THE PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE IS A KEY COMPONENT OF PHILOSOPHY

THE PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE IS A KEY COMPONENT OF PHILOSOPHY

1. PHILOSPHY MUST BE EVALUATED IN TERMS OF “TRUTH” AND “GOODNESS”

Mortimer Adler, philosopher, THE CONDITIONS OF PHILSOPHY, 1965, p. 31-32.

For philosophy to be respectable as a branch of knowledge, philosophical theories or conclusions must be capable of being judged by appropriate criteria of goodness; or, in other words, they must be capable of being judged by reference to an appropriately formulated standard of truth. The two words that require comment are italicized ones—“goodness” and “truth.” The criteria of goodness appropriate to anything that claims to be knowledge are criteria of truth. To say, in connection with historical scholarship, scientific research, or philosophical though, that one conclusion is better than another is to say that it is sounder or truer. When I lay down the requirement that philosophical theories or conclusions must be capable of being judged for their relative truth—one truer or sounder than another—I am saying that if philosophy is a branch of knowledge, in the same sense that history or science is, then it can never suffice merely to find one philosophical theory more to our liking than another; or to regard one as better than another simply because it is more pleasing to consider, more harmonious to contemplate, or more useful for whatever purpose we have in mind. We must be able to say that it is truer than another, or at least to hope that we can find some theory which is truer than others. And when we say this, we must use the word “truer” in the same sense in which we apply it in making judgments about scientific theories or historical conclusions, relative to one another. What is that sense? Since we are not here concerned with episteme, but only with knowledge in the sense of doxa, we can eliminate at once the standard of indubitable and incorrigible truth that is set by self-evident propositions and demonstrated conclusions. We can also eliminate, I think, the standard of truth which would be set by statements that are completely verified by empirical data, if complete verification were possible, as many now realize it is not.

Mortimer Adler, philosopher, THE CONDITIONS OF PHILSOPHY, 1965, p. 43.

The last condition concerns the subject matter of those questions which are purely philosophical –that is, which belong to philosophy, and to philosophy alone, as a special field of learning or mode of inquiry. Such questions must be primarily questions about which is and happens in the world or about what men should do and seek, and only secondarily questions about how we know, think, or speak about that which is and happens or about what men do and seek. Questions about what men do and seek are concerned with human conduct and the organization of society. They deal, for example, with such matters as good and evil; right and wrong; the order of goods; duties and obligations; virtues and vices; happiness, life’s purpose or goal; justice and rights in the sphere of human relations and social interactions; the state and its relations to the individual; the good society, the just policy, and the just economy; war and peace.
3. PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE MUST BE PUBLIC, NOT PRIVATE

Mortimer Adler, philosopher, THE CONDITIONS OF PHILSOPHY, 1965, p. 36-37.

To be worthy of respect as a mode of inquiry aiming at knowledge and developing theories capable of being tested for their relative truth and capable of being falsified, rectified, or improved, philosophy too should be conducted as a public enterprise. The operative word here is “public.” We have come to see that any human work is personal in some sense and to some degree—a scientific theory, a historical interpretation, as well as a poem or a painting. But the inescapable personal character of any work does not necessarily make it exclusively personal in the sense of being wholly private. It can have a public as well as a private aspect. There may be some things which are exclusively private, such as certain emotional experiences, the mystic’s vision, the voice of conscience, and the like. The exclusively private is, of course, also incommunicable. Hence insofar as knowledge in general, and any branch of knowledge in particular, is communicable, it cannot be exclusively private.

IT IS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH TRUTH IN VALUE JUDGEMENTS

1. VALUE JUDGEMENTS CAN BE TRUE FOR INDIVIDUALS

Mortimer Adler, Philosopher, the truth and the good -is and ought. http://www.radicalacademy.com/adlertruthgood.htm, Accessed June 1, 2003. p-np.

Now let us turn in the opposite direction and ask whether there is any truth in our value judgments -- our judgments about things as good or bad. When such judgments are challenged, most people find it difficult to defend them by giving reasons calculated to persuade others to agree with them. Since individuals obviously differ from one another in their desires, what one person regards as good may not be so regarded by another. Unless I am lying, my statement that I regard something as good (which is tantamount to saying that I desire it) is a true statement about me, but that would seem to be as far as it goes. The judgment that the object in question is good would not appear to be true in a sense that commands universal assent -- good not just for me but for everyone else as well.

Mortimer Adler, Philosopher, the truth and the good -is and ought. http://www.radicalacademy.com/adlertruthgood.htm, Accessed June 1, 2003. p-np.

We are thus brought face to face with the much disputed question about the objectivity or subjectivity of value judgments. In the contemporary world, skepticism about value judgments prevails on all sides. Value judgments, it is generally thought, express nothing more than individual likes or dislikes, desires or aversions. They are entirely subjective and relative to the individual who makes them. If they have any truth at all, it is only the truth that is contained in a statement about the individual who is making the judgment -- the truth that he regards a certain object as good because he, in fact, desires it.
3. FINDING TRUTH IN VALUE STATEMENTS IS NECESSARY TO CONFRONT SKEPTICISM

Mortimer Adler, Philosopher, the truth and the good -is and ought. http://www.radicalacademy.com/adlertruthgood.htm, Accessed June 1, 2003. p-np.

To refute the skeptical view, which makes all value judgments subjective and relative to individual desires, we must be able to show how prescriptive statements can be objectively true. An understanding of truth as including more than the kind of truth that can be found in descriptive statements thus becomes the turning point in our attempt to establish a certain measure of objectivity in our judgments about what is good and bad. Only through such understanding will we be able to show that some value judgments belong to the sphere of truth, instead of all being relegated to the sphere of taste and thus reduced to matters about which reasonable men should not argue with one another or expect to reach agreement.