10nfl1-Nukes-Cover
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| Affirmative Evidence Deterrence fails NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT GUARANTEED TO DETER NONNUCLEAR STATES IN CRISES Daniel S. Geller. Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation The Journal of Conflict Resolution, ol. 34, No. 2 (Jun, 1990), pp. 291-310. Organski and Kugler (1980: 176), however, report that in six of their seven relevant cases that involved confrontations between nuclear and nonnuclear powers, the nuclear state lost. They conclude that the theory of nuclear deterrence is unsupported by their results. Ina related piece, Kugler (1984) cites evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons does not confer an advantage in crises with nonnuclear states, and that classical deterrence theory is flawed. Russett (1989), Huth (1988), and Huth and Russett (1984, 1988) report that extended deterrence success is not systematically associated with either the possession of nuclear weapons or an advantage in the overall strategic military balance rather, existing and usable conventional forces in, or deployable to, the conflict area appear to be a more important factor. Finally, Blechman and Kaplan (1978) produce findings that the strategic nuclear balance has little salience in crisis outcomes again, the local balance of conventional military power appears to be determinative. Download 1.23 Mb. Share with your friends:
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