NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO STOP WAR BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NONNUCLEAR STATES. Nuclear Disarmament versus Peace in the Twenty-First Century. Julian Lewis International Affairs Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 82, No. 4 (Jul, 2006), pp. 667-673. Published by Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Stable URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3874151 The principal policy implication of this analysis is that nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to impede escalatory dispute behavior by either nuclear or nonnuclear antagonists. At best, the evidence (to date) suggests that secure, second-strike nuclear forces are sufficient to prevent a direct nuclear attack by an opponent on one's own territory (Howard, 1984; Jervis, 1984, 1988; Russett, 1989). Nuclear disputes, however, show a pronounced tendency to escalate (short of war) and to engage coercive tactics that include the limited use of force. In confrontations between nuclear and nonnuclear states, war is a distinct possibility, with aggressive escalation by the nonnuclear power probable. If force is to be brought to bear in either of these dispute types, usable conventional military power is likely to prove critical.
