NUCLEAR ADVANTAGES DO NOT PROVIDE A COERCION BENEFIT VIS-À- VIS OTHER NUCLEAR STATES Daniel S. Geller. Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation The Journal of Conflict Resolution, ol. 34, No. 2 (Jun, 1990), pp. 291-310. On the basis of numerous case studies, Snyder and Diesing (1977: 458-459) conclude that, unlike in prenuclear times, relative measures of military power between major nuclear states provide little insight as to who possesses a coercive advantage in a crisis. Given a stable, second-strike strategic nuclear balance, a quantitative nuclear edge for one side does not automatically confer an exploitable bargaining advantage (i.e., a greater willingness to escalate across the nuclear threshold. Although the conventional military force balance in the crisis area does appear to affect states' relative bargaining power in historical cases, even conventional military superiority cannot provide an unambiguous index of comparative risk tolerance, resolve, or escalatory propensity. At best, Snyder and Diesing note, one side's conventional preponderance places the pressure to escalate across the nuclear threshold on the conventionally weaker opponent.
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