The New Europe / European Union R. James Ferguson 2004
Download 135.74 Kb.
|
1 2
The New Europe / European Union R. James Ferguson © 2004Week 8: The United Kingdom: Atlantic and European Orientations Topics: - 1. Great Britain: Partial Engagement in the Continental System 2. The British Political Comprise: The Evolution of Parliamentary Democracy and Constitutional Monarchy 3. Changing Status: the End of Empire and the Welfare State 4. Cautious Engagement of the Common Market: Moving Beyond Euro-scepticism 5. Blair and the ‘Third Way’ 6. The Three Stages: UK's Global Role, the Special Atlantic Relationship, and Deepening European Engagement 7. Future Challenges: The Pound, the Euro, Identity Politics, Balancing the Atlantic Division 8. Bibliography and Resources 1. Great Britain: Partial Engagement in the Continental System One of the most fascinating aspects of the United Kingdom has been her evolution into an imperial great power and then her re-adjustment as one important state among many within Europe and the global order. In the past this was done through the parallel trends of a strong industrial revolution, a growing naval power, the economic resources of empire (see Brewer 1989), and the ability to selectively distance herself from affairs on the Continent. At the same time, in spite of the effort to view herself as an island kingdom cut off of the troubles of continental Europe, the UK could never safely ignore events in Europe. The threats of invasion (by Spain, by Jacobites in 1745, then by France in the late 18th and early 19th century, then by Germany in World War II) remained very real (Langford 1991, p376, p434), while as a matter of policy the UK moved to limit the power of any state that looked like it might dominate European affairs (Spain, France, Germany, and for a time the Soviet Union). Thus, for example, British policy swung against France in its policies from 1688, trying to limit its influence in the Low Countries, and leading to a major conflict in the Americas (the Seven Years War with France, largely fought out in France and India), eventually reducing French influence there (Langford 1991, pp355-356, p400), a policy of competition which was only reversed in the early 19th century. This trend towards seeing herself as partially protected from the turbulence of European affairs deepened in the 19th century once Napoleon's effort to build a European 'empire' was defeated (Harvie 1991, p436). Thus British policy tended toward reducing European commitments, and the use of balance of power to counter any rising state, e.g. British willingness to balance the growth of Russian influence in the mid-19th century (Harvie 1991, p457), followed by an effort to keep Turkey intact to avoid too strong a Russian influence in east (Matthew 1991, p507). Later on, Britain would also maintain strong interests in the stability of the eastern Mediterranean, in the politics of Egypt (which was eventually occupied in 1882) after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1870, and then in the stability of Persian and the Middle East as a whole (Matthew 1991, pp507-508). One of the great turning points in world affairs during the 20th century has been the refocusing of British attention from its world role, sustained briefly through her power status was one of the 'Great Three' (U.S., USSR and UK) at the end of World War II, back towards Europe and engagement with a rapidly integrating EU. In part, this was driven by simple economic needs (the need to join the Common Market), with Britain being termed in many other areas the 'reluctant European' (see European Update 2002), a term also applied to cautions on European integration expressed by Scandinavian countries. Through the late 1990s the UK accepted that it would need to be involved more closely in the political integration of Europe unless its influence was to rapidly decline. However, the weight of British history, its unique (and slow) evolution towards parliamentary democracy, and its sense of 'difference' from European cultural and political life meant that the UK has been slow to cede key areas of sovereignty to European institutions. This was especially true of Conservative governments, but remains a real issue for the UK through 2002-2003. In effect, British concerns helped create a multi-track, multi-speed European integration path, an issue of interest to countries such as Sweden and Denmark, which have concerns over rapid institutionalisation and the impact of the euro (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p147; a referendum in Sweden in September went against joining the euro-zone, with clear lessons for the UK, see Naughtie 2003). However, the speed of the EU's integration and expansion plans through 2000-2004 has meant that a horizon on the 'British exceptionalism' may soon emerge, with British leaders needing to choose between relative independence from, and relative influence on, European affairs. This process has been accelerated by the need to make a real choice in relation as to whether or not to join the euro zone, and by the issue of whether British citizens in the end will support the European Constitution being negotiated through 2003-2004. At the same time, Britain has sought to maintain its special relationship with the United States, an important linkage that has been controversially sustained through 2001-2004. The Blair government, in particular, has sought to deepen political and military cooperation with the European Union (pushing forward both the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Defence Initiative). However, the issue of economic integration and national sovereignty remains highly controversial, with both issues likely to come to the fore again in the 2004-2006 as the UK considers whether to adopt to euro. The outcome of a possible forthcoming referendum, delayed through 2003 on the basis of the economic case for the euro not yet having been made in the UK (Daily Mail 2003; BBC 2002b), could strongly influence the direction UK takes in the short and medium term. Through June 2003, PM Tony Blair made the case for having a referendum before the next national elections, but argued that the case for the euro would need to be made more fully to the British public first (BBC 2003). Here, the timing the such a referendum in relationship to both economic issues, the ongoing strength of the pound and the euro, and in relation to 2004 elections. One view has suggested that the pound needs to sit at a certain level against the euro (approximately 1.4859 euro) for a beneficial transfer to monetary union that would keep British exports attractive (BBC 2001a; see further below). Through March 2004 Chancellor Gordon Brown ruled out re-assessment of the euro option on economic grounds until 2005, as well as attacking the stringent limits of the EU Stability and Growth Pact and arguing for greater flexibility (see HM Treasury 2004), with some sources a possible delay in a euro referendum until as late as 2008 (BBC 2004a). This issue has now been complicated by the issue of whether the UK should have a referendum on the proposed EU Constitution, on the which the Blair government has decided there should be a referendum, but only after national elections, perhaps after Spring 2005. In effect, it has been suggested that the Labour government wishes to ‘prepare’ the country for a yes vote over a longer time frame, making the tie of elections and referenda crucial (BBC 2004b). In such as setting, the relatively strong performance of Euro-sceptic parties during 2004 EU parliamentary elections sent a strong signal that pro-EU policies may rebound on the labour government unless carefully explained and managed. 
United Kingdom (Map Courtesy PCL Map Library) In broader terms, it is possible to suggest that current British policy has sought to gain the 'best of all possible worlds' by engaging in its special Atlantic relationship with the US, by gaining more influence on European affairs, and by retaining until the last minute some independent control monetary and financial policy. In terms of foreign and security policy, Britain in the 1997-2004 has played a very active role in world affairs, engaged militarily in the Gulf War, in Yugoslavia, in interventions in Sierra Leone (1998-2000), in Afghanistan (2001-2002), and a major player in the invasion and governance of Iraq. In combination with a new ideology called the 'Third Way' (see below) and its effort to balance German and French influence, it is possible to see some strengthening of British diplomacy through this period. There have been costs to this process: Blair’s statements on WMD in Iraq and his engagement in the war has cost him considerably in terms of increased criticism within his party, reduced his electoral popularity, subjected UK intelligences services to close scrutiny via the Butler Inquiry, and placed clear tensions on relations with several EU states, Germany, France, Belgium Greece, Austria, Sweden and Finland, while EU populations as a whole were sceptical of the US and EU position (Lundestad 2003, p276, p286). Indeed, France, Germany and Russia for a time aligned themselves into a very critical joint statement on Iraq and the need to continue inspections and use war only as a last resort (Wilson 2003). European tensions with the US over missile defence systems, the Kyoto protocol on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as issues such as the ICC (International Criminal Court) landmines and small weapons agreements made this a difficult breach in policy for the UK to bridge (see Lundestad 2003, pp270-271). In turn, some 52% of American want the U.S. to be the ‘only major force in the world’, and only 33% would want to allow EU superpower status (Lundestad 2003, pp288-289). Although through mid-2004 British media are turning more towards health, employment and economic issues, these factors have placed serious pressure on the Labour government and its future. In this lecture there will not be time to look at British history in detail, nor the complex issues of Celtic nationalism as it has effected English relations with Scotland (Union with Scotland occurred in 1708, but devolution has recreated a Scottish Parliament with local powers, accomplished through 1997-1999; for controversial views see Wheatcroft 2003; Curtice and Canavan 2003), Wales (also now with a local Assembly), future referenda on other local assemblies in England through 2004 (designed in part to bridge the economic gap between the south and north in England, with three regions, the North-East, North-West and Yorkshire and the Humber, being offered this option, see Wheeler 2003); and the Irish peace processes (these issues would make good topics for essays and seminars). Table 1 provides a timeline of some key events in the 20th century. Table 1: Selected UK Timeline 1914 - June 2003 (after BBC 2002c-2004) 1914 - Outbreak of World War I. UK enters hostilities against Germany. Gruelling trench warfare in Belgium and France. 1918 - War ends in November with armistice. The number of UK war dead runs to several hundred thousand. 1921 - UK agrees to the foundation of the Irish Free State. Northern Ireland remains part of the UK. 1924 - First UK government led by the Labour party under Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. 1926 - General Strike arising from coal dispute. 1929 - World stock market crash. Unemployment begins to rise in UK. 1931 - Economic crisis. Millions are unemployed. National Government coalition formed. 1936 - King Edward VIII abdicates over relationship with an American divorcee, Wallis Simpson. 1938 - Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain meets the leader of Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler, in Munich. Chamberlain says he has averted war with Germany. 1939 - Germany invades Poland. UK declares war on Germany. 1940 - Winston Churchill becomes prime minister. British fighter pilots repel German air attacks in the Battle of Britain. London and other cities badly damaged in German bombing raids. 1944 - Allied troops invade France from Britain on D-Day (6th June) and begin to fight their way towards Germany. 1945 - Germany surrenders on 8 May. Labour leader Clement Atlee is elected prime minister to replace Winston Churchill. The new Labour government introduces the welfare state. 1945 - The UK becomes a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 1947 - The former colony India wins independence. 1948 - National Health Service is established. 1949 - The UK becomes a founder member of NATO 1953 - Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. 1956 - UK intervenes in Suez Canal Zone, but withdraws under pressure from the US. 1961 - UK application to join European Economic Community vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle. 1969 - British troops sent to quell unrest in Northern Ireland. 1973 - The UK joins the European Economic Community. 1975 - EEC membership is endorsed in a referendum. North Sea oil begins to be pumped ashore. 1979 - The Conservative politician Margaret Thatcher becomes prime minister. She begins to introduce free-market policies. 1981 - Thatcher government begins programme of privatisation of state-run industries. 1982 - Argentina invades the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands in the South Atlantic. The UK dispatches a task force, which re-takes them. 1983 - High unemployment, unrest in UK inner cities, continuing violence in Northern Ireland. Thatcher re-elected. 1984 - The IRA attempts to assassinate Margaret Thatcher in her hotel in Brighton. Several killed and injured by a bomb blast, but the prime minister escapes unhurt. 1987 - Thatcher re-elected with a slightly reduced majority. 1990 - Thatcher resigns as prime minister after she fails to defeat a challenge to her leadership of the Conservative party. John Major becomes prime minister. 1991 - UK takes part in US-led military campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. 1992 - Major re-elected as prime minister. Labour party chooses John Smith as its leader. 1993 - Downing Street declaration on northern Ireland - a peace proposal issued jointly with the Irish government. 1994 - John Smith dies. Tony Blair becomes Labour leader. 1996 - The British government announces that BSE, or 'mad cow disease', can be transmitted to humans. A crisis for the British beef industry follows, with mass slaughtering of animals, the collapse of markets, and bans on exports. Many beef farmers face financial ruin. 1997 - The Conservatives under Major are deeply divided over policy towards Europe. Labour under Blair wins landslide election victory in May. 1997 - August: Diana, Princess of Wales, is killed in a car crash in Paris. 1997 - September: Referenda in Scotland and Wales back the creation of separate assemblies in Edinburgh and Cardiff. 1998 - The Good Friday Agreement on a political settlement for Northern Ireland is approved by voters in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland. 1999 - UK forces take part in the air war with Yugoslavia and the consequent multinational force in Kosovo. 1999 - Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly inaugurated. Blair government begins to tackle reform of the House of Lords by limiting the number of hereditary peers who can vote in debates on legislation. 2000 - UK forces intervene in Sierra Leone to protect and evacuate foreign citizens caught up in the civil war. They subsequently stay on to help train the government army. 2001 April - Blair postpones country-wide municipal elections due in May as an outbreak of foot and mouth disease amongst cattle, sheep and pigs continues to spread. 2001 June - Blair's Labour party wins a second successive general election victory, with a majority almost as large as that of May 1997. The leader of the opposition Conservative party, William Hague, resigns in the wake of his party's defeat. 2001 September/November - Following devastating attacks on targets in the USA, PM Tony Blair offers strong support for US-led campaign against international terrorism. 2002 January - Following overthrow of Taleban, UK peacekeepers lead International Security Asistance Force (ISAF) in Afghan capital, Kabul. 2002 March - UK sends 1,700 Royal Marines to Afghanistan to help US and Afghan forces in fight against Taleban and al-Qaeda remnants. 2002 June - UK hands over command of ISAF in Afghanistan to Turkey. 2003 March - UK joins US-led military campaign against Iraq after UN-based diplomatic efforts to ensure Baghdad has no weapons of mass destruction are perceived to have failed. 2003 August - Prime minister, defence secretary, government officials and aides, BBC managers and journalists testify at inquiry into death of Dr David Kelly, government scientist at centre of row over claims government embellished case for Iraq war. 2. The British Political Comprise: The Evolution of Parliamentary Democracy and Constitutional Monarchy Britain has long viewed itself as having a special role in world affairs, based on a special political deal that has led to a relatively stable social system. In large measure, this has been based on the evolution of the British Parliamentary system. The type of democracy that evolved in Britain has strongly influenced democracy in ex-colonies and former dominions such as Canada, Australia and South Africa, as well as legal system in countries as diverse as India, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. This model has been viewed as several features which distinguish it sharply from Republican or Presidential systems. These include the notions of constitutional monarchy, the emphasis on the parliamentary system, with the head of government being the leader of the dominant party in the lower house, and choosing a cabinet from members of parliament. In large measure, the British system emerged out of a series of contests for political power which structure compromises that have limited armed conflict between major interest groups and classes in British society. This trend of compromise between interests, which leads to a rather evolutionary approach towards full democracy (in the sense of full enfranchisement, this did not occur until after World War I), has often been heralded as the basis of Britain's relative social stability. However, there is also a certain conservatism within the main structures of British government which seek a balance between the interest of the 'people' and elite groups, whether these are conceived of the as the tradition aristocracy or the new industrial rich. In this context Winston Churchill's joke, that 'Democracy is the worst form of government in the world - except for all the other forms' has its serious aspect. This system, with its strengths and limitations, was born out of a civil war and revolution (see Richardson 1977), and evolved alongside a series of major social changes (industrial revolution, emergence of capitalism, urbanisation, emergence of a literate working class, the Union movement) during the 18th and 19th centuries. The early Saxon 'local moots' had features of an early participatory system, while the Althing of Iceland has been discussed as the earliest parliament (established circa 930 A.D.). These institutions, however, only represented free men, and effective power was retained by a tribal aristocracy of earls. Likewise, the Magna Carta (1215) has often been viewed as a proto-liberal or proto-democratic document. It clauses, once again, only limited the King's arbitrary actions in relation to free men, and in effect it protected the privileges of the powerful nobles rather than those of ordinary people. It was significant, however, in that it placed the king's actions under the control of the law. This restriction on the authority of the King, however, was later on eroded as royal powers grew, and by the Tudor period (16th century) the kings and queens of England came to view themselves as absolute representatives of the nation. This trend found fruition in the doctrines of kingship based on divine right, a tradition exemplified most strongly by James I (Wootton 1986, pp28-9). However, several other trends already existed. As early as 1381 in the Peasants' Revolts, large segments of English Society could rally around the cry of 'With King Richard and the true-hearted Commons', indicating that a notion of two sources of authority, Crown and Parliament, was already emerging in everyday thought (Watson & Barba 1990, pp30-1; Cheyney 1962, pp132-3). From the 16th century there also emerged an account of England as a mixed constitution, with authority (and therefore effective power) shared between the king, Lords and Commons (Wootton 1986, p30). As such, a contract was implied between the king and the people, and the king was therefore at some level accountable by the people. By the period of the Civil War (1642-9), radical thought had emerged in England, e.g. the idea of inalienable rights held by all men, supported by the Levellers, and the first communist movement with 'a strategy for effective social action', the Diggers (Wootton 1986, p9). It was these conflicts over the powers of the Crown which helped cause the Civil War, one which Charles I lost, and which led to his dethronement and then his execution (in 1649). Interestingly enough, even a thinker such as Thomas Hobbes, who supported the idea of an absolute view of sovereignty, did not support Charles I at this stage - by loosing the war, he had shown that he could not provide an effective and stable government for the land. Ironically, the government of Charles I had shown that it was 'weak and yet was capable of acting in an arbitrary and tyrannical fashion' (Wootton 1986, p27). From 1649-60 England was a Commonwealth (i.e. a republic), though largely guided by its Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell. Nonetheless, the republican movement itself, i.e. those who wished to do without kingship altogether, was very weak in England, partly because of unique relationship of the Crown to the Church of England, and the perception that most Republics of the contemporary world were small city-states or Federal alliances (as in Switzerland). In the future, the gradual evolution of democracy and parliamentary power would moderate any impulse towards radical revolutions. Nonetheless, this would be a very slow process. The basic 'Leveller' argument that the vote should be extended to all English male residents was ahead of its time, and would only find fruition in universal male enfranchisement 1918, while women would not receive the vote until 1928. It is important to note, however, that for this period, the issue was not only voting, but the right to revolt against the arbitrary power of kings - it was then, largely a question 'not of democracy, but of popular sovereignty' (Wootton 1986, p41). It was for this reason that Parliamentary rights were viewed as essential. No matter how poorly, it could at least be a focus for power and authority of the people, and therefore counterbalance tyrannical, and later on aristocratic, privileges. These issues would be resurrected again under the rule of James II, who was himself a Catholic, and although he supported the rights of Church of England, was suspected of wishing to open the way for Catholics to enter government, and in the long run to overturn to the Protestant revolution in England. This began with the admission of Catholic officers into the army, a move which alienated from the Parliament he had convened in 1685, and which in November 1685 caused the king to prorogue both houses (discontinue meetings, without formally dissolving them; Jones 1990, pxii). More importantly, however, James II in April 1687 tried to proclaim a Declaration of Indulgence which would suspend 'test and penal laws' (Jones 1990, p7), thereby allowing Catholics not to be barred from offices in the realm. He had hoped this policy would gain support among the Dissenters, i.e. those Protestants who still had problems with the structure and authority of the Church of England (Jones 1990, pxvi). From a modern point of view, this Declaration was enlightened. However, at the time it was taken as a clear attack on the nature of Protestantism in England, and the 'thin edge of the wedge' for further reform. James II ordered that his 'Declaration of Liberty and Conscience' be read in all churches in May 1687, most of whose churchmen refused to do so (perhaps 400 out of 7,000 ministers, see Jones 1990, p19). These and other fears, combined with James II's attempt to raise a large army, literally forced the hand of his son-in-law William III of Orange, who was the Stadholder (chief of state) of the United Provinces of the Netherlands. He was able to organise a sizeable force for the invasion of England. When it became apparent that an agreement could not be made with William, James II was forced to withdraw to prepare for the invasion (Jones 1990, p90). As it turned out, little force was required, for once William landed at Devon with 14,000 Dutch and expatriate British troops, opposition soon collapsed. James II fled to France, but even with French help was unable to regain the throne, in spite of activities in Ireland. The revolution of 1688 changed the nature of British monarchy, setting on a new path for the next three centuries. In 1688 William and Mary of Orange had been invited to England, on the first occasion, by a small number of Englishmen due to the fear that the birth of James II's first son (the Prince of Wales) would lead to the recreation of a Roman Catholic monarchy (Jones 1990, p63, p85). Prior to that birth, Princess Mary of Orange, of course, had been 'heiress presumptive' (Jones 1990, p119). She was obedient to her husband and would allow him to take the throne - William had the reputation of being a fairly tolerant but firm Protestant (Jones 1990, p120). William may have been motivated by personal ambition, by the desire to support a different form of political kingship in England, but also by the very fact that he now had no choice but to aim at the English Crown if he wished to limit the power of France. In 1689 the Convention Parliament offered William and Mary jointly the throne, but this was done alongside a Bill of Rights which assured parliamentary superiority. This was the basis of what has been seen as a sense of compromise that limited political violence, but not protest, in later centuries (Langford 1991, p352). The Crown could no longer dismiss the parliament at will for unspecified periods, and it was Parliament, not the crown, which made the laws and controlled taxes. Nor could the monarch raise an army without the consent of the Parliament. This system was thus a constitutional monarchy, and although rulers like George III (second half of 18th century) would attempt to maintain the initiative in military and foreign affairs, this fact could never be undone. In large measure this was a victory for Parliament as the centre of real power (Langford 1991, pp356-358), and Parliament also became the final house of review for all laws (not a High or Supreme Court with powers of constitutional interpretation, as in the U.S.A., see Steiner 1986, p152). It was must be remembered, of course, that the electoral base of this parliament was extremely narrow at that time: it represented men of wealth, property, and a small number of free town citizens. At the very best it represented at that time only 1/6 of the households of England (Wootton 1986, p23), and probably much less (see further Jones 1990, p76). In large measure certain key tensions and conceptions had already been established by the Civil War and the 'Glorious Revolution' (see Webb 1980). These included the idea of a limited, Constitutional Monarchy, the primacy of people's sovereignty as expressed through the centrality of Parliament, and the idea of the rule of law. In the late 19th century and early 20th, new trends towards the dominance of Cabinet Government (first established under the 'prime minister' Robert Walpole in the early 18th century) and the slow evolution toward universal enfranchisement brought the British system more recognisably towards a full democratic system. We can see how limited the democratic element was in the early 19th century by the fact that in 1815 only some quarter of a million voted out of a total population of 11 million in Wales and England (Walshe 1967, p137). Likewise, there was a strong imbalance between country and city voting areas through the late 18th century, giving the 'better' classer strong representation per vote (Harvie 1991, p430). In 1837-1848 period the Chartist movement, based on the London Workingmen's Association, drew up a democratic People's Charter which they presented to parliament, demanding universal manhood suffrage, equal electorates and payment for members of parliament: in spite of three petitions including 1.2 to 3.3 million signatures, the demands were rejected (Walshe 1967, p139; Harvie 1991, pp443-444). Although not immediately successful, the aims of the Chartists would be gradually fulfilled in the next century (voters rose from 717 thousand in 1833 to 6.7 million in 1900, then 21.3 million in 1918, see Mackintosh 1970, p21). Likewise, the 'house of privilege', that is the House of Lords, which had at first been the most powerful element of Parliament, comprising many hereditary members, had its ability to check and reject legislation from the lower house strongly limited in 1911 and 1949. In effect, power now resides in the House of Commons, with the House of Lords providing a review and temporary checking procedure only (through the late 1990s there was some further reduction of the voting powers of the House of Lords for hereditary peers). The political trends underlying these events have been suggested as comprising several key phases of parliamentary and government evolution. Five Phases of Parliamentary Development (adapted from Verney 1971, p15; Kavanagh 2001, p10) 1265-1603 Monarch governs and Parliament supplies money 1603-1688 Dispute of Parliament with King over supreme power 1688-1914 Evolution of parliamentary system 1914-1997 Cabinet government 1997-2002 Partial Decline of Cabinet system ('neo-Presidential' style?) One aspect of main stream British system is that it tends to favour a two party system. i.e. government verses opposition. The parliament came to be dominated by the Whigs (originally an anti-Catholic party of the late 17th century, later on their support for moderate democratic reform leads them to be called the Liberals) and the Tories (originally Anglican defenders of James II right to succeed to the throne, they are viewed as the more 'Conservative' party, see Jones 1990, p130; Walshe 1967, p140). The British system acknowledges and institutionalises this system by the way the House of Commons is organised, with the government on one side, facing the 'royal opposition' on the other (officially recognised in 1937). Furthermore, the opposition is allowed to utilise about one third of the parliamentary agenda to field its ideas and propose legislation, once again emphasising a dialogue between two groups. At present, Labour and Conservatives are the two main parties, with a weaker Liberal Democratic party. As we can see, with the development of the powers of the Parliament and the executive functions of the Cabinet, real royal power was steadily reduced (Mackintosh 1970, p18). One of the interesting aspects of British history is that in spite of the effective reductions of royal power since 1642, the notion of royalty has at various times retained great popularity in Britain. This was at first sustained by a royalist idea, developed by Hobbes, that in some sense in a monarchy 'the king is the people' (in Wootton 1986, p46), literally embodying their needs, wishes and aspirations. For much of the 19th and early 20th century it was true to say that: - The monarchy represented the timeless quality of what was taken to be a pre-industrial order. In an increasingly urbanized society, it balanced the Industrial Revolution: the more urban Britain became, the more stylized, ritualized, and popular became its monarchy, for the values which it claimed to personify stood outside the competitive egalitarianism of capitalist society. (Matthew 1991, p496). In large measure this popularity was maintained by the fact that the Crown sometimes supported popular measures, e.g. the extension of the franchise. In the late 20th century this was harder to sustain, especially with ongoing criticism of the royal family within the popular British press. The traditions of the British government abound in symbolic displays, e.g. the invitation to the leader of winning party to come to Buckingham Palace and then create 'Her Majesty's' government, the opening of the first session of Parliament by the Queen with a speech usually written by the prime minister (Steiner 1986, p136), and the annual address to the public. It is possible to regard this all as a kind of 'public theatre' ensuring a sense of stability and allowing a kind of vicarious involvement by the people in the life of the nation. The height of theatre was reached with the crowning of a young and beautiful Queen (Elizabeth II) in 1952, for the first time broadcast by the BBC, and many members of the Commonwealth thought that a new Elizabethan age might return in which Britain, if not a superpower, would at least retain a Great Power status. Since then the royal family has had to suffer serious scandals in the younger generation and within 'the household' and its management. Even the greatly popularity of Princess Diana, and her rise to almost saintly status after her death in a car crash in 1997, has not solved this problem. It is precisely the symbolic aspect of the monarchy is vulnerable to such attacks, and which makes the future of a charismatic monarchy problematic. 3. Changing Status: the End of Empire and the Welfare State In the eighteenth century, the benefits of empire in part began to be seen through mercantilist terms, i.e. how could they benefit the wealth and power of England: - Colonies still tended to be seen primarily as valuable sources of raw materials, as dumping grounds for surplus population, or as means of adding to the nation's stock of bullion. The jewels in the imperial crown were the West Indies, with their sugar plantations; the Anglo-Spanish War of 1739, like its predecessors, like its predecessors was seen as a means of breaking into the eldorado of South America, with enticing prospects of gold, silver, and tropical products. Yet in retrospect it is clear that Britain's overseas trade was being recast in the direction of quite a new kind of empire. The dynamic export markets lay increasingly outside Europe, notably in North America. Textiles, the traditional staple, benefited by this redirection, but the growth was still more marked in the newest manufacturing sectors associated particularly with the metal industries, in the production of household commodities, tools, weapons, and all kinds of utensils - in short in the vastly expanding demand for 'Birmingham goods'. (Langford 1991, p376). In short, as the weight of the global economy shifted from Europe towards an Atlantic system, embracing the Americas and Europe in trade networks (see Braudel 1986), Britain benefited from extensive trade, investment and market access in both North and South America, with strong financial interests in Cuba, Mexico and Brazil. In the 19th century, through deepening trade and investment in Africa and Asia, Britain emerged as a dominant economic as well as geostrategic power. It was no accident that by 1815 Britain had 'annexed something like 20 per cent of world trade, and probably about half the trade in manufactured goods' (Harvie 1991, p422). In large measure 'trade preceded the flag', and British economic interests extended well beyond areas directly annexed (Matthew 1991, p505). However, the political and military cost of empire could be very high: in the early 19th century up to one-sixth of the adult male population had been drafted under arms (Harvie 1991, p435). It is no accident that these viewpoints led into a period where there was strong support for free trade and laissez-faire economic and political policies, i.e. limited role for government and the abolition of protective tariffs (Matthew 1991, p466). This was based on the relative strength of British trade and industry as it developed through the second half of the 19th century: - Compared with any other country, the British economy in the period 1850-70 was extraordinary in its complexity and in the range of its products and activities. It was strong in the basic raw materials of an early of an early industrial economy - coal and iron - and it increased its world ascendancy in these two commodities as Continental countries imported British coal and iron to supply the basic materials for their own industrialization. An energetic manufacturing sector pressed forward with a huge range of items, from ships and steam engines through textiles to the enormous variety of small manufactured goods which adorned Victorian houses and, by their export in British ships, 'Victorianized' the whole trading world. This intense industrial activity rested on a sound currency and on a banking system which, though it had its failures, was comparative stable and was, especially from the 1870s, gaining an increasingly important role in the economy. (Matthew 1991, p473). However, after the economic pressures of World War I and the disaster of the depression period of the early 1930s, Britain began to turn away from this free trade agenda (for earlier controversies, see Meyer 2000). It turned to the empire and dominions as the source of economic stability: - A century of free trade was buried at the Ottawa conference in 1932 when a new commercial system of tariffs and imperial preference, due to last until the 1970s, was inaugurated. The effect of tariffs upon the British economy was deeply controversial, but the cartelized steel industry was one industrial giant that appeared to show some benefit. (Morgan 1991, p547) It was this system if imperial preferences in trade which allowed countries such as Australia to benefit greatly from export of primary resources into a guaranteed market. Yet it was precisely this system that would need to be dismantled as Britain moved in the early 1970s to enter the European Common Market. During the post-World War II period the Labour government also moved towards a new policy of comprehensive social security, based on part on the egalitarian sentiments of the war period (Morgan 1991, p562-565). It developed a comprehensive system of social security, full employment, health care, unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and death benefits funded from government taxation (Morgan 1991, p563). These policies, the basis of the welfare state, gained strong support down until the 1970s, even under Conservative governments from 1951-1964, an agenda that provided hard to sustain with the huge post-war debt that Britain faced (Morgan 1991, p568-570; see further Lewis 1995). In the 1970s, with a changing global economy, this policy would be greatly reduced. Likewise, from the 1950s Britain found that she had to withdraw from the direct control of empire (Morgan 1991, p573), whether through the voluntary release of states (as in the case of India), complex processes of decolonisation (as in Kenya), or the limited ability to project power into East Asian and the Middle East. One event which symbolises this decline of British imperial reach was the effort to directly occupy the Suez Canal Zone in 1956, a covert plan developed with French and Israeli support. However, the United States strongly opposed the plan, as did much of world opinion, and Egyptian nationalism proved durable - in the end Britain had to withdraw her forces (Morgan 1991, 574-576). Britain was thenceforth at best a circumscribed great power, who now had to deal with the new economic realities of North American dominance and a growing European potential. The Commonwealth, which still exists as a useful organisation for north-south dialogue and human rights (see Hain 2002), was no longer a forum for the projection of unilateral British power. 4. Cautious Engagement of the Common Market: Moving Beyond Euro-scepticism Even as Europe began to move towards cautious integration from 1951 onwards, Britain was prepared to stand aloof, expecting that her great power status, special relationship with the United States, and preferential trade network would be sufficient to maintain her national power. There may also have been a sense that Britain had been able to stand alone as a European democracy that had not been invaded by Germany (Morgan 1991, p559) - a sense of residual greatness that was not well suited to the realities of the following decades. Furthermore, the first British effort to join the European Union was rebuffed by France through the 1962-1963 period, but the British as a whole were not certain that their future lay with the European Economic Community in any case (Morgan 1991, p576). However, through the early 1970s inflation began to rise seriously, as did unemployment, followed by a decline in traditional industrial areas in north-east England, Scotland, and Wales (Morgan 1991, p578). By 1973, it seemed that the 'nation's capacity to generate wealth, along with its share of world trade and production, were in serious, perhaps terminal, decline.' (Morgan 1991, p578). After much 'diplomatic infighting', Britain entered the EEC in 1973 under the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, a move that was ratified by a two-thirds majority in the referendum of 1975 (Morgan 1991, p584). However, British opinion remained critical of Europe, and the British were viewed at best as 'reluctant Europeans' (Morgan 1991, p584). British caution of the European system became even more marked under the early period of the Conservative government of Prime Minister Thatcher, a stance made easier while the national economy was boosted by North Sea oil revenues (Morgan 1991, p586). Although Britain benefited from access to the Common Market (Europe by the late 1990s comprised the destination of over 50% of UK exports), growth was relatively slow until 1983, in part due to the impact of the Common Agricultural Market on British farmers. Thatcher in particular was highly critical of cross-funding within the CAP, and argued that it effectively penalised efficient farming nations such as the UK, Germany and Holland, though the position of British farmer began to improve from 1982 (Jones 1984, pp225-226). With about half of the EU budget (circa 44.5 billion euros) spent on various forms of agricultural subsidies, the pattern of this spending in the 21st century remains a sensitive issue as the EU expands, e.g. of concern to Welsh and France farmers (Thomas 2004). There had also been early disputes with the Danes over EEC fishery policies (Jones 1984, p226). At the same, ongoing privatisation, though it made sense to the markets, also led to a further 'hollowing' out of state power (Kavanagh 2001, p5). It was through the early and mid-1990s that the Conservative Party's formula for government, as represented by Prime Minister John Major (see Major 1999), began to wear thin, paving the way for a triumphant return of what came to be called the 'New Labour'. 5. Blair and the Third Way The government of Prime Minister Tony Blair swept into office in 1997, partly on the basis of poor Conservative electoral performance, and on the promise of generating a more caring government (better education, hospitals, youth centres, strong anti-poverty policies) and society without increasing taxation (Toynbee & Walker 2001, pp1-2, pp10-11). In general terms, New Labour sought to make neo-liberal capitalism compatible with the need of a centre-left socialism, almost a 'new social contract between "comfortable Britain" and the poor' (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p10). It must be remembered that through the mid-1990s Britain had some 8 million people in relative poverty (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p12), with a greater gap between rich and poor than most EU countries. In this context, the concept of a 'Third Way' was invoked. In usual European parlance, this was the idea of a better alternative to rampant capitalism or authoritarian communism. The idea was applied to the strong role of government in social programs in Scandinavia and Germany, and for a time it seemed that Gorbachev might be steering the Soviet Union in this direction (see Dallago et al 1992). 
Tony Blair on the Move (Photo courtesy Felix Clay/Wirepix 1999) In the context of the late 1990s, the Third Way took on a new spin: - The Third Way is a new buzzword that captures the common elements of still inchoate paradigm assigning welfare functions to families, markets and states. The "old" welfare model, constructed between the 1930s and the 1970s, emphasized protecting people from the market. Social Security, unemployment insurance, and disability insurance provided income for individuals who could not work, because of old age, poor health, or fluctuations in the business cycle. "Third Way" solutions, by contrast, emphasize programs that help people to participate and succeed in the market through education, training, and programs that sustain labor force participation. Third Wayism comes in many variants. Its common features include a commitment to globalization, flexible labor markets, and fiscal rectitude; it also aims to provide people with the means to prosper in such an environment through education and training, family support systems (to help people enter the labor market), and wage and tax incentives (to keep them there). (Myles & Quadagno 2000). In such policies there is also a strong emphasis on women in the workforce, and in investing in the educational and health care of children, viewed as the formation of social capital (Myles & Quadagno 2000). The Third Way became even more deeply entrenched through 1999-2000, in part under the influence of Anthony Giddens (director of the London School of Economics) work (e.g. The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, 1999) and became a core part of the rhetoric of the British government, formally enshrined in Labour's National Policy Forum of 2000 (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p6; see further Giddens 2001). New Labour also held out the surprising promise of full employment (Toynbee & Walker 2001, pp6-7). There are, however, limitations to this approach: - The main Achilles heel of the Third Way Scenario is its silence on the fate of those most disadvantaged by a strategy that relies on the labor market as the primary source of welfare: working-age adults who have no labor to sell. Even under the most optimistic conditions, a significant minority of adults, young and old, who come into the world with (or acquire), physical, mental, personal, and other impairments will never be able to find their welfare in the market. Third Way strategies are sensitive not only to the distribution of incentives but also to the distribution of capacities; hence the emphasis on education and training, especially for those with limited jobs skills. But even the most ambitious program of education and training will not provide Rawlsian justice for those most disadvantaged by the initial distribution of endowments. Third Wayers will have to work harder. (Myles & Quadagno 2000) However, the Blair government was able to reduce poverty in some key areas, e.g. among children and pensioners (Toynbee & Walker 2001, pp23-24). By 2000, the poorest one tenth of the population were estimated to be 8.8% better of 'in real terms' (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p40). Through 1997-2001 some 1 million new jobs had been created, but unemployment ranged between 5-6% in 1998-2003 period (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p14’ DFAT 2003). Estimates of 2004 GDP growth of circa 3.5% may help slightly reduce this to around 4.9% (DFAT 2004). Likewise, women had gained some increased representation: 120 Labour MPs were women out of a total of 659 (Milne 1997), while 34% of public appointments are held by females (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p29). Labour also spend 800 million pounds on the 'New Deal for Communities' project, helping projects in old or deprived local communities (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p38). With these modest but real social gains, combined with a fairly robust foreign policy, it was not surprising that Blair had a strong victory in general elections in 2001. The final results, with all 659 seats declared include (Field 2001; BBC 2001b): - Labour = 413 Conservative = 166 Liberal Democrats = 52 Others = 28 However, the turnout was only 58% compared with 71.5% in 1997 elections, lower than at any time since 1918 (Field 2001). In part this may be due to a certain disillusionment from the left (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p230), who may have expected more radical policies from Blair. In the past, the labour might have been compared to mild Social Democratic in Europe (see Jahn & Henn 2000) parties, but in recent years New Labour government, ironically, in many ways retains much of the business-friendly, great-power rhetoric common to centre-right politicians. In the aftermath of another election defeat in 1992, Labour, under the stewardship of Tony Blair, has become 'New' Labour, and continued the modernisation process with the rejection of traditional socialist priorities, and the adoption of a more social democratic, and increasingly neo-liberal, orientation. . . . It is generally agreed that this 'New Labour' project is one which has gained increased momentum, and now dominates the Labour Party. As a consequence, there has been a qualitative change in the political, organisational and ideological orientation of the party. In many ways, the party elite may consider that they have been vindicated with the direction in which they have steered Labour following its landslide general election victory in l997. (Jahn & Henn 2000) Indeed, it is possible to argue that by this move to the right Labour has stolen much of the ground from the conservatives, and in doing so made it hard for leaders such as Michael Howard to distinguish their own policies, since Blair in effect has moved to right on a number of issues including crime, social welfare and immigration issues (Lyall 2003). 6. The Three Stages: UK's Global Role, the Special Atlantic Relationship, and Deepening European Engagement One of the great ironies of history has been the benefits the UK gained from surrendering its colonies. This greatly reduced the political and economic pressures on Britain through the 20th century, for a time gave her privileged access to resources in former colonies, access to growing markets and trade within the major dominions (Australia, Canada, South Africa), and increased her prestige politically in parts of Asia and Africa. Ironically, the United States (formed in part via rebellion from the UK), would end up as the major ally of Britain through two World Wars, and through the NATO alliance, a major partner for the UK strategically. Yet by the 1980s Britain struggled to maintain its image as a great power, a factor made clear by the enormous effort the UK had to undertake in order to re-take the Falkland (Malvinas) Island back from Argentina in 1982. In this context, the turn towards sustained cooperation with both the European Union and the United States (the Atlanticism and the Atlantic Alliance) would be the basis of sustaining Britain’s international prestige. From 1997, Labour sought to develop a stronger projection of foreign policy, working in the global arena, e.g. a pragmatic if selective support for human rights (for the mixed report card here, see Toynbee & Walker 2001, pp125-126), through maintaining special cooperation with the U.S., and via cautious convergence with the EU in some areas. Prime Tony Minister Blair, as a leader of 'New Labour', was willing to turn more towards European integration, willing to present himself as a centre-left leader able to communicate easily with the German, Dutch, Swedish and French leaderships (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p137). Blair, for example, soon agreed to sign onto the Social Chapter, designed to ensure employment, improved working conditions, and developing human resources, (which Britain had opted out of in 1994 under the Conservative Major government), though still remaining outside the Schengen agreement on open borders (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p148; Bainbridge 1998, p449). The Labour government has also resisted the harmonisation of taxation on savings, a factor negotiated through 2003-2004 in relation to the emerging EU constitution, and did not want qualified majority voting within the EU extended to issues such as security, border control and defence areas (Toynbee & Walker 2001, pp148-151). However, reality would prove more complex as Tony Blair had to negotiate the thorny issue of monetary union, as well as maintaining special relations with the U.S. and manoeuvre towards a heightened role for after the somewhat negative legacies of the Thatcher and Major years. Blair was willing to speak of Europe as a 'superpower, not a superstate' (Walker 2000-2001), terminology that seemed to offer the prospect of greater cooperation with Europe without the loss of British policy independence. One way this was done was through the strong support that Blair gave to the project of a European Defence Initiative (EDI) that could be developed into the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), leading to the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). Britain has a relatively large and modern defence force, and even under the Labour government retained strong defence spending, a surprise to many in the European Union (Freedman 2001). The Strategic Defence Review in Britain during 1998, for example, argued a new role for the armed forces, in which the sustained cutting edge would be maintained even as some administrative cuts were made (Freedman 2001). It was also able to deploy sizeable forces overseas, e.g. the deployment of 25,000 troops, 100 aircraft, and 30 ships to Oman in Operation Safe Sword, a training exercise that few nations outside of the U.S. could have mobilised (Walker 2000-2001). It able to deploy sizeable forces in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, leading to an ongoing burden through 2004, with some 13,000 troops deployed in Iraq from early 2004. Support for the European Defence Initiative may have had several political motives: - The idea for a European force began in Britain in the course of 1998, as a means for the new government of Tony Blair to demonstrate its strongly pro-European credentials despite its refusal to join Europe's single currency. The project emerged from a paper written by Roger Cooper, a fast-rising civil servant in the Foreign Office, who suggested that Britain's impressive military capabilities were an underused asset available to the British government in its European diplomacy. Cooper argued that Britain's tradition reluctance to embrace any European military formation that might challenge or weaken the NATO alliance and its commitment to the United States had become outdated with the end of the Cold War. With careful drafting, a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) could be concocted that would reinforce, rather than weaken, NATO. It could, for example, be presented as a way to meet longstanding U.S. complaints that the European allies were not adequately sharing the burden of joint defense. The financial strength and existing military resources of the 15 EU nations could be far more effectively deployed. (Walker 2000-2001) . . . But fundamentally, his decision to commit Britain to an EU force was based on the view that this could serve British interests in Brussels without damaging them in Washington! Thus, British support for ESDI was rather different from the French push for more strategic independence from the United States (Walker 2000-2001). In general terms, Blair has suggested that the European force would only be used if no NATO force was sent, or in conjunction with NATO operations. Blair's support for ESDI increased after the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999, especially once the real limits of British and French airpower emerged in the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. Blair's support in fact held the allies together during the air war (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p130), in spite of growing criticism over civilian casualties and the impact on refugees flows. In general terms, Blair has sought to maintaining or regaining influence via Security issue run through UN, via NATO, via European Institutions, and via the US alliance or US-led coalitions. The UK thus has considerable policy flexibility if it can keep these options open. This has led to a certain activism, combined with pragmatism in foreign affairs, even as Tony Blair claims his actions are grounded on strong principles (see Bentley 2003). For example, Britain was critical of human rights in Iraq and Nigeria, but was relatively silent on human rights issues in Tibet, China and Kashmir (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p126). Likewise, certain tests were applied by UK policy as to whether NATO should act in a given case, including a strong moral case for intervention, failure of diplomatic options, the existence of realistic military options, the ability to maintain a long-term commitment, and a link to traditional national interests. On this basis the UK was willing to intervene in Kosovo, but was not willing to militarily intervene over Russian suppression of Chechnya (Freedman 2001, p299). Likewise, the UK gave increased support to some UN programs and support for poverty relief (greater funding, totalling 35 and 15 million pounds per year for the UNDP and UNICEF), but was critical of others such as UNESCO (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p139; Bentley 2003). Likewise, Britain was willing to support German and Japanese bids for reform in the UN Security Council (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p139). The UK has also wiped out the debt owed to it by the least developed countries that could apply through the High Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Trust Fund, though the 5 billion pounds involved had to be invested into 'social priorities' (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p140). On this basis it might be only a slight exaggeration to suggest that 'Realpolitik trumped Blairite idealism' (modifying the view of Toynbee & Walker 2001, p126; see further Lloyd 1998). Likewise, the UK was willing to operate through the UN Security Council its deployment of troops to the International Security Assistance Force ISAF in Afghanistan (through mid-2002), but chose to part a U.S.-led coalition invading and controlling Iraq through 2003-2004, a move that could not be supported at the NATO level. Likewise, though European nations were happy to invoke Article 5 of the NATO agreement on collective defence, the U.S. soon became reluctant to allow the ‘war on terror’ to be run through a multilateral alliance which was partly out of its direct control (see Lundestad 2003, pp273-274). Indeed, through 2002-2004, the UK has trouble maintaining its role as an ‘Atlantic bridge’ for the EU-UK, with difference emerging over future NATO roles in Iraq and the level of pre-emptive intervention that is legally permissive and positive in global terms (see further Lundestad 2003). Tensions here have been driven in part by ongoing economic competition and trade tensions between the U.S. and the EU, including disputes over bananas, hormone-treated beef, anti-trust legislation, competitiveness issues in the face of major mergers, e.g. the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merger, and disputes over steel tariffs (see Lundestad 2003, ppp272-273, p289). 7. Future Challenges: The Pound, the Euro, Identity Politics, and Balancing the Atlantic Division The United Kingdom has moved slowly towards deepening engagement in the European project. However, there are a number of issues where there are potentials for tension to slow this process (Field 1996a; 1996b; Field 2001), including - 1) Family law, e.g. differences with Germany over child custody and rights. 2) Desires for financial control of currency to support national economic growth, leading to calls for review of the Stability and Growth Pact and criticisms of EU financial institutions (see HM Treasury 2004) 3) Limited influence of UK within EU structures due to prior institutional rules worked out with limited consultation with Britain due to late entry. 4) Relative early dominance of partnership of France and Germany, within European processes. 5) Budgetary and CAP support for small states with relatively strong qualified majority voting rights compared to population, a trend which will continue to some degree after 2004 as the EU expands. 6) In past, the UK had relatively less nationals as officials in the EU (11% verses 16% in relation to France). 7) Problems in allowing the advanced UK steel industry to complete and export into Europe. 8) Many in UK are against 'Open-Ended Integration'. Here Blair initially opposed any integrated 'Federal' model, as has been suggested by Germany (Toynbee & Walker 2001, pp143-144), unless there were clear safeguards. Thus in the 2002-2003 European Convention on a future constitutions there was serious debate on use of voting verses national veto rights: - One of the toughest battles will be over attempts gradually to eradicate national vetoes and make qualified majority voting the norm for all EU policymaking. Yesterday's proposals state - in a nod to Euro federalists - that European leaders can, by unanimity, decide which policy areas would move from unanimity to majority voting. Britain vehemently opposes that clause because it makes constitutional reform a continuous exercise. At least 15 other countries, including Spain, Ireland, the Nordic states and many new members, will join Britain in fighting to remove it. Britain will also oppose moves to introduce majority voting on taxation matters. (Times 2003) This opposition by the Blair government has partly softened, but still faces a gradual tack in winning support with British voters. This is part of the broader debate on the constitution, with the reality that all 25 member states will need to support it for it to take hold. This will be a slow and difficult process, with referenda likely in several countries: - Only four countries are absolutely certain to have referendums: Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and now Britain. Another four seem almost certain to: the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. Poland seems likely to join them, and France may yet follow; others are still considering the matter. Yet a pan-European debate is unlikely. The votes will take place at different times, and different aspects of the long and complex constitutional text will prove controversial in different countries. (Economist 2004a) 9) A better balance of power among major powers within the EU is needed, especially the emerging triangular relationship of the big three (UK, France and Germany), an issue partly moderated via regular conferences held several times each year through late 2003-2004 (see lectures 6 and 7). 10) Continuing pressure on UK policies from eurosceptics and euro-pessimists, which also includes a very critical conservative press. This trend will deepen in future elections and become important in future referenda. 11) The strong alignment of the UK with the US on the Iraq led to strong tensions with Russia, France and Germany, suggesting a possible split within EU defence and foreign policy orientations. Thus President Chirac of France has spoken of the U.S. as a ‘hyperpower’ that needs restraint and balancing from European powers (Lundestad 2003, pp277-280). Although Britain tried to smooth this division from mid-2003, there is no guarantee that the UK can act as a strong facilitator between divergent European and US orientations in the future. This might undermine some the UK’s new foreign policy agenda (see above). Likewise, British involvement in the Iraq war was unpopular with many Labour supporters, leading to a crisis through early 2003 in which there was a real possibility that Tony Blair might lose the confidence of his own party, while ongoing controversy about a possible ‘beat-up’ of the weapons- of-mass-destruction (WMD) issue continues to plague the government through 2003-2004. The euro also represents a major challenge to British policy. There are several major issues, some economic, some political, that impact on British attitudes in this area. In brief, they include: - 1). The possibility that a pound, if too strong in relation to euro, will be bad for exports. On this basis, entry into the euro would also depend in locking in a suitable exchange rate for transition, and therefore picking a right time for joining the monetary union. As the euro began to strengthen against the dollar through mid-2002, this was viewed as good for those who wished to join the monetary union (BBC 2002d). 2) Through 1997-2004, the Blair government has remained somewhat ambiguous on the euro, hedging on the issue (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p145) of whether it really supported the idea by involving the notion of economic tests and a future referendum as deciding issues. The government had failed to run a positive campaign on the euro, thereby allowing a strong ground for critics and eurosceptics. In 2000, 64% of Britons polled remained against the euro (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p143), though this has begun to change somewhat through 2002. By mid-2003, Tony Blair was stating that he and the government would need to run a strong campaign to sell the euro to Britons, and even to elements within his own party. At the same time, Chancellor Gordon Brown that the economic benefits of the euro for the UK had yet to be fully established at the present time but that there might be progress over the following year – this same claim was repeated 2004, with delays on the issue till 2005 and perhaps as late as 2008 (BBC 2003; BBC 2004a). If delayed too long, however, the UK may be viewed as outside a core integrating group in the EU, and lose some influence on economic and financial issues as the European agenda pushes forward. 3) The tests proposed for euro were designed to insure that it would make economic sense for Britain to join, with the status of these tests being assessed by the UK government in early June 2003 as either met or not met: that it would be good for jobs (not met), beneficial for foreign investment (not met), whether there was sufficient convergence between the economies (not met), whether there was flexibility for adjust (not met), that it would not undermine the role of London as a major financial centre and on financial services generally (met) (BBC 2002d; BBC 2003). In other words, adopting the euro would have to further British national interests. Yet through 1999 it seemed that there was indeed some convergence in many areas of UK and Euroland economies, e.g. in areas such as interest rates (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p145). In fact, some studies, e.g. by Ian Begg would argue that in the main the tests have been met, while those commissioned by the 'no' campaign still suggest a certain divergence between the British and Euroland economies (BBC 2002d). In reality, adopting the euro will be a political, national and economic decision. In the past, the government has said it would decide whether the tests had been met by June 2003, and on this basis it might then proceed to a referendum (BBC 2002e). At present, these tests may be re-assessed in 2005, and a referendum would only occur after that time. The Blair government also knows that losing the pound remains unpopular for a majority of voters through 2004. 4) Directory: wbeu wbeu -> 1. Introduction: The Pillars of European Cooperation Topics: The Historical Context for the New Europe Download 135.74 Kb. Share with your friends:
|
1 2