Prolif good – War


AT Prolif Solves War (General)



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AT Prolif Solves War (General)




Prolif creates numerous chances for conflict. Letting prolif happen causes far more destructive wars.


Russell ‘3  (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld)

The preceding analysis makes plain the weak analytic reeds on which nuclear proliferation optimists base their case. They mistakenly extrapolate the conditions in the Cold War superpower rivalry to those of contemporary major regional rivalries. Today's regional conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia differ markedly from the US-Soviet standoff, most notably in that they involve border disputes that were not part of the superpower conflict in which spheres of influence were clearly delineated. Moreover, contemporary regional conflicts are pitted with nationalism and the drive for prestige, power and interest and actors may prefer the risk of war to the perceived injustices of the 'peaceful' status quo. Waltz and like-minded thinkers assume that nation-states will rationally calculate costs, benefits and risks as would a detached third party. In reality, however, political actors may view their circumstances much differently than outside observers. The scenarios described here with their historical analogies are illustrative of the complexities of statecraft and war that fundamentally undermine the notion that nuclear weapons - in any and all circumstances - will prevent the outbreak of war between nuclear-armed belligerents. In their quest for theoretical parsimony, the optimists overly simplify the realities of international politics. They fail to heed Morgenthau's warning that 'The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impos~ible.'C~o~nsequently, the arguments by proliferation optimists are inadequate for deriving policy prescriptions for dealing with the concrete dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons proliferation. A laissez-faire policy toward nuclear weapons proliferation will not in itself render war obsolete as an instrument of statecraft. Instead, such a policy would likely increase the odds of more destructive wars between nation-states in the Middle East and South Asia.


Current nuclear state is stable, but further prolif causes crisis instability and collapse of deterrence.

Cimbala 8 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Russian-U.S. Nuclear Force Reductions and Nuclear Proliferation,” vol. 27, issue 5, 6/3/2k8, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Russian-U.S.+Nuclear+Force+Reductions+and+Nuclear+Proliferation&rft.jtitle=Comparative+Strategy&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen+J&rft.date=2008-10-21&rft.issn=0149-5933&rft.volume=27&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=431&rft.epage=450&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F01495930802185460&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_01495930802185460 /mr)

Conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows. First, a deterrence-stable and crisis-stable nuclear world can be imagined, and even arranged, if sensible diplomacy can be combined with realistic expectations about military plans and technologies. It’s a win-win for the existing nuclear weapons states to make their interactions more predictable and less threat based. It’s also a win-win for them to keep other states from joining the nuclear club. The case for optimism about nuclear weapons spread has been made elsewhere by theorists, but few diplomats or military planners tasked with managing the problem of proliferation have been favorably impressed.26

Proliferation won’t deter war -- bad command and control, rapid response risks inadvertent war and proliferation would be rapid.


Busch ‘4 (Nathan, Visiting Ass. Prof. Public & Int’l Affairs – Center for Int’l. Trade & Security – UGA, “ No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 301-302)

*NWS= Nuclear Weapons State



This study has revealed numerous reasons to be skeptical hat the spread of nuclear weapons would increase international stability by helping prevent conventional and nuclear wars. Because there is reason to suspect that emerging NWSs will not handle their nuclear weapons and fissile materials any better than current NWSs have, we should conclude that the further spread of nuclear weapons will end to undermine international stability in a number of ways. First, because emerging NWSs will probably rely on inadequate command-and-control systems, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use will tend to be fairly high. Second, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt systems that allow for rapid response, the risks of inadvertent war will also be high, especially during crisis situations. Third, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt MPC&A systems that are vulnerable to overt attacks and insider thefts, the further spread of nuclear weapons could lead to rapid, destabilizing proliferation and increased opportunities for nuclear terrorism.
Even if prolif results in some stability, theater missiles means there’s less time for rational decision-making – guarantees preemption and accidental nuclear war

Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)

Even under the “optimistic” assumption of eight-sided nuclear parity in force size force characteristics and operational assumptions make a considerable difference for crisis and arms race stability. Most states in Asia will depend on land based missiles and/or bomber delivered weapons as the bulwark of their deterrents. Few will be capable of operating fleets of ballistic missile submarines as does the United States. Thus, ICBM or IRBM/MRBM dependent countries in Asia will rely on alerted forces and prompt launch to guarantee survivability. Hair triggers may be more the rule than the exception. In addition, many of the land based missiles available to Asian powers for use as “strategic” launchers will be of medium or intermediate range, theater, as opposed to intercontinental, missiles. These theater range missiles will have shorter flight times than true ICBMs, allowing less time for the defender's launch detection, decision making and response. Errors in launch detection, in the estimation of enemy intentions, and in choice of response are more likely with shorter, compared to longer, range missiles. The high dependency of Asian forces on land based missiles will be compounded by command and control systems that may be accident prone or politically ambiguous. In democratic states, political control over the military is guaranteed by checks and balances and by constitutional fiat. In authoritarian polities, the military may operate as a political tool of the ruling clique or it may be an autonomous political force, subject to intrigue and coup plotting. The possibility of political overthrow or military usurpation during a nuclear crisis would not be ruled out in systems lacking constitutional or other political safeguards. The danger is not only that of Bonapartism on the part of disgruntled officers. It is also the danger of panic in the face of nuclear threats and an institutional military bias for getting in the first blow to maximize the possibility of military victory and avoid defeat.
Nuclear weapons don’t guarantee stability – empirics prove

Cimbala 96 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Proliferation and peace: An agnostic view,” vol. 22, issue 1, , 1996, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139 /mr)

Other contributions from nuclear agnostics provide grounds for skepticism about a positive association between nuclear weapons spread and international stability, based on case studies of nuclear crisis management and force operations or on the operations of nuclear command and control systems generally. Studies of nuclear crisis management by Richard K. Betts, Alexander L. George, Richard Ned Lebow, and Scott D. Sagan, among others, have called into question many of the assumptions about decision making on which rational deterrence theory is based.(44) These studies were supported by extensive analyses of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear command and control systems, including detailed information about their operational biases and military-doctrinal proclivities, by Bruce Blair, Desmond Ball, Paul Bracken, and others.45 These "crisis management/ force operations" and "command and control" literatures jointly call into question the assumption that rational deterrence theory leads to optimism about nuclear proliferation. Peter D. Feaver has explained that nuclear command and control organizations must optimize between the "always" requirement, for responsiveness to authorized commands in order to avoid vulnerability, and the "never" requirement, to prevent accidental or unauthorized nuclear use.(46) He notes that one cannot infer the behavior of nuclear command systems without taking into account those environments or domains which might influence nuclear use decisions. These environments are the strategic weapons systems and force structures; the strategic environments in which a state's policy is located; and, most significant in the present context, the strategic culture of a state, including its patterns of civilmilitary relations and whether that pattern emphasizes "delegative" or "assertive" control by civilians over military operations.(47) The work of Blair, Sagan, Feaver, and others who are attempting to develop testable hypotheses about nuclear organizational behavior is important for another reason. Testable propositions about leaders' decision making and command system performances will help to settle some past disputes about how behaviorally correct deterrence theory really is.(48) Deterrence has always been promoted as a species of rational decision theory: it depends upon arguments about cost-benefit ratios and calculations of expected gains and losses.(49) For many of its critics, however, U.S. versions of nuclear deterrence theory suffered from vacuous arguments and insufficient validation in comparative case studies.(50) Much of the deterrence literature, like a great deal of the Marxist literature, served as a scholastic rallying point for polemicist argument instead of a source of disinterested scientific research or policy studies.
Their turns assume a Cold War environment – they aren’t applicable anymore

Cimbala 5 - Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Nuclear weapons in the Twenty-first century: From simplicity to complexity,” vol. 21, issue 3, 10/1/ 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Nuclear+weapons+in+the+Twenty-first+century%3A+From+simplicity+to+complexity&rft.jtitle=Defense+%26+Security+Analysis&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-09-30&rft.issn=1475-1798&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=267&rft.epage=281&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F0743017052000344947&rft.externalDBID=DFSA&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_0743017052000344947 /mr)

The role of nuclear weapons in twenty-first-century confiict is uncertain. Nuclear weapons acted as a basically stabilizing force for most of the Cold War. Once the US and the Soviet Union both deployed highly survivable nuclear retaliatory forces, the logic of mutual deterrence superseded policy based on nuclear brinkmanship. Although political rivalry between Moscow and Washington remained a fact until the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, deterrence based on mutual vulnerability remained the paradigm that dominated US thinking and planning for nuclear deterrence and, if necessary, war. Some have asserted that, in the twenty-first-century international political environment, nuclear deterrence based on mutual vulnerability has been superseded by events and technology. The absence of a US-Russian political rivalry, the development of new threats to US security, and the potential for new technology for missile defenses together raise the possibility of a new security road map. Missile defenses, if reliable against plausible and constrained threats, could complicate or overturn the balance of terror based on mutual vulnerability - or so technology optimists hope, and pessimists fear.



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