Review of International Studies

Pavel Tsygankov, Moscow State University

Vladimir Solovyev¹

The article contributes to the recent discussion of roles played by the global core and periphery in forming knowledge about the world. As a “semi-peripheral” nation, Russia may speak on behalf of both the center and peripheral parts of the world, thereby becoming an important voice in the global conversation. This paper reviews discussions among Russian scholars by identifying the dominant schools as Universalist and Pluralist. Both are in favor of Russia’s continued integration with the global IR community, but stress different sides of such integration. While Universalists argue for the ontological and epistemological unity of the world, Pluralists emphasize social, cultural, and intellectual diversity. Based on a survey among those teaching IR theory in Russian educational institutions, the paper also reviews development of the discipline as viewed by the Russian academic community. Russian academics assess the state of IR theory as in crisis relative to intellectual developments in the country’s recent past and abroad. The progress of Russian IR depends on its continued global integration and the development of indigenous Russian political thought.

Knowledge and power are intimately connected: knowledge informs power, and power shapes knowledge. As the world moves away from the U.S. political hegemony, the global scholarship on international relations too reflects a greater cultural diversity. The recent attempts by International Relations scholars to create room for knowledge from the perspective of the “non-American” and “non-Western” periphery² have implications for Western, particularly American, intellectual hegemony. While inviting a dialogue across the globe, new voices from Asia, Africa, and Latin America are challenging the position of the West’s ideological and cultural dominance. The increasingly multipolar world may be becoming multicultural as well.

The (re)emergence of discussion in International Relations theory on roles played by the global core and periphery in forming knowledge about the world raises important questions about the potential of “non-Western” cultures to contribute to global academic developments. If the world is indeed moving away from the U.S. political and intellectual hegemony, what role would local cultures have in knowledge formation? What happens to the assumptions about world’s ontological and epistemological unity when others enter the field of discussion, each with their own special assumptions and suppositions? Should the U.S.- and West-centered discipline of IR be overturned by developing periphery-based approaches, or there is a way to build a common and non-hegemonic standard of theorizing? What criteria of progress in IR should be employed? If more room is to be given to indigenous cultural and political theory, how will it affect the traditional disciplinary boundaries of IR? If a globalized discipline of IR is possible, what might be the global conditions to sustain it?

Russia presents an interesting case that has the potential to improve our understanding of the described themes. A “semi-peripheral” economy,³ a geopolitical borderland located between Western and non-Western countries,⁴ and a culture with special relations with Europe, Asia and the Muslim region,⁵ Russia may speak on behalf of both the central and peripheral parts of the world. It is therefore well positioned to represent and articulate various sides of the debate, thereby serving as an important voice in the global theoretical conversation. However, a number of questions must be asked about Russian IR’s ability to become such a voice. What is the distinct contribution of Russian IR approaches? Do they resonate within the larger international audience and have the potential to expand the horizons of the global discipline? Is Russian IR sufficiently independent from Western, particularly American knowledge? From this perspective, are Russian claims to a power pole substantive? Which issues do Russian scholars address with particular vigor and creativity? Which historical memories, traditions, and ideologies are especially important in understanding the structure and the dynamics of Russian IR? Finally: is there a Russian school of IR?

This paper attempts to address three aspects of IR developments in Russia. First, we review discussions among Russian scholars and argue that after the Soviet disintegration the new IR community in the country has made important progress in adapting to the global academic world and defeating previously strong voices of isolationism. The dominant currents in today’s Russia can be described as Universalist and Pluralist. Both are in favor of Russia’s continued integration within the global IR community, but stress different sides of such integration. While Universalists argue for the ontological and epistemological unity of the world, Pluralists emphasize social, cultural, and intellectual diversity. Second, we review the self-perceived state of affairs in the Russian academic community based on a survey of IR theory taught across the country’s educational institutions. Russian IR is a highly eclectic mix of local and Western approaches to post-Cold War realities. We find that Russian academics are dissatisfied with the state of IR theory and are beginning to reassess the twenty-five years that have passed since the end of the Cold War. They describe development in the field with alarm, characterizing it as a crisis in comparison to Russia’s own history and developments abroad. Third, we analyze ways forward for Russian IR theory, both as perceived by experts and based on our own understanding of its crisis. In particular, we argue that progress of Russian IR depends on simultaneously meeting two challenges: continued global integration and the development of Russian indigenous political thought.

The article is structured as follows. We first describe the state of Russian IR theory by locating it within the discussion on the “Western” core/non-“Western” periphery and proposing a typology of main currents in the Russian academia. We then proceed to discuss the notion of the crisis of Russian IR theory as defined by members of Russian academia and explained by its various currents. Following this is our discussion of possible ways out of the perceived crisis, in particular whether Russia should aim to establish its own school within the global community of IR scholars. The conclusion summarizes the article’s key points and offers final reflections on the contemporary and future development of Russian IR theory.

Scholars of international relations and comparative politics have long established that Western social science is frequently biased and, upon a close scrutiny, reveals intellectual assumptions and political preferences of those residing in the West.⁶ IR scholars have referred to American mainstream approaches as “parochial”,⁷ not global, and attempted to address their ethnocentric biases by proposing to take seriously various insights of “non-Western” thinkers in post-colonial studies. In particular, post-colonial scholarship proposes that IR theory must offer a reciprocal engagement with the Other, rather than merely expect it to follow the West’s lead. In contrast to eeeeeedsdthnocentrism and treatment of “non-Western” theorists as dependent subjects (“subalterns”) and consumers of the already developed knowledge, production of a more global knowledge requires defining the Self and its moral values as something open to negotiation, rather than absolute, exclusive, and essentialist; and viewing the Other as different, but morally equal and, for that reason, as a source of potential learning.⁸ In practical terms, such an approach would promote negotiations to establish mutually acceptable norms and reduce space for hegemonic actions.

Post-colonial thinking has made room for the active promotion of pluralist approaches in IR beyond the traditional Western cannon. Arlene Tickner, Ole Weaver, and David Blaney, who teach in Latin America, Europe, and the United States, respectively, initiated a series of books on IR theory as viewed from the global periphery.⁹ Helene Pelerine edited a volume for French-speaking audiences devoted to overcoming Anglo-American bias in IR.¹⁰ John Hobson published an important book that analyzes the colonial Eurocentric underpinnings of Western IR theories.¹¹ IR theorists are also increasingly interested in problems of civilization, civilizational identity and their impact on the formation of different worldviews.¹²

Those critical of the idea of global pluralism within IR knowledge express their concern about the field’s coherence. To preserve such coherence, they recommend basing scholarship on the notion of rationality and universal scientific standards. Western realists and liberals tend to view such standards as reflecting the ontological unity of the global world with prescribed principles of behavior and procedures to resolve disputes among states. While liberals emphasize the importance of international institutions, realists continue to highlight the military-economic dimension of the world order, with some favoring the leading role of the United States in preserving the West-favored international balance of power.¹³ However, both realists and liberals are convinced that the ontological unity of the world assumes a commitment to certain epistemological and scholarly standards. As a result, these scholars view attempts by non-Western cultures to create their own schools of IR as unsustainable and even prone to self-marginalization because such ambitions are perceived as questioning the established universal principles of scientific knowledge (analysis, verification, falsifiability, and others). For example, the American scholar Jack Snyder expressed his readiness to study Confucianist thought for an understanding Chinese strategic culture, while refusing to consider Confucianism as a legitimate philosophical foundation behind a special Chinese school of IR.¹⁴

Challenging the identified pluralist voices are not only Western rationalists, namely liberals and realists, but also some representatives of post-structural IR theory. Despite being critical of West-centered IR, these post-structuralist scholars support some commonly agreed principles of research and express reservations about special schools in IR or even the idea of dialogue between “Western” and “non-Western” approaches.¹⁵ For instance, according to the British scholar Kymberly Hutchins, the very juxtaposition of “Western” and “non-Western” excludes the possibility of a dialogue and may result in endless mutual criticisms and reinforced parochialism.¹⁶

As with other discussions in social sciences, the “Western/non-Western” debate is difficult to understand without analyzing its social and political underpinnings. This theoretical debate is taking place against the backdrop of rapidly changing practices of international relations that challenge the idea of universal knowledge and common behavioral standards. Without the decline of the American and, more broadly, Western hegemony, this debate might have not taken place. The West’s ability to project global power is now challenged in some principal ways. The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 undermined the United States and Europe’s monopoly on the use of force in world politics; and the global financial meltdown revealed the West’s economic vulnerability. During September-October 2013, Russia and other non-Western powers greatly contributed to preventing the United States from using force in Syria. Some European nations, including Germany, Great Britain, and others, also did not support use of force.

In Russian IR, the global-parochial controversy yields three theoretical approaches or intellectual trends, each emphasizing different sides of the debate. First, there are Universalists whose position corresponds with the above-described views favoring IR as a global discipline with clearly established and universally shared scientific standards. Critical of Russian international studies, Universalists find Russian IR to be parochial and not integrated with global research. The majority of them is convinced that the global integration is largely ahead of Russian IR and that only such integration may preserve Russia from isolationism and self-marginalization. Even those who argue that Russia generally completed the process of adapting to global science after the Soviet breakup find that Russian IR lacks the genuine diversity or richness of discussion necessary for theoretical progress and remains under the heavy influence of realist and geopolitical approaches.¹⁷ Not surprisingly, Universalists do not favor the idea of creating Russian school of IR and view such attempts as excessively ambitious, prone to isolationism and the ideological suppression of scientific independence.¹⁸

The second visible intellectual trend is Isolationism. Although the post-Soviet developments considerably weakened this trend within academia, Isolationism remains influential among some politicians and in the larger cultural community that includes writers, experts, and media circles. Isolationists are convinced that Russia has everything it needs for its intellectual development and only lacks state ideological guidance. To a degree, isolationism has developed in response to Westernization. Western knowledge, with its parochial issues and epistemological biases, may indeed invite rejections and even hostilities. But Isolationism––a refusal to learn from the "other"––also has deep roots in Russia's own superiority/inferiority complex. During the Soviet era, the official Marxism assumed the mantle” of speaking on behalf of the "most progressive social class" and therefore, by definition, knowing the "Truth". Post-Soviet IR, alas, is not free from Isolationism either.¹⁹ Interestingly enough, while proclaiming that Western post-structuralist approaches are alien to Russia’s indigenous values, Isolationists nevertheless borrow from Western traditional geopolitical theories. For example, the recent text by Alexander Dugin, the founder of neo-Eurasianist school within Russian geopolitical thought, demonstrates knowledge of various IR approaches, but in constructing a theory of a multipolar world it relies on Carl Schmitt, Samuel Huntington, and other traditional geopolitically-minded thinkers.²⁰

Finally, there are Pluralists who advocate a culturally sensitive integration and a sustained dialogue with the global IR community. This intellectual trend is increasingly powerful and shapes Russian IR discourse by taking issue with Universalists as well as those falling into the Isolationist camp. Pluralists support Russia’s integration and dialogue with the global IR community, but they also argue for the mobilization of indigenous intellectual capital as a necessary condition of such integration. In particular, for the purpose of bringing the “Russianness” out, some Pluralists advocate a stronger interaction of Russian IR theorists with those specializing in Russian political philosophy.²¹ They see the weakness of Russian IR not only in its insufficient integration with global developments, but also in its lack of knowledge of Russia’s own intellectual roots. Russia has left behind Soviet Marxism but has not yet developed a new framework for the growth of academic knowledge. Because of the latter, Pluralists argue, Russian IR is frequently caught in ideological confrontation between Universalists and Isolationists with little space for productive discussion. The main assumptions of the two approaches are simply too difficult to reconcile. While Universalists hold the potential of underestimating the indigenous intellectual tradition, Isolationists respond to the excesses of Universalism and call for Russia's autarchic intellectual development, thereby depriving Russian IR of opportunities to learn from foreign cultures and social sciences.
3. The Crisis of Russian IR

During the more than twenty years of post-Soviet development, Russian IR has come a long way by introducing a number of fruitful approaches and theories for understanding the international system and state foreign policy. Instead of one dominant worldview, as it was with the officially-sanctioned Marxism of the past, a variety of new schools have emerged and begun to develop. During the post-communist period, Russian IR has built a relevant academic infrastructure by way of establishing scholarly associations, specialized journals, and venues for preparing and defending dissertations in the field of international relations. In particular, the Russian Association of International Relations has been established and conducts annual meetings with the participation of several hundred members from various regions of Russia and beyond. IR-related sections or committees have also been functioning within other social science conferences such as the Russian Political Science Association, Russian Sociological Association, and the like. Dissertations on various subjects of international studies have been defended not only in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in Ekaterinburg, Nizhni Novgorod, Kazan’ and other cities of the country. In addition to several established social science journals, a specialized journal of IR theory (Mezhdunarodnyye protsessy: Zhurnal teoriyi mezhdunaronykh otnosheniy, or International Trends: Journal of the theory of international relations) has been published since the 1990s. Although Russian scholars occasionally approach IR from the perspective of of other social sciences such as of History, Philosophy, or Sociology,²² the trend of developing IR theory within specialized departments has grown stronger. Most specialists in Russian IR agree that its most important formative stage is now behind it and that Russian international studies have established themselves as an important scholarly discipline and teaching subject in educational institutions.²³

At the same time, new serious problems have appeared that complicate the further development of Russian IR theory (RIRT). Many Russian scholars specializing in IR are no longer satisfied with merely consuming the knowledge as developed by their foreign colleagues. Increasingly, their standards for developing Russian IR include global visibility and independent thinking. In our survey conducted among those teaching IR theory in Russian universities,²⁴ we asked the respondents to assess the state of RIRT relative to its development in the 1990s and in comparison with foreign/Western countries. In particular, we asked them to choose among the categories of “successful development”, “crisis”, and “overcoming crisis,” or propose a classification of their own. Their answers are summarized in table 1.

Relative to the 1990s, only 10% of respondents assess the state of RIRT as a “successful development.” Most common assessment was that of a “crisis” supported by 50% of the experts. Some of them qualified their assessment using characteristics such as “no accomplishments and no failures”; “nothing original is created”; “the existing results are not visible abroad”; and even “a backward movement relative to the early 2000s”. Another group (23%) assesses Russian IR as “overcoming its crisis.” Some of those who endorsed such categorization clarified their assessment with characteristics close to those of a crisis state – “sluggish development,” “stagnation”, or “reproduction of old stereotypes”. Others preferred characteristics such as “beginning of movement out of the crisis”, “stabilization”, and “beginning of development”. Still another group of respondents, around 17%, presented their own categorization using definitions such as “slow progress” and “accumulation of potential for development.”

Quite chilling were also assessments of the state of RIRT in comparison with foreign schools and theories. Only 13% selected the categorization of “successful development and a dialogue with foreign colleagues”. The majority (50%) opted in their assessment for “insufficient development”, meaning a lack of independent thinking²⁵ as well as low degree of international integration. In particular, some experts of liberal theoretical orientation used clarifications such as “the dead end of searching for its own theories”, “isolationism and absence of a dialogue”, and “lack of public demand, decline, and development of pseudo-scientific studies”. Another group of respondents (37%) characterized the contemporary state of RIRT as “a growing dependence on foreign/Western approaches.” According to some members of this group, Russian international studies continue to progress in the "paradigm of familiarizing" (paradigma osvoyeniya), that is by borrowing Western theoretical arsenal but not developing its own.²⁶ Other in the group lamented “thoughtless translation” and “lack of one’s own position.”

How do Russian IR theorists explain what they perceive to be the crisis of their discipline? Against some expectations, most respondents do not link the crisis to economic and material factors or lacking financial resources. Only around 18% subscribed to the view. More representative were two other groups. One of them identified the weaknesses of professional education, including poorly developed curriculum and methods of teaching IR theory (33%). But the largest (70%) was the group of those who explained the crisis by lack of ideational and social demand for development of RIRT.²⁷ Within the group were those who felt that their work was not needed: “this is not prestigious; the money is secondary.” Others argued that the process of such ideational demand will take a long time, while Russian IR still has too short of a history for the emergence of a motivating “great idea.” In addition, some 13% proposed their own explanation of the crisis by linking it to the “inability to integrate with the global science”, “weakness of empirical research”, “weak internal criteria of assessing quality”, “absence of conditions for discussion”, and ongoing “generational change” among Russian IR specialists.

Table 2 summarizes Russian explanations of the identified crisis of IR theory.

Therefore, the overwhelming majority of Russian respondents seem to point to lack of a stimulating ideational context that they deem necessary for the development of IR theory. There is no consensus on what such context might or should be. Universalists are likely to advocate a more aggressive global integration, whereas Isolationists may go as far as to recommend the establishment of a state ideology as guiding IR theorists in their research.²⁸ As to Pluralists, there is no evidence that they support the idea of state ideology or miss the revival of an officially sanctioned idea, whether it is Marxism or another ism. Nevertheless Pluralists seem to crave for the emergence of some cohesive paradigm of knowledge or its own ideological "mainstream" in international studies. They aspire to the emergence of a “great” idea similar to the "democratic peace", "international society", and "great harmony" in the United States, Great Britain, and China, respectively, that some scholars view as serving to provide such a mainstream idea in the three identified countries.²⁹

Continuing with the search for a cohesive paradigm of knowledge, Russian scholars are engaged in the discussion of whether special efforts and resources should be allocated for establishing a special Russian school of IR (RSIR). Most Russian IR scholars support the idea. According to oour survey, the overwhelming majority of respondents find it necessary to build RSIR either with some reservations (50%) or without any reservations (38%). Two third of those Russian theorists working abroad also support RSIR as a way of engaging with global IR developments. Only 12% expressed doubts about need to create a national school of IR or were categorically opposed to it. Here, the main disagreement is between Universalists and Pluralists, with Isolationists not showing an interest in global integration.

Those opposing RSIR advance arguments similar to the above-identified critique of globally pluralist approaches by Western scholars. Many Russian Universalists are Westernizers in the sense that they view the West as the most viable and progressive “civilization” in the world. They argue the affinity of Russia’s values with those of the West based on the commitment to universal values of democracy, human rights, and a free market.³⁰ This group of scholars rarely reflects on democracy and global historical, cultural, and political conditions by treating the world’s institutional development as predominantly West-centered. In defense of their opposition to RSIR, Russian critics identify the dangers of isolation from global academic trends. In addition, they argue that any attempt to create a special RSIR will mean the involvement of the state, which is likely to translate into political-ideological pressures on the Russian academic community similar to the Soviet one.

Those supportive of RSIR advance two main arguments: sociological and political. The sociological argument states that any substantive theoretical developments cannot be fully divorced from the social and political roots in which they take place. If much of IR scholarship has American roots, then Russia too ought to be mindful of its special historical and global predicaments and strive to create theories sensitive to those predicaments.³¹ RSIR cannot escape having a strong imprint of Russia’s special characteristics. Among those characteristics are the country’s predominantly Eastern Christian religious origins; the large territorial space and diversity of geopolitical challenges across the world’s longest geographic border; an inter-continental and inter-civilizational location between Western and non-Western worlds; pre-Westphalian imperial roots; a semi-peripheral position in the global economic system; the anti-bourgeois attitudes of mass social strata, and many others. If theory has to respond to social circumstances, then Russian IR theories must provide a perspective reflective of the country’s values and interests in world politics.

The second argument in favor of RSIR is political or power-based, rather than sociological. According to this argument, the need for developing Russia’s own approaches in IR is dictated by global competition. If E. H. Carr was correct that the “study of international relations in English-speaking countries is simply a study of the best way to run the world from positions of strength”³², then development of a nationally-specific IR theory outside the United States and Europe is a necessary condition for achieving a multipolar balance of power.³³ Such a zero-sum perspective is reflected in the old maxim according to which those who don’t want to feed their own army will have to feed the army of a foreign country. If the analogy stands, Russians must allocate necessary resources for establishing national IR theory in order to preserve their own system of values and interests. Centuries of history have formed such systems in Russia by helping it to meet various international challenges. Today’s main international challenge is the formation of a multipolar world and, if Russia wants to contribute to shaping the new world, there is hardly an alternative to building a nationally-specific IR theory inside the country and RSIR within the global scholarly community.

Russian scholars have already developed a number of concepts and theories to reflect the country’s special circumstances. In particular, these concepts and theories concern the international system and Russia’s identity. For example, in research on the international system's structure and polarity, one popular concept is Aleksei Bogaturov’s proposal to view the post-cold war international system as “pluralistic unipolarity”, in which the unipolar center is a group of responsible states, rather than one state (the United States).³⁴ 18% of respondents identified the idea of pluralistic unipolarity as an example of Russia’s distinct theoretical contribution. Bogaturov sees Russia as a member of the group of responsible states and argues for the consolidation of its position within the global center, as well as for discouraging the formation of one state-based unipolarity in the world. His approach to world order includes, not unlike the British school tradition, the notions of norms and rules.³⁵ It also complicates the Self/Other ideological opposition, because the Russia’s Self was expected to develop closer ties with the Other (West), while resisting the tendency of its members (the U.S.) to become predominant in the system.

In researching Russia’s identity and development model, Russian scholars proposed a number of culturally specific concepts such as the geopolitical “island” (Vadim Tsymbursky), “Orthodox civilization” (Alexander Panarin), “Eurasian empire” (Alexander Dugin), “new West” (Dmitry Trenin), “peripheral empire” (Alexander Kagarlitsky), and others.³⁶ According to our survey, Russian academics view as especially promising those thinkers who theorize Russia as a special system of values. In response to our request to identify the three most important Russian thinkers of the 19^th-20^th century relevant to the development of RSIR, 35% identified Nicholai Danilevsky, 18% did Konstantine Leontyev, and 15% did Alexander Panarin (see table 3 for all identified thinkers). Each of these thinkers profoundly influenced Russian political theory by developing the idea of Russia’s special, non-Western path of development. Danilevsky, long before Samuel Huntington, asserted that Russia was a “special cultural-historical type” of Slav people that could not see itself as a part of Europe.³⁷ Leontyev, who also wrote in the second half of the 19^th century, parted with Danilevsky’s belief in a kingdom of Slavs as a way to defend Russia’s distinctiveness and predicted that Russia would create a “neo-Byzantine”, rather than a Slavonic, cultural type.³⁸ Finally, Panarin wrote in the late 20^th-early 21^st century sympathizing with ideas of the cultural distinctiveness of Russia as “Eastern Christian civilization.³⁹ The latter was also supportive of Eurasianist theory that was developed by émigré intellectuals in the early 20^th century and positioned Russia as a principally non-European, “Eurasian” civilization. In our survey, around 15% of respondents indicated their support for ideas of Eurasianism and Eurasian integration as especially significant for RIRT. Besides Panarin, other Eurasianist thinkers listed in table 3 as important for RSIR are Nicholai Gumelev (10%), Nicholai Trubetskoi (8%), and Nicholai Savitsky (5%).
Table 3 Most Important Russian Thinkers Relevant for RSIR

Russian Thinkers	Assessment
N. Danilevsky C. Leontyev A. Panarin V. Vernadsky N. Gumilev N. Berdyayev V. Solovyev N. Тrubetskoi A. Gertsen N. Savitsky P. Sorokin V. Lenin S. Witte	35% 18% 15% 10% 10% 10% 8% 8% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%

Post-Soviet IR theory in Russia is emerging as a complex field with three main currents or intellectual trends. In the paper, we have identified them as Universalist, Pluralist, and Isolationist. These currents show their principal differences in at least three important respects: the attitude toward Western IR theory, diagnosis of the state of RIRT, and proposed ways to further develop IR theory in Russia. Universalists view Western IR theory as the main source of knowledge for Russia. In their assessment, RIRT is in a state of crisis because it pursues a harmful search for special theories instead of engaging in active integration with the global community of IR scholars. Pluralists don’t disagree with Universalists regarding the importance of integration with global/Western IR, yet Pluralists view such global integration as only one of the two principal sources of RIRT development. According to them, RIRT also cannot be successful without utilizing locally specific knowledge reflected in Russian political philosophy. Such philosophy has long been articulating nationally specific values and should form a basis of RSIR as an intellectual platform from which to engage the global community of IR scholars. Finally, Isolationists do not show a particular interest in engaging / integrating with global IR. Apart from traditional geopolitical theories, Isolationists are not especially interested in Western ideas and find them “alien” and potentially harmful to Russia’s system of values. They propose that Russia’s state take a more active approach in articulating national ideology for the country and scholars of IR.

Table 4 summarizes the three trends in RIRT.

At the moment RIRT is leaning away from knowledge universalization & toward its “nationalization.” This conclusion emerges from evidence of Russia’s growing attention to developing its own national school of IR. Many Russian scholars agree that the current state of their discipline is not satisfactory and that they need to pay a greater attention to developing international studies for the purpose of the country’s adaptation to global realities. In the words of Timofei Bordachev of Moscow’s Highest School of Economics, “we should aim to build … international studies that would train universal specialists for working in state, business, and non-state sector at the international level. Such specialists should possess practical, flexible, and multi-disciplinary knowledge. They should be prepared to forecast and analyze the whole spectrum of inter-state relations on the basis of economic, humanitarian, and political sciences.”⁴⁰ The majority of Russian theorists are in agreement that in order to facilitate such development, the country has to take seriously the task of establishing RSIR. In their assessment, RSIR is necessary in order to provide a perspective reflective of Russia’s historical values and interests in the world by sustaining competition from other states.

The debate between Russian Universalists and Pluralists helpfully highlights that IR knowledge accumulation is an inherently contested process. While both currents agree that RIRT is in crisis, they differ on criteria for crisis and success. Our review of Russian arguments for and against establishing RSIR suggests that both Universalists and Pluralists make important points that merit our attention. As Russia continues its integration with global international studies, Isolationism is likely to be marginalized further. However, the two other currents, Universalism and Pluralism, will continue to be in the state of intense discussion over what counts as successful IR development in Russia. It is premature to speculate whether such discussion will yield new theoretically fruitful syntheses or further deepen the perception of the RIRT crisis. While Universalists will be pointing to promises of integration with Western theories and concepts, Pluralists will continue to stress the importance of bringing to the outside world Russia’s own indigenous voices. Russia’s learning from others is likely to follow the country’s own international needs. At this historical moment, many Russian scholars conceptualize such needs as those of preserving and further articulating the country’s values and interests, rather than merging them with those of the outside world. Importantly, in identifying prominent Western thinkers relevant for RIRT, most Russians name realist scholars with their emphasis on preservation of sovereignty and zero-sum interactions in world politics, rather scholars of liberal or other orientation.⁴¹ It remains to be seen in what way future development of the world will shape the Universalism-Pluralism discussion.