■■ topic paper – police practices
Plan - strengthen the Posse Comitatus Act
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Plan - strengthen the Posse Comitatus ActInherencyPolice and military are increasingly blurred in the status quo. Key causes are: (1) erosion of the Posse Comitatus Act, (2) military weapons that trickle down to police, (3) normalization of SWAT activity, and (4) criminality increasingly repackaged as insurgencyKRASKA professor and senior research fellow, college of justice and strategy @ Eastern Kentucky University 2009 (Peter, “Militarization and Policing – It’s Relevance to 21st Century Police”, Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Vol 1, Issue 4, p.1-2 note://// indicates par. breaks)[AR SPRING16] Simplicity is comforting. Modernity’s basic dichotomies such as fact/value, private/public, and national/international simplify our thinking and lull us into intellectual complacency. Police academics in the United States, with only a few exceptions, have been quite comfortable with the military/police dichotomy. The US military handles external security through the threat and practice of war. The civilian police handle internal security through the enforcement of federal and local laws. Most assume that studying the police and military is a mutually exclusive undertaking. Taking this dichotomy for granted is understandable given that the clear demarcation between the police and military has been considered a preeminent feature of the modern nation-state (Giddens, 1985). The failure of a government to clearly demarcate the two is usually seen as an indicator of repressiveness and lack of democracy.//// My research and writing has been challenging this dichotomy since the late 1980s. Its central thesis has remained steadfast, and may be viewed at this point in history as an obvious point to the keenly observant: we have been witnesses to a little noticed but nonetheless momentous historical change–the traditional distinctions between military/police, war/law enforcement, and internal/external security are rapidly blurring. Over the past 15 years, I have researched and traced the evolution of two interrelated trends that embody this blur: the militarization of US police and crime control, and the police-ization of the US military. Empirical indicators of these converging trends include the following://// • the significant erosion of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act by the United States, which previous to the early 1980s prohibited the military involvement in internal security or police matters, except under the most extreme circumstances, leading to an unprecedented level of US armed forces’ involvement in internal security matters;///// • the advent of an unprecedented cooperative relationship between the US military and US civilian police at both the highest and lowest level of organization, including technology transfers, massive military weapons transfers, information sharing between the military and police targeted at domestic security, a close operational relationship in both drug control and terrorism control efforts, and a high level of cross-training in the area of special weapons and tactics team (SWAT) and counter-civil disturbance, counterinsurgency, and antiterrorism exercises;//// • the steep growth and normalization of police special operations units (e.g. SWAT teams) that are modelled after (not identical to) elite military special operations groups;/// • a growing tendency by the police and other segments of the criminal justice system to rely on themilitary/warmodel for formulating crime/drug/terrorism control rationale and operations; and a redefining of criminality to ‘insurgency,’ and crime control to ‘lowintensity conflict’—requiring counterinsurgency measures carried out by both the US military and civilian police.//// This article submits that understanding this blur, and the associated organizing concepts militarization and militarism, are essential for accurately analyzing the changing nature of security, and the activity of policing, in the late-modern era of the 21st century. Police leaders, in particular, will have to be increasingly cognizant and wary of the implications and potential consequences of this convergence, and the attendant social forces of militarism and militarization. The aim of this article, then, is to expose and sensitize the reader to what we might call a martial theoretical orientation. The idea here is to employ this orientation as a type of conceptual lens, or interpretive construct, which when peered through, will help us assess and accurately make sense of current trends in the police institution, the activity of policing, crime control, and warfare. ImpactsWeakening of Posse Comitatus Act in the squo is causing a repressive ‘defeat and conquer’ approach to people in the U.S.TIGHE and BROWN, professors crim. Justice @ Western Oregon University 2015 (Scott, assistant professor, and William, professor, “The Militarization of Law Enforcement: Bypassing the Posse Comitatus Act”, Justice Policy Journal, Fall, note://// indicates par. breaks) [AR SPRING16] American law enforcement has experienced historic changes over the past several decades – particularly in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 events. In the past, community policing and problem solving were popular policing strategies used in many jurisdictions, but now police departments frequently institute “zero tolerance” policies. This shift incorporates the use of military equipment and weaponry that has flooded into law enforcement agencies across the United States. In many cases/situations law enforcement has also adopted military strategies and tactics – tactics designed for use against foreign enemies. One popularly broadcast and subsequently perceived mission of American law enforcement was to protect and serve the public. Today, the progress of that mission statement is in question. Another issue related to law enforcement performance is clearance rates. In 1971, the clearance rate for violent crimes was 46.5 percent. That percentage increased to 47.7 percent by 2011 - reflecting a 1.2 percent improvement over 40 years. Amidst this inferior performance in police activity we seem to have entered into a period where law enforcement has become militarized. Today’s law enforcement mission reflects a bypassing of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which restricted the use of the military in civilian issues/circumstances. Today, the militarization of law enforcement provides an exception to that law through the creation of an ad hock (sic) military presence. Thus, protect and serve has been replaced with defeat and conquer. This paper examines short and long-term implications of defeat and conquer mission. SolvencySolvency – the Posse Comitatus Act should be changed – made stronger via language that limits military transfer from military to the policeHILL and BERGER 2009 (Stephen, associate prof International Relatkions @ University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, specializing in paramilitary policing and conflict resolution, and Randall, professor criminal justice @ Univ. of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, “A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut”, Social Justice, V.36 No. 1, p.35, note://// indicates par. breaks)[AR SPRING16] Another effective measure might be to add language to the PCA that would prohibit the transfer of surplus military hardware to civilian law enforcement and police training for use in military tactics and maneuvers (Bennett, 2006; Kealy, 2003). Solvency – strengthening the Posse Comitatus Act is key – it’s LEGISLATION that keeps the military and police distinct. (This card is also an internal link to heg good, or at least something like military readiness)BENNETT JD student Lewis & Clark Law School 2006 (Dan, “The Domestic Role of the Military in America: Why Modifying or Repealing the Posse Comitatus Act Would Be A Mistake”, 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev 935, p.953-953, note://// indicates par. breaks)[AR SPRING16] The PCA is a crucial bulwark for liberty. The military is not trained for domestic law enforcement operations, and they should not be placed in a position of trying to enforce laws in conformity with the principles of civil liberty when that is not their mission. The PCA is not an archaic relic, nor does it hamper the ability of the federal government to keep its people safe when disaster strikes.//// The Posse Comitatus Act embodies a principle that many people erroneously believe lies in the constitution itself: that the military has no place becoming involved in domestic law enforcement, and that such an involvement is a slippery slope. That belief is reasonable, as the idea of domestic law enforcement activities at the hands of our military forces is repugnant to the nature of our society. Modern Americans would no more appreciate the sight of the Army or Marines patrolling our streets than did the colonists appreciate redcoats marching through the streets of Boston just prior to the Revolution. Even if there were no such concerns, the military is a singularly inappropriate entity to undertake the role of a domestic law enforcement body. Its training is wrong for such a task, it has the wrong equipment for such a task, and time spent enforcing the laws is time not spent training for its primary mission: the protection of this nation in combat. The military should not be taken away from that mission and placed into one for which it was not designed.//// The PCA does not prohibit disaster relief efforts. In considering the wisdom of modifying or eliminating the PCA, it is important to be forthright about what the Act does and does not prohibit. The PCA’s prohibitions target law enforcement, not disaster relief. There is nothing in the text or interpretation of the PCA that can be read to rule out the option of the military pitching in with its unique talents and capabilities in the event of a disastrous, Katrina-style incident. Instead, the PCA prohibits only active, law enforcement activity, and even that prohibition does not apply during a disaster due to the exceptions. The PCA prevents the nation’s armed forces from arresting its citizens, or searching their homes. It prevents the armed forces from spying on Americans on American soil.74 The PCA does not, however, prevent the armed forces from delivering food and water to a hurricane ravaged community, and it does not prevent them from restoring order when order has been destroyed. Even if restoring order involved active law enforcement responsibilities this would be acceptable under the constitutional and statutory exceptions of the PCA. The key distinction is that these law enforcement functions can only be undertaken when there is a pressing disaster, at any other time the PCA prevents this role. Anyone who argues that the Act must be eliminated to allow the armed forces to serve these vital functions in the case of an unpredictable emergency is either ignorant of the law or arguing disingenuously. Many Americans would be shocked to learn that what they consider a fundamental principle of our democratic system, that the military cannot operate domestically, is enshrined only in a statute. For better or worse, however, the PCA is the only source for that principle in American law. If anything, the discussion should be whether the PCA should be strengthened75 or perhaps even enshrined as a constitutional amendment. Regardless, the PCA continues to serve an important purpose and it must be kept intact. Modifying, weakening, or doing away with the Posse Comitatus Act is as unwise as it is unnecessary, and is not an idea that should be seriously maintained. Download 1 Mb. Share with your friends:
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