Chapter 3 OPERATION ANACONDA WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT THE CH-47

“US Army-style air assaults were key…the helicopter landings by hundreds of US troops at strategic locations in the Shahi Kowt Mountains were pulled off almost flawlessly on D Day,” Colonel Frank Wiercinski explained.⁷⁰ Wiercinski was commander of the 101st Airborne Division’s Task Force Rakkasan, the air assault force for Operation ANACONDA which took place during March 2002 south of Gardez in Paktia Province. “We used Chinooks because of the altitude…the lowest HLZ was 8,500 feet…we needed to get to the HLZs fast with a lot of troops,” he later recounted, adding “the CH-47 was the helicopter of choice…we had just put in new 714 engines, incredibly powerful…we had up to 35 troops with full combat loading [per aircraft].”⁷¹

TF Rakkasan went on to conduct fourteen combat air assaults in support of ANACONDA. Lieutenant Colonel James Marye, commander of Task Force Talon, the US Army composite aviation unit in Afghanistan that actually flew the air assault missions, was equally complimentary of the Chinook, noting “no other airframe was capable of providing lift for that large a force at that altitude to achieve mass on each HLZ. “The Chinook was the assault platform of choice for that type of operation where massing large numbers of troops on a specific target is required to achieve overwhelming firepower…Operation ANACONDA would not have succeeded or even occurred without the CH-47,” Marye subsequently wrote.⁷²

Prelude to Operation ANACONDA

Following the terrorist attack of September 2001, the United States launched a military campaign – Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – against the Taliban regime and its militant al-Qaeda allies in Afghanistan. An ingenious combination of US Special Forces, friendly indigenous Afghan militias, and devastatingly effective American airpower quickly overwhelmed Taliban resistance. By December, Taliban rule in Afghanistan was officially over, Hamid Karzai had been appointed leader of the new interim government, twenty-five million Afghan citizens had been liberated, and US and coalition military forces remaining in Afghanistan began the transition to stability and humanitarian aid operations.

In January 2002, plans were being formulated to redeploy US troops back to the United States. Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division, who also led the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC, Forward) which was responsible for nearly all ground forces in the theater, described the mindset at the time, noting “it was the general consensus from everyone that the war, the fight, in Afghanistan was done.”⁷³ Meanwhile, Special Operations Forces intelligence reports indicated the presence of up to 800 Taliban and al-Qaeda combatants remaining in the Shahi Kowt Valley, near Shir Khan Kheyl village.⁷⁴ Since a key aspect of the potential assault on the Shahi Kowt involved establishing blocking positions to prevent the enemy from escaping, CENTCOM directed that a combination of Afghan militiamen, US Special Forces, and US conventional forces be organized to conduct the operation.⁷⁵

The conventional force chosen for Operation ANACONDA was the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) which had arrived in mid-January to replace elements of US Marine Corps Task Force 58 at Kandahar. In compliance with the DoD light American footprint directive and consistent with the prevailing notion that the war in Afghanistan was basically over, the Rakkasans deployed with only 2,200 Soldiers, just 30% of its standard equipment load plan, and no organic artillery – hardly the makings for a full-spectrum brigade combat team (BCT).⁷⁶ Colonel Wiercinski, his downsized brigade staff, and the 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry took control of operations at Kandahar, while 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry deployed initially to Shahbaz Air Base in Jacobabad, Pakistan to provide airfield security. 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, which was providing security at Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airfield in Uzbekistan, would eventually be attached to TF Rakkasan, thereby providing Wiercinski with three highly trained light infantry battalions for Operation ANACONDA.

Task Force Talon served as the composite aviation component for the Rakkasan package. Aviation assets from the 3d and 7th Battalions, 101st Aviation regiment were assigned to TF Talon which was led by 7-101st commander, Lieutenant Colonel James Marye. The task force consisted of a grand total of twenty-four helicopters – eight CH-47 Chinooks from A Company, 7-101st (Major John Davidson), eight AH-64 Apache gunships from A Company, 3-101st (Captain Bill Ryan), and a detachment of eight UH-60 Black Hawks for command and control and medical evacuation. At the time of deployment in early January, Talon’s mission primarily involved transporting Soldiers in support of CFLCC stability operations. Bravo Company, 159th Aviation Regiment, XVIII Airborne Corps (Major Terry Jamison) joined the task force in February, adding seven more CH-47 Chinooks to the aircraft mix.⁷⁷

CFLCC (Forward) was redesignated Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain in mid-February 2002. Major General Hagenbeck moved his headquarters from K2 to Bagram and took over responsibility for the planning and execution of Operation ANACONDA. His planning staff began a thorough analysis of the 60-square mile Shahi Kowt Valley that was bordered by a steep mountain ridge on the east and the smaller Tergul Ghar hill mass to the west. The valley was oriented northeast to southwest with entrances at both the north and south ends. Intelligence reports indicated that Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were concentrated in the south-central portion of the valley near the villages of Shir Khan Kheyl, Babol Kheyl, and Marzak. CJTF Mountain planners anticipated that the enemy would be armed with AK-47s, RPG-7s, 82-mm mortars, and DShK 12.7-mm machine guns. Concerns were raised regarding the availability of suitable HLZs along the eastern ridge as well as the possibility that enemy combatants might have established defensive positions in the eastern high ground. The final analysis concluded, however, that the enemy would fight briefly, allow their leaders to escape, and then withdraw eastward toward Pakistan. Planners discounted the possibility of the Taliban and al-Qaeda vigorously defending the valley and fighting to the death.⁷⁸

Hagenbeck’s final operations plan for ANACONDA called for TF Anvil, two Afghan militia groups each accompanied by US Special Forces advisors, to establish outer-ring blocking positions east and south of the Shahi Kowt. A third Afghan militia – the operation’s main effort, designated TF Hammer, and also advised by US Special Forces Soldiers – was to split into two assault elements, enter the valley from the north and south, and hold in place along a line three kilometers west of Tergul Ghar. Following a series of preplanned US air strikes, TF Hammer would then proceed eastward to clear Shir Khan Kheyl, Babol Kheyl, and Marzak.⁷⁹

While the Afghan militias were moving into position, TF Rakkasan would air assault into seven blocking positions below the eastern ridge to prevent Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters from escaping along exfiltration routes into Pakistan. Sealing the escape routes on the eastern side meant a two-battalion operation with each of the seven passes closed off by an individual infantry company. “This mission had 101st written all over it…an air assault…the 101st’s raison d’etre,” Lieutenant Colonel Jim Larsen, TF Rakkasan executive officer, recalled thinking during a February 2002 receipt of mission briefing at Bagram.⁸⁰

Finally, Major General Hagenbeck’s commander’s intent for Operation ANACONDA was unmistakable – he would consider the operation successful when all the al-Qaeda combatants in the Gardez-Khost region were either killed or captured. On 26 February 2002, the CJTF Mountain commander issued the following mission statement to Coalition forces:

On order, CJTF Mountain attacks to destroy (capture or kill) AQ (al-Qaeda) vicinity OBJ Remington (Shir Khan Kheyl), and to identify or disrupt AQ insurgency support mechanisms and exfiltration routes into Pakistan. BPT (be prepared to) conduct follow-on operations to clear selected objectives and interdict AQ movements in AO Lincoln.⁸¹

The planning for ANACONDA was painstakingly meticulous at CJTF Mountain command level. For the aviators who would eventually fly the mission, the goal was simply to get the infantry on the ground, on time, where they wanted to be. “For us, the objective was always get them in on target, plus or minus 50 meters, plus or minus 30 seconds,” explained Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jeffrey Simon, a TF Talon Chinook pilot.⁸²

During the last two weeks of February, TF Rakkasan Soldiers, pilots, and aircrew members conducted a series of drills and rehearsals designed to replicate the ANACONDA mission requirements. Troops carrying nearly 100 pounds of combat equipment practiced loading and unloading the TF Talon Chinook helicopters. On the last day of the month, the six CH-47s scheduled for the first lift into Shahi Kowt conducted a fully loaded fly away exercise in the mountainous region north of Bagram to reevaluate and reaffirm the Chinook’s high altitude flight and performance characteristics. ANACONDA would be the highest altitude combat assault ever undertaken by US Soldiers. Additionally, Rakkasan combat engineers made preparations for establishing a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) at an abandoned airstrip north of the valley. The FARP TEXACO was intended primarily to give AH-64 Apache pilots a close-in facility to quickly rearm, refuel, and return to the fight. Fuel at the FARP would be provided by two Chinooks, specially equipped with 3,600-gallon internal fuel tanks, and referred to fondly as “fat cows.”⁸³

Due to inclement weather conditions in eastern Afghanistan, D-Day for Operation ANACONDA was postponed until 2 March. The delay gave Colonel Wiercinski all the more time to worry about problematic issues, such as the distinct possibility of enemy heavy weapons covering the flight approaches to the Shahi Kowt, the prospects of a Chinook being shot-down, assaulting into the low ground (not the high ground) below the eastern ridge, losing the element of surprise with a day vs. a night assault, going into battle with no supporting artillery, and recent intelligence reports that enemy fighters were not holed up in the villages, but instead were manning defensive positions in the ridgelines.⁸⁴ Wiercinski no doubt recalled the briefing he attended at the Special Forces’ advanced operating base the day he arrived in Bagram. Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber, commander of Advance Force Operations, had stated the obvious, “Remember, every enemy on the planet expects the US military to attack using helicopters, this enemy will be no different.”⁸⁵

The final plan for ANACONDA remained essentially unchanged. Beginning on D-1, TFs Hammer and Anvil would begin movements to reach the western and southern portions of the Shahi Kowt, respectively, by daybreak on D-Day. At dawn on D-Day, the first air assault wave of Rakkasans would land along the eastern ridgeline. The northeastern escape route out of the valley would be purposely left open to entice enemy fighters to withdraw in that direction. At dusk on D-Day, a second Rakkasan air assault would land in the northern portion of the valley to close the northeastern exfiltration route. On D-1, Colonel Wiercinski spoke with the Chinook crews that would ferry the Rakkasan Soldiers into combat and to the Apache pilots who would provide the protective firepower for the air assault. He told the airmen that in an earlier briefing he had told the infantrymen that they would be “flying into battle with the best crews and the best helicopters in the world.” “Not every helicopter and not every crew could do this,” he said. “You’ve got the equipment, you’ve got the people…this is going to be a great mission.” In concluding his remarks, the Rakkasan commander reflected on the broader meaning of the ANACONDA mission. “When they wrote the book on air assault, this is what they were talking about,” Wiercinski said. “No other unit in the world could do this…you will make history.”⁸⁶

After midnight on D-Day, Rakkasan troops began boarding the six CH-47 Chinooks that would take them into the Shahi Kowt. For security purposes, the loading operation – forty to forty-five Soldiers per helicopter – was conducted under blackout conditions. As only five AH-64 Apaches were available for the mission, TF Talon commander Lieutenant Colonel Jim Marye revised the air movement plan such that two lead Apaches (Team 1) would clear the valley and cover the three Chinooks (Section 1) inserting 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry into the northern HLZs, while the remaining three Apaches (Team 2) would escort the three Chinooks (Section 2) landing in the southern HLZs with the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry. At 0430, 2 March 2002, Apache Team 1 departed Bagram for the valley. The three Chinooks in Section 1 lifted off at 0500, followed shortly thereafter by Section 2. Although inclement weather played havoc with the enroute flight, the pilots successfully navigated the intense fog and cloud cover and all the aircraft had arrived without incident in the objective area by approximately 0615.⁸⁷ In describing the intensity of the mission, Chinook pilot Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kenneth Gunter reported that “ten minutes out the entire helicopter was just silent…everybody was just doing their jobs and getting ready for those last few minutes inbound.”⁸⁸

Apache Team 1’s sweep of the designated landing areas along the eastern ridge was uneventful with no enemy activity detected. Once cleared to proceed, the Chinooks then entered the valley from the south, with each aircraft proceeding to a different HLZ close to the blocking position assigned to the ground maneuver element onboard. The three Chinooks inserting 2-187 Infantry landed safely at HLZs 1, 3, and 4, while the three CH-47s with 1-87 Soldiers landed at HLZs 5, 12, and 13. “I was most worried about the terrain in the landing area…we had imagery [but] those pictures didn’t do us a lot of good,” recalled Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Quinlan. “We knew we were going to be in jagged areas…so basically getting that helicopter in there safely and getting those guys off, that’s what everyone was focused on,” Quinlan added.⁸⁹

At the same time, Colonel Wiercinski and a tactical command post staff were inserted by UH-60 Black Hawks on a high ridge – Rak TAC ridge – south of the valley. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Marye as the Air Mission Commander remained airborne over the Shahi Kowt in a command and control UH-60 for the duration of the air assault. As the Section 1 Chinook pilots began their return trip to Bagram, they were ordered to TF Hammer’s location west of the valley to pick up wounded US Special Forces Soldiers and Afghan militiamen.⁹⁰

Soon after landing, 2-187 began taking enemy fire at HLZ 3. A short time later, Soldiers remaining on HLZ 1 also came under small arms and RPG fire. However, with assistance from the Apaches, the 2-187 troops completed their movement and established three blocking positions by 1500 D-Day.⁹¹ “I don’t think they anticipated the type of resistance they encountered when they got on the ground…a lot of us anticipated it going smoother than it did,” Chief Warrant Officer 3 Scott Breslin thought as he climbed out of the Shahi Kowt and headed back to Bagram.⁹²

To the south along the eastern ridge, 1-87 also received enemy fire from Takur Ghar after landing. The Soldiers began to consolidate in a bowl-like depression between two of their assigned blocking positions – BPs Heather and Ginger – as enemy small arms, machinegun, RPG, and 82-mm mortar fire intensified. CW3 Simon recalled thinking that enemy fighters “are actually attacking our guys as opposed to trying to flee…it wasn’t what we expected.”⁹³ Although fixed wing and Apache close air support knock out numerous enemy fighting positions, by noon on D-Day 1-87 had more than 20 wounded Soldiers, was running short of ammunition, and was pinned-down in the bowl.

After sunset, an AC-130 gunship arrived to provide suppressive fire while two US Air Force HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters evacuated the wounded. At midnight, two Chinooks landed and extracted the 1-87 Soldiers from the bowl area.⁹⁴ Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Ketchum, one of the Chinook pilots on the extraction mission, recalled being nervous going in – “we weren’t sure how the infantry guys were going to signal us…we came around and I saw them waving a stick in the air and that was really a sigh of relief.” “My aircraft had five wounded that had taken shrapnel to different parts of their bodies,” Ketchum continued, “fellow Soldiers carryied them onto the aircraft and they were bleeding.”⁹⁵

By the end of D-Day, TF Hammer’s advance east of the Shahi Kowt had bogged down, two of the five TF Talon Apaches were un-flyable due to battle damage, a second lift by Chinooks with reinforcements from Bagram had been cancelled because of the intense action in the valley,⁹⁶ twenty-six Americans had been wounded, most of 1-87 had been extracted, and the enemy was fighting back, not attempting to escape. CJTF Mountain needed a new plan.

On 3 March (D+1), TF Rakkasan ordered all of the 1-87 and 2-187 units remaining along the eastern ridge to link up, move north, and consolidate at HLZ 15. At approximately 1100, six Chinooks departed Bagram headed for HLZ 15 with 1-187, the brigade reserve, onboard. Due to enemy mortar fire at the HLZ, the ground commander recommended that this air assault mission be aborted. However, one section of Chinooks landed anyway, while the other section returned to Bagram. At 1800, additional 2-187 Soldiers arrived by Chinook at HLZ 15, and at 2000 the Chinooks that had earlier aborted brought in the remaining 1-187 troops. By the end of the day, all of the Rakkasan troops had assemble at HLZ 15 in the north end of the valley.⁹⁷

After arriving at the HLZ, 1-187 was ordered to move south to BP AMY. Upon reaching AMY early the next morning, the battalion was further ordered to clear the entire eastern ridge all the way south to blocking point GINGER. That afternoon (4 March), however, 1-187 was instructed to hold at BP DIANE. TF Rakkassan then assigned the mission of securing blocking point GINGER to the reconstituted 1-87th, designated at this point TF Summit. With a well-trained and capable, yet makeshift, complement of three full companies, Summit air assaulted into HLZ 3 west of BP DIANE aboard CH-47 Chinooks on 5 March. A brief change of mission involving the seizure of Takur Ghar was quickly reversed and 1-87 proceeded south toward PB Ginger as originally planned. By 12 March, TF Rakkasan had withdrawn all of its battalions from the Shahi Kowt. The entire extraction operation was conducted by Chinook pilots and crews.⁹⁸

By 10 March, Afghan militia forces had reorganized west of the valley. Under the code name Operation GLOCK, a newly arrived Northern Alliance Tajik unit assaulted and cleared Tergul Ghar, then attacked the villages to the east in the Shahi Kowt. The original TF Hammer Pashtun force also attacked villages in the southern portion of the valley before linking up with the Tajiks. CJTF Mountain leaders then established Task Force Commando, comprised of the 3d Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry; 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, and elements of 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division to conduct additional ANACONDA missions. During Operation HARPOON on 13 March, the Canadian Light Infantry, along with A/4-31, air assaulted onto the north end of Tergul Ghar to conduct a more thorough sweep of the four mile long hill mass. Chinooks from the 159th Aviation Regiment conducted the air assault. After completing the mission and reaching the south end of Tergul, the Canadians and A Company were extracted by CH-47s from the 159th.⁹⁹

The final ANACONDA operation was designated POLAR HARPOON. The mission was assigned to 4-31 Infantry and entailed clearing Takur Ghar and the upper Shahi Kowt Valley. On 18 March, Chinooks inserted the battalion TAC and C Company on a precariously steep ridgeline north of, and 1500 feet below, Takur Ghar’s peak. Additional CH-47s landed in the valley with A Company. Charlie Company and the TAC climbed to the top of the mountain and conducted a thorough search, while A Company swept the valley below. After completing the mission, 4-31 was extracted the next day, again by Chinooks.¹⁰⁰ Operation ANACONDA was finally over. Although some would disagree, General Tommy Franks, commander in chief, US Central Command, declared ANACONA “an unqualified and absolute success.”¹⁰¹

Task Force Talon conducted fourteen separate CH-47 Chinook combat air assaults in support of TF Rakkasan during Operation ANACONDA. “I use[d] Chinooks to bring the troops in rather than Black Hawks…because of the altitude…the constraints on the lift capability of helicopters at that altitude,” Major General Hagenbeck explained in a post-operation interview.¹⁰² More than 1,400 Soldiers had been safely inserted and extracted in ANACONDA – the highest altitude combat operation in American history.¹⁰³ Although none of the air assault Chinooks sustained battle damage from enemy fire, the outcome could have been devastatingly different.

On D-1, a five-man Special Operations reconnaissance team that had earlier infiltrated the upper Shahi Kowt spotted an enemy DShK 12.7-mm machine gun position perfectly situated to interdict the CH-47s as they entered the valley and began their landing approaches. With assistance from US Air Force AC-130 gunships, this Special Operations team and others located throughout the Shahi Kowt attacked and successfully destroyed five DShK antiaircraft positions prior to the Rakkasan air assault the next morning.¹⁰⁴ Although this Long War Occasional Paper focuses on CH-47 Chinook combat air assaults by conventional forces, it is worthy of note that during the Special Operations phase of ANACONDA, two MH-47E Chinooks from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment were shot down by enemy RPGs and small arms fire.¹⁰⁵ “When we found out that two MH-47 crews had gone down in the exact area where we were putting in the 10th Mountain, it hit close to home,” CW2 Quinlan recalled. The notion that the Taliban “could be that effective with their rocket-propelled grenades to take down an aircraft…I think that hit the special operations community pretty hard,” Quinlan said in an after action interview.¹⁰⁶

Operation ANACONDA was the US military’s first conventional combat operation of the OEF campaign. It was the first time Chinooks and Apaches had ever operated together as a team in combat. Unfortunately, TF Talon may not have had a sufficient of number of Chinooks available to transport the entire Rakkasan force and its equipment to the valley all at the same time in one lift. “The whole mission economy of force due to the restricted footprint allowed in Afghanistan by direction of the Secretary of Defense,” explained Colonel Scott Kubica, Talon executive officer during ANACONDA.¹⁰⁷ Ground commanders were forced to pick and choose which units and what supplies to take in first or leave behind. These decisions were difficult to make since intelligence estimates of the enemy situation in the Shahi Kowt were updated continually as new data came in prior to D-Day. In hindsight, for example, more mortars should perhaps have been included in the first lift.

After inserting the first lift troops in the valley, the original six Chinooks returned to Bagram to pick up the remaining Soldiers and equipment. Inclement weather and enemy activity in and around the HLZs, delayed/prevented the second lift of Rakkasans from reaching the valley in a timely manner. More Chinooks, enough to move everyone and everything in one lift, may have been more effective. “Our deployment to OEF was done by USAF Strategic Airlift vice Sea Lift…that kept us from taking more Chinooks,” Colonel James Marye, TF Talon Commander emphasized. “Our full up sixteen ship Chinook company would have been able to accomplish the task” of transporting all of the Rakkasans and their equipment to the Shahi Kowt in just one lift. Marye conceded, however, that FARP TEXACO may not have been able to support more aircraft. “We had a pretty fair FARP capability, but it would have been a serious stretch with additional Chinooks, since they had to also fuel and rearm Apaches and Black Hawks, he later wrote. ¹⁰⁸

Because of the CH-47’s exceptional allowable combat load and its ability to operate in high altitude environments, the six Chinooks that did participate in the D-Day air assault mission enabled TF Rakkasan to surprise the enemy, take the initiative, and choke off escape routes by rapidly massing combat power on key terrain features in the Shahi Kowt. No other aircraft was capable of supporting Operation ANACONDA to the same extent. Two months after ANACONDA ended, Royal Marines went back into the valley. They discovered some caves, defensive positions, and piles of American MREs and bottled water, but no al-Qaeda or Taliban fighters – “it’s pretty quiet,” Sergeant Darren Hughes admitted, acknowledging that ANACONDA may have been more successful than previously believed.¹⁰⁹ “It was clear that Operation ANACONDA had dealt the enemy a heavy blow…al Qaeda and Taliban forces have been devastated,” Brigadier Roger Lane, commander of British forces in Afghanistan said in May 2002. “I don’t think we fully appreciate how devastating ANACONDA was,” he told a Times reporter as he climbed down from an RAF Chinook at Bagram.¹¹⁰