Plan – DHS/DOD/Congress constrains direct weapons sales

Plan – DHS/DOD/Congress constrains direct weapons sales

Solvency (DHS)

Solvency – Department of Homeland Security should make the police have to pay more for any direct equipment sales

Materiel from the controversial 1033 program—whereby surplus military hardware is funneled from the Pentagon to local law-enforcement agencies—has provided a stark backdrop to protests in Ferguson. Police outfitted in SWAT gear aboard an armored LENCO BearCat military vehicle met protesters in the streets, potentially exacerbating a crisis situation and producing haunting photos.//// The 1033 program turned into a national lightning rod over the course of the summer, leading the White House to announce this month that it will tighten standards on the provision of military equipment to local law-enforcement agencies. But a lesser known program under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security provides funds to law-enforcement agencies to buy militarized gear themselves, Roman says, either through the Pentagon or on the open market.//// Some of these buys are justified. More of them would be, Roman says, if police departments were required to match some part of the funds they receive.//// "If I come to you, and I say, 'Would you like a tank?' you're going to say, 'Sure!'" he says. "If I ask you if you'd like a tank that costs a million dollars, but you need to pay 3 percent for it, so you have to come up with $30,000, you're probably going to ask yourself if you really need a tank."

The Dpt. of Homeland Security should condition/constrain law enforcement acquisition of militarized equipment

ACLU 2014 (American Civil Liberties Union, “War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing”, June 2014, https://www.aclu.org/report/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-police, p44 note://// indicates par. breaks)[AR SPRING16]

12. The Department of Homeland Security should impose meaningful conditions on the receipt of funds to local law enforcement agencies. In order to receive funds, local law enforcement agencies should have to agree to the following://// ■■ Not to use the funds to purchase automatic or semi-automatic rifles or APCs//// ■■ To certify to DHS that agencies receiving funds have not in fact used equipment purchased with DHS money except in actual high-risk scenarios///// ■■ To require agencies receiving DHS funds to make a record of each equipment purchase made using DHS funds, which should be made available to the public.

Solvency (DOD)

Solvency - DOD should make a clarification statement that state/local police can’t use automatic/semiautomatic weapons and APC’s

ACLU 2014 (American Civil Liberties Union, “War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing”, June 2014, https://www.aclu.org/report/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-police, p44 note://// indicates par. breaks)[AR SPRING16]

The Department of Defense should promulgate regulations pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2576a(a)(1) clarifying that automatic and semi-automatic weapons and APCs are not suitable for use by state and local law enforcement agencies for the purpose of equipment transfers under the 1033 Program.

Solvency (Congress)

Congress should constrain state/local purchase of automatic or semi-automatic weapons (applies to Homeland Security, Byrne, all other grants)

ACLU 2014 (American Civil Liberties Union, “War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing”, June 2014, https://www.aclu.org/report/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-police, p42 note://// indicates par. breaks)[AR SPRING16]

Congress should condition state and local law enforcement agencies’ receipt of federal funds on an agreement not to use the funds to purchase automatic or semi-automatic rifles or APCs. This condition should be applied to grants made through the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Grant Program, the Department of Justice’s Byrne JAG grant program, and all other funding streams through which money is transferred from the federal government to state and law enforcement agencies.

Plan – end asset forfeiture laws

Impacts

Asset forfeiture is what is an internal link to “no-knock” SWAT raids in the status quo

HILL and BERGER 2009 (Stephen, associate prof International Relatkions @ University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, specializing in paramilitary policing and conflict resolution, and Randall, professor criminal justice @ Univ. of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, “A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut”, Social Justice, V.36 No. 1, p.36, note://// indicates par. breaks)[AR SPRING16]

This case is not unique. Aggressive police tactics in the U.S. "War on Drugs" have reinforced negative public attitudes toward law enforcement, especially among people living in disadvantaged neighborhoods, with no decline in drug use (Nunn, 2002; Small, 2001). Lawmakers in several U.S. states have responded to an emerging backlash against the "War on Drugs" by introducing bills to repeal or modify civil forfeiture laws that law enforcement has used to seize personal property and other assets (frequently with no arrest) believed to have been used during the commission of a criminal act. Critics assert that law enforcement agen? cies have used asset forfeiture revenues to equip and send PPUs on "no-knock" drug raids, often conducted on the "wrong" premises (Shannon, 2007). According to studies by the Rand Corporation, among others, treatment is 10 times more cost effective than interdiction for reducing cocaine use in the United States (Rydell and Everingham, 1994). Based on these findings, ballot initiatives in California, Arizona, and Washington, D.C., have helped to retard the militarization of policing by calling for substance abusing offenders to be redirected into treatment programs (Drug Policy Alliance, 2002).

Solvency

Solvency – ending asset forfeiture laws can check police militarization. Now is key

HILL and BERGER 2009 (Stephen, associate prof International Relatkions @ University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, specializing in paramilitary policing and conflict resolution, and Randall, professor criminal justice @ Univ. of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, “A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut”, Social Justice, V.36 No. 1, p.37, note://// indicates par. breaks)[AR SPRING16]

This article seeks mainly to raise awareness of an unchecked paramilitary policing juggernaut that poses a threat to the provision of democratic policing in the United States and abroad. The longer the process continues, the more difficult it becomes to reverse it. This has been the experience of the Israeli National Police and, unless the paramilitary policing juggernaut is controlled, U.S. policing is likely to travel along the same path. Significantly, the United States has exacerbated the effects of this juggernaut throughout the international community by supporting paramilitary police forces in Europe and the deployment of FPUs in international peacekeeping operations. Adequate public discussion must take place on federal policies toward police militarization at home and abroad. Though public awareness is essential, the tools and strategies to control the juggernaut must be developed before the process becomes irreversible. This article has suggested preliminary steps that might slow the juggernaut while the debate over militarization proceeds. These include, at a minimum, a strengthening of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, repeal of forfeiture laws, and an ongoing analysis of the long-term effects of FPUs on the civilian nature of indigenous police forces in countries that have experienced peacekeeping operations.

Download 1 Mb.

Share with your friends: