Towards Democratisation?: Understanding university students’ Internet use in mainland China

2.3.1 Dominant political ideas

Opinions vary as to whether Confucianism is an obstacle to democracy (He, 1996, pp.160-163). Some scholars such as Huntington, Cotton, Price and Pye argued that it is, while other scholars, including Bary, Nathan, Friedman, Liang Shuming, and Lin Yuseng, pointed out positive elements in Confucian culture (He, 1996, pp.160-161). The author argues that both sides are right, in part, as, in the first instance, Confucianism is a complex system of moral, social, political, philosophical, and quasi-religious thought. More importantly, it has developed over two thousand years in China and other East Asian countries such as Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, and South Korea, as well as various territories predominantly settled by Chinese people, such as Singapore. It is not surprising to find both pro-democratic and anti-democratic elements in it. Therefore, the key to the debate does not lie in Confucianism itself, but in which part of Confucianism or which branch of Confucianism the ruling class chose to be dominant in society, and how they interpret it in ways that legitimise their ruling.

The dominant political ideas that the ruling class have imposed throughout the authoritarian history of China, the author argues, are anti-democratic and pose one of the obstacles to the democratisation of China. First, Confucianism apotheosises the power of the emperor by taking the emperor to be the son of Heaven. It places the emperor above all people and makes him an unchecked authority. The tradition to apotheosise the ruler has long existed in China, tracing back as far as the Xia Dynasty (Chinese: 夏朝; Xia Chao, 2070 – 1600 BC), the first dynasty in China. It says, in The Announcement of Duke Shao in The Book of History⁰, that ‘the Xia Dynasty follows the order of Heaven’. However it was first introduced into Confucianism and systematically developed by Dong Zhongshu (Chinese: 董仲舒, 179 – 104 BC), a Confucian scholar in the Han Dynasty. He was a very important figure in the history of Confucianism and the political ideology in China. We will return to him later.

Secondly, dominant political ideas focus on maintaining social order and stability, or the so-called Great Harmony (Ogden, 2002, pp.43-44; He, 1996, p.160). The harmony is believed to be achieved by obedience, individual sacrifice for the benefit of the group, and unification of thought, instead of by conflicts, communication, debates, and compromises. Ogden (2002, p.41) argued that Chinese people were concerned that pluralism might erode law and order. Pye and Pye (1985, p.189) held the same view, that diversity and a pluralistic power structure in Chinese culture is believed to lead to social disorder. These thoughts are evident in Chinese ruler’s measures to suppress dissidents (see the next paragraph). Moreover, dominant political ideas emphasise hierarchy (Ogden, 2002; Pye and Pye, 1985) rather than equality. Ogden (2002, p.45) claimed that ‘the Confucian principles of reciprocal moral obligations and duties… are based on social hierarchy, with differential treatment of individuals depending on rank and relationship to oneself’. ‘It has always been easy for the Chinese to establish bureaucratic hierarchies because they have an instinct for recognising fine status differences’ (Pye and Pye, 1985, p.209). In this hierarchical ladder, the inferior should obey and respect the superior. For example, citizens should obey and respect officials, the younger should obey and honour the elder, and women should be subordinate to men (Ogden, 2002, p.47). According to Confucius, to govern is to achieve a state where ‘the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; where the father is father, and the son is son’ (Analects⁰ XII, 11).

Lastly, the dominant political ideas advocate for the rule of virtue (or the rule of men) and unchecked authority instead of the rule of law which is seen as one of the essential democratic procedures (Keane, 1992). Pye and Pye (1985, p.200) pointed out that it was believed in Chinese culture that ‘rule should be by (virtuous) men and not by (impersonal) law’. Ogden expressed the same concern. He argued that ‘the rule of virtue rather than the rule of law’ was thought to be required to achieve harmony, the goal of China’s rulers, according to Chinese political thought (Ogden, 2002, p.44) and the dominant Chinese tradition attached great importance to ‘the Confucian notion that a ruler’s legitimacy should be based on morality rather than law’ (Ogden, 2002, p.51). He also stated that ‘China’s thinkers have, for over two thousand years, been concerned primarily with getting moral individuals to rule’ and said ‘little about the issue of limiting their power’. Such an orientation toward virtue is still evident in CPC’s (Communist Party of China) legitimation strategy (Hwang & Schneider, 2011; Schneider & Hwang, 2014).

The dominance of antidemocratic and authoritarian political ideas has been achieved by rigid control and active promotion by the rulers and the civil-service examination system. For example, Qin Shi Huang (Chinese: 秦始皇，259 – 210 BC) ordered all classic works of the Hundred Schools of Thought except those of legalism and all histories in the imperial archives except those written by the Qin historians to be burned. Those discussing particular books, those using ancient examples to satirise contemporary politics, those failing to burn the listed books within 30 days, and authorities failing to report cases were severely punished by execution, imprisonment or banishment. Sometime their families were punished, too. This is called the Burning of the Books⁰ in the history of China. Countless scholars and intellectual have suffered imprisonment or other punishment, better or worse, for what they wrote in the history of imperial China, which is called the Literary Inquisition. Severe punishment on the dissidents or so-called dissidents has generated self-censorship.

Apart from the controlling methods, the rulers also boosted the dominance of their chosen thoughts and ideas and achieved unification of thought by its school system and officials’ control. There were a very small number of private schools in imperial China, but the dominant form of academic training occurred in the government’s own schools (Ogden, 2002, pp.51-52). When Emperor Wu of Han (Chinese: 汉武帝，Hanwudi, 156 – 87 BC) took Dong Zhongshu’s advice and tried to establish Confucianism as the state philosophy and code of ethics, he promoted Confucian scholars and intellectuals to higher ranks and governmental positions and deposed those of other schools of thought⁰. Another important measure that contributed to the success of thought control was the civil service examination system⁰. This included the scholars and intellectuals, ‘who might perhaps have been the most logical group to develop “political thought”’ (Ogden, 2002, p.53), into the political system. Ogden argued that ‘China’s potential dissident leaders and thinkers held the highest political positions’ and ‘benefit too much from the system of state power and patronage to want to challenge it’ (Ogden, 2002, p.53).

To sum up, within Confucianism, statements that support democracy can be found. The author also believes that there are elements in the other major schools of thought in China mentioned before and other important aspects of traditional Chinese culture relevant to democratisation. However, they have never taken a dominant position in Chinese culture. Nor have they been translated into social or political policies. The authoritarian rulers in China have taken efficient measures to guarantee that the dominant political ideas serve their governance. However, China has such a long history, vast territory, and big population of various ethnic groups. It would be wrong to assume the above summary of dominant political culture in China could capture the complexity of that picture. It would be wrong to assume that the Chinese authoritarian culture is an undisrupted history of Confucian influence since the later Han dynasty. Actually there have been breaks, like the establishment of Buddhism during the Six Dynasties period, the ‘rejection of the Chinese heritage altogether in favour of Western science and democracy’ advocated by the May Fourth Movement (Wood, 1995). It is also wrong to assume that people’s minds are empty slates that can be ‘programmed’ by elites with particular cultural values, creating an ‘essence’ that then defines national cultures in rather stable ways over an extended period of time.

The author does not agree that the authoritarian values are Chinese. Actually Europe also has a long history of authoritarian ideas and practices. The author does not make these assumptions. Instead, dominant political ideas are introduced and examined to help better understand the particular socio-political environment and cultural tradition that Chinese Internet users are embedded in. the author argues that some norms and doctrines of Confucianism have great influence in the authoritarian history in China. Some are still evident in the Leadership’s strategy to appeal to its people. For example, Hu Jintao’s advocacy of a harmonised society is a modern version of achieving stability by ‘harmonising’ conflicts and dissents. Some are evident in Chinese society, for example, in families and schools, children are still be taught that to obey their parents and teachers is a virtue. The author attempts to explore whether the online world challenges or reinforces these norms or doctrines of Confucianism and how the participants are influenced.

2.3.2 Persistence of authoritarian regimes

The author makes no claim that the authoritarian political ideas deeply rooted in Chinese society have determined or will determine Chinese people’s attitudes to, behaviour towards or choice of democracy. For one thing, a pro-democratic political culture is important for democracy but not indispensable. For another, ‘a political culture is not fixed and transcendent but changeable and entangled in reciprocal relationships with various social, economic and political institutions’ (He, 1996, p.157). It is also unreasonable to assume that China will not become a democracy because it never has been. The fact that Europe also has a long history of authoritarian ideas and practices is living evidence. Nor does the author claim that the Chinese people are passive receivers of what the ruling class choose to prevail as mainstream. The two important factors of China’s political tradition - the dominant political ideas and the persistence of the authoritarian regime in China - are introduced for three reasons. In the first place, it helps to explain and better understand the Chinese political system. Secondly, the author wants to draw attention to the study of the complicated factors and forces (they cannot be covered in this thesis) that have shaped China’s political tradition and system and will probably shape the political future of China. The author argues that any conclusion on the democratic future of China without seriously examining those factors is unreliable. The last, but the most important reason, is that it provides the background to interpret why the participants used the Internet or understood their Internet use in certain ways and whether they perceived that Internet use changed some of their values or the Internet had changed the political culture in mainland China.