Running head: the people's republic of china: a cbrn snapshot

The People's Republic of China: A CBRN Snapshot

Michael Mancino

Henley-Putnam University

CBRN Weapons

INT415

April 11, 2014

When considering the strategic use of CBRN weapons it is important to identify challenges associated with their production or proliferation. Chemical weapons are easy to manufacture, but they inflict relatively limited damage over small areas and dissipate fairly quickly. Biological weapons can be made in most medical laboratories but remain difficult to weaponize. Furthermore, prompt inoculation and quarantine would limit the number of affected areas and victims. Nuclear weapons are very difficult to produce, however one device with a sufficient yield is capable of destroying an entire city and leaving harmful radiation which could render large areas uninhabitable for years (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, & Rajkumar, 2005). Radiological weapons are often referred to as the poor man’s nuke and are much simpler to build than any of the other three types since they are essentially a conventional explosive with an added radiological material. Conventional explosives are used to distribute the radiological material via detonation. The main limitation in a radiological weapon is the acquisition of a radiological material capable of inflicting serious injury in significant quantities.

Despite the capability of a large number of state actors possessing CBRN capabilities, growing concern has centered on the potential for non-state actors, terrorist organizations or fringe groups acquiring and employing such weapons. Many countries are involved in a variety of non-proliferation treaties and practices which seek to limit the availability of materials necessary to construct and deploy them. For the purposes of this paper, analysis will focus on the People’s Republic of China and its arsenals and capability to construct or procure CBRN weapons, the potential threat to the international community and efforts established or proposed that will limit such a threat.


Chemical Weapons Capability
As of 1993 the PRC is a signatory of the international Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 03/2014). China is believed to possess chemical and biological weapons research and development programs, and some offensive chemical weapons (Cirincione et al., 2005). Its current inventory is believed to include a full range of chemical agents as well as a wide variety of delivery systems including artillery rockets, aerial bombs, sprayers and short range ballistic missiles (Federation of American Scientists: Chemical and Biological Weapons; China, n.d.).

Although China claims complete compliance with the CWC, transfers of precursor chemicals to Iranian interests following the ratification of the CWC indicate the insufficiency of Chinese chemical controls (Federation of American Scientists: Chemical and Biological Weapons; China, n.d.). Following evidence of transfers of precursor chemicals in 1997 the US government imposed trade sanctions on five individuals and three Chinese companies. In 2003, the United States accused China of having “an advanced chemical weapons research and development program”, however a 2010 report cited insufficient evidence to confirm previous or current activities (Arms Control Association: Chemical and Biological Weapons Status at a Glance, 02/2014). Chinese military strategists emphasize preparedness for chemical and nuclear warfare by means of special fortifications, improved masks and chemical weapon detection methods (Croddy, 2002). Currently the PRC considers India the most imminent threat in regards to chemical weapons despite the higher volumes of weapons in possession by the United States and the former Soviet Union.

China is a signatory of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, known as the BTWC as of 1984. Prior to signing the BTWC the United States suspected that China maintained an offensive biological weapons program but since the ratification of the treaty it maintains that it has never researched, produced or possessed such weapons and that it has no intentions to ever do so. The PRC currently possesses an advanced biotechnology infrastructure as well as sufficient munitions production capability necessary to develop, produce and weaponize biological agents (GlobalSecurity.Org, n.d.). Despite its assurances, US intelligence officials believe there is evidence of biological weapons research and maintenance. For example Ken Alibek, former deputy director of the Soviet/Russian Biopreparat BW complex, maintains that an outbreak of hemorrhagic fever near Lop Nor in XinJiang province in the late 1980’s was the result of Chinese bio-weapons research (Croddy, 2002). Despite the back and forth that China does or does not maintain an offensive BW program, it has conducted research into defensive uses for biological weapons including tularemia, Q fever, plague, anthrax, eastern equine encephalitis, and psittacosis (Croddy, 2002).

Beginning in 1952 the PLA formed sanitation/anti-plague units for defense against bio-weapons during the Korean War. In 1954 delegations from the PLA visited the Soviet Union for training and curriculum development in microbiology and infectious disease. China’s military currently emphasizes eradication of infected vermin and insects as its primary means of BW defense under the assumption that an attack would focus on those archaic vectors. Modern biological weapons attacks would more than likely take the form of aerosols and as such the PLA has issued a limited number of aerosol samplers and biological weapons sampling kits (Croddy, 2002).

Despite repeated assurances that they are not pursuing development of chemical or biological weapons, a 2008 US Congressional Research Service report alleged, through unclassified sources, that several nations, including China, maintain bio-weapons capability. As of 2011, the Nuclear Threat Initiative reported that although China has declared itself in compliance with the BTWC it maintains a small scale offensive program and has transferred controlled biological weapons-related items to nations of proliferation concern (GlobalSecurity.Org, n.d.).

The size of China’s nuclear arsenal is debatable; however the average number cited by reports in 2011 put the number somewhere between 200-300 devices. The Federation of American Scientists estimates that China has at least six different types of payload assemblies (Nuclear Threat Initiative: Country Profiles: China, 03/2014). Despite its proclamation that it maintains the minimum number of weapons in order to maintain deterrence, China is one of the only nations in the world that has increased its stockpile of nuclear weapons in recent years. Delivery methods of Chinese weapons are also increasing and advancing. The US intelligence community believes that by the mid 2020’s China could nearly double its arsenal of long range missiles capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the continental United States (Kristensen & Norris, 2013).

China’s proliferation and use of radiological dispersion devices (RDD’s), or dirty bombs, is of little concern. In general, RDD’s are used as the poor man’s nuke. Because China is a nuclear weapons state and continues to research and develop nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that it would employ comparatively crude dirty bombs. The main concern with any nation is the likelihood that its radiological materials were to be acquired by non-state actors for use in such a weapon. China has a substantial bio-medical research industry which includes nuclear medicine. Furthermore, many products manufactured in China contain small amounts of radioactive material. When sources such as these are left unaccounted for, whether due to human error, poor disposal, or poor security and controls they become known as ‘orphan sources’ and run the risk of being procured for use in RDD’s.

Threats and Responses
The likelihood of a CBRN attack against the continental United States by China at this point is unlikely. A working group report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) outlines the relationship of current US-China nuclear relations and policy. In summary, the working group states that current relationships are stable, however there exists some concern that China’s growing conventional military could lead to disruption of American interests in the Asia-Pacific region (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2013). A December 2013 report by the Heritage Foundation iterates that one of the main issues from China’s continual proliferation stems from its participation with other nations of US concern. Different sources show that China has participated in the procurement of missile technology for Iran, Syria and Pakistan and continues to aid Pakistan’s and North Korea’s nuclear program (The Heritage Foundation: China’s Strategic Capabilities and Intent, 12/18/2013).

China’s nuclear weapon policy remains one of no-first-use and is unlikely to change at this point, however a white paper dated April, 2013 by the Chinese ministry of defense does not mention this policy. Regarding its chemical and biological weapons, China has repeatedly stated that it does not have or is not pursuing such weapons for offensive capability. As such, the threat from China is not on a state level.

CBRN threats are more likely to originate from non-state actors or extremist groups. When speaking of China or SE Asia, the threat to the United States is likely to originate from such groups obtaining materials from that country through black market channels or poorly controlled sources. China’s extensive chemical and bio-medical infrastructure has the potential to provide extremists with the proper precursor materials to construct their own weapons. Furthermore, sales of technology to states such as Iran and Syria leave avenues for procurement to terrorist and extremist groups.

In order to decrease the threat of CBRN weapon attacks against the United States and its interests, it is prudent that China should improve its controls on the sale and security of its chemical and medical products. The United States is continuing its efforts to restrict China’s nuclear aid to other countries of concern and it will become increasingly important for the Chinese government to cease such aid to volatile states like North Korea. The United States Air Force doctrine document on counter CBRN operations stresses dissuasion, impediment of access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, materials and/or expertise (United States Air Force, 2007). Of course, the myriad of prevention and detection efforts by government organizations mainly apply on a larger scale and to other states. If anything, History has shown non-state actors and terrorists to be versatile and creative in the procurement of their weapons.

It is difficult to say where the world might be in 20 years in regards to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Based on the material in this course and the independent material found it is unlikely that the United States will face a direct assault from CBRN weapons by another state. The most likely threat will continue to originate from terrorist and extremist groups. The US government continually stresses the rising intention of terrorists deploying such weapons on US soil. Despite our best efforts, these groups will be able to obtain or produce such weapons. Destabilization of government regimes in places like the Middle East may open up new markets for proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Black markets such as the A.Q. Khan Network are probably still in existence in some form or fashion or will re emerge at some point.

It is doubtful that the United States and her allies will be able to stop every conceivable action to procure and deploy these weapons. The best option, then, is prophylaxis. The better we are able to secure dangerous sources, detect them when they arrive in our territory or deter and prevent terrorists from obtaining them, the less likely we are to suffer an attack. If history is to be a judge, at some point we will be attacked, in some fashion, by CBRN weapons.

References

Arms Control Association: Chemical and Biological Weapons Status at a Glance. (02/2014). https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cbwprolif

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2013). Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A Way Forward. Retrieved from https://csis.org/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf

Cirincione, J., Wolfsthal, J. B., & Rajkumar, M. (2005). Deadly Arsenals (Second ed.). Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Croddy, E. (2002). China’s Role in the Chemical and Biological Disarmament Regimes. Retrieved from Center for Non-proliferation Studies: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/91crod.pdf

Federation of American Scientists: Chemical and Biological Weapons; China. (n.d.). http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/cbw/

GlobalSecurity.Org. (n.d.). http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/cbw.htm

Kristensen, H. M., & Norris, R. S. (2013). Chinese Nuclear Forces: 2013 (DOI: 10.1177/0096340213508632). Retrieved from Sage Journals: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/6/79.full.pdf+html

Nuclear Threat Initiative. (03/2014). http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/treaties/

Nuclear Threat Initiative: Country Profiles: China. (03/2014). http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/nuclear/

The Heritage Foundation: China’s Strategic Capabilities and Intent. (12/18/2013). http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/12/china-s-strategic-forces-military-capabilities-and-intent