***Impacts***
Timeframe is key-Space debris collisions could happen today
Imburgia 11,(Bachelors United States Air Force Academy, J.D.University of Tennessee College of Law LL.M., The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army, Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force, member of the Tennessee and the Supreme Court of the United States bars, member of the Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law. Targeting Officer, United States Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base) “ Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk”, Fri
NASA scientists have warned about the threat of the cascade effect since the late 1970s.60 In the decades since, experts have worried that collisions caused by the cascade effect “would expand for centuries, spreading chaos through the heavens”61 and multiplying space “debris to levels threatening sustainable space access.”62 “Today, next year or next decade, some piece of whirling debris will start the cascade, experts say.”63
With increased space debris the chance of a catasphrophic collision is tripled- ensuring one will occur in the next 8 years
Kessler 09 (NASA's senior scientist for orbital debris studies at the Johnson Space Center in Houston) Donald J Kessler NASA March 8, 2009 http://webpages.charter.net/dkessler/files/KesSym.html
The 1978 prediction of a catastrophic collision between catalogued objects of 0.013 per year was based on a catalogue containing 3866 objects; today, the catalogue contains about 13,000 objects, or more than 3 times as many objects. This gives a collision rate that is more than 10 times what it was just over 30 years ago, or 0.13 per year….which is the same as one catastrophic collision between cataloged objects every 8 years….with the time between collisions rapidly becoming shorter as the catalog continues to grow. The larger fragments from either explosions or collisions will further accelerate the rate of collisions. Most of the collisions in the 1978 paper were predicted to take place between 800 km and 1000 km altitude. That is even truer today. Not only is this region rapidly growing, certain altitudes contain a high concentrations of satellites, and the inclinations of their orbits are near polar, both conditions increasing the probability that they will collide, and do so with collision velocities that average more than 10 km/sec. We are entering a new era of debris control….an era that will be dominated by a slowly increasing number of random catastrophic collisions. These collisions will continue in the 800 km to 1000 km altitude regions, but will eventually spread to other regions. The control of future debris requires, at a minimum, that we not leave future payloads and rocket bodies in orbit after their useful life and might require that we plan launches to return some objects already in orbit. These control measures will significantly increase the cost of debris control measures; but if we do not do them, we will increase the cost of future space activities even more. We might be tempted to put increasing amounts of shielding on all spacecraft to protect them and increase their life, or we might just accept shorter lifetimes for all spacecraft. However, neither option is acceptable: More shielding not only increases cost, but it also increases both the frequency of catastrophic collisions and the amount of debris generated when such a collision occurs. Accepting a shorter lifetime also increases cost, because it means that satellites must be replaced more often….with the failed satellites again increasing the catastrophic collision rate and producing larger amounts of debris. Aggressive space activities without adequate safeguards could significantly shorten the time between collisions and produce an intolerable hazard to future spacecraft. Some of the most environmentally dangerous activities in space include large constellations such as those initially proposed by the Strategic Defense Initiative in the mid-1980s, large structures such as those considered in the late-1970s for building solar power stations in Earth orbit, and anti-satellite warfare using systems tested by the USSR, the U.S., and China over the past 30 years. Such aggressive activities could set up a situation where a single satellite failure could lead to cascading failures of many satellites in a period of time much shorter than years. As is true for many environmental problems, the control of the orbital debris environment may initially be expensive, but failure to control leads to disaster in the long-term. Catastrophic collisions between catalogued objects in low Earth orbit are now an important environmental issue that will dominate the debris hazard to future spacecraft.
2NC Impact Extension
Nuclear War with Russia would lead to extinction- The impact of a nuclear existential risk must be weighed first
Bostrom 2 (Nick, Dir. Future of Humanity Institute and Prof. Philosophy – Oxford U., Journal of Evolution and Technology, “Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards”, 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)
The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3] A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic work has been done in this area. Part of the explanation may be that many of the gravest risks stem (as we shall see) from anticipated future technologies that we have only recently begun to understand. Another part of the explanation may be the unavoidably interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking seriously about a depressing topic. The point, however, is not to wallow in gloom and doom but simply to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival. In order to do that, we need to know where to focus our efforts.
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