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Facilitating cooperation between the US and Chinese scientists breaks the gridlock in space and scientific engagement and solves for future scientific and resource competition
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- Eliminating the Wold Amendments opens up international cooperation and US space expansion
- Cooperation solves arms race – provides a middle ground for the two countries
Facilitating cooperation between the US and Chinese scientists breaks the gridlock in space and scientific engagement and solves for future scientific and resource competitionBrinton, 11 (Turner, writer for SpaceNews; 8/2/11; “Experts: Opportunities Increasing for Space Engagement with China”; http://www.space.com/12505-china-space-international-cooperation.html)//JPM The Chinese government, military and commercial space sectors are all undergoing rapid institutional and organizational change, she said. The government in 2008 effectively demoted the Chinese National Space Agency, which had been in charge of representing China's space program to the outside world. Relationships and responsibilities among the nation's different military organizations continue to change. And since the early 1990s Chinese defense firms have evolved from essentially being government ministries to organizations that operate much like U.S. and European defense contractors, she said. "All of these changes introduce a kind of Eliminating the Wold Amendments opens up international cooperation and US space expansionHannah Kohler 15 (2015, B.A. Penn State 2012 "The Eagle and the Hare: U.S.–Chinese Relations, the Wolf Amendment, and the Future of International Cooperation in Space," Georgetown Law, http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf)//SZ However the 2014–2015 Wolf Amendments are interpreted, they will still have resounding effects for U.S.–China space-industry relations. Although a complete ban of all visitors of Chinese nationality would be an almost unthinkably direct political affront, even the blanket ban on CNSA–NASA cooperation that is the facial purpose of the statute will have repercussions. The moratorium on bi- or multilateral industry communications created by the 2013 Appropriations Act will severely constrain information transfer between both space agencies, effectively blinding NASA to the Chinese space program’s current endeavors as well as the reverse (although considering how closed-mouthed CNSA is about even public projects, it is likely that this effect will hit NASA 129. Unfortunately, CNSA, as an official institution of the Chinese government by any definition, is probably still barred from participation in any NASA-hosted activities, multilateral or not. Additionally, such a measure could cause the already tenuous trust developed with the CNSA to deteriorate. Cooperation solves arms race – provides a middle ground for the two countriesWeeden and Ziao 16 [BRIAN WEEDEN AND XIAO HE, 4/26/16, “USE OUTER SPACE TO STRENGTHEN U.S.-CHINA TIES,” Brian Weeden is the Technical Adviser at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C. Xiao He is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/] With the end of the Cold War, outer space activities lost much of their urgency and hipness. But today space is back, and more important than ever. Modern militaries and the global economy are dependent on space capabilities. Private companies are daring to take on challenges that were once the domain of superpowers. And in national security circles, there is discussion of a renewed strategic competition in space that could pit the winner of the last space race, the United States, against the rising power of China.∂ The United States and China have identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their national interests and development. Both nations are dedicating considerable resources to developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Beijing and Washington see their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and international prestige. Over time, what happens in space could serve as either a source of instability, or a means of strengthening the U.S.-China relationship.∂ The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the U.S. — and the global — economy.∂ China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power. From China’s perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions — particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States.∂ As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on “active defense” have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression.,∂ Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities.∂ Thus, the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the United States and China should engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability and security of space. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space powers. The United States and China, as well as the private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political challenges.∂ At the same time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their interests differ in space and look to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict. While the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and bilateral measures to reduce tensions and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) capabilities. Finally, both countries would benefit significantly from improving their national space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, and increasing data sharing with each other and the spacefaring community. That effort would be very useful in alleviating the security dilemma.” Both countries see the potential in cooperation on this matter and have been continuing the discussion in recent years, yet are held back by mutual distrust in other areas of foreign policy.Logan 8 (Jeffrey, specialist in energy policy, “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation”, CRS Report for Congress, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs10722/m1/1/high_res_d/RS22777_2008Sep29.pdf) China and the United States have a limited history of both civilian and military collaboration in space. China has publicly pushed for more dialogue and joint activities. Mistrust of Chinese space intentions grew in the mid-1990s when U.S. companies were accused of transferring potentially sensitive military information to China.12 Since then, cooperation has stagnated, often roiled by larger economic, political, and security frictions in the U.S.-China relationship. In September 2006, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin visited his Chinese counterpart, Laiyan Sun, in China. He couched the visit as a “get acquainted” opportunity rather than the start of any serious cooperation in order to keep expectations low. No follow-on activities were announced after the trip, although the Chinese issued a fourpoint proposal for ongoing dialogue between the two organizations that stressed annual exchanges and confidence building measures.13 On January 11, 2007, China conducted its first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, destroying one of its inactive weather satellites.14 No advance notice of the test was given, nor has China yet explained convincingly the intentions of the test.15 The international community condemned the test as an irresponsible act because it polluted that orbital slot with thousands of pieces of debris that will threaten the space assets of more than two dozen countries, including China’s, for years. Understanding the nuances of China’s intent in conducting the test is important, but remains open to interpretation. How was the decision made to conduct a test that would contradict Beijing’s publicly-held position on the peaceful use of outer space, and that would almost certainly incur international condemnation? Some speculate that the United States’ unilateral positions encouraged China to conduct the test to demonstrate that it could not be ignored.16 In particular, the U.S. National Space Policy issued in September 2006 declares that the United States would “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”17 Given China’s apparent commitment to space, the growing U.S. dependence on space for security and military use, and Chinese concerns over Taiwan, the ASAT test may have been a demonstration of strategic Chinese deterrence.18 Others saw a more nefarious display of China’s space capabilities, and a sign that China has more ambitious objectives in space.19 Still others speculate that the engineers running China’s ASAT program simply wanted to verify the technology that they had spent decades developing and significantly underestimated the international outrage the test provoked.20 Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 160.03 Kb. 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