PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION

45. 
    The majority of the Western Balkans citizens have a positive image of NATO and the EU. The EU in particular enjoys overwhelming support. Even in the RS, where support is relatively low, it is still higher than 50%. During the visit to Serbia last March, this Committee heard that support for EU membership is decreasing in the country, but the government can still rely on the support of a clear majority of Serbians in its European endeavours.
    

46. 
    In terms of NATO’s image, the situation is less straightforward. Serbia is the only country in the region that is not seeking NATO membership. There is a consensus among all mainstream parties on this issue. NATO is viewed positively by only 20-30% of the population. This view is undoubtedly linked with NATO’s involvement in the civil war in BiH and, particularly, in the military action against then-Yugoslavia over the Kosovo issue in 1999. Serbian authorities have a clear policy of ensuring – through education programmes and various symbolic gestures – that the events of 1999 are not forgotten and are imprinted in the collective memory of the Serbian people, including the younger generation. The Serbian government also nurtures memories of the crimes committed against the Serbian population on the territory of BiH and Croatia in the 1940s and 1990s and accuses Sarajevo, Zagreb and the West of downplaying these crimes. Due to Belgrade’s persistent policy of presenting Serbia as a victim, it is unlikely that Serbia’s position towards NATO will change in the foreseeable future. Recent public protests over the signing of a rather technical cooperation agreement with NATO Support and Procurement Agency signify a level of mistrust and misperception towards NATO. However, NATO and Serbia have steadily built up cooperation and dialogue, since the country joined the Partnership for Peace programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 2006. The current government of Serbia has consistently supported deeper cooperation with the Alliance; Belgrade particularly appreciates the role KFOR plays in protecting the citizens of Kosovo, regardless of their ethnicity. At the Warsaw Summit, Allied leaders stressed that changes in NATO troop presence in Kosovo will remain conditions‑based and not calendar-driven. NATO fully respects Serbia’s policy of military neutrality.
    

47. 
    NATO has initiated some public diplomacy projects within Serbia, including the implementation of a NATO Contact Point Embassy and the NATO Military Liaison Office in Belgrade. Part of the aim of both of these projects is to create a platform to explain the benefits of cooperation in frameworks such as the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) to a wider audience, but such efforts have so far been limited. Arguably the most successful attempt to improve NATO's image among the Serbian and Montenegrin populations was the release of a statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in June 2015, where he expressed his condolences to the families and to all those who lost loved ones in the 1999 campaign. "We made every possible effort to prevent the loss of innocent lives, the loss of civilians. But, unfortunately, in this particular case, we could not avoid it. Innocent people were killed and that is why we sincerely regret it," Stoltenberg said. This statement resonated very well in both Serbia and Montenegro. The Special Rapporteur wishes to express her complete support for this statement.
    

48. 
    Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a clear dividing line with regard to NATO membership. While pro-NATO views among the citizens of the Federation are overwhelming (between 80-90%), the situation in the RS is almost exactly the opposite. While Banja Luka has not officially ruled out the possibility of BiH’s membership of the Alliance, it is likely that RS leadership will insist on holding a referendum once membership prospects become more tangible. In practice, by sabotaging the registration of defence property on RS territory, Banja Luka is de facto exercising a veto over the NATO integration process. It is also noteworthy that representatives of the RS ruling party refused to meet with the visiting delegation of this Committee in March 2016. That said, the Bosnian Serb parties that are in opposition to Mr Dodik have a much more constructive view on cooperation with NATO.
    

49. 
    The lack of broad public support for NATO membership was one of the main problems hindering Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. According to a survey conducted in January 2016, 47.3% of the citizens of Montenegro support NATO membership, 37.1% oppose it and 15.6% of them are undecided. The government of Milo Djukanovic has been a staunch supporter of NATO. It sees joining the Alliance as a strategic priority. However, many protesters hit the streets of Podgorica in late 2015, demanding the resignation of the government. These demonstrations turned into violent clashes with the police. While the demands of the protesters were broad, some of them expressed dissatisfaction with the decision to join NATO.
    

50. 
    NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division cooperates actively with the Montenegrin authorities as well as with a wide range of civil society partners on programmes such as visits to NATO Headquarters, seminars, speaking tours and educational youth programmes.
    

51. 
    During its visit to Skopje in June 2016, this Committee was informed that public support for NATO membership in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has declined from more than 90% to about 75% as a result of frustration over the name issue deadlock and of nationalist trends encouraged by the previous government. Nevertheless, all major political parties firmly support the goal of Euro-Atlantic integration and public support remains solid. The defence sector seems unaffected by the political crisis and continues to seek NATO standards and to contribute to NATO-led operations.
    

52. 
    The critical role of increasing public awareness of the Alliance’s policies and debunking stereotypes is played by a number of NGOs in Serbia, Montenegro and BiH’s RS, including the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, the Belgrade Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies, the Banja Luka Centre for International Relations and the Atlantic Council of Montenegro.
    

5. New Challenges: the Refugee and Migration Crisis and Foreign Fighters

53. 
    The humanitarian catastrophe facing Europe today – a major exodus of people from the war‑torn Middle East – has a direct effect on the Western Balkans: of the 1.3 million people that applied for asylum in the EU in 2015, more than 700,000, many of them children, travelled along the Western Balkans route from Greece to Central Europe. The current route cuts through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and on to Croatia and Hungary. Until recently, the people seeking refuge proceeded in a rather orderly fashion. Belgrade and Skopje, with the assistance of international organisations, set up a series of camps to provide food, water, temporary shelter and medical assistance to refugees before they move on to Central Europe. Until recently, on average, 2,000-3,000 people were entering these two countries every day.
    

54. 
    However, the domino effect of the closing of borders by Central and South-Eastern European countries at the beginning of 2016 has resulted in the rapid worsening of the humanitarian crisis. The situation on the border between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia now appears to be less acute following implementation of the EU-Turkey refugee deal. Nevertheless, thousands of refugees find themselves stranded on the Greek side of the border, unable to move forward and facing challenging living conditions. In recent years, thousands have made perilous attempts to cross the border illegally, only to be forcibly turned back by the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
    

55. 
    Skopje has very limited capacity to deal with this challenge, particularly since, unlike its neighbours, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s geography makes its borders very difficult to guard. The country’s authorities have resorted to extreme measures against refugees, including the use of tear gas. This is also a psychological challenge to the country as it invokes memories of the 2001 inter-ethnic conflict, partially prompted by the arrival of Kosovo Albanians in the wake of the turmoil in Kosovo.
    

56. 
    The situation in Serbia is somewhat better, as this Committee witnessed during its visit to the Adasevci camp on the border with Croatia. The camp was originally intended as a temporary shelter for refugees transiting through Serbia. However, some 340 refugees, including many families with children, mostly from Syria and Iraq, are now unable to move on. Serbian authorities, assisted by relevant international organisations and local NGOs, are doing their utmost to meet the needs of these people and to treat them with dignity. However, there is a strong sense of desperation and uncertainty among the refugees, and their living conditions are not adequate for a long-term stay. In total, there are about 2,000 refugees stranded in Serbia.
    

57. 
    It must be noted that many local citizens of the Western Balkans have also joined the refugees and migrants from the Middle East. According to Eurostat, in 2015 there were about 70,000 asylum applications filed by citizens from Kosovo, about 65,000 from Albania, almost 20,000 from Serbia, and more than 10,000 from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, most of them hoping for better economic opportunities. According to the German authorities, Albanians were the largest ethnic group seeking asylum in Germany after the Syrians: about 55,000 Albanians sought asylum in Germany in 2015. Kosovars were the third largest group with about 37,000 asylum requests. The asylum-seekers from the Balkans are considered to be economic migrants. They are generally accommodated in separate camps from the Middle Eastern and African refugees and some of them are sent back to their home countries since these countries are generally considered to be safe. Many of the asylum-seekers are young people, often well-educated and with special skills, which means that the countries of origin face an ever growing brain drain.
    

58. 
    Another new risk that affects the region is the problem of so-called foreign terrorist fighters. This is not a new phenomenon for the region: hundreds of foreign jihadists fought in the Bosnian war in the 1990s. When the wars in the Balkans ended, most violent jihadists left the region to fight elsewhere. However, since 2013, there has been a new surge of foreign fighter-related activity in the Balkans. Fighters from the Balkans are usually older than other members of violent extremist organisations in the Middle East and many of them have previous military experience. In June 2015, the terrorist organisation Daesh released a video titled "Honour is in Jihad" aimed specifically at Muslim communities in the Balkans, urging them to join the fight in Iraq and Syria.
    

59. 
    Countries of the Western Balkans have introduced strict policies vis-à-vis suspected foreign fighters: upon their return these people face immediate arrest and prosecution. However, in addition to repressive measures, more needs to be done to understand the motives of these people and the process of their radicalisation. While an overwhelming majority of Muslim Bosnians condemn extremism, there are some rural communities where radical ideas thrive, particularly when led by radical preachers. Inevitably, the poor socio-economic conditions, the lack of proper education and job opportunities, and high youth unemployment in Western Balkan countries with sizeable Muslim communities provide fertile ground for radical ideas. In this context, moderate religious authorities in BiH deserve credit for their tremendous work with these communities and their work in preventing radicalisation. In the last year, the number of foreign fighters from the Balkans has been falling, but, according to a survey released in August 2016 by the Regional Cooperation Council, this decline is most likely related to reduced demand rather than the efficiency of deradicalisation policies.
    

60. 
    It is also known that dozens of radically anti-Western Serbs went to fight on the side of the separatists in eastern Ukraine.
    

6. conclusions

61. 
    Efforts to achieve durable stability in the Western Balkans have not yet reached the point of no return. European and/or Euro-Atlantic integration remains a critical factor for peace, stability and progress in the region, but the easy part of the integration process has been more or less achieved with the upcoming NATO membership of Montenegro. The EU membership path for Montenegro and Albania is relatively straightforward, but the remaining countries of the region face much more complex challenges. A combination of seemingly unsolvable constitutional/status issues and the rise of narrow-minded nationalism have created a vicious circle. It can only be broken by the strong political will and statesmanship of local politicians, acting in accordance with broader national interests. The examples of Mr Dacic and Mr Thaci signing a normalisation agreement as well as Mr Vucic and his right-wing party assuming a staunchly pro-EU stance show that citizens in the Western Balkans respect that kind of strong leadership.
    

62. 
    At the same time the Euro-Atlantic community should continue to be committed to the region and periodically send encouraging signals and incentives, such as NATO's membership invitation to Montenegro and the offer of trade opportunities or visa liberalisation policies in return for tangible progress and reforms.
    

63. 
    In terms of specific recommendations, the Rapporteur wishes to emphasise the following points:
    

• 
  In the mid-term, unresolved status issues (Kosovo and the name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) should not impede the pace of integration. The negotiation process itself offers benefits to the countries’ populations by encouraging reform and offering partial access to the EU market and youth support programmes. The use of a footnote “This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 (1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence” next to “Kosovo” allows Kosovo’s participation in regional forums. However, the Special Rapporteur is convinced that in order to achieve actual membership, both Belgrade and Pristina will eventually have to tackle the issue of the status of Kosovo, or, at least, to achieve a much higher level of normalisation of relations.
  
• 
  It is imperative that dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina continue. The working group tasked with the drafting of the ASM/CSM statute must absolutely deliver a document that meets the needs of the Kosovo Serb community while staying within the legal framework of Kosovo.
  
• 
  Athens and Skopje should be encouraged to agree on the name issue or on workable modalities that would allow the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to proceed more rapidly along the path to NATO/EU integration. The delegation of this NATO PA Committee visited the country in June 2016, and brought back a message – received both from local and international interlocutors – that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been neglected for too long and that it runs a serious risk of implosion. Currently the country appears to be farther away from membership and the EU than it was several years ago. This dynamic needs to be changed.
  
• 
  The upcoming parliamentary elections in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be a critical test for the country’s democracy and a chance to end the protracted political crisis which impedes the country’s progress. The Special Prosecutor’s Office should receive all necessary support to finish the work for which it was established.
  
• 
  The international community’s presence in Kosovo and in BiH should be maintained for the foreseeable future.
  
• 
  BiH leadership should ensure adequate funding for the defence sector to prevent its backsliding from the status of a relatively successful institution. NATO leadership should consider revisiting the requirement to register all defence property as a precondition for activating the MAP. The MAP could have a positive effect on other reforms in the country.
  
• 
  Promoting regional cooperation and people-to-people contact are critical elements towards achieving genuine reconciliation, European integration and greater prosperity in the region.
  
• 
  Civil society organisations should be supported, particularly in their efforts to promote reconciliation and to convince local politicians to abandon narrow nationalist narratives and act in accordance with broader national interests.
  
• 
  The Euro-Atlantic community should send a clear signal that high levels of corruption, the absence of an independent judiciary and problems with freedom of speech and human rights cannot be justified by external factors, such as unresolved status issues or deadlocked EU and NATO integration. Unless these shortcomings are seriously tackled, EU and NATO integration – as well as hopes for more investment and better economic prospects – will remain a pipe-dream.
  
• 
  The challenge of accommodating the refugees stranded in the Western Balkan countries is also an opportunity to overcome existing differences between these countries and to embark upon genuine cooperation on this critical issue. As EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn put it, the refugee crisis demonstrates that the Balkan countries are already “members of the club”. The Euro-Atlantic community should increase its support for the countries of the region in this endeavour. The closure of borders in some EU countries was a mistake that resulted in the further deterioration of this humanitarian crisis; it has put an additional strain on the Western Balkan countries.
  
• 
  To help address the foreign fighter problem, the Euro-Atlantic community needs to improve its sharing of information and expertise with the Western Balkan states. The countries of the region need to focus more on preventive work and deradicalisation efforts.
  
• 
  Socio-economic development assistance is absolutely critical to achieving durable solutions to the region’s problems. Regional economic cooperation projects need to be fostered. There is a lot of potential in the region that could and should be utilised to generate prosperity and to provide people, particularly young people, with employment and education opportunities. Such measures would help to stop the brain drain.
  
• 
  The Euro-Atlantic community needs to redouble its efforts to communicate with the people of the region and, in particular, dispel myths about NATO. The benefits of cooperation with the Alliance should be demonstrated through civilian ventures such as NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme. NATO can also offer valuable assistance in emergency situations, such as floods in Serbia, through its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.
  
• 
  The Euro-Atlantic community should also take into account that some nations in the region have cultural affinities with Russia. Moscow is also active in the region, promoting its political and economic influence, as well as “soft power”, including through its Regional Humanitarian Centre in the Serbian town of Nis, which is designed to contribute to emergency response operations.
  
• 
  The role of NATO Ally Albania is important, given its links with communities in Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Albania should continue to encourage ethnic Albanian communities there to be constructive and show commitment towards building multicultural and inclusive societies.
  
• 
  Politicians in the region could do more to communicate to their citizens that Euro-Atlantic integration and efforts to implement the Community acquis are about raising standards and making reforms that are necessary for their countries and their people. In this sense, the process is just as important as the end result.