no contagion from Bangladesh or India to Sri Lanka in 1989, pending confirmation from Moore. Moore confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail.
Nepal, 1960 (vs. Nepali Congress – State A could be India or China)
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No mention of substate conflicts in India or China in UCDP conflict summary.
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Chinese and Indian substate conflicts appear not to be involved based on Tribhuvan Nath, The Nepalese Dilemma, 1960-1974 (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1975), pp. 196-208. Basically a conflict between the King and parliamentarians, though Marxists (including Maoists) were on the periphery.
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Chinese and Indian substate conflicts appear not to be involved based on Frederick H. Gaige, “Nepal: Compromise and Liberalization,” Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1969: 94-98. In fact, CCP was opposed to the Nepali Congress.
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Chinese and Indian substate conflicts appear not to be involved based on Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 46.
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Hence I will code no contagion from India or China to Nepal in 1960, pending confirmation from Riaz. Riaz confirms in 6/29/10 e-mail.
Nepal, 1996 (vs. CPN–M – State A could be Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, or Pakistan)
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Peru Nepal, 1996. See below.
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India Nepal, 1996. UCDP conflict summary: “CPN-M … received secondary support in the form of training and military hardware from a number of Indian Maoist insurgency movements, amongst them the Maoist Communist Centre and the People's War Group.” This makes it look more like contagion from India than from China. No mention of other potential State As.
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No mention of potential State As (besides India) in Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 119-134. Ideological inspiration from India is noted, though very early in the Maoist movement’s life (late 1940s). Also significant inspiration from Peru (p. 126) – the “Maoist” appellation seems to stem from Indian and Peruvian inspiration, not Chinese.
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No mention of potential State As in Deepak Thapa with Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004, Updated Edition (London: Zed Books, 2004), pp. 53-109.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Pakistan to Nepal in 1996, pending confirmation from Riaz. Riaz confirms in 6/29/10 e-mail.
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Update, 1/12/11: In Askok K. Mehta and Mahendra Lawoti, “Military Dimensions of the ‘People’s War’: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Nepal,” in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, eds., The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 179, it is alleged that while the CPN-M received no more than 15% of its arms from outside the country, these arms “could have been acquired from” both the Indian Maoists and the Sri Lankan LTTE. I will not code Sri Lanka Nepal contagion because this link seems far too marginal (and since Riaz confirmed it did not exist).
Thailand, 1951 (vs. Navy military faction – State A could be Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, or China)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As in Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1979), pp. 49-55.
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No mention of potential State As in Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 140-144. Communist suspicions and intrigue abound in intra-regime struggle, but no mentions of specific countries (besides U.S.).
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Hence I will code no contagion from China, Indonesia, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Thailand in 1951, pending confirmation from Phongpaichit.
Thailand, 1974 (vs. CPT – State A could be South Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, or Philippines) – substate conflict onset occurred in 1974 and civil war onset occurred in 1976
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China Thailand, 1974. UCDP conflict summary: “CPT (Communist Party of Thailand) was formed on 1 December 1942 as the Thai section of the Chinese Communist party. The group continued to be heavily influenced by China and also received various support from China. … In 1962, a small, pro-CPT, radio station, VOPT (Voice of the People of Thailand), began broadcasting from the Chinese province of Yunnan. … Radio Hanoi and Radio Beijing also broadcasted similar messages.” (Seemingly not related to South Vietnam substate conflict, though.)
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Also: “Some early party members who had gone to China to fight in the revolution returned to Thailand, including Udom Srisuwan, a Christian-educated Chinese-Chan who became … the party’s main theoretician.” (Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 181) No mention of other potential State As (besides Laos and Malaysia).
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Laos Thailand, 1974/1976. UCDP conflict summary: “Since the 1960s, there had been recurring reports about CPT (Communist Party of Thailand) receiving vast support from mainly China but also from North Vietnam and Laos. In the mid-1970s, following the Khmer Rouge’s victory in Cambodia in 1975, support was reported also from Cambodia. The support reportedly consisted of mainly weapons, funds, training and the granting of temporary sanctuaries for CPT rebels.” Some Thai meddling in Laos as well (see Chapter 5). See above on North Vietnam. No mention of other potential State As.
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Cambodia Thailand, 1974/1976. Evangelization present, as discussed in Chapter 5.
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South Vietnam Thailand, 1974/1976. Meddling with overt partiality present, as discussed in Chapter 5.
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Malaysia Thailand, 1974. “In the Far South, it still seems difficult to find one’s way between the guerillas of the Malayan CP … and the CPT; they most certainly cooperate ideologically as well as out of necessity, and have probably carved their own zones.” (Patrice de Beer, “History and Policy of the Communist Party of Thailand,” in Andrew Turton, Jonathan Fast, and Malcolm Caldwell, eds., Thailand: Roots of Conflict (Nottingham, U.K.: Spokesman, 1978), p. 147) No mention of other potential State As (besides China).
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No mention of State As’ contribution to 1974 onset (besides those noted above) in Stephen I. Alpern, “Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: A New Cause for Alarm,” Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 8 (1975): 684-692.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Thailand in 1974, pending confirmation from Phongpaichit.
Thailand, 2003 (vs. Patani insurgents – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, or Philippines)
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Cambodia Thailand, 2003. Aurel Croissant e-mail, 6/15/10: “I cannot see any influence of the … conflict in Cambodia on Pat(t)ani – except perhaps the fact, that the Cambodia-Conflict played a role for the small arms trade on the Malay peninsula including Southern Thailand.”
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Indonesia Thailand, 2003. UCDP conflict summary: “More substantial claims have been made that some Thai insurgents have received training in Indonesia, especially in the region of Aceh, but it has not been clarified to what extent this has taken place as part of a planned support of the Thai insurgency.” Malaysian state support is also alleged, but no recent substate conflicts in Malaysia (CPM was last active in 1981, and this is not the Malaysian state). No mention of Cambodia, Myanmar, or the Philippines.
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Afghanistan Thailand, 2003. The group GMIP is comprised of “Patani natives returned from fighting with the mujahideen in Afghanistan” (UCDP conflict summary) and this group comprised a significant component of Patani insurgent leadership in 2004 (Kanid Utitsarn, “Insurgency in 3 Provinces in Southern Part of Thailand,” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project (2007), p. 2). No mention of other potential State As’ conflicts (besides Indonesia) in Utitsarn 2007.
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Philippines Thailand, 2003. “Some groups are involved in arms-trade to Aceh, Mindanao, and Sri Lanka.” (Aurel Croissant, “Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19 (2007): 1-18, p. 6)
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Sri Lanka Thailand, 2003. “Some groups are involved in arms-trade to Aceh, Mindanao, and Sri Lanka.” (Aurel Croissant, “Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19 (2007): 1-18, p. 6) No mention of Cambodia or Myanmar/Burma.
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No mention of additional State As (besides those noted above) in Patcharawat Thnaprarnsing, “Solving the Conflict in Southern Thailand,” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project (2009).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Myanmar to Thailand in 2003, pending confirmation from Croissant. Croissant confirms in 6/15/10 e-mail.
Cambodia, 1967 (vs. KR – State A could be Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, or South Vietnam)
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China Cambodia, 1967. “[Pol Pot] had his own concept of a revived Angkorean glory. His, inspired by the brutal China of Mao Zedong, called for a new atheistic civilization built atop a totally destroyed past.” (Wilfred P. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970-1975 (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), p. 42) No mention of Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, or Burma/Myanmar.
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South Vietnam Cambodia, 1967. “Despite his sympathy for the communists abroad, Sihanouk was wary of leftists in Cambodia. In 1963, with the war exploding in neighboring Vietnam [at this point an intrastate conflict in South Vietnam], he moved openly and dramatically against the left, … [forcing] the leading leftists to flee Phnom Penh. Among them were the top central committee members of the Khmer Rouge. … Most of these Khmer Rouge fled to a Vietnamese communist base along the border, … hoping to lead their own insurgency against Sihanouk one day.” (Elizabeth Becker, When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution, Second Edition (New York: PublicAffairs, 1998), pp. 10-11) No mention of Indonesia, Malaysia, or Burma/Myanmar; role of Laos seems quite limited (but I should ask – Becker says “Laos was a very junior partner”).
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to 1967 onset (besides China) in Edward Kissi, Revolution and Genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 19-44.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, or Myanmar to Cambodia, pending confirmation from Becker. Becker confirms in 6/15/10 e-mail.
Laos, 1959 (vs. Pathet Lao/Neutralists – State A could be Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, South Vietnam, or China)
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South Vietnam Laos, 1959. Laos granted an embassy to South Vietnam but not North Vietnam, which led to increased North Vietnamese support to the Pathet Lao, contributing heavily to the civil war onset there in 1959. See Chapter 5 for more detail and sourcing.
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“On 15 December 1958, a Lao patrol was fired upon in a disputed area close to the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. This remote mountain valley was of considerable strategic importance for the DRV, since it provided an infiltration route around the western end of the demilitarized zone for communist cadres moving south. The DRV immediately … dispatched ‘a battalion-sized force’ into the disputed area. In response to this incident, … Phuy Xananikon demanded and received emergency powers to govern for a period of one year without recourse to the Assembly – a move which effectively eliminated any parliamentary forum for the [communist] LPF.” This sets in motion a wave of anti-communist repression that ultimately leads to the civil war. The international incident would not occurred without the intrastate conflict in South Vietnam – the reason the area was important to the DRV. (Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 105-108) No mention of other potential State As.
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China Laos, 1959. “Concurrent with [Phuy Xananikon’s] anti-communist activities in 1959, China set up a center for training Pathet Lao cadres in Yunnan and sent into Laos cadres of the Ho Tribe.” Does note that China’s influence on Lao communists was overshadowed by DRV until later in the war. (Don Fletcher and Geoff Gunn, Revolution in Laos: The “Fourth Generation” of People’s War? (Townsville, Australia: Southeast Asian Monograph Series No. 8, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981), p. 36) No mention of other potential State As (besides Vietnam).
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Also: “The ideological orientation of the Pathet Lao movement was influenced from the outset by the Maoist model.” (p. 39)
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No mention of potential State As (besides Vietnam) in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Vietnam and China) in C.J. Christie, “Marxism and the History of the Nationalist Movements in Laos,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1979): 146-158.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Laos in 1959, pending confirmation from Stuart-Fox. Stuart-Fox confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail – also claims that the “Chinese influence we now know was minimal,” although I still think what I found above is sufficient to code contagion.
Laos, 1989 (vs. LRM – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, or Philippines)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. The rebels congregated in refugee camps in Thailand, but Thailand had no proximate conflict (the CPT certainly wouldn’t have supported them).
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No mention of potential State As in Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 201.
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No mention of potential State As in Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 498-502.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, or the Philippines to Laos, pending confirmation from Stuart-Fox. Stuart-Fox confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail.
South Vietnam, 1955 (vs. FNL – State A could be Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, or China)
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China South Vietnam, 1955. Edward Miller e-mail, 6/18/10: “All senior VWP leaders and strategists were very familiar with Mao’s ideas and repeatedly described themselves as practitioners of ‘people’s war.’”
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Philip E. Catton, Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950-1963 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), especially pp. 89-90.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Truong Nhu Tang with David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai, A Vietcong Memoir (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), pp. 1-80.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, or Thailand to South Vietnam, pending confirmation from David Hunt (recommended by Edward Miller, who was recommended by Jacobs). Hunt more or less confirms in 6/24/10 e-mail.
Malaysia, 1958 (vs. CPM – State A could be Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, South Vietnam, or China)
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This appears not to be a legitimate onset, based on Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), pp. 257-264. The CPM originally started fighting the British in an extra-state conflict in 1948 (not included in the scope of this project). In 1957 the British handed over the Malay state to an anti-communist government that continued the fight against the now mainly defunct communists. So there doesn’t appear to have been a real onset in 1958 – this conflict is best viewed as one continuous, low-grade conflict starting in 1948 and ending in 1989, and out of the scope of this project because it started as extrastate.
Malaysia, 1963 (vs. CCO – State A could be Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, South Vietnam, or China)
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China Malaysia, 1963. “Both Wen and Bong [SCO/CCO leaders] had opted to renounce their citizenship and left for China … on 27 June 1962. … The group was escorted to Beijing … as overseas Chinese guests of the State Department and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau. Wen and Bong spent the next seven or eight months in China, … meeting Chinese officials associated with foreign affairs.” (Vernon L. Porritt, The Rise and Fall of Communism in Sarawak, 1940-1990 (Victoria, Australia: Monash University Press, 2004), p. 83) No mention of other potential State As’ conflicts.
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Also: “Many young Chinese are proud of the achievements of Communist China and feel what is good in China should be copied here.” (Quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, “Communism in Sarawak Today,” Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 10 (1966): 568-579, p. 575) The CCO allegedly had “a Vietcong-style training camp” (ibid), but not sure this really qualifies as South Vietnam Malaysia contagion. No mention of other potential State A conflicts.
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Also: “It is perhaps partly because of these Maoist ideological influences particularly in the practice of modern insurgency, that the heterogeneous rebel elements have been able to establish any pattern of coordinated action at all.” (Justus M. van der Kroef, “The Sarawak-Indonesian Border Insurgency,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1968): 245-265, p. 258) No mention of other potential State A conflicts.
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No mention of potential State A conflicts in UCDP conflict summary. Indonesia supported the CCO, but this appears unrelated to any Indonesian conflicts.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, or South Vietnam to Malaysia, pending confirmation from Porritt. Porritt confirms in 8/5/10 e-mail.
Malaysia, 1974 (vs. CPM – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, South Vietnam, or Thailand)
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Based on UCDP summary, this appears not to be a legitimate re-onset. CPM was active through the 1960s and early 1970s.
Malaysia, 1981 (vs. CPM – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, or Thailand)
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Based on UCDP summary, this appears not to be a legitimate re-onset. CPM was active throughout the late 1970s.
Philippines, 1946 (vs. HUK – State A could be China)
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Based on Alfredo B. Saulo, Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction (Manila: Ateneo Publications, 1969), pp. 1-49, this onset appears to be pre-1946. The Huk militia originated in 1942 and fought the Japanese-run government of the Philippines. There was only a 2-3-year lull in the fighting after Allied liberation of the Philippines before Huk was reactivated and starting fighting the new Filipino government. (In any case, Chinese communism appears to have had only a very limited influence on Filipino communism at this stage.)
Philippines, 1969 (vs. CPP – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, or South Vietnam)
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Based on UCDP conflict summary, this does not appear to be a legitimate re-onset. CPP split off from HUK in 1968, after being expelled by the HUK leadership of the Filipino communists. HUK was still active in the 1960s, suggesting the CPP conflict is just a continuation of the HUK conflict from the 1940s. See also Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 97-98: “Even after the Huk Rebellion collapsed, low-level violence had continued as some Huk commanders and their protégés refused to surrender. The young Maoists of the CPP forged tenuous links with these Huk remnants, all of which were active in banditry at the time in the central Luzon area north of Manila, sparking another round in the conflict.”
Philippines, 1970 (vs. MIM/MNLF – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, or South Vietnam)
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No mention of potential State A conflicts in UCDP conflict summary. Malaysian support for rebels is noted, but this seems unrelated to the dual communist insurgencies in Malaysia.
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No mention of potential State A conflicts in W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 74-84, 138-148. Nur Misauri was a Marxist (p. 77), but this doesn’t seem to have anything to do with China. MNLF training in PLO camps is also mentioned, but this was probably post-onset (Arab World support for the MNLF began around 1971 and escalated slowly from there; civil war onset was in 1972 according to UCDP/PRIO).
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No mention of potential State A conflicts in Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front,” Background Paper to Philippine Human Development Report (2005).
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No mention of potential State A conflicts (besides China) in Dennis Shoesmith, “Islam and Revolution in the Southern Philippines,” Dyason House Papers, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1983): 2-12. MNLF did use Maoist tactics and ideology to some extent, but seemingly post-onset (party documents cited are from the early 1980s, and a change in tactics to Maoist methods is noted, suggesting in the earlier period Maoism was not involved).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, China, or South Vietnam to the Philippines, pending confirmation from Kathleen Nadeau (writer of a general history on the Philippines). Nadeau confirms in 6/18/10 e-mail (but not for South Vietnam, which I didn’t consider to be a State A at the time – South Vietnam is absent from the secondary sources, however).
Indonesia, 1950 (vs. Republic of South Moluccas – State A could be Myanmar, Philippines, or China)
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No mention of potential State As in Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 139.
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No mention of potential State As’ conflicts in Dieter Bartels, “Can the Train Ever Be Stopped Again? Developments in the Moluccan Community in the Netherlands Before and After the Hijackings,” Indonesia, Vol. 41 (1986): 23-45.
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No mention of potential State As’ conflicts in Guy J. Pauker, “Government Responses to Armed Insurgency in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Examination of Failures and Successes and their Likely Implications for the Future,” Rand Paper Series (1985), p. 17.
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Hence I will code
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