US
By some margin, the US is the largest country donor to Pakistan, having contributed a quarter of all development aid since 1960. US military and development aid to Pakistan increased rapidly following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as the government sought to enlist it as an ally in counterterrorism efforts. Currently US assistance is guided by the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009, which authorizes $1.5bn in annual non-military assistance to Pakistan for financial years 2010 to 2014, and “such sums as may be necessary’ for military assistance.”374 In practice, levels of support have fallen short of this in each year since 2011 by $400-500 million. Under the Act, in order to receive military aid, Pakistan is expected to demonstrate progress and co-operation with the US on counterterrorism, non-proliferation and democracy, although the requirements for the State Department to verify compliance in certain areas was waived in September 2012; the government cited “national security interests” as the reason for the waivers.375
US development aid in recent years has focussed on helping Pakistan establish political parties and conduct elections; on vaccination and other health programmes; and on primary and tertiary education. The US has also supported Pakistan in pursuing economic reforms, such as improving tax collection, strengthening border management and building infrastructure.
UK
The UK has had an aid relationship with Pakistan since independence in 1947. Total development aid since 1960, in inflation-adjusted dollars, has been $5.9 billion. DFID’s Operational Programme for the 2011-15 period aims to build stability, particularly in the border regions; to improve the functioning of Pakistan’s democracy and electoral process; to promote economic development and reform, particularly through skill training and increasing access to microfinance; and to improve the delivery of public services, particularly health and education.
As a result of the March 2011 bilateral aid review, relative to the previous four-year period, aid to Pakistan is planned to increase by 148% over 2011/12 to 2014/15. By 2013/14, it will be the UK’s largest aid partner, receiving more than £400m per year. Humanitarian disasters may result in total aid flows being higher still. Education programmes will be expanded dramatically, and will come to account for over half of total aid spending in Pakistan (see chart). They will include some of the largest individual programmes in DFID’s history, including a £203.5m programme in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (recently commenced) and a £260m programme in Punjab (planned). Regionally, aid will be focussed on Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. As in the past, a large proportion of aid is expected to be channelled through government, although, as a result of the moves towards greater devolution by the PPP-led Government since 2010, this will take place predominantly at the provincial rather than the federal level. As the Operational Plan puts it:376
If we are to support the GoP [government of Pakistan] in demonstrating that it can deliver to its people, we must continue to channel resources through their systems and strengthen their capacity. However, where GoP leadership is weak or where we are not confident in fiduciary safeguards, we will look for alternative delivery mechanisms.
In its assessment of DFID’s work in Pakistan, published in October 2012, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact expressed confidence in its education programmes, on the basis of a detailed examination of four existing projects, together worth £107 million.377 There is also cause for optimism in the experience of the World Bank, whose support for the education sector has been among the most successful elements of its partnership strategy. On health, the ICAI expressed concern that the process of devolution in Pakistan had affected the results achieved for certain programmes, while the DFID’s humanitarian response was commended for its design and attention to value for money.
In addition to corruption and Pakistan’s tangled bureaucracy, aid efforts are hampered by rising levels of violence, driven by the conflict between the Pakistan military and rebel groups in the FATA and a sharp increase in sectarian violence and terrorist attacks. Security constraints prevent DFID staff (and those of many other development agencies) from travelling freely to Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA. Further decentralization of staff from two existing offices, in Islamabad and Lahore, is planned only if security conditions permit.378
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