10nfl1-Nukes-Cover
ANY ACCIDENTAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BREAKDOWN
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| ANY ACCIDENTAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BREAKDOWN DETERRENCE Fred Charles Ikle. The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Jan. – Feb, 1996), pp. 119-128 During the Cold War, a constant tension persisted between nuclear deterrence and the preservation of nonuse. While these two goals were at first clearly separated by anus- versus-them bipolarity (deter them from aggression, not us prevent nuclear attack against us, not them, they became increasingly entangled overtime. Deterrence came to be seen as guaranteeing nonuse, and continued nonuse as proof of successful deterrence. Now that the bipolar order of the Cold War has crumbled, nonuse and deterrence will no longer sustain each other. However, nonuse is the sturdier of the two. The success of nuclear deterrence is an interpretation of recent history nonuse since 1945 is an indisputable historical fact. Deterrence is theoretical nonuse is concrete and unambiguous. Faith in nonuse made it easy for both hawks and doves to place their confidence in deterrence. The strategic order among the major nuclear powers is fragile precisely because it rests so heavily on beliefs and untested theories. As soon as these beliefs are confronted with compelling evidence to the contrary, the strategic order will start to breakup. A nuclear detonation that resulted from an accidental missile launch or a malfunctioning command chain would force national leaders to promise a fundamental change in policy. "Ready" and "robust" deterrent forces would no longer suffice as the answer to the dangers of the new nuclear age. Download 1.23 Mb. Share with your friends:
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