Masarykova univerzita
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ag.iii)EvidentialityThe concept of evidentiality is related to the speaker’s attitude to the proposition, therefore it is mentioned here. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine evidentiality more thoroughly since it focuses predominantly on the source of knowledge of the information. Evidentiality is a semantic category “which allows a speaker to communicate her attitude to the source of her information” (Saeed 1997:131). In other words, it means that the speaker denotes the source of the information expressed. The hearer learns “whether the statement relies on personal first-hand knowledge, or was acquired from another source; and if the latter, perhaps to say something of the source” (Saeed 1997:132). Palmer (2001) considers evidentiality a type of epistemic modality. By contrast, Aikhenvald points out that “evidentiality is a category in its own right, and not a category of epistemic or some other modality, or of tense-aspect” (2003:1). The reason why evidentiality should not be regarded as a part of epistemic modality is that “evidential markers may indicate a speaker’s attitude towards the validity of certain information but do not have to” (2003:13). Every language has its own evidential devices but “not every language has grammatical evidentiality” (Aikhenvald 2003:1). This has also been confirmed by Chafe (1986) who states that English “expresses evidentiality with modal auxiliaries, adverbs, and miscellaneous idiomatic phrases, although not, for example, with a coherent set of verb suffixes [...]” (Chafe 1986:261). Chafe (1986) applies a broader approach to evidentiality involving attitudes towards knowledge. He defines so called “modes of knowing”, i.e. “various ways in which knowledge is acquired” (1986:263). These modes include:
beliefIn this mode, “concern for evidence is downgraded” (1986:266). One believes in things because somebody else who they have confidence in believe in them too. These expressions of belief are typical of English: I think, I guess, and I suppose (1986:266). Chafe gives this example of belief: I think that a lot of the time I’ve been misjudging her. inductionInduction is a mode of knowing, in which evidence is very important. English usually does not indicate “what the nature of the evidence was. The most common marker which serves this function is must, which signals an inference with a high degree of reliability” (Chafe 1986:266, italics in original), for example : It must have been a kid. hearsay evidenceOne learns of many things because other people tell us about them. Some languages make use of affixes or particles “to qualify knowledge as having been acquired through language rather than direct experience” (Chafe 1986:268). English does not have these devices so it uses various phrases to fulfil this function, e.g. people say, they say, I’ve been told (1986:268). To illustrate this mode of knowing, Chafe provides this example: They were using more verbs than English speaking kids have been said to learn. deductionThe last mode of knowing defined by Chafe, deduction, relates to a “hypothesis from which conclusions about evidence can be deduced. Typical markers of deduction are should and presumably” (Chafe 1986:269, italics in original), e.g. Adults presumably are capable of purely logical thought (1986:269). To conclude, the concept of evidentiality is not investigated more thoroughly here since this thesis focuses on the speaker’s attitude towards the assertion and on the degree of certainty the speaker has about his/her proposition, not on the source of knowledge of the information. ag.iv)Subjectivity vs. ObjectivityOne feature that is intrinsically related to modality is the difference between subjectivity and objectivity. Palmer (1986) claims that “modality in language [...] seems to be essentially subjective. [...] It could even be further argued that subjectivity is an essential criterion for modality. Modality could [...] be defined as the grammaticalization of speakers’ (subjective) attitudes and opinions” (Palmer 1986:16). Subjectivity is usually related to epistemic modality but some scholars associate it also with deontic modality, as, for example, Lyons who understands it as speaker’s involvement: “Subjectivity is a matter of speaker’s, or more generally, of the locutionary agent’s involvement of himself in the utterance. In the case of epistemic modality what is involved is his knowledge (or beliefs). In the case of deontic modality it is his will and authority that is involved. But in both cases it is the locutionary agent who is the source of the modality” (Lyons 1983:111). Hoye points out, however, that when analysing deontic modality from the point of view of subjectivity, problems may appear because there are different degrees of speaker’s involvement (1997:43-44). According to him, the sentence Can I just try come more cake? undoubtedly involves the speaker “but the source of permission or obligation may be external where there is no degree of speaker involvement whatsoever unless the speaker is identified as a member of the society or institution instigating the action”, as in Will lecturers kindly refrain from missing classes? (Hoye 1997:43). The majority of authors who deal with subjective and objective modality do not provide any formal definitions. Lyons explains that objective modalized statements express speaker’s distance from the proposition. These statements may be considered true or false without much difficulty. By contrast, “subjectively modalized statements [...] are statements of opinion, or hearsay, or tentative inference, rather than statements of fact” (Lyons 1977:799, my emphasis), which means that these statements include a subjective point of view that is presented as true. However, the distinction between subjective and objective modality is not so obvious in everyday language use, as Lyons (1977:797) points out. The next section will look into types of modality in greater detail.
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