Prolif good – War
Terrorists can’t obtain WMD’s – too expensive and no interest
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- NPT Regime strong – response to noncompliance proves Fields Enia ‘9
- NPT regime effective – affects non-signatory states Fields Enia ‘9
- Non-compliance does not signal crisis but rather realities the NPT regime was built to handle Fields Enia ‘9
- NPT should not be abandoned – sparked nonproliferation and can effectively continue the norm Leaver ‘5
- NPT effectively discourages proliferation – latent nuclear states prove Rublee 8
- The NPT bolsters a norm of nonproliferation Rublee 8
- Despite NPT shortcomings, abandonment risks conflict Ayson ‘5
- Compliance K2 NPT Compliance key to global perception of NPT effectiveness Dunn 9
- US Key US key to solve the NPT. Curtis, ‘8
- ***NPT Bad***
- Perception of discrimination. Wesley, ‘5
- Loopholes. Claussen, ‘8
- Unenforceability. Council on Foreign Relations, ‘5
- Outdated. Garvey, ‘8
- Increases Prolif NPT increases prolif and blinds states to nuke development. Wesley, ‘5
- Makes states view nukes as a no-risk option. Wesley, ‘5
- NPT forces states to prolif to compete. Wesley, ‘5
- largely due to other factors.
- Decreases barriers to nuke production. Wesley, ‘5
- No Impact
- NPT collapse leads to stronger UN prolif prevention – solves better. Garvey, ‘8
Terrorists can’t obtain WMD’s – too expensive and no interest. Muller and Steinbach, ’10 – *chair of polisci at Ohio State AND **Israeli nuke expert [John Muller, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University; John Steinbach, Israeli nuclear weapon expert; “Was Obama Nuke Summit Necessary or Just ‘Nuclear Alarmism’? And What About Israel’s Arsenal?” published 4/14/2010; http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/14/was_obama_nuke_summit_necessary_or] Jay SHARIF ABDEL KOUDDOUS: And John Mueller, you also say that terrorists exhibit only a limited desire to obtain these nuclear weapons, which goes contrary to what most intelligence reports are telling us. Why do you say that? JOHN MUELLER: Well, I looked at those intelligence reports, and, of course, Obama said the same thing. The indication of interest is extraordinarily small. There is some interest. They sort of think about it. They have thought about it from time to time. But, for example, in Afghanistan, when there were some hotheads among al-Qaeda who wanted to develop weapons of mass destruction, mostly like chemical weapons, which actually aren’t weapons of mass destruction, bin Laden basically approved it but didn’t put any money into it. When they were — when they left Afghanistan after the invasion in 2001, we got a computer which indicated that their entire budget for weapons of mass destruction, mainly primitive work on chemical weapons, was about $2,000. And since that time, they certainly haven’t been in better position. There’s no indication they have anything resembling a competent technology team that could put anything together, maybe not even chemical weapons, much less nuclear ones.
--- NPT --- ***NPT Good*** AT: NPT Failing NPT not failing – proliferation only signals deterrence not instability Fields & Enia ‘9 - *Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, **Professor in the Department of Diplomacy & World Affairs at Occidental College (Jeffery & Jason, THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 July 2009 , pages 173 – 196) RA Of course, there have been arguments about the tensions in the regime. Many NNWS continue to feel slighted by the perception that the NWS have abandoned serious, sustained commitment to disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. However, with respect to the regime’s foundational norms on the negative implications of nonproliferation for security and non-transfer, these disputes have never escalated beyond the third phase of norm change, where old norms are disregarded and new ones emerge. The complete disarmament of the NWS remains a distant and challenging goal; yet, successive NPT Review Conferences have sought to strengthen the treaty by enhancing measures to discourage, detect, and punish noncompliance.43 The strength of the nonproliferation norm diminishes as the security dilemma becomes acute*that is, when states view nuclear weapons as desirable for their deterrent effect in the absence of security guarantees. However, security needs must be balanced with maintaining good standing in the international community. States may feel constrained by and vulnerable because of the nonproliferation norm, but the majority still accept its overall intent and purpose. Without recognizing how the security environment affects the nonproliferation (non-acquisition) norm, it is easy to arrive at the erroneous assessment that the regime is faltering. We should be cognizant of how norms evolve within this regime, how systemic as well as ideational factors play a role. While arguments about contradictions and gaps in the normative framework are bound to happen, given systemic changes, these do not necessarily suggest a regime crisis, particularly in light of continued efforts to strengthen the institutions meant to encompass the original norm.
(Jeffery & Jason, THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 July 2009 , pages 173 – 196) RA Those who assess the nonproliferation regime as in crisis generally refer to strength as the measure of compliance with rules and expectations of the regime.49 By nature, nuclear noncompliance has severe consequences. One new nuclear state that reaches weapon status by subverting the regime has serious consequences for international security because it alters the balance of power. But even if one accepts that cases of noncompliance are grievous occurrences simply by virtue of their ramifications, one should still be buoyed by the reality that such cases have been infrequent and that the regime generally adapts and members act to strengthen it. As Jim Walsh points out, regimes adapt to adverse and unforeseen circumstances, as the nonproliferation regime did with full-scope safeguards following India’s nuclear test in 1974 and with the Additional Protocol following revelations about Iraqi nuclear pursuits in the 1990s.50 (See Table 3, ‘‘Major Disagreements, Noncompliance, and Violations of Regime Obligations,’’ for a list of prominent cases of noncompliance and failure to meet regime obligations.) While problematic for international security, none of these cases viewed individually or collectively is an exemplar of the existential weakness of the regime. States frequently cited as noncompliant have their own security needs, and in an anarchic global environment one expects them to attempt to meet those needs.51 This is to say that because other variables influence state behavior within a regime, one cannot always conclude that the regime is therefore on the verge of collapse.52 Thus, the measure of regime strength in this case should not be whether a state pursues nuclear weapons, but rather how it acts when it does so and how the membership of the regime responds. It would be a sign of fundamental weakness if these noncompliant states behaved without regard to consequences or if other countries concerned about the security implications had attempted to deal with noncompliance outside the institutions of the regime. While instances of regime noncompliance have critical security implications and as such are signs of weakness in the regime, they are not the sole basis for our assessment of the overall strength of the regime. With respect to the disputes enumerated in Table 3, there is a gap between theoretical expectations given states’ security needs in the international system and the relatively small number of actual cases of noncompliance; the majority of noncompliant states have attempted to hide their activities; and responses to*in many cases solutions for*noncompliance have generally occurred within the framework of the regime. Each of these realities represents a point of strength of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As such, our assessment of the regime’s strength is more optimistic than those judging solely on a binary view of noncompliance. NPT regime effective – affects non-signatory states Fields & Enia ‘9 - *Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, **Professor in the Department of Diplomacy & World Affairs at Occidental College (Jeffery & Jason, THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 July 2009 , pages 173 – 196) RA Questions of who is inside and who is outside of a regime*and with what consequences*are questions of scope, and this is only one dimension along which to assess regime health. Returning to one of the foundational points of our argument, we argue that it is important to avoid viewing the NPT and the nonproliferation regime as one and the same. The NPT is an institutional component of the regime.74 Starting with this broader definition of regime allows one to observe the ways in which institutional outsiders might respect certain tenets of the regime, even while operating outside of its institutional architecture. For example, despite not being a signatory to the NPT, Israel does not share nuclear weapons technology with NNWS.75 While India’s record in terms of procurement and its own facilities is spottier, it has been mostly restrained in terms of exporting nuclear weapons technology.76 In addition, despite standing outside of the NPT framework, India has allowed IAEA safeguards on six of its nuclear facilities since 1971, and in 2008, India concluded an agreement with the IAEA to safeguard an additional eight reactors.77 Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan network present a clear negative development on the sharing of nuclear weapons technology, but this must be balanced with the fact that Pakistan has nine different safeguard agreements currently in force with the IAEA.78 Finally, regime adherents are also cognizant of those states that are not NPT signatories and take measures to limit proliferation from them.79 Thus, the mere existence of outsiders does not represent an existential threat to the regime. The actions of both outsider states and of NPT signatories in dealing with outsiders demonstrate some of the strengths of the regime’s normative foundations and allocational mode. While the actions of outsiders can present particular challenges to the regime’s institutions, their overall effect on the nonproliferation regime is mixed and provides at least some grounds for optimism.
(Jeffery & Jason, THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 July 2009 , pages 173 – 196) RA The implications for international security as a result of outright defection from the NPT and abandoning nonproliferation norms by a state could be severe. This reality does not make the nonproliferation regime less subject to the dynamics that constitute a regime than in any other. Analysts often have trouble with this. Fear of the potential consequences (another nuclear weapon state) leads some to automatically diagnose regime weakness or imminent collapse. Yet the dimensions essential for assessing the health and for understanding the inner workings of any regime show that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is not unique in being subject to the parochial interests of its adherents. Self-interested members who flout norms imposed by the stronger members are to be expected. This does not constitute a crisis, but merely reflects how regimes work. The multidimensional aspects outlined in this paper are underappreciated and useful in assessing the health of the regime. The nonproliferation regime presents an interesting set of circumstances because key actors who have not accepted the norms may have the ability to affect actors inside the regime*a unique dynamic. At the same time, the perception (real or exaggerated) of a lack of substantial movement toward disarmament by the NWS perpetuates the notion that a one-sided bias underpins the NPT bargain. These realities may be troubling, but they do not necessarily constitute crisis. Instead, they demonstrate how security concerns permeate aspects of the regime. Those who aim to evaluate regime health should consider this before automatically deciding that the nonproliferation regime is in crisis. NPT should not be abandoned – sparked nonproliferation and can effectively continue the norm Leaver ‘5 - Senior Lecturer, School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University. (Richard, The failing NPT: the case for institutional reform, Australian Journal of International Affairs,59:4,417 – 424) RA Even as the NPT hovers around the brink of its own collapse, two of its paradoxes are more apparent than ever. First, its Article 6 cause of nuclear disarmament has been given enhanced relevance by the modern strategic nightmare that features terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. For if nuclear devices of any kind do eventually end up in the hands of terrorists, we can already be certain that they will have been sourced from some or another agency of some or another state. The second paradox is that a well-functioning NPT already delivers large doses of nuclear disarmament. By entering into verifiable commitments not to acquire practical knowledge about nuclear explosions, the NPT’s non-nuclear signatories have effectively endorsed the main substantive provisions of a nuclear prohibition regime. And since the treaty now has 184 such signatories instead of the mere 40 that attended its birth, the argument that nuclear disarmament is too remote and too idealistic ignores the extent to which it has already been achieved for the vast majority of states. The gap that remains is occupied by the really difficult cases of the nuclear weapon states. But there is no reason why the drip-drip-drip of gradual proliferation should be used to abandon the NPT when it could be turned, ju-jitsu like, against those difficult cases so as to reinvigorate their own commitments to Article 6. That, I believe, is a reformist project which is truly worthy of our time and energy.
(Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, 22 Aug 2008, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 420-450WileyInterScience) RA However, I would argue that before the United States (or any other country) gives up on the NPT and associated nuclear nonproliferation regime, we should take full account of not only the regime’s failures, but also its successes. Indeed, the success of the NPT is in many ways more surprising than its recent failures: for almost four decades, almost all states in the international system chose to forgo nuclear weapons, and in some cases, even gave them up. Numerous reports in the 1960s warned that the number of new nuclear states could reach as high as 20 in a few decades (The Bomb 1965:53). Instead, the count by 2008 is only four: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.2 The fact that so many states abstained from nuclear weapons tells us to look closely at the nuclear nonproliferation regime. What role has it played in encouraging nuclear forbearance? With the risk of nuclear theft or accidents increasing with each new nuclear weapons state, the international community needs all the help it can get in discouraging nuclear proliferation. This is especially important given the growing numbers of ‘‘latent nuclear states,’’ those with the ‘‘necessary industrial infrastructure and scientific expertise to build nuclear weapons on a crash basis if they chose to do so’’ (Sagan 1996:56). In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that over 40 countries were ‘‘nuclear latent states’’. Given the high stakes, we need to better understand how and in what ways the NPT has actually helped discouraged nuclear proliferation. In doing so, we can also understand the mechanisms through which international regimes work to influence policymakers.
(Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, 22 Aug 2008, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 420-450WileyInterScience) RA In short, understanding that nuclear forbearance is actually the result of three separate attitudes—and that undermining the NPT could undermine commitment to nuclear nonproliferation with two of the three attitudes—leads to the conclusion that undermining the NPT could lead to a wave of nuclear proliferation among states we assumed would never think about the nuclear option again. In other words, the value of the NPT cannot be evaluated without assessing the extent to which it has helped to prevent proliferation. How specifically does the NPT do this? I posit that it has created an international social environment that influences elite decision-making through a number of specific and distinct mechanisms. Without the NPT, those mechanisms fall apart. It is to this social environment and the ‘‘influence’’ mechanisms fostered by it that the papers turns to next.
(Robert, Selective non-proliferation or universal regimes?, Australian Journal of International Affairs,59:4,431–437) RA If the future seems rather grim for the NPT, it may therefore be nothing compared to the mess which could accompany the breaking of the six decade-old taboo on nuclear use. The world does need a shot in the arm if it is to commit itself to strengthening or replacing the existing regime. But the medicine required may be too strong or hazardous for the patient (the international system). Perhaps then it is better to accept that the disease (the spread of nuclear weapons) is unlikely to be dealt with successfully any time soon, but to regard it as a chronic rather than a fatal condition. Muddling through may therefore be a better approach than grand designs. To adapt the old saying, even if it is partially broken, one might hesitate before trying completely to fix (or replace) it. Compliance K2 NPT Compliance key to global perception of NPT effectiveness Dunn 9 - Senior VP, Science Applications International Corp, served as assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Lewis, THE NPT Assessing the Past, Building the Future, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009) Today, fears have again emerged that runaway proliferation could develop. It is often argued that the spread of nuclear weapons is at a ‘‘tipping point,’’ that there is a danger of ‘‘cascading’’ proliferation, and that we could be entering a ‘‘new nuclear age.’’22 In this context, however, widespread adherence to the NPT alone will not suffice to counter fears of nuclear weapon proliferation. Rather, the NPT’s contribution to countering fears of runaway proliferation will depend heavily on whether there is a widespread perception that countries are complying fully with their NPT obligations. US Key US key to solve the NPT. Curtis, ‘8 – president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative [Charles B. Curtis; “Reducing the Global Nuclear Danger: International Cooperation – the Indispensable Security Imperative;” published 2008 under the commission of the Better World Foundation; http://www.nti.org/c_press/speech_curtis_reducing1107.pdf] Jay To do this, the United States must abandon its policy of disdain for international treaty regimes and institutions, and work instead to strengthen them. Underlying this effort must be a restored U.S. commitment to work through the United Nations and the structure of international regimes for counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, arms reduction and control, and the instruments for promoting global economic wellbeing that the United States helped create but has recently failed to adequately support. Where international organizations and regimes have been weakened by our lack of support or by their own internal flaws, these weaknesses must be eliminated, and both political and financial support restored. Working through international institutions is critical to restoring faith in the United States as a global partner. That restored faith will allow more effective leadership. Central to gaining international cooperation from non-nuclear weapons states on nuclear proliferation matters would be a clear and unambiguous commitment by the U.S. and other weapons states to act purposefully to meet their responsibilities under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This point was made in an opinion piece written in January in the Wall Street Journal by former U.S. Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn. In their essay, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” they argue that we are on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era, with more nuclear-armed states and a real risk of nuclear terrorism. In such a world, the four warn that continued reliance on nuclear deterrence for maintaining international security “is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective,” and that none of the nonproliferation steps being taken now “are adequate to the danger.” The veteran statesmen argue that the United States and other nations must both embrace the vision of a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons and pursue a balanced program of practical measures toward achieving that goal: “Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.” As former Secretary General Kofi Annan noted as he left office, the world risks becoming mired in a sterile stand-off between those who care most about disarmament and those who care most about proliferation. Continued paralysis is a danger to us all. On our current path, in Annan’s words, the “world is sleepwalking toward nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.” The United States has an opportunity to break this stalemate and re-establish its essential leadership in non-proliferation in a single, dramatic stroke. Selecting the forum of the United Nations annual meeting of the General Assembly attended by all world leaders, the United States should expressly and explicitly renew its NPT vows. The President should state the U.S. intention to engage all nuclear weapons states in a joint enterprise to work toward a safer world free from the threat of nuclear weapons and toward the establishment of a more secure global political context that would make that goal possible. The President should acknowledge that the requisite security context for achieving that goal does not exist today – and admit that we are headed in the wrong direction and must change course. The President could emphasize this commitment by announcing a number of steps that would reduce the nuclear danger and underscore America’s bona fides. ***NPT Bad*** Fails Structural flaws. Claussen, ‘8 – Fellow at the Folke Bernadotte Academy for Peace Studies [Bjørn Ragnar Claussen, MA from Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Tromsø; “The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy;” published Autumn 2008; http://www.ub.uit.no/munin/bitstream/handle/10037/2062/thesis.pdf?sequence=1] Jay Moreover, if states withdraw from the NPT, their number would arguably add to the “pressure from outside.” Although many states consider the right to withdraw from a treaty as a norm of international law, the abrupt termination of a multilateral arms control treaty such as the NPT may directly affect the security of many or all parties.134 As noted in the previous chapter section (2.4.2), the NPT has structural flaws, which means that a state can move to the brink of nuclear weapons capacity, thereby giving it the option to develop nuclear weapons quickly if it should decide to withdraw, without violating the treaty. Although its formal nuclear status is still unclear, the utilisation of the withdrawal provision of Article X by the DPRK illustrates this point. This has led several scholars to argue that in order to ensure the survival of the NPT, no state should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty.135 The case of the DPRK also illustrates that different types of pressure can form clusters. The DPRK constitutes both “pressure from within,” by having acquired nuclear weapons despite its obligation as a NNWS not to do so, and arguably “pressure from outside,” by utilising the withdrawal provision of the NPT.
[Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] Jay Many countries regard the NPT as deeply unfair, because it effectively solidifies an inequality in international relations that accords some states the (albeit questionable) status and security conferred by nuclear weapons while denying it to others.1 Although the NPT commits nuclear weapons states to eradicating their nuclear arsenals, after over a quarter of a century they have made only partial moves towards fulfilling this undertaking.2 Some commentators have argued that the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 further underlined this breach of trust by depriving non-nuclear weapons states of the opportunities provided by periodic renewal (rather than just review) conferences to press the nuclear weapons states on nuclear disarmament or to pressure Israel over its covert nuclear weapons program (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 42). With little prospect of securing the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear weapons states, the continuation of the NPT has become farcical.3 Commenting on the 2000 NPT Review Conference, two observers noted that ‘agreement on the Final Document had been possible only because many of the provisions were capable of varying interpretations, and thus unlikely to be implemented in full’ (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 43). They also noted that evidence of backsliding on commitments, particularly by the US, was ‘greeted by most delegations with resignation and quiet cynicism, rather than forthright and persistent criticism’ (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 45). The unwillingness of states to expend diplomatic capital in taking on the US over its commitments indicates that fewer and fewer states continue to regard the integrity of the NPT as a foreign policy priority. The unfairness of the NPT risks generating cynicism among states about their obligations under the treaty, and therefore impacts directly on its effectiveness. Friedrich Kratochwil (1989) has argued convincingly that states do not follow rules out of a sense of unreflective obligation or blind habit, but on the basis of explicitly developed justifications derived from socially shared conceptions of rationality and justice. Because the NPT effectively enshrines an unequal distribution of the security and status conferred by nuclear weapons, it contravenes the principles of natural justice. This in turn detracts from its legitimacy and ultimately from its effectiveness. As Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes have argued, ‘a system in which only the weak can be made to comply with their undertakings will not achieve the legitimacy needed for reliable enforcement of treaty obligations’ (1998: 3). Furthermore, by effectively making the prohibition of the spread of nuclear weapons a higher priority than the eradication of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states, the NPT regime implies that some states, and not others, can be trusted with nuclear weapons. The implicit judgement the regime makes about competence and trustworthiness only further aggravates the status inequality issues that plague the NPT. By arguing that the NPT enshrines a system of ‘nuclear apartheid’, Indian leaders and diplomats rehearsed many of these issues in their defence of India's nuclear tests in 1998. The effectiveness of this line of argument, plus the fact that interests deemed more important than non-proliferation soon brought an end to most states’ sanctions against India and Pakistan, have done a great deal of damage to the moral authority of the NPT. Loopholes. Claussen, ‘8 – Fellow at the Folke Bernadotte Academy for Peace Studies [Bjørn Ragnar Claussen, MA from Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Tromsø; “The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy;” published Autumn 2008; http://www.ub.uit.no/munin/bitstream/handle/10037/2062/thesis.pdf?sequence=1] Jay “Pressure from within” refers to NNWSs parties to the NPT which deliberately violate their treaty obligation to forsake nuclear weapons. States parties which have yet not concluded safeguards agreements also belong to this type of pressure.111 “Pressure from within” stems in part from a paradox embedded in the NPT: Under the NPT, the NNWSs agreed to give up their pursuit of nuclear weapons, but not their pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. According to Article IV, it is the inalienable right of all states parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Moreover, Article IV guarantees NNWSs the right to full access to nuclear power technology, on condition that they submit their nuclear activities to international inspections. According to Jonathan Schell, this bargain was a “Trojan horse” written into the text of the NPT.112 Nuclear technology is a dual-use technology with both civilian and military applications. Education, experience, materials and technology involved in making nuclear weapons can be drawn in large part by peaceful applications of nuclear energy.113 The NPT clearly prohibits NNWSs from using nuclear technology to make nuclear weapons, but once they have it, they have taken a major step towards the development of nuclear weapons.114 For NNWSs which desire nuclear weapons, Article IV thus assures that they are be able to acquire most of the wherewithal to fulfil their ambitions without violating the NPT.115 Hence, the number of states capable of building nuclear weapons has paradoxically increased due to the NPT. According to David Santoro, this paradox can prove to be the Achilles heel of the NPT.116 NNWSs which work within the NPT, but deliberately manipulate or violate the provisions of the treaty, such as Iran is suspected to do, may cause states parties, both NWSs and NNWSs, to loose confidence in the credibility of the NPT, and opt for other means to prevent proliferation.117 Unenforceability. Council on Foreign Relations, ‘5 [The Council on Foreign Relations, written by Esther Pan; “Nonproliferation: Proliferation Threats;” published 4/27/2005; http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/nonproliferation-proliferation-threats/p7834?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype%3Dbackgrounder%26page%3D30] Jay Does the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty need an overhaul? Many experts say it does. They concede that the, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which went into effect in 1970, has helped limit the number of nuclear-armed countries. But they say the NPT has structural flaws that undermine its effectiveness against states determined to acquire nuclear weapons or terrorist groups bent on using them. Critics of the treaty and supporters alike will get a chance to air their views at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) NPT review conference in New York, May 2-27. There, the 189 signatories to the NPT--and observers, including India and Pakistan--will meet to discuss treaty reforms. Which articles do critics object to in the NPT? The main criticisms from member countries deal with the following articles: Article 4, which gives all parties to the treaty the "inalienable right" to the "research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." This was intended to allow all countries to share the benefits of nuclear power. But critics say Article 4 grants countries too much leeway to convert a lawful nuclear program into an illegal weapons program. The problem, says Jon Wolfstahl, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is that some countries now interpret Article 4 to mean they can legally build a civilian nuclear program and gain the knowledge they need to make nuclear weapons, then renounce the treaty to construct them. Article 2, which states that all non-nuclear weapons states that sign the NPT agree not to receive, manufacture, or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, they agree "not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The United States claims that Iran has already violated this article by acquiring nuclear technology from other countries, including Pakistan, and will push for it to be interpreted more strictly. Article 6, which states that all parties to the NPT will pursue negotiations and other measures in good faith to stop the nuclear-arms race and seek nuclear disarmament "at an early date." Because the treaty does not specify a date, however, the goal of nuclear disarmament has not been reached nearly 40 years after the treaty's creation. Experts say many non-nuclear countries around the world accuse the nuclear-weapons states of dragging their feet on complete disarmament. Non-nuclear countries may lobby to add a fixed deadline, perhaps 10 or 15 years from now, by which disarmament must be completed. Article 10, which gives each member state the right to withdraw from the treaty with only 90 days notice if its "supreme interests" are jeopardized. What's the treaty's biggest flaw? That there is limited power to enforce it, experts say. Most international inspections mandated by the NPT are voluntary, and countries largely control inspectors' movements. There are no penalties for breaking the terms of the NPT--as North Korea did when it developed an illicit nuclear-weapons program--except being reported to the U.N. Security Council. Thus far, the Security Council has taken no punitive action against North Korea. "The nonproliferation regime is like a pyramid scheme," says Joseph Cirincione, director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "It works as long as everyone believes in it. As soon as they stop doing that, it collapses." Outdated. Garvey, ‘8 – Law Professor at University of San Francisco [Jack Garvey; “A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;” published February 2008 in the Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 12 No. 3, 1-19] Jay The success attributed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in truth depended on a now vanished logic of national power and interest. It was the cold war that stabilised the consensual regime of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For most of the life of the treaty, it was principally the leverage of Soviet–US confrontation that persuaded governments to favour adherence to the treaty and the IAEA safeguards regime. The states that did develop nuclear weapons outside the treaty regime, Israel, India, Pakistan and for a time South Africa, were responding to the exceptional and distinctive dynamics of regionally defined national interest. But it was the mutually assured destruction of the United States and Soviet Union that discouraged nuclear weapons development by other states. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the principal nuclear weapons trauma of the period, was both in its origin and resolution, a Soviet–US encounter. The crisis was ‘Cuban’ in name and venue, but its outcome was decided as a matter of the US and Soviet strategic policy, the other states of the world mere witnesses to a nuclear confrontation that would have determined all their fates. The Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, no longer secured by the leverage of US–Soviet bipolarity, has buckled under the pressures of evolving political dynamics, dynamics that generate new and higher levels of risk. In a world of new instabilities, where nuclear technology, both hard and soft, is more and more accessible,5 the treaty is failing to achieve containment. That new reality is named by the new rhetoric of risk; ‘nuclear terrorism’, ‘failed states’, ‘rogue states’, ‘nuclear traffickers’ and ‘non-state actors’. There are new countermeasures, such as the ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’6 of the Bush administration. There are new agreements, as with North Korea7 and India.8 Yet, there is no comprehensive rethinking and recreation of the non-proliferation regime.9 Recent calls for addressing these new threats simply reiterate the importance of working within established legal and institutional frameworks.10 Increases Prolif NPT increases prolif and blinds states to nuke development. Wesley, ‘5 – Executive Director, PhD in IR [Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] Jay Due to persisting demand-side factors and crumbling supply-side controls, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will probably be unable to prevent a likely proliferation rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade into the foreseeable future. Beyond being ineffective, I argue that the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous. The NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. However, abandoning the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons. The failure of the 2005 Review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to reach agreement on even a ‘single matter of substance’ only confirms that global efforts to control weapons of mass destruction have reached a dangerous precipice (Nason 2005; Cubby 2005). As two observers of the 2003 PrepCom (Preparatory Committee) meeting commented, ‘the NPT review process is under such severe strain that it has been sedated: interaction over difficult issues has been put on hold’ (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 48). Yet an overwhelming majority of states and commentators advocate persisting with the NPT regime, despite its numerous shortcomings. They do so in the fearful but misguided belief that it represents our ‘last chance’ (Epstein 1976) to ensure a world that is safe from the use or threat of nuclear weapons. The danger in this obsessive focus on the NPT, while failing to acknowledge and confront its fundamental weaknesses, is that states will lose sight of the ultimate objective—preventing the threat or use of nuclear weapons—and thereby gradually lose their capacity to ensure this objective. My intention here is to provoke debate about the utility of keeping the NPT on life support, as opposed to replacing it with a regime that acknowledges contemporary realities, while developing a more effective compact against the use or threat of nuclear weapons. Makes states view nukes as a no-risk option. Wesley, ‘5 – Executive Director, PhD in IR [Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] Jay The drivers of proliferation among several of Asia's emerging great powers combine both mounting demand-side incentives and crumbling supply-side controls. Neither of these can adequately be addressed by the NPT in its current state. The major demand-side incentives are greater strategic uncertainty among regional powers and a rising thirst for international prestige. At the global level, the actions and statements of the United States, which currently combines a belief in its unassailable power with a post-11 September 2001 conviction of its unrivalled vulnerability, have increased the strategic uncertainties of many states. The current US preoccupation with terrorism and non-proliferation and recent high-visibility demonstrations of US air power have enhanced the credibility of Washington's threats of coercion against ‘rogue states’. As the United States’ inhibitions against the use of force have fallen, the attractiveness of nuclear weapons—the ultimate insurance policy—have risen. In Asia, a newly intense pattern of competition and collusion among the current and emerging great powers has further increased the attractiveness of nuclear weapons. China, Japan, India, Russia and Iran have reacted to a range of recent changes—rising prosperity, regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq, patterns of alignment and basing during the ‘war on terror’, uncertainties over energy security—to create a shifting pattern of alignments and tensions that are yet to settle into a stable and predictable template. In the meantime, this new great power manoeuvring has begun to link up previously separate security dyads and complexes, as combinations of powers jostle for position in Northeast, Southeast, Central, South and Western Asia. This is a fluid and potentially dangerous power dynamic, as Asia's powers are yet to settle among themselves issues of status, spheres of influence, regional norms of behaviour, patterns of alignment and enmity and tacit conditions governing the use of force. Meanwhile, the threat perceptions of many middle and smaller powers have been raised. As regional rivalries drive various containment and counter-containment strategies (see Paul 2003), and increased strategic uncertainty raises states’ security concerns, the demand-side pressures for nuclear weapons will continue to mount. The other major demand-side driver of proliferation is the growing thirst for status among Asia's emerging great powers. Rising prosperity and growing nationalism has fed a renewed interest in gaining symbols of international prestige and influence. The campaign of states such as Japan, India, Indonesia and Brazil for permanent seats on the UN Security Council is one manifestation of the new hunger for prestige. Membership of the ‘nuclear club’ has long been recognised as another tacit symbol of great power status. Possession of nuclear weapons is one indicator of membership in the great power ‘club’. The ability to design and manufacture nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles is thought to signal high levels of technological competence, a particularly important status symbol for developing countries (Navais 1990: 9–13). The NPT's inability either to prevent the spread of nuclear components, materials and technology, or to secure the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear weapons states (as discussed below), only adds to these demand-side pressures. In developing nuclear weapons, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and probably Iran have demonstrated that neither the NPT nor any other international regime provides them with an adequate security guarantee against either nuclear or conventional coercion. To the contrary, by confining the possession of nuclear weapons to some states and not others, the NPT has raised the attractiveness of nuclear weapons for those states not covered by the nuclear weapons states’ guarantees of extended deterrence. These demand-side pressures suggest that the incentives of a small number of states to acquire nuclear weapons will endure over time. Each new nuclear weapons state will give rise to proliferation incentives among a limited number of neighbours and rivals, thereby maintaining a fairly consistent level of proliferation pressure over time. As I discuss below, because the vast majority of states choose to eschew nuclear weapons, because their sense of insecurity is insufficient to justify the costs of possessing nuclear weapons, the risks of a major nuclear ‘break out’ are low. It is the conditions of proliferation, rather than its occurrence, that a new regime should try to regulate. While the demand-side pressures for proliferation will continue, the supply-side restrictions have crumbled and are unlikely to be rebuilt. In the words of one technical expert, ‘one by one, the barriers to proliferation are gradually falling, and for those states that anticipate continuing security challenges, there may be a strong temptation during the first decades of this century to proliferate’ (Erickson 2001: 46). On the one hand, the economic and technological barriers to acquiring nuclear components and technology are falling. Most potential nuclear weapons states are becoming wealthier at the same time as the costs of building a nuclear weapons program are falling. Globalisation has led to the broad dispersal of sophisticated project management skills, while the international education market and the fact that the basic knowledge required to make nuclear weapons is now nearly 50 years old means that the technological competence required for a viable nuclear program is no longer a rare commodity (Zimmerman 1994). On the other hand, the effectiveness of export controls has eroded. The post-Cold War priority of economic growth and integration led to the abolition of most blanket restrictions on dual-use technology exports and a reduction of the range of dual-use military technology subject to export controls (Saunders 2001: 127–8). States such as Russia and China have engaged in a form of diplomatic rent seeking by continuing to export nuclear technology and dual-use materials to potential proliferators—sometimes at the cost of substantial financial losses and threats of US sanctions (Diaconu and Maloney 2003)—in order to gain diplomatic influence and weaken US leverage over key regional states. If this combination of demand-side and supply-side conditions leads to several states’ moves towards proliferation in the years ahead, the NPT will be singularly unable to prevent it, or to stabilise the process of proliferation. NPT forces states to prolif to compete. Wesley, ‘5 – Executive Director, PhD in IR [Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] Jay My central argument is that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons will probably continue at the rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade, whether or not the NPT is retained. Persisting with the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous than if the NPT is replaced with a more practical regime. I argue that the NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. On the other hand, scrapping the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only magnified the NPT's flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commentators were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation pressures were building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear—not chemical or biological—weapons deter conventional military attack. The international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistication of Iraq's, Pakistan's, North Korea's and Libya's progress in acquiring nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India's highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world's half-hearted and short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of the NPT regime, perhaps terminally. Even worse than being ineffective, the NPT is dangerous, because it increases the pressures for opaque proliferation and heightens nuclear instability. Equally flawed, I argue, is the current counter-proliferation doctrine of the United States. I advocate scrapping the NPT (and the doctrine of counter-proliferation) and starting again, because the NPT is a failing regime that is consuming diplomatic resources that could be more effectively used to build an alternative arms control regime that is responsive to current circumstances. We need to confront the practicalities of scrapping the NPT—the positives and the negatives—and think clearly about the requirements of a replacement regime.
[Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] Jay Some of the causes of the NPT's declining effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation have been rehearsed above. However the main cause of its ineffectiveness is structural: as Frank Barnaby observes, ‘The problem is that military and peaceful nuclear programs are, for the most part, virtually identical’ (1993: 126). This directly erodes the viability of the deal that lies at the heart of the NPT: that non-nuclear weapons states agree not to try to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance with peaceful nuclear programs, should they want them. The NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are thus simultaneously engaged in promoting and controlling two types of nuclear technology that are virtually indistinguishable until a point very close to the threshold of assembling the components of a nuclear weapon. For many states that have contemplated the nuclear option, adherence to the NPT thus actually makes it easier to obtain cutting edge nuclear technology and dual-use components that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program (Dunn 1991: 23). As Barnaby argues, ‘Under [Article X of] the NPT, a country can legally manufacture the components of a nuclear weapon, notify the IAEA and the UN Security Council that it is withdrawing from the Treaty, and then assemble its nuclear weapons’(1993: 124). Although the IAEA's inspections role has been strengthened during the course of the 1990s, there is little prospect that its powers will be increased to such a level that it will be able to counter the highly sophisticated deception programs mounted by most covert proliferators. The only remedy to this dilemma has been to question the need of states such as Iran for peaceful nuclear power and to doubt the veracity of their statements that they do not intend to acquire nuclear weapons. This only further opens the regime up to charges of selectivity, unfairness and politicisation (Jones 1998).
No Impact No impact to NPT collapse – econ, domestic politics, US heg, and international norms contain prolif. Wesley, ‘5 – Executive Director, PhD in IR [Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] Jay In considering whether states should scrap the NPT, two prominent questions need to be answered: what are the dangers associated with ending the NPT? And what would a new regime that confronts contemporary proliferation realities, while more effectively ensuring the prevention of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, look like? The major concern of those who oppose scrapping the NPT is that it would result in a ‘proliferation break-out’. This suggests that without the constraints of the NPT, the number of nuclear weapons states would rise from the current nine acknowledged and non-acknowledged holders of nuclear weapons to dozens. However, this assumes that the NPT has been the main reason for the limited spread of nuclear weapons over the past 60 years, an unlikely proposition for a regime whose shortcomings have been acknowledged since its inception. A more likely explanation for the relative lack of proliferation is that most states have experienced insufficient demand-side pressures to overcome the costs of acquiring nuclear arsenals. For most states, this is a condition that will persist past the ending of the NPT. Even though states have grown wealthier and proliferation costs have fallen, it is important to recognise that developing a nuclear arsenal is not cost-free. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs are expensive, meaning that most states will need to divert substantial resources from their conventional armed forces or other policy programs during the weapons development phase.6 Costs can also be incurred through the international opprobrium that will likely attend proliferation, from diplomatic boycotts to cancellation of aid funding to sanctions by states such as Japan. And a nuclear program brings risks, both the danger of catastrophic environmental and social damage from accidents, as well as arising from the strategic uncertainties generated among neighbouring states (Erickson 2001: 43). Potential proliferators must also confront the power of the nuclear taboo—which long pre-dates the NPT—and shoulder the burden of justifying to domestic and international public opinion why they need the bomb. These factors will persist past the demise of the NPT, and in the absence of a sudden decline in the security of a large number of states, fears of a proliferation break-out are unfounded. Another concern is that by making it easier for some states to acquire nuclear weapons, scrapping the NPT will result in several states being willing to take greater risks in advancing their strategic interests. This would work either by emboldening aggressive states by reassuring them that they are able to deter retaliatory action or through a version of extended deterrence, in keeping outside powers out of regional conflicts (Dunn 1991: 26). Such misgivings, however, ignore past evidence of the effect of nuclear weapons on their possessors’ behaviour, and misunderstand the nature of nuclear weapons. In effect, they assume that nuclear weapons imbue their holders with ‘super-strategic’ properties. It has long been widely acknowledged that nuclear weapons have no rational offensive value; by threatening a prospective opponent with catastrophic destruction, their only logical use is to deter others’ attacks (Schelling 1963). In using nuclear threats offensively or as an explicit adjunct to a conventional attack, a state would incur unacceptable risks ‘because no state can expect to execute the threat without danger to [itself]’ (Waltz 1981: 13). As Saunders observes, ‘There is little empirical evidence to support claims that developing countries that acquire WMD and delivery systems will behave less cautiously than other nuclear weapons states’ (2001: 133). And there is little reason for nuclear-armed regional powers to believe with any certainty that extended deterrence will work to keep the US out of a regional conflict. Since experiencing the frustration of being unable to use its nuclear arsenal to prevail in limited conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, the US has developed a truly awesome conventional military capability that provides it with the capacity to prevail decisively in limited wars. In Iraq, it has also demonstrated its willingness to intervene and defeat an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction with the relative confidence that if such an opponent were to use WMD against its forces or its allies, the US would retaliate with overwhelming force. William Perry, then US Secretary of Defence, said in 1996 that if the US was attacked by chemical weapons, ‘We could have a devastating response without the use of nuclear weapons, but we would not forswear that possibility’ (quoted in Feiveson and Hogendoorn 2003: 90). A third concern is that by making it easier to acquire nuclear weapons, the end of the NPT will give certain disgruntled states the confidence to defy global and regional norms of behaviour. However, this concern assumes that such states only comply with such norms due to a persisting sense of insecurity that possession of nuclear weapons would remove. As Chayes and Chayes have convincingly argued, states follow norms and agreements in international relations not out of the fear of coercion but due to a general ‘propensity to comply’ with agreements they have made or joined (1998). Even disgruntled states exhibit great concern for their international reputation, especially in an era of globalisation, where general reputation and confidence in a government is necessary to secure the requirements for economic development. Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi's extraordinary about-face in compensating the victims of Libyan-backed terrorist attacks and abandoning well-developed plans to develop a nuclear arsenal have only underlined the importance of reputation and co-operativeness in the age of globalisation. A fourth concern is that scrapping the NPT will make it easier for extremist regimes to gain the ultimate guarantee that others will not intervene to topple them. There are certainly merits to this anxiety: it would be very difficult to justify and mount an intervention to topple a regime that possessed nuclear weapons. This in turn would take off the table the ultimate sanction against a genocidal government. But there are reasons to question the international dangers posed by nuclear-armed ‘rogue states’. By enormously increasing the stakes involved in military adventures, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to strengthen the hand of moderates in any regime. And by ruling out the option of forceful intervention, a nuclear arsenal will probably, on balance, reduce the paranoid perceptions of a regime labelled a rogue state. In many ways, the case of Pakistan provides some evidence of these tendencies. As Gaurav Kampani observes, Pakistan fits the label of a rogue state better than most others: a state sponsor of terrorism with an active nuclear weapons program; a military dictatorship faced with an economy in terminal decline and a shrinking strategic space; and a set of societal, government and military institutions increasingly populated by extremist Islam (Kampani 2002: 107). Yet Pakistan has proved remarkably susceptible to international pressure to moderate its internal and foreign policies.7 A fifth concern is that conflicts between regional powers will become more likely as the demise of the NPT results in more states with nuclear weapons. An increase in regional conflict in Asia may well be coming, mainly as a result of the newly intense patterns of competition among that continent's new great powers. But possession of nuclear weapons will more likely have a positive (containing, de-escalating) effect on such conflicts, rather than a negative (escalating, broadening) effect. The most dangerous strategy one can choose in a war is to make a nuclear-armed state feel desperate; as a result, conflicts involving nuclear-armed states are more likely to be carefully limited and confined to stakes that are calculated to be well below the nuclear threshold of all parties (Waltz 1981: 20). Moreover, history shows that nuclear weapons have only been used or threatened to de-escalate or bring an end to conventional conflicts: the experience or prospect of catastrophic damage has tended to be a powerful motive forcing belligerents to modify their objectives. Further, the costs of nuclear war would be proportionately greater for new as opposed to the older nuclear states: the smallness of the territory and high rates of urbanisation of most aspiring nuclear states would ensure that a nuclear exchange would devastate a greater percentage of their populations and industry than projected exchanges between the superpowers were estimated to imperil during the height of the Cold War. The case of India and Pakistan offers some cautious hope that in some cases, after an unstable and dangerous period, acquisition of nuclear weapons will cause opponents to begin to address the root causes of their antagonism and delimit spheres of interest. A final concern is that by allowing nuclear weapons to spread to more states, the end of the NPT raises the chances that nuclear or radiological materials will pass into the hands of terrorist groups. Once again, we need to be cautious about such doomsday scenarios. Despite intense scrutiny, there is no evidence that even the most determined state sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria and Iran, have passed chemical or biological weapons to their terrorist clients. Having refused to pass on lower-stakes chemical and biological weapons, there is little reason to fear that they would hand over nuclear or radiological materials. Also, international advances in tracing the responsibility for terrorist attacks will have badly eroded such regimes’ confidence that they could allow a client group to carry out a nuclear or radiological attack and escape major retaliation. Such concerns have over time seen such regimes exercise tighter control over the groups they support, and to use such groups more as a deterrent than an offensive foreign policy option.8 Further, if regimes such as Iran and Syria had decided to rely on terrorist groups to deliver their WMD threats against their targets, they would not have spent millions acquiring ballistic missile technology. Thus there seems to be little reason to believe that ending the NPT will increase the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists. Indeed as I have argued above, the NPT's side effects of opaque and transnational proliferation represent a much more dangerous set of conditions for diagonal proliferation. NPT collapse leads to stronger UN prolif prevention – solves better. Garvey, ‘8 – Law Professor at University of San Francisco [Jack Garvey; “A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;” published February 2008 in the Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 12 No. 3, 1-19] Jay We are at an intersection in the evolution of international law, where the road not taken, can condemn the journey to dissolution and chaos. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not holding. However, it remains serviceable within a new architecture. Shifting to this architecture can occur without sacrificing what has been accomplished under the regime of the treaty. It is certainly no small accomplishment that over 180 countries are now party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that they cooperate in the important work of the IAEA, though in extreme variance of degree. The new architecture is simply designed, and designed simply, to overcome the negative dynamics of the treaty, while generating effectiveness. The Chapter VII resolution here proposed would impact the grand bargain of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty only by making mandatory the implementation of the commitment to non-proliferation, and applying it to all the states, including non-parties to the treaty. The transition to a mandatory regime can be accomplished without undermining the present treaty commitments, such as they may be, to nuclear disarmament and assistance in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Nor is there any reason that the shift should impair the nuclear safeguards agreements presently in force. The Security Council's declaration that nuclear weapons proliferation is a threat to the peace, triggering Chapter VII consideration, will establish the basic foundation for transition to a mandatory non-proliferation regime, while conserving the progress that has been accomplished. Any further consideration, modification or implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would be designed to conform to this foundation. Ultimately, the mandatory structure might replace the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with agreements more congruent with the new architecture. The nuclear dilemma presents us with as stark and significant a challenge as has confronted humankind since cast out of the biblical garden. However, there is now a legacy of knowledge and experience that instructs the future. Existing structures of international law provide the opportunity for a new architecture to bind the nuclear devil anew, perhaps with permanence. There is no choice but to succeed. Akila, Andrew, Elsa, Karthik, Jesse, Jon, Meg, Meyer, Viveth, ZachDirectory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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