Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File
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- Poverty irrelevant to terrorism
- AT: Proliferation
AT: Poverty TerrorismEmpirical study proves poverty inequality and repression don't cause terrorismPiazza in ‘6 (James, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. @ U. North Carolina, Terrorism and Political Violence, “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages”, 18:1, March, InformaWorld)This study evaluates the popular hypothesis that poverty, inequality, and poor economic development are root causes of terrorism. Employing a series of multiple regression analyses on terrorist incidents and casualties in ninety-six countries from 1986 to 2002, the study considers the significance of poverty, malnutrition, inequality, unemployment, inflation, and poor economic growth as predictors of terrorism, along with a variety of political and demographic control variables. The findings are that, contrary to popular opinion, no significant relationship between any of the measures of economic development and terrorism can be determined. Rather, variables such as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression and, most significantly, the structure of party politics are found to be significant predictors of terrorism. The article concludes that “social cleavage theory” is better equipped to explain terrorism than are theories that link terrorism to poor economic development. Poverty irrelevant to terrorismKrieger and Meierrieksy in ‘8 (Tim, Junior Professor @ University of Paderborn, and Daniel, Dept. Econ. @ U. Paderborn, “What causes terrorism?” 6-19, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148682)Regarding popular hypotheses on terrorism, (iv) no convincing evidence is found that economic factors { for example, economic growth, poverty, income disparity or the like { are closely connected to terrorism. Richer countries only seem to be more often targeted by transnational terrorism. There is only marginal evidence that religious or ideological affiliation { mainly, Islam and Islamism { is connected with terrorism risk. Additionally, higher levels of education or democratic political systems do not guard effectively against terrorism. Hence, (v) several popular policy advices { such as poverty alleviation, economic development, democratization or the like { should be watched critically, considering their efficiency in fighting terrorism. However, in reference to political instability, (vi) popular beliefs are confirmed insofar as governmental weakness and political transformation tend to systematically encourage terrorism. Surprisingly for Western leaders, installing stable democratic regimes is not a panacea for terror in this connection. Given the findings of our review, stable authoritarian regimes appear to combat global terrorism just as effectively, although related potential under-reporting biases should be considered carefully. AT: Proliferation1. Prolif is slow Tepperman ‘9 (Jonathon, former Deputy Managing Ed. Foreig Affairs and Assistant Managing Ed. Newsweek, Newsweek, “Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb”, 44:154, 9-7, L/N) The risk of an arms race--with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one--is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors--Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say--might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior. 2. Deterrence checks your impacts – even countries that hate each other will not start nuclear wars – India and Pakistan are the proof AND new nuclear states reduce the incentive for others to attack them lowering the probability of nuclear war to near zero David J. Karl, PhD, International Relations, University of Southern California, International Security, Volume 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 95-6 (MHHAR1518) Because strategic uncertainty is seen as having a powerful dissuasive effect, optimists usually view the very increase in the number of nuclear-armed states as an additional element of stability. Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator, for instance, argue that uncertainty over the reaction of other nuclear powers will make all hesitant to strike individually. As an example, they point to the restraint the superpowers exercised on each other in the 1960s, when first the United States and then the Soviet Union contemplated military action against China's nascent nuclear weapon sites. The net effect of the uncertain reaction of others is that "the probability of deliberate nuclear attack falls to near zero with three, four, or more nuclear nations." Similarly, Waltz reasons that even in cases of asymmetric proliferation within conflict dyads, nuclear weapons will prove "poor instruments for blackmail" because a "country that takes the nuclear offensive has to fear an appropriately punishing strike by someone. Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offense even against a non-nuclear state raises the possible costs of aggression to incalculable heights because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of other nuclear powers.
Kenneth Waltz, Political Scientist, Berkeley, THE USE OF FORCE, 1993, p. 547 (MHDRWB081) Britain and France are relatively rich countries and they tend to overspend. Their strategic forces are nevertheless modest enough when one considers that their purpose is to deter the Soviet Union rather than states with capabilities comparable to their own. China of course faces the same task. These three countries show no inclination to engage in nuclear arms races with anyone. India appears content to have a nuclear capabilities that may or may not have produced deliverable warheads, and Israel maintains her ambiguous status. New nuclear states are likely to conform to these patterns and aim for a modest sufficiency rather than vie with one another for meaningless superiority. Directory: files -> documents documents -> North Mankato Taylor Library documents -> In the Red and Brown Water documents -> - documents -> I. Disaster Summary Sheet II. Tropical Cyclones documents -> Cbp and Trade Automated Interface Requirements Appendix: pga december 22, 2015 documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Mobile audio/video recording systems documents -> Cartographic Concepts for Realizing a Location Based umts service documents -> 1/ Background Statistics Human development index rank Download 2.71 Mb. Share with your friends:
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