Variant rules for mark herman’s empire of the sun
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| Yamato). There were thirty attacks on carriers which damaged two and sank only the CVL Chuyo. On some occasions the diversions of submarines to chase cryptographic leads worked very well. In May of 1944 two submarines were vectored to a troopship convoy en route from China to Saipan immediately before the invasion and virtually destroyed the 43rd Division. While many of the troops were rescued and available in the defense, the division lost all of its equipment and supplies. (Actions such as this one are reflected as the alternative event to Allied Card #5 Operation Matador.)
Exploiting the potential of these crypto intercepts required that a number of submarines be assigned patrol areas near the forward Japanese bases and far from the SLOC over which flowed oil from the Japanese conquests. Nor did the diversion of submarines to fleet support ever really abate. My analysis leads me to believe that the dramatic increase Japanese shipping losses which occurred during 1944 were due to the increase in the number of submarines available and to the forward bases which shortened transit times. These factors allowed Admirals Lockwood, Christie and Fife to meet their fleet support requirements and still have plenty of submarines to send on patrols to the SLOC and the Japanese home waters. Later, intelligence intercepts started to show the strategic efficacy of the “tanker war”. Only then did the Navy’s fleet commanders really start to get behind the blockade strategy and encourage the submarine force to send even more patrols against the SLOC. That’s not to minimize their insight, but in a sense to compliment it. That they were able to evolve to a realization that they had a potentially war winning strategy in hand, while they could do something about it, under the stress of day to day operations is remarkable. Nor were the Japanese quiescent during these improvements. While ultimately they failed to solve their ASW problem, contrary to popular opinion they did try. Considering that the U.S. and Royal Navies barely succeeded in the North Atlantic with much greater resources, both in material and in technology, it seems a bit myopic to me to scorn the Japanese for failure to do so. They did start to convoy once the sinkings started to rise. They improved their ASW doctrine and their ASW equipment. They deployed ASW minefields effectively and made their ASW aerial patrols more effective. The IJN probably could have done more. But it is hard to know in retrospect what the marginal return would have been on committing more resources to ASW; it is especially hard to compare that trade with conserving those same resources for use with the main fleet. In this EOTS variant, the Submarine Warfare Modifier serves to allow each player to decide whether or not to put more effort into strategic warfare or to divert that effort to always pressing operational needs. It also serves as a means to reflect the steady improvements that the U.S. Navy made as the war went on. With suitable positioning of the Sub Base counters and postulating no early changes to the SWM by either side, the Japanese should start feeling the strategic effects of submarine warfare in 1944, which is the historical time frame. If the Allies commit more effort by playing Card #80 New Submarine Doctrine early and the Japanese fail to respond, then the Allies will start to achieve earlier successes. With each success they may further improve the SWM as success leads to more success in terms of evolving the doctrine, tactics and procedures. The other component to early success, however, is getting the Sub Bases close to enough target hexes to have a chance of success. Not only does moving the Sub Bases require scarce activations, the Japanese might respond to the threat by attacking those bases. Alternatively, the Allied player might prefer to waive the long shot at strategic warfare success during the early war in favor of having the Sub Bases in position to allow him to more effectively use his Submarine Attack, Operation Matador and Makin Island Raid events. It can be a cruel choice, but it is one the historical commanders had to make. U.S. Submarine Force operations against Japan have become the definitive example of the successful conduct of the guerre d’course… commerce raiding. Thousands of sailors on both sides died in this titanic struggle, but unquestionably the final result shortened the war significantly. Perhaps this little tale taken from E. B. Potter and Chester Nimitz’ text book Sea Power makes the point most succinctly. On December 31st 1941, Admiral Nimitz stood on the deck of the submarine Grayling and executed his orders to take command of the Pacific Fleet. There was no other suitable warship available at Pearl Harbor. On November 24th 1945, Admiral Nimitz relinquished command of the Pacific Fleet from the deck of the submarine Menhaden. The most powerful fleet the world had ever seen was at his beck, including the grand old lady Enterprise that had served him so well in desperate times or the Missouri where his foe had finally surrendered. For his ceremony, Admiral Nimitz chose instead to honor the Silent Service which had contributed so much, and at such a high cost, to his country’s victory. +++++++++++++++++++++++ Highly Recommended: For the excellent quick look: E.C. Whitman; Rising to Victory: The Pacific Submarine Strategy in World War II; An HTML Article hosted by the U.S. Navy. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_11/rising_victory.html For the superb definitive work: Clay Blair, Jr.; SILENT VICTORY: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan; J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia and New York; 1975 Download 174.01 Kb. Share with your friends:
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