Neoliberalism K—UMich 2013 neg 1NCs 1NC: Generic

FW Blocks

Generic 2NC FW

1. Prefer the negative framework – extend that a discursive focus is the only way to merge the political economy and poststructuralism. The aff doesn’t solve – it excludes one or the other. That’s Springer in 12.

2. Don’t engage in state action - We have a responsibility to challenge neoliberal dominance of the policymaking sphere—it damages equality, education, and the environment

3. Empirically, policymaking focus kills political agency and fails to understand the root of neoliberalism—discursive analysis must come first

It is certainly not our intention to question the extent to which our knowledge of the empirical phenomena associated with claims of globalisation has been enhanced in this way. Nonetheless, we will argue that something quite significant is lost in this overly restrictive emphasis upon material indices of globalisation and on arguments which such indices might adjudicate.2 The implicit supposition which seems to underlie much of the sceptical or second-wave literature seeking to expose the ‘myth’ or ‘delusion’ of globalisation, is that a rigorous empirical exercise in demystification will be sufficient to reverse the tide of ill-informed public policy made in the name of globalisation. Sadly, this has not proved to be the case. For however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalisation thesis by the sceptics, their rigorous empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform public policy-making. It is here, we suggest, that the discourse of globalisation — and the discursive construction of the imperatives it is seen to conjure along with attendant fatalism about the possibilities for meaningful political agency — must enter the analysis. For, as the most cursory reflection on the issue of structure and agency reveals, it is the ideas actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself which informs the way in which they behave (Hay 1999a, forthcoming a). This is no less true ofpolicy makers and governments. Whether the globalisation thesis is ‘true’ or not may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true (or, quite possibly, just useful) by those employing it. Consequently, if the aim of the sceptics is to discredit the political appeal to dubious economic imperatives associated with globalisation, then they might well benefit from asking themselves why and under what conditions politicians and public officials invoke external economic constraints in the first place. It is to this task that we direct our attentions in this paper.

4. Consequential thinking is bad decisionmaking – if we constantly think of the consequences to every action, making decisions will take forever.

1. 
   Proves consequential thinking is not inevitable – we don’t take 3 hours to decide which color of pen to use
   
2. 
   Decreases value to life
   

5. The role of the ballot is to allow for indiscriminatory discourse – that’s a neg ballot. That’s Springer 12.

AT: Policy Relevance/Plan Focus

1. Don’t engage in state action - We have a responsibility to challenge neoliberal dominance of the policymaking sphere—it damages equality, education, and the environment

2. Empirically, policymaking focus kills political agency and fails to understand the root of neoliberalism—discursive analysis must come first

It is certainly not our intention to question the extent to which our knowledge of the empirical phenomena associated with claims of globalisation has been enhanced in this way. Nonetheless, we will argue that something quite significant is lost in this overly restrictive emphasis upon material indices of globalisation and on arguments which such indices might adjudicate.2 The implicit supposition which seems to underlie much of the sceptical or second-wave literature seeking to expose the ‘myth’ or ‘delusion’ of globalisation, is that a rigorous empirical exercise in demystification will be sufficient to reverse the tide of ill-informed public policy made in the name of globalisation. Sadly, this has not proved to be the case. For however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalisation thesis by the sceptics, their rigorous empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform public policy-making. It is here, we suggest, that the discourse of globalisation — and the discursive construction of the imperatives it is seen to conjure along with attendant fatalism about the possibilities for meaningful political agency — must enter the analysis. For, as the most cursory reflection on the issue of structure and agency reveals, it is the ideas actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself which informs the way in which they behave (Hay 1999a, forthcoming a). This is no less true ofpolicy makers and governments. Whether the globalisation thesis is ‘true’ or not may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true (or, quite possibly, just useful) by those employing it. Consequently, if the aim of the sceptics is to discredit the political appeal to dubious economic imperatives associated with globalisation, then they might well benefit from asking themselves why and under what conditions politicians and public officials invoke external economic constraints in the first place. It is to this task that we direct our attentions in this paper.

3. Policy approaches externalize globalization and fail to understand how it motivates their environment and decisions—examination of neoliberal motive must be prior

As discussions like this proceed, so the limits of rationalistic approaches become apparent. The externalization of globalization in mainstream accounts is related to the treatment of interests and identities as exogenous or prior to the processes of institutionalized interaction. The implication of much of the literature on globalization and European integration is that actors’ interests are affected by globalization and/or that it is in some actors’ interests to promote globalization. The role of globalization in actually constituting those interests and identities is largely ignored. This need not be so. Increasing attention is being paid to the complex effects of institutionalization in the EU, and particularly to the capacity of institutions to co-ordinate actor expectations, generate shared systems of belief and shape norms, values and conventions within policy communities (Cram 1997; Radaelli 1995; also Armstrong and Bulmer 1998; Garrett and Weingast 1993). It is here that constructivist approaches can add value by forcing an explanation of the social construction of the external environment as a means to understanding how particular identity claims and interests arise within a policy-making context. This is discussed further in the following section which elaborates briefly a case for the analysis of the discursive aspects of globalization and goes on to discuss how constructivism might be used to think about the usage of ‘globalization’ in the EU context. The third section of the article lays out some empirical material, with reference to the role of globalization discourses within the EU polity. The argument is that our understanding of the global–European interface can be greatly enhanced by the application of a form of constructivism. More concretely, the argument builds the hypotheses that (a) the deployment of ideas about globalization has been central to the development of a particular notion of European identity among élite policy actors but that (b) ‘globalization’ remains contested within EU policy circles.

4. Their Schmidt card concedes that we must use an analytical approach – means you prefer the negative framework.

5. Considering state action is only half of the battle – state action only considers the political economy not poststructuralism. We need both to successfully take a discursive approach. That’s Springer in 12.

AT: Theory reasons K’s are bad

Kritiks enrich the activity and expand education and learning.

Shanahan 04 (William, “Twilight of the Topical Idols: Kritik-ing In the Age of Imperialism”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25, pg. 66-77)

Make no mistake about it. Debate is in the midst of a yet-to-be-determined

revolutionary transformation, some of the outlines of which are visible and whose edifices have begun to be erected. Nonetheless, the powerful accommodational forces at work in debate, well-honed from years of brilliant, lived circumvention, are engaged in an extensive project of rehabilitation and reconstruction, designed to re-articulate the besieged, discursive hegemony of that once-great, tradition of policymaking. Contestatory, agonistic theoretical engagement exemplifies what is grand and worthy in our debate community. Provisional, local theory, imbedded in a specific resolutional context and emerging from the particularities of individual debate rounds, expands knowledge and forms better praxis.1 The long-dominant forms of traditional policymaking survived due to an extraordinary ability to absorb arguments and practices that threaten it, while maintaining an almost fetishized insularity. In the words of critical debate’s new demigod, the debate revolution needed to “strike twice,” at both the content and style of traditional debate, or risk the fate of the first Russian revolution, the sixties counter-revolution, and the worlds too numerous to mention assimilated by the Borg.2

Debate is key to examine the affirmative’s relationship to the topic.

Shanahan 04 (William, “Twilight of the Topical Idols: Kritik-ing In the Age of Imperialism”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25, pg. 66-77)

Most importantly perhaps, debate’s invigorated reflexivity1 finally acknowledged

that the process of interpretation was neither neutral nor innocent. For far too long however,

debate had proceeded as if affirmatives’ relationship to the topic was unproblematic and did not require examination. This is not to say that our very erudite community failed to recognize how interpretation was “subjective,” but rather they failed to accept the very notion that subjectivity itself was tied to politics, ideology, and philosophical bent. Not surprisingly, debate’s insularity fairly effectively prevented five decades of sustained criticism against the canons of Western philosophy and politics from entering into debate rounds and debate thinking, as if most of, for example, Continental philosophy had nothing to offer us. Even the most casual glance across a variety of disciplines demonstrated the irrefutable relevance of so-called post-structuralism and postmodernism to debate practice. For an activity that prides itself on its erudition, these theoretical oversights were conspicuous and disabling. How could such a sophisticated argumentative community fail to

consider and evaluate the relevance of such far-reaching and important changes in academic scholarship?

Kritiks are no longer on the fringes of the debate community. They are read in over 50% of debate rounds and are not unpredictable.

Bruschke 04 (Jon, Associate Professor of Communications at Cal State Fullerton, “Debate Factions and Affirmative Actions”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25, pg. 78-88)

By 1997 I was coaching at Cal. State Fullerton and the only argument my team would run on either side of the topic was critical, and that more or less brings us up-to-date on my prognostication skills and the state of contemporary debate. Bill Shanahan ended up at Fort Hayes, and they ramped the weirdness up a notch. In 2001 West Georgia won an octo-final debate on the World Government counterplan (again, the entire topic in 1947), the morning after a near-miss on the first non-decision in the history of the NDT: Dartmouth

and North Texas had found themselves in a spot where a discussion of debate, activism and critical theory broke out prior to the 2AR and lasted over an hour. A concession was offered and withdrawn, a subsequent flurry of discussion considered whether a 2AR was fair after the elapsed time, at least two judges left the room declaring they couldn’t decide the debate, and when the dust had settled and the tears were dried Dartmouth advanced. From what Ican tell, in the year 2004 more than half of all debates involve some sort of critical argument, it is issued as often by the affirmative as the negative, and those who would resist constantly refer to a promised land of substantive debate that will get to the core of the real issues, but when taken up on the offer seem only able to present phantasmatic claims about political capital (“winners lose?”). Critical arguments have thoroughly saturated the debate world, as witnessed by the acumen demonstrated in those arguments by the old guard of our activity: Northwestern, Harvard, Dartmouth, Berkeley and Kansas (when they want to), and more.

Kritiks provide negative teams fair ground in a world where affirmatives are running increasingly narrowed plans.

Bruschke 04 (Jon, Associate Professor of Communications at Cal State Fullerton, “Debate Factions and Affirmative Actions”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25, pg. 78-88)

I see pattern in all this. Since affirmatives have stopped defending the entire

resolution, negatives have had a damnable time finding links. A Dartmouth team once literally ran a chicken dung case on the hazardous waste topic, Augustana granted one guy bar membership on the free speech topic (George Anastopolo) and got a first round, I myself advocated issuing Halley’s Comet pencils to Native Americans on the space exploration resolution. At first, negatives tried topicality, which worked as far as it went but the collective judging pool seemed to have a distaste for it that was roughly akin to broccoli: You had to admit there was probably a place for it, but you didn’t want it to dominate the menu. Then hypothesis testing tried to get the affirmative to defend against all possible better alternatives, which was at least one way for the negative to try to focus back to the resolution. When policy making killed that nonsense the meatball counterplan emerged, and if affirmatives wouldn’t defend the core of the bloody topic negatives tried to make them defend all of capitalism or something equally unsavory. When permutations sent that strategy to the back burner the critique emerged, with negatives using their critiques to make affirmatives defend even broader things like Cartesianism or rationality or statism. The tool is different but the instinct is the same: Affirmatives don’t have to defend the topic so they defend as little as possible, and negatives employ strategies to make them defend the broadest ground imaginable.

Kritiks are necessary to save debate from irrelevancy.

Bruschke 04 (Jon, Associate Professor of Communications at Cal State Fullerton, “Debate Factions and Affirmative Actions”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25, pg. 78-88)

The take-home point is this: The divisions and factions now lurking in our hallways

and elim brackets are not new, nor even in my view as feisty as the divisions between the plan and the counterplan, the hypo-tester and the policy-maker, or the meatball and the permutation. They reflect real divisions in the intellectual traditions of our universities, and we would do well to welcome those points of contention into our activity. If all goes well, it might mean that through our debates our community can generate ideas that stimulate intellectual progress in those disputes, reconnecting us to the central mission of the university and making us seem less like a bizarre group of caffeine-sustained, poorly dressed frequent fliers who talk too fast and are otherwise irrelevant.

AT: Topic education

The kritik increases topic education – it forces the aff to question former assumptions which allows for a deeper understanding of the topic.

Policy approaches externalize globalization and fail to understand how it motivates their environment and decisions—examination of neoliberal motive must be prior

Rosamond, Professor of Political Science, University of Copenhagen 99 (Ben, “Discourses of globalization and the social construction of European identities”, Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, 1999, Taylor and Francis)//AS

As discussions like this proceed, so the limits of rationalistic approaches become apparent. The externalization of globalization in mainstream accounts is related to the treatment of interests and identities as exogenous or prior to the processes of institutionalized interaction. The implication of much of the literature on globalization and European integration is that actors’ interests are affected by globalization and/or that it is in some actors’ interests to promote globalization. The role of globalization in actually constituting those interests and identities is largely ignored. This need not be so. Increasing attention is being paid to the complex effects of institutionalization in the EU, and particularly to the capacity of institutions to co-ordinate actor expectations, generate shared systems of belief and shape norms, values and conventions within policy communities (Cram 1997; Radaelli 1995; also Armstrong and Bulmer 1998; Garrett and Weingast 1993). It is here that constructivist approaches can add value by forcing an explanation of the social construction of the external environment as a means to understanding how particular identity claims and interests arise within a policy-making context. This is discussed further in the following section which elaborates briefly a case for the analysis of the discursive aspects of globalization and goes on to discuss how constructivism might be used to think about the usage of ‘globalization’ in the EU context. The third section of the article lays out some empirical material, with reference to the role of globalization discourses within the EU polity. The argument is that our understanding of the global–European interface can be greatly enhanced by the application of a form of constructivism. More concretely, the argument builds the hypotheses that (a) the deployment of ideas about globalization has been central to the development of a particular notion of European identity among élite policy actors but that (b) ‘globalization’ remains contested within EU policy circles.

AT: no text

1. Ground –

   1. Kills neg flex – our entire kritik cannot be limited to single sentence, kills negative block’s strategic options.

   2. Breadth – the less specific we are the more ground they get for turns and they can still perm.

   3. No moving target – our alternative is still grounded in the alt card.

2. Education --

   1. Cross-x check abuse – they could have gotten us to clarify a specific part of the kritik if they didn’t understand it in our speech. We would have defended it.

   2. Critical thinking-- Condensing the critique into a one sentence alternative allows the affirmative to not critically think about what we are critiquing

3. Err neg on theory -- aff gets first and last speech and unlimited prep.

4. Not a voter - Reject the argument not the team.

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