was possible. They had been criticizing Eisenhower for letting the crisis in Little Rock grow to such an extent that ordering federal troops was the only possibility to resolve the crisis. They perceived the use federal troops as a great failure. Stern explains that John Kennedy as well as Robert Kennedy “had a real conviction that it was wrong to send troops in…” (“Eisenhower and Kennedy” 4). It was also the reason why Kennedy kept persuading the Governor - he wanted to avoid using federal troops; he wanted to persuade Barnett to take steps leading to Meredith’s registration without violence and particularly without the necessity for federal troops. Kennedy certainly did not consider delaying of Meredith’s registration at Ole Miss, as Burke Marshall pointed out during his discussion at JFK Library in September, 2002. Kennedy was presented with a very difficult situation and there was not much he could do. Robert Kennedy claimed that he had never seen his brother “so angry” (Talbot 155). He himself regarded the night when the battle of Ole Miss was fought as the “worst night” he had ever spent (ibid.).

The Ole Miss crisis certainly marked a shift in Kennedy’s approach to the civil rights and in his views of the South. During this civil rights battle Kennedy experienced the manner in which Southern representatives dealt with federal government officials and how easily they ignored a Supreme Court decision. Therefore he could easily picture what sort of treatment the African Americans must have been experiencing for many years. Apart from the fact that the Ole Miss crisis “stirred doubts within JFK’s inner circle about how firmly the president was I control of his own army, it also contributed to the conviction that “the South was a hostile territory” (Talbot 162).