Prolif good – War
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Oil Shocks ImpactOil shocks devastate the economy, collapse global trade and guarantee escalation.Cook et al 10 – Malcolm, East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy (June 2010, MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute, Raoul Heinrichs, Rory Medcalf, Andrew Shearer, “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures,” http://asiasecurity.macfound.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futures_-_final_version.pdf) Asia, the most dynamic region in the world, is dependent on energy originating in the world’s most turbulent region, the Middle East. Indeed, the combination of instability and war in the Middle East (and the possibility of more ahead), together with Asia’s increasing dependence on that volatile region, has reaffirmed the salience of energy as an issue with potentially deep implications for Asia’s future security order. Today, the level of oil production in the Middle East is relatively flat and the discovery and development of new fields is progressing unevenly. With renewable sources of energy many years away from becoming a viable replacement for hydrocarbon-based fuels, concerns about the scarcity of energy resources have the potential to engender both competition and cooperation among the major powers of Asia. In regional terms, Asia is already the world’s largest consumer of energy, with between 70-80 per cent of imported oil coming directly from the Middle East. Approximately half of China’s oil supply originates in the Middle East. India, despite importing considerably less by volume, relies on this region for over 60 per cent of its total oil imports. At almost 85 and 90 percent repectively, Japan and South Korea (with their heavily industrial economies) depend on the Middle East to an even greater extent. While the United States relies on imports from the Middle East to a far lesser extent, it nevertheless continues to underpin security in both regions – Asia and the Middle East – and across the sea lanes that connect them. What would the implications be for Asia of an acute crisis in the Middle East, resulting in prolonged disruptions to the steady supply of oil? 10 Of course much would depend on the specific nature of the crisis – the way it started, its chief protagonists, duration, and the means by which it was resolved. 108 Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a few general, if speculative, conclusions. Perhaps the most immediate and pronounced effect of a major disruption in the flow of oil would be serious economic upheaval throughout the region, manifest in a collapse in production and trade and either the gradual or rapid reversal of regional economic integration. Massive inflation – not only in the price of oil, but all goods which need to be shipped – could quickly result in slowing GDP growth, higher unemployment, poverty, diminished investment and lower asset values. Social unrest and international political stability would be likely to ensue. For China in particular, this would pose a severe challenge, compromising both the strength of its regional position and at the same time undermining the basis of its leadership’s claim to internal legitimacy. If, as the previous chapter suggested, the response to this might be to fan the flames of Chinese nationalism by adopting a more assertive regional posture – a way of compensating for its economic underperformance – the prospects for an Asian concert would be greatly diminished as new tensions either reinforce the status quo – US primacy – or usher in a more contested balance of power. On the other hand, there are strong forces for cooperation when it comes to energy. Despite its military modernisation and efforts to diversify supply, China’s energy supplies from the Middle East and North Africa are vulnerable to interdiction. Japan also outsources its energy security to the United States. As a consequence of their continued dependence on the United States to provide access to oil markets and freedom of passage across vital sea lanes, all the major powers of Asia – China, Japan, even India – have strong incentives to promote a cooperative approach to energy security and to maintain stable, working relationships. Furthermore, any breakdown in the global supply of oil will mean a concomitant rise in the cost of oil for all importing countries. A self-defeating ‘energy security dilemma’ could arise as each country tries to secure its energy resources, thereby intensifying competition in world energy markets, and in turn increasing the salience of national energy security strategies. 109 As a region, Asia’s general interest promises to be best served by enhancing cooperation and coordination to preserve open access to global oil markets. Indeed, nascent counter-piracy operations around the Gulf of Aden 110 reflect the possibilities inherent in a more cooperative approach to energy security. Another possible outcome to a prolonged oil shortage, especially in the wake of such a crisis, would be a general attempt among the powers of Asia to bolster their political and military influence in the Middle East and Central Asia, to position themselves more favourably should similar circumstances arise in future. Japan and South Korea have been pursuing major investment in Middle Eastern oilfields and operations to produce natural gas for many years now. China meanwhile has already cultivated what it describes as a ‘strategic oil partnership’ with Saudi Arabia; it is a major arms supplier in the region and its close ties with Iran have already begun to impede Sino-US relations, as Washington struggles to gain or sustain Beijing’s support for more extensive sanctions against Iran in relation to its ongoing nuclear program (itself a potential catalyst for just such a crisis). India is also a major importer of Saudi oil. To be sure, China is not yet capable of becoming a major strategic challenger in the Middle East, lacking as it does the necessary force-projection assets. For the foreseeable future, therefore, it is likely to rely on its partnerships to dilute the singularity of US primacy in that critical region. Nevertheless, as its power and influence expand, China might seek out a much more prominent role in the Middle East – a development that the United States is not only likely to resist in the Middle East, but potentially in Asia and other parts of the world as well. Once again, this would most likely hasten the emergence of a balance of power. Finally, the most serious risk of a serious oil crisis is that it might unleash an intense security competition in Asia itself. This scenario has an unfortunate historical basis. It was concern for the security of its energy supplies, especially in the wake of Washington’s oil embargo (1941), which in part motivated Japan to occupy oilfields in maritime Southeast Asia in World War II. To what extent does the rise of China, with its rapidly expanding power and growing dependence on foreign energy supplies, portend the renewal of intense competition over energy in the coming decades? Perhaps the most serious risk is that China’s efforts to secure and consolidate its oil supply will arouse the insecurity of other regional powers. 111 China has expansive claims in the South and East China Seas, through which a great proportion of Japan’s energy is transported. Furthermore, as China’s energy dependence intensifies, as the price of energy increases with continued demand, and as new uncertainties emerge regarding freedom of access, the capacity to at least deny the use of sea lanes that connect the Persian Gulf to the Pacific will become a more urgent strategic priority for a number of regional navies. Prolif and NPT File ***PROLIF GOOD*** 1 Akila, Andrew, Elsa, Karthik, Jesse, Jon, Meg, Meyer, Viveth, Zach 1 Prolif Good – War 3 Prolif decreases war. 3 Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette) 3 Prolif solves major war 3 New proliferators decrease the likelihood and damage of war—5 reasons 4 -caution 4 -deescalation due to fear of retaliation 4 -deterrence by punishment 4 -nuclear use causes immediate sobriety 4 -no motive to seek victory 4 Waltz 95 4 New proliferators dramatically reduce the risk of war 4 Waltz 95 4 Prolif prevents the escalation of wars 5 Waltz 95 5 Even if low-scale violence does occur it won’t escalate 5 More nuclear states increase stability—the cold war became even more stable when europe joined the fray 5 Waltz 95 5 Asal & Beardsley Methodology Good 6 Our studies are best -- 6 1) Empirics 6 Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette) 6 2) Data 6 Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette) 6 3) Accuracy and robust results. 6 Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette) 6 Prolif Good – Deterrence 7 Nuclear weapons prevent and descalate war—deterrence, caution, lack of motivation, and miscalc 7 Waltz 95 7 Nuclear weapons prevent and deescalate war. 8 Waltz 95 8 Nuclear weapons are the best means of deterring conflict; the world before them was wrought with war 9 Prolif good -- creates stability through state survival and deters conventional and nuclear conflict through balancing. 9 Exts – Cold War Proves 11 Cold war proves nuclear deterrence is good 11 India/Pakistan Prove 12 India and Pakistan prove prolif has a stabilizing effect 12 AT Deterrence Failures 13 Uncertainty makes the cost of war too high 13 Even low chance of retaliation is sufficient to deter 13 Even if deterrence failure occurs, prolif guarantees it doesn’t escalate. 13 Waltz 95 13 More ev. 14 Waltz 95 14 AT Any Risk of Prolif O/W 15 Study ONLY empirical outcomes. The ONLY relevant question is the net body count and nuclear prolif clearly reduces it. Single risk of accident isn’t enough. 15 Prolif Good – Conventional War 17 Proliferation solves nuclear and conventional conflict 17 Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette) 17 Conventional war is really deadly. 17 Exts – Prolif Solves Conventional War 19 40 to 1. Benefits outweigh the costs. 19 Prolif solves conventional war and arms racing 19 Waltz 95 19 Preventing proliferation guarantees devastating conventional wars in all global hotspots. 19 Conventional War Bad – General 21 Conventional war sucks. 21 Conventional War O/W Nuclear War 22 Conventional war is just as devastating as nuclear war 22 Conventional war escalates to nuclear war. 22 Conventional weapons are increasing in lethality 22 Conventional War Bad – Terrorism 24 War causes terror 24 AT Conventional War Unlikely 25 Conventional war is probable. Sound deterrent strategies should guide policy analysis. 25 Multiple nations are gearing up for conventional war-fighting now. Absent adjustment the world will face risks of large-scale conflict. 25 AT Prolif Bad – General 27 Their impact claims are based on a flawed analysis 27 AT Accidents 28 The risk of accidents is low -- nukes are on balance better for stability. 28 AT Anonymous Strike/Blackmail 29 No risk 29 Waltz 95 29 AT Arms Race 30 Only small arsenals -- solves stability -- three reasons. 30 Nuclear capabilities make arms races irrelevant 31 Waltz 95 31 Deterrence disincentivizes arms racing 31 Waltz 95 31 AT Arsenal Insecurity – General 33 Small arsenals, self-interest, and ingenuity keep weapons secure 33 AT Civil War/Unstable States 34 Lower risk of prolif in those states and no escalation. 34 Waltz 95 34 AT Crisis Instability 35 Prolif solves crisis stability – first strike capability. 35 Prolif creates a perception of second strike capabilities that solves crisis instability. 35 Even if prolif causes more crises, it forces leaders to back down before they escalate. 35 AT Faulty Arsenals Destabilize 36 Nope 36
Waltz 95 36 Even atrocious arsenals can deter 36 Waltz 95 36 AT Irrationality 37 Leaders aren’t irrational -- they’re focused on state survival 37 All actors are at least rational enough, even non-state/terrorist groups. 37 Prolif stabilizes radical regimes -- Libya proves. 37 Waltz 95 37 AT Mil Control → First Use 38 Doesn’t happen. 38 Waltz 95 38 AT Miscalc 39 Prolif solves miscalc. 39 No miscalc 39 AT Nuclear Hitler 40 Won’t happen 40 Waltz 95 40 AT Offensive Use – General 41 Nuclear use by small states would not escalate – the costs are too high 41 Waltz 95 41 AT Overconfidence 42 The uncertainty of nuclear response means even an overconfident actor wouldn’t attack 42 Waltz 95 42 AT Preemptive Strikes 43 The high probability of 1st strikes failing is sufficient to prevent them 43 Empirical studies prove no preemption. 43 No offensive use. 44 Waltz 95 44 AT Preventative Strikes 45 No preventative wars 45 Political constraints check preventive war 45 nope 46
Waltz 95 46 AT Rivalries 47 Even bitter rivals are deterred by nuclear use 47 Waltz 95 47 AT Theft/Terrorism 48 NOPE – bunches of warrants 48 No terror / stolen – MAD theory but smaller scale 48 Terrorists have no motivation for a nuclear attack 49 Nope – if there was terrorism – there’d be more control 50 AT Unequal Prolif 51 Unequal prolif means no retaliation 51 2nd Strike capability allows deterrence to work even between misbalanced forces 51 Waltz 95 51 Prolif Good – BW Shift 53 Bioweapon use causes extinction. 53 Clifford Singer, Spring 2001. Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign. “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P_XIII/Singer.htm. 53 Exts – Stopping Prolif → BW 54 Preventing proliferation encourages biological weapon acquisition. 54 Nuclear Deterrence Good – CBW Attacks 55 Presence of nuclear weapons prevents a CBW attack. 55 Bioweapons O/W Nuclear War 56 Bioweapons outweigh nuclear war -- short circuits deterrence. 56 Bio-weapons use outweighs and turns nuclear war. 56 Alexander, 2007 56 Bioweapons cause extinction and outweigh nuclear war. 57 Prolif Good – Satellites 59 Proliferation causes satellite surveillance expansion. 59 That’s key to the global environment 59 Extinction. 59 Cairns, 2004 59 Prolif Slow 62 Proliferation will be slow and will not cause instability or terrorism -- their impacts are fabricated as the result of political and economically motivated scaremongering. 62 Prolif is inevitable, slow, and stabilizing—no offense 63 Prolif will stay slow and won’t snowball. 66 Waltz 95 66 Prolif slow and inevitable 67 Waltz 95 67 Small Arsenals 68 Won’t build large arsenals – solves conflict. 69 Small arsenals check 69 Exts – Yes Build Small Arsenals 71 No adversaries = no large buildup 72 AT Arsenals Too Small for Deterrence 73 Even small arsenals are sufficient for deterrence. 73 New proliferators will have strong deterrence credibility in spite of limited arsenals 73 Even small arsenals can effectively deter 73 Waltz 95 73 ***PROLIF BAD*** 75 Prolif Bad (Below) 77 Prolif guarantees great power intervention – escalates to nuclear war. 77 Prolif Bad (Kissinger) 78 Prolif causes extinction -- deterrence fails and can’t replicate Cold War stability -- accidents, miscalc, terrorism, preemption. 78 Prolif Bad (Krieger) 80 Proliferation risks extinction. benefits don’t justify jacking with the future of humanity. 80 Prolif Bad (Sokolski) 81 A proliferated world would risk escalatory regional nuclear wars. 81 Sokolski, 2009 81 Prolif Bad (Roberts) 82 In the new world order proliferation will be rapid and destabilizing – even Waltz assumes proliferation is slow 82 Prolif Bad (Robock) 83 Prolif dramatically increases the risk of nuclear war -- causes nuclear winter. 83 Prolif Bad (War – General) 84 Proliferation leads to catastrophic scenarios and threats exist now – India, Pakisan, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq prove 84 New proliferators are inherently unstable – escalation. 85 Risk of Prolif O/W 88 Even if the risk is relatively low the consequences are too high to risk. 88 Prolif Bad – Accidents 90 Proliferation creates significant accidental and unauthorized nuclear risks -- India and Pakistan prove they won’t take sufficient protective measures. 90 Prolif causes an arms race – accidental nuclear war 91 Prolif Bad – Crisis Instability 92 Prolif causes crisis instability in post-Cold War era 92 Crisis Instability T/Deterrence 93 Crisis instability kills deterrence 93 Prolif Bad – Deterrence Failures 94 Regional deterrence failures are likely. They’ll escalate to draw in the US. 94 Deterrence failure is likely. Incomplete intelligence and irrationality in a regional crisis. 94 Cimbala, 2007 94 New proliferators will make deterrence less stable: historical animosity, short-range and civil-military relationships. 95 Cimbala, 2007 95 Deterrence is unstable. Failure is likely even with minimal deterrence. 96 None of the requirements for rational deterrence will apply. 99 Nuclear deterrence will only solve under near perfect information – in most likely situations it can’t solve conflict and only increases the risk 100 Deterrence isn’t automatic. 101 AT Cold War Proves Deterrence Solves 102 Deterrence theory failed in the Cold War and will continue to fail – incites war 103 AT Indo-Pak Proves Deterrence 106 Indo-Pak crises prove deterrence failure is possible and nukes don't prevent escalation. 106 AT Indo-Pak Proves Deterrence (Kargil) 108 US intervention, not nuclear weapons prevented Kargil escalation. 108 AT Nukes Only For Deterrence 110 New powers will see nuclear weapons as useful for offensive warfighting, not deterrence. 110 Exts – Deterrence Fails (Non-State Actors) 111 Terrorists and rogue states are not deterred by nuclear arsenals 111 Prolif Bad – Irrationality 113 Rationality is a uniquely poor assumption for nuclear war planning. 113 Mozley, 1998 113 Prolif Bad – Miscalc 114 Proliferation risks miscalculation. 114 Prolif Bad – Pre-Delegation 115 Risk of preemption means pre-delegation making nuclear escalation more likely. 115 Prolif Bad – Preemption 116 Future proliferators will use nukes, not deter. Preemption is likely. 116 Proliferation lead to preemptive strikes 120 The act of proliferation invites first strikes even if deterrence applies -- prolif good authors concede. 121 Prolif Bad – Preventative Strikes 123 Prolif increases preventive attempts 123 Prolif Bad – Preemption/Preventative Strikes 125 Prolif causes preventive and preemptive strikes -- empirical proof. 125 Prolif Bad – First Strikes Impact 126 Tech diffusion causes first strikes. 126 These states will be left uninhabitable. 126 AT No Preemption – Deterrence 127 Deterrence can’t check preemption – fears cause irrational decisionmaking 127 AT No Preemption – Intel 128 Intelligence over-confidence means they'll chance preemptive strikes. 128 AT No Preemption – Rationality 129 Nuclear arsenals won't deter intervention. 129 AT No Preventative War 131 Historically rare nature of preventive war is irrelevant. It is likely in the future against nuclear prolif. 131 AT Diplomacy Checks 134 Diplomacy doesn’t check war – countries will look to military actions before cooperation 134 AT Intel Checks 135 Bad c and c makes prolif a war risk. 135 AT Nuclear Irrelevancy 136 Nuclear irrelevancy doesn’t accurately depict the world 136 AT Safety Measures 138 Small countries will build large arsenals and lack stable C and C 138 AT Small Arsenals 139 Actual dynamics of conflict prove there will be a rapid arsenal buildup and according loss of command and control. 139 AT Prolif Slow (General) 143 Neorealism dictates that states will continue to proliferate indefinitely if they have the technical capabilities 143 AT Prolif Slow (No Tipping Point) 145 We are at the nuclear tipping point – consensus of experts 145 AT Rationality Checks 146 Rationality of states is irrelevant – even the tiny possibility of miscalculation or misunderstandings would plunge the world into the dark ages 146 AT Realism 147 c. structural weaknesses 148 f. In the context of proliferation, RIST and RDT theories fail 151 AT Waltz 153 Waltz’s theory is flawed 153 Waltz’s rational deterrence theory fails 153 Prolif → BMD 156 Prolif causes BMD buildup 156 Prolif Bad – Environment 157 Prolif causes massive environmental destruction. 157 Prolif Bad – Heg 158 Prolif destroys heg and diplomacy -- 158 a. Proliferation affects each state differently. The largest determinant of whether proliferation is good or bad is an individual state’s power projection capabilities – this understanding of proliferation is comparatively better for policymakers. 158 b. Proliferation hurts power-projecting states like the US while strengthening our enemies – proliferation hurts hegemony by decreasing our ability to leverage coercive diplomacy 159 Exts – Prolif Kills Heg 160 Proliferation erodes hegemony 160 Constrains conventional military freedom 160 b. Deter’s military intervention 160 c. reduces effectiveness of coercive diplomacy 162 d. Trigger regional instability 163 e. Undermines alliance structures. 164 F. dissipates strategic attention 165 h. Sets off further proliferation 166 Conversely, new proliferation makes our enemies stronger by allowing them to constrain our freedom of action: all our internal links are reverse causal 167 Prolif Bad – Hegemonic Transition 171 Prolif makes major power transitions more dangerous and increases the likelihood of catalytic conflicts escalating. 171 Prolif Bad – Terrorism 173 Exts – Prolif → Terrorism 174 Nuclear proliferation increases the risk of nuclear terrorism; preventing it solves 174 Proliferation will increase terrorist theft of nuclear materials which escalates to an arms race. 175 Prolif risks a nuclear terrorist attack. 175 Prolif guarantees non-state actor acquisition -- extinction. 176 AT Prolif Solves War (General) 178 Prolif creates numerous chances for conflict. Letting prolif happen causes far more destructive wars. 178 Proliferation won’t deter war -- bad command and control, rapid response risks inadvertent war and proliferation would be rapid. 178 AT Prolif Solves Conventional War 181 nuclear war isn't close to deterring conventional wars. And this holds escalatory potential. 181 War is still likely. Subordinates, first strike and lack of survivability. 181 Empirically nuclear proliferation increases the risk of conventional war – high costs encourage conflict 182 Prolif transforms ongoing disputes into shooting wars. 182 Doesn’t solve lower level conflicts. 183 AT Asal & Beardsley 184 Proliferation only reduces the risk of war by 37%, but risks absolute destruction 184 AT Allied Prolif Good/Stable 185 Proliferation is bad even when it spreads to allies. 185 Asian Prolif Bad – Arms Races 187 Asian prolif causes arms races – escalates to nuclear warfare 187 Asian Prolif Bad – Preemption 188 Asian prolif specifically causes preemption – nuclear war 188 Asian Prolif Bad – Terrorism 191 Asian proliferation risks instability and nuclear terrorism. 191 Asian prolif causes terrorism. 191 AT Prolif Good (Asia Specific) 193 Their prolif good turns assume a Soviet and American influence – they don’t apply to Asia 193 Iran Prolif Bad 194 Iranian prolif undermines deterrence – guarantees crisis 194 Middle East Prolif Bad – General 195 Middle East prolif causes destabilizing arms races, escalation, and nuclear terrorism. 195 IHT ‘6 (Noah Feldman, “Nuclear holocaust: A risk too big even for martyrs?” 10-27, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/27/news/bombforweb.php) 195 Middle East Prolif Bad – Heg 196 Middle East proliferation eviscerates US hegemony 196 Missile Prolif Bad – Escalation 198 Proliferation causes escalation 198 Proliferation causes interstate regional conflict 198 Missile Prolif Bad – NPT 199 Missile prolif destabilizes the world and collapses non-prolif efforts. 199 ***RANDOM PROLIF-RELATED*** 201 NPT Good – Terrorism 203 The NPT is key to nonproliferation- solves extinction and terrorism 203 NPT Good – Prolif 205 The NPT solve prolif- symbolic steps reduce the likelihood of war 205 Brink of rapid prolif – NPT key. 207 Nonprolif prevents extinction. 207 AT US Actions → Prolif 209 Prolif is based on regional concerns -- not motivated by US action. 209 Global Disarm Attempts Bad 211 Removal process would lead to nuclear miscalculation -- empirical examples prove. 211 Even if its successful, it causes categorically greater instability and escalation than the SQ. 211 AT NPT Solves Prolif 213 No wildfire prolif- the NPT isn’t key 213 Arms control can’t solve irrational actors -- only deterrence checks that. 214 AT CBMs Solve 215 Confidence-building measures fail -- increases the risk of preemption and conflict. 215 Opacity Bad – Stability 217 Proliferation won’t be stable under opacity. 217 Opacity Good – Stability 218 Opaque prolif solves stability 218 Opacity Good – Theft/Terrorism 219 Opacity prevents nuclear theft. 219 AT Opacity Not Solve Deterrence 220 Opaque prolif still solves deterrence 220 ***RANDOM UNRELATED*** 222 Yes – Global Nuclear Modernization 224 Threat is high now – states are modernizing their arsenals and research is advancing rapidly 224 Yes – China Buildup 225 China is a challenger -- building up nuclear stockpiles. 225 Yes – Russia Buildup 226 Russia is developing its capabilities now -- multiple warrants. 226 Yes – Rogue State/Terrorist Threat 227 Rogue states are a huge threat – even if they won’t attack, they will sell nuclear arsenals to terrorists 227 Yes – Nuclear Terrorism 228 Nuclear terrorisms high probability. 228 Terrorists can acquire nuclear materials. 228 Terrorists can get the bomb – Pakistan, North Korea, or the Black Market 229 Nuclear terrorism is feasible -- crushes the global economy 230 Yes – Nuclear Winter 232 Nuclear winter theory is true – their experts rely on limited, outdated experts 232 Oil Shocks Impact 235 Oil shocks devastate the economy, collapse global trade and guarantee escalation. 235 --- Prolif --- ***Prolif Good*** Impact – Democracy Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.7 Mb. Share with your friends:
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