Ideologies in Foreign Policy Atlanticism, Europeanism, Internationalism or Autonomism

Ideologies in Foreign Policy

Atlanticism, Europeanism, Internationalism or Autonomism

On the other hand, due to the undemocratic domestic developments in Slovakia, it turned towards the East and only with the increasing threat of international isolation did the opposition win the elections and re-directed foreign policy initiatives towards the West. Dzurinda’s government realized the importance of gaining the US as a sponsor in order to obtain NATO membership and focused on building close relations. The subsequent government led by Robert Fico has criticized this stance and promised to reorient the direction of Slovak foreign policy. There was a lack of consensus among Slovak political parties and governments as to foreign policy goals. Slovakia had a less stable political party system and often formed coalition governments that were criticized by Western organizations and politicians.

During each period there was one dominating trend in the foreign policies of the Czech and Slovak Republics and it oscillated between ideologies of Atlanticism, Europeanism, Autonomism and Internationalism.

Atlanticism vs. Autonomism

The division of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the Czech Republic did not change the main foreign and security priorities which had been formulated under the Czechoslovak government¹⁵¹ and referred to as a “’Return to Europe”. The goal of NATO membership was defined and developed by the Czech political right in 1990-91 and became a uniting factor on the right side of the political spectrum.¹⁵² Although after the “Velvet Divorce” the concept of neutrality was examined, the Czech government and President Havel dismissed the idea as it would only eventually amount to a weakness and limitation in Czech security policies.¹⁵³ Instead the right-wing government of the Czech Republic decided that security would be best guaranteed by joining one of the most powerful international military alliances which had provided stability to Europe for the last 50 years.

The most important player in the coalition government of 1992 was the ODS-KDU faction of the coalition government which consisted of ODS-KDS, KDU-ČSL, ODA, and had won the election with 76 mandates. ODS was founded in 1991 by Václav Klaus who helped to create the ideology and image of the party.¹⁵⁴ The party and the government strongly supported NATO integration. In the 1992 election program of ODS, “Svoboda a prosperita”, the party outlines as its first foreign policy priority the integration of Czechoslovakia into the European community, and the establishment of a defense and military alliance with Western states.¹⁵⁵ In 1993, the ODS-KDS government continued along this line. In a parliamentary speech given by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec “Vládní koncepce v oblasti mezinárodní politiky České republiky” the strategic goal of joining NATO was formulated as an instrument to assuring the stability, security and economic prosperity of the Czech Republic.¹⁵⁶

During the 1990s, the relationship between the presidents Václav Havel and Bill Clinton influenced the development of bilateral relations between the two countries and NATO membership. Throughout his presidency, Havel stressed the shared values of democracy on both sides of the Atlantic, emphasized the importance of NATO enlargement and forged good relations with all US governments until the end of his term in 2003.¹⁵⁷ President Clinton often pushed for NATO enlargement and this only strengthened the Atlantist stance in Czech politics. In 1998, Clinton during a press conference with Havel stated:

“I thanked President Havel for beginning to talk with me a long time ago, even before I became president, about the importance of the expansion of NATO and the Czech Republic's role in it.”¹⁵⁸

Atlanticism in the foreign policy of the Czech Republic was only reinforced during Clinton’s second term in office (1996-2000). Madeline Albright, an American citizen of Czech origin and close friend of Václav Havel,¹⁵⁹ was appointed the first female US Secretary of State

Another characteristic of Atlanticism is the perception of Russia as a “potential threat”.¹⁶⁰ For the new political elite that took power after the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia, the USSR represented the main cause of national oppression and a forceful introduction to totalitarian regimes.¹⁶¹ NATO membership was presented by the Czech media as a safeguard against destabilization stemming from the East such as the 1991 unsuccessful Soviet coup d’état, the Russian constitutional crisis of 1993 and the war in Chechnya.¹⁶² The aversion to Russia was apparent in some members of the first ODS parliamentary caucus. At a parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, Czech deputy Radim Špaček opposed membership in the organization for Russia. He argued that Russia would use the Council of Europe as an instrument to manipulate and influence other countries.¹⁶³ The only mention of Russia in the 1992 election program of ODS “Svoboda a prosperita” describes a crumbling colonial Russian empire as the main source of threats to the Czech Republic.¹⁶⁴ However, by the next elections in 1996, ODS does not even mention an approach for bilateral relations with Russia in its election program or in its Government Declaration.

One key issue between the Czech Republic and Russia was the debt settlement. Here one can view the “hesitant”¹⁶⁵ approach towards Russia ascribed to Atlantists. The ODS government took a hard stance on this and preferred debt repayment through the import of raw materials or participation in the privatization of some companies in Russia. It strongly refused repayment through the delivery of Russian armaments. The refusal of the Czech government to allow repayment of the debt in the form of Russian military technology was a source of annoyance for Russia. The Czech Republic was owed one of the largest amounts out of the Central and East European countries and therefore Russia had the chance to export the largest amount of armaments. This would make the Czech Republic an attractive partner for Russia as well as providing a market for Russian armament producers in the future.¹⁶⁶ By maintaining a delivery of military technology to Central European countries, Russia could also preserve their military technology dependency on Russia and resume exports of weapons to the region.¹⁶⁷ Klaus’s government felt that this issue was non-negotiable and repeatedly refused Russia’s efforts to pay back the debt with weapons. In 1997, Russia offered the Czech Republic modernization of their MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-22, Su-25 fighters, and T-72 tanks. This offer was refused as the government reasoned it might affect Czech membership in NATO. A second, more lucrative offer was made by Russia, this time in the form of K-50 helicopters and Su-39 and Su-30 airplanes but this was also turned down.¹⁶⁸

The perception of Russia as a potential threat was also apparent in the government’s decision to diversify energy sources. In the 1992 Energy Survey conducted by the International Energy Agency, one of the five key elements of Czechoslovakia’s energy policy is to diversify.¹⁶⁹ Between 1989 and 1992 oil deliveries from the former USSR to Czechoslovakia were cut back by 34%, the only other supply option, the pipeline Adria was viewed as unstable as well due to the events that developed in Yugoslavia during the early 1990s.¹⁷⁰ The political uncertainty surrounding the countries which were responsible for supplying oil to the region highlighted the security risks in having these countries, especially Russia, as the sole provider of energy. The ODS led government displayed Atlanticism during its period in power which was only further advanced by the strong Atlanticism presented by President Havel.

During the same period, it was not the Atlantist trend that dominated Slovak foreign policy but Autonomist, characterized as the “preservation of national sovereignty and broad autonomy, which they see threatened by the EU and NATO.”¹⁷¹ Until 1998, HZDS led by charismatic Vladimír Mečiar formed the main political party in government and had a decisive impact on the foreign policy orientation of Slovakia during the 1990s. Although the 1995 Program Declaration of the Slovak government stated that it would continue with efforts to integrate Slovakia into Western structures such as NATO and the EU, and that the government expected to attain full membership in the EU by 2000,¹⁷² the actions of Mečiar and his government seldom contributed to achieving these goals. Slovakia’s democratic transformation was marred by Mečiar’s government’s violations of democratic principles in order to retain power, use of authoritarian measures to solve conflicts, repression of political rivals and political and economic cronyism.¹⁷³

In contrast to the Czech Republic, there was support among political parties for Slovakia to declare neutrality. One political party, SNS, in the governing coalition strongly and openly advocated neutrality for the country. SNS rejected NATO membership and viewed the alliance as a product of the Cold War.¹⁷⁴ Chairman of the party, Ján Slota described NATO membership as

“another step towards depriving this young state of its sovereignty. The Slovak nation has been under the boot of the Soviet Warsaw Pact for 50 years, and I think it has had enough of such oppression.”¹⁷⁵

Some representatives of the second coalition partner, the radical left-wing party ZRS, also preferred neutrality for Slovakia and within the framework of this status sought cooperation with Central European countries.¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, some members of HZDS also supported neutrality for the country. Russia welcomed Slovakia’s exclusion from the first round of enlargement and offered to provide security guarantees if the country would decide for neutrality or closer cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).¹⁷⁷ If Slovakia had announced its neutrality it would have de facto become an ally of Russia¹⁷⁸ especially since by the end of Mečiar’s term, the West largely ignored the country and Slovakia was on the brink of isolation.

Although it would eventually border with NATO countries, it did not have a security guarantee from key Western states. The often cited reason was the lack of respect for democratic principles shown by Mečiar’s government. Mečiar argued that Slovakia’s rejection in the first round of enlargement was due to an agreement between the USA and Russia.¹⁷⁹ The Slovak army had fulfilled its requirements for accession concerning compatibility and interoperability with NATO forces. It had developed a good reputation from PfP missions and from participation in United Nations operations. US General Joseph Ralston agreed with the positive transformation of the Slovak military and admitted that as soon as the political atmosphere would allow it, America would support Slovakia in its bid to NATO.¹⁸⁰

Although the HZDS government had stated its goals as NATO and EU membership¹⁸¹, in practice Mečiar did little to promote these efforts and instead focused on maintaining and strengthening Slovakia’s relationship with Russia.¹⁸² During Mečiar’s government, a political wing within the party that was against EU and NATO integration grew in importance. This was demonstrated by the vice-Chairman of HZDS and chairman of the parliamentary committee Augustín Marián Húska who warned of ideological dangers such as globalism, cosmopolitanism and consumerism that stemmed from the West and declared it a new paganism.¹⁸³ Slovak-Russian relations reached a level of an alternative foreign policy. Between the years of 1993 and 1995, the Slovak government envisioned itself as a bridge between East and West which would connect Russia with the rest of Europe. According to Mečiar’s government, the foundations of the bridge were composed of a Slovak-Russian bank, a common gas enterprise which would unite all gas pipelines in Europe and the preservation of a Slovak monopoly on the transit of Russian energy to West Europe.¹⁸⁴

There are two distinctive features of Russian debt repayment in Slovakia. The first is that unlike the Czech Republic, Slovakia followed Hungary’s precedence and allowed Russia to repay its debt through military technology.¹⁸⁵ The Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Affairs, Viktor Pachomov declared that during 1998, Russia would supply Slovakia with military technology worth 140 million USD as debt repayment. The biggest problem with debt repayment through military technology was that it opposed the stated strategic goals of Slovakia, which was NATO membership. Critics argue that the acquisitions made by the Slovak Army did not take into account its military strategic interests.¹⁸⁶ There were also accusations of corruption and illegal arms trade, especially regarding Russian debt repayment which led Petr Švec, president of the Association of Slovak Soldiers to state:

“The greatest immorality and corruption at the ministry of defense is hidden behind settlement of the Russian debt.”¹⁸⁷

Katrim Stella s.r.o., the company assigned with the task of main supplier to the Slovak army, ordered navigation technology for the MIG-29 jet fighters which responded to Eastern norms and one third of these airplanes were in desolate technical state.¹⁸⁸ The planes cost 210 million USD of which Katrim Stella received a 10% cash commission.¹⁸⁹ The maintenance and operation of the airplanes were so costly that the Slovak army was not able to finance the modernization of their current military equipment. Slovak General J. Tuchyňa was among the critics of the purchases, especially regarding the acquisition of the KA-50 helicopters and a proposed anti-missile system S-300.¹⁹⁰ Katrim Stella is similar to Devin Bank in that both companies represent Russian capital in Slovakia.¹⁹¹

The second feature was that the Russian government repaid the debt through Russian owned business companies in the Slovakia Republic.¹⁹² Devin Bank is the primary example of how the settlement of Russian debt could be abused under certain conditions to benefit Russian groups acting under state cover.¹⁹³ The bank was established in 1992 and by 1993 encountered financial difficulties which threatened its existence. Russian investment came in the form of three companies; VTF Moscow, MF Moscow and APIS which combined, owned 52.7% of the bank. Russian Sergej Gorodkov was appointed chairman of the board of directors and Karol Martinka, an individual close to Mečiar, was appointed executive director. It was Martinka who convinced the Mečiar government that Devin Bank should mediate the Russian debt repayment.¹⁹⁴ Igor Cibule, Director of the Slovak Foreign Intelligent Service during Moravčík’s interim government (March-December 1994) stated:

“The Devin Bank is not only a common bank institute; it serves for exerting Russian influence in our country. It should be emphasized that this bank is closely connected to Prime Minister V. Mečiar… I dare say that the Devín Bank is a kind of a Trojan horse of Russian interests in Slovakia”¹⁹⁵

Between 1996 and 1998, Devin Bank profited from the commissions of the purchases from the Slovak government, within the framework of Russian debt repayment, and the opposition accused the government of cronyism and questioned why a private institution was being used to solve state debt reclamation.¹⁹⁶ Tunneling, murder, loses in the amount of one billion Slovak crowns in bankruptcy assets and corruption are some of the issues surrounding the investigation concerning individuals connected with the bank.¹⁹⁷

In 1997, Slovakia was refused membership into NATO and the EU. Mečiar reacted by stating that if the West did not want Slovakia, it would turn towards the East.¹⁹⁸ The Russian government also supported the re-election of Mečiar’s government, and considered Slovakia a political ally.¹⁹⁹ Boris Yeltsin stated before the 1998 elections that his government “wished, really wished Mr. Mečiar would win the elections”²⁰⁰ The close relationship between the two countries was reflected in the number of agreements signed during the period of Mečiar’s government. It was argued by the opposition that some of the agreements mostly concerning military cooperation were unclear and could be interpreted to the advantage of Russia, and to the detriment of Slovakia.²⁰¹ The so called “gas agreements”²⁰² signed during the visit of Russian Prime Minister Černomyrdin to Bratislava in 1997 was also met with criticism. Opponents of the contracts argue that it puts Slovakia at a disadvantage as the agreements do not allow Slovakia to diversify its energy sources and thus it remains dependent on Russia. As the agreement remained unpublished due to “business secrets”²⁰³, it is unclear if the conditions of the contract favor private subjects, both Russian and Slovakian, to the detriment of the state.²⁰⁴

The Slovak government during the period of Prime Minister Mečiar was hostile towards NATO and the country followed a different interpretation of democracy and values than those presented in NATO or the American community. In 1996, several US state representatives criticized Slovakia for its shady undemocratic tendencies. Ralph Johnson, US ambassador to Slovakia, stated the concerns of the USA regarding new legislation that would reinforce the position of the state at the expense of its citizens. Mečiar’s government often brushed off the criticisms from the USA. In response to Ralph Johnson’s criticisms, Mečiar compared the US ambassador to the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Stepan V. Chervonenko, during the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion²⁰⁵ and the Foreign Minister Pavol Hamžík stated:

“I do not see any reason why the ministry should react to appearances of ambassadors; there are ‘x’ number of them here.” ²⁰⁶

Slovakia during the period of Mečiar’s leadership was defined as authoritarian and although it stated as its foreign policy priorities NATO and EU accession, in reality the government showed a level of contempt and disrespect for these organizations. This period of government in Slovakia can be termed Autonomist.