NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STILL ENCOURAGES PHYSICAL COERCION BETWEEN NUCLEAR STATES. Nuclear Disarmament versus Peace in the Twenty-First Century. Julian Lewis International Affairs Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 82, No. 4 (Jul, 2006), pp. 667-673. Published by Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Stable URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3874151 Most obviously, of all the serious disputes that have occurred between nuclear states since 1949, not one has escalated to war, whereas numerous conflicts between nonnuclear states have crossed the Small and Singer (1982) war threshold. In fact, Osgood-Tucker and Snyder- Diesing suggest that crisis bargaining between nuclear powers has taken on some interesting new twists. Specifically, they argue that with war itself eliminated as a plausible policy option, nuclear nations have raised the threshold of provocation below which they can threaten, maneuver, and physically coerce one another short of war. The corollary issue involves the value of nuclear weapons in disputes with nonnuclear states Does the possession of nuclear power seriously inhibit the actions of nonnuclear opponents, or does it provide only a dubious marginal military or psychological advantage to the nuclear state Previous empirical work conducted on the subject of nuclear weapons and deterrence points to the limited salience of this military capability.