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Hegemony

Aff Solution Fails

One shot solutions don’t solve-problem is multifaceted


Miller, Wilson Center distinguished scholar, 2013 (Aaron, “Speak No Evil”, 5-28, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/28/speak_no_evil_obama_drone_speech)

I'll take the word of those who argue that drones are the poster child for the anger Arabs and Muslims feel toward America. I can see why. But the grievances toward the United States in this region run deep, and the source of that anger is not only drones. Don't forget: The Middle East was exasperated with Washington long before droning, and it remains eager to blame America for just about everything. The list of the Arab world's grievances go on and on: America is blamed for supporting the authoritarian Arab kings, blindly backing Israel, not talking to Hamas, not intervening militarily in Syria, intervening militarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, according to Egyptian liberals, for supporting Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. And that's even before we discuss the small but determined minority of Muslims who do, in fact, hate us because of who we are -- not just because of what we do. No nuanced modulation of our approach on drone strikes or the closure of Gitmo is going to change any of that.


US leadership is meaningless – friendly nations decipher between good and bad norms and authoritarian nations don’t care anyway.


John O. McGinnis 7, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. ** Ilya Somin ** Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL INFLUENCE ON U.S. JURISPRUDENCE: Should International Law Be Part of Our Law? 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1175

The second benefit to foreigners of distinctive U.S. legal norms is information. The costs and benefits of our norms will be visible for all to see. n268 Particularly in an era of increased empirical social science testing, over time we will be able to analyze and identify the effects of differences in norms between the United States and other nations. n269 Such diversity benefits foreigners as foreign nations can decide to adopt our good norms and avoid our bad ones.The only noteworthy counterargument is the claim that U.S. norms will have more harmful effects than those of raw international law, yet other nations will still copy them. But both parts of this proposition seem doubtful. First, U.S. law emerges from a democratic process that creates a likelihood that it will cause less harm than rules that emerge from the nondemocratic processes [*1235] that create international law. Second, other democratic nations can use their own political processes to screen out American norms that might cause harm if copiedOf course, many nations remain authoritarian. n270 But our norms are not likely to have much influence on their choice of norms. Authoritarian states are likely to select norms that serve the interests of those in power, regardless of the norms we adopt. It is true that sometimes they might cite our norms as cover for their decisions. But the crucial word here is "cover." They would have adopted the same rules, anyway. The cover may bamboozle some and thus be counted a cost. But this would seem marginal compared to the harm of allowing raw international law to trump domestic law.


Belief in US leadership is a lie.


Eric Black 12, former reporter for the Star Tribune and Twin Cities blogger, Some ideas to limit the ‘supremacy’ of the U.S. Supreme Court, 11/27/12, www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2012/11/some-ideas-limit-supremacy-us-supreme-court

It seems to be part of our national DNA. We see ourselves as so unlike the rest of the world that we have developed a semi-religious belief in what we call “American exceptionalism.” Maybe the upside is some kind of boost to our collective self-esteem. But one of the downsides is a reluctance to look around the world and see if anyone (especially not France) has a good idea from which we might benefit.¶ Especially on democracy. We see ourselves as the world’s model for democracy and the “rule of law.” We expect others to copy us, although they have long since stopped doing so with reference to the specifics of how to design a government. We grumble a good deal about the breakdowns in our system, but we are not much open to ideas for improving it.¶ University of Minnesota political scientist Lisa Hilbink, whose specialties include comparative constitutional systems around the world, said that basically, since the end of World War II, most of the world outside of Latin America came to the conclusion that the U.S. system was “pretty crazy.”


Alternative Causes

Broader counterterrorism practices damage credibility more.


Hilde, professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, ‘9 [Thomas, “Beyond Guantanamo. Restoring U.S. Credibility on Human Rights,” Heinrich Böll Foundation, http://www.boell.org/downloads/hbf_Beyond_Guantanamo_Thomas_Hilde(2).pdf]

One should be cautious of jumping too quickly to condemnation. No country has a perfect record on human rights. Indeed, as Darius Rejali and others have documented, modern torture techniques have been perfected not only by totalitarian states but also by the grand liberal democracies, particularly the UK, France, and the U.S. 6 But the scope and magnitude of the post-9/11 institutionalization of torture and other abuses is unique in modern history among the liberal democratic states. The institution undermines the principles of equality before the law, universal human dignity and autonomy, and basic liberties are the moral-philosophical core of the liberal democratic state. The system of torture and its legal arguments created in its defense have damaged international human rights standards and diminished credibility and legitimacy of the United States as a lead advocate for human rights. It is likely to have compromised national security as well. Is it possible to reverse this damage to credibility and security? A number of tenuous balancing acts are involved. Each of these elements stands on their own as a nest of complex issues in need of resolution and for which present options are suboptimal. Credibility, however, depends on each of them taken as an interrelated whole. these critical balancing acts include: 1) legally and humanely processing Guantanamo detainees and other detainees in light of the abuses, while also ensuring national and international security; 2) pursuing the moral and legal accountability required in a representational democracy, while mitigating other resulting political and social injuries; and 3) reinforcing international human rights standards and ensuring the rule of law in tandem with the pursuit of national interests. Furthermore, the events compel us to revisit a larger and older question addressed briefly in the final section: what must be said about the contemporary status and nature of human rights and their enforcement if powerful countries may ignore them or rewrite their content to accommodate the perceived interests of that country?


Plan can’t solve leadership —too many alt causes and institutional barriers


Nossel 2008(Suzanne, Guardian Staff, November 19, "Closing Gitmo is just the beginning", http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/nov/19/obama-guantanamo-human-rights)

While abuses carried out as part of the fight against terrorism cost the US its position of leadership on human rights issues globally, regaining that status will require more than just bringing counter-terrorism tactics in line with international norms. While the Bush administration hailed democracy and freedom as centrepieces of its foreign policy, in practice it tended to sideline human rights considerations within its important bilateral relationships.¶ To cite just a few examples, disregard for human rights has contributed to a culture of lawlessness in Pakistan's tribal areas. Despite $10-12bn in mostly military US aid to Pakistan since 2001, civilians affected by the current conflict are left defenceless in squalid, disease-infested camps – some of which the UN refugee agency cannot reach – where their frustration with the US-led war effort only grows. As part of its effort to stabilise this strategically vital region, the US must invest in building institutions that support the rule of law and ensuring that approaches to security uphold human rights. In neighbouring Afghanistan, the US needs to take immediate steps to reduce civilian casualties in military operations, and to press for an end to corruption, which is both fuelling the conflict and undermining popular faith in democratic governance.¶ In contemplating political agreements to end the conflict the US must avoid strengthening the hands of the region's most brutal warlords. While human rights will not be the sole consideration governing multi-faceted relationships with foreign governments, the new administration needs to affirm their place on the agenda and work with like-minded voices to press for progress.¶ The US also has work to do in terms of strengthening the international human rights infrastructure. The Bush administration distanced itself from the international human rights community by failing to ratify key treaties and absenting itself from new institutions of human rights enforcement. The next administration must demonstrate in tangible ways that the US is prepared to cooperate with others in building and strengthening mechanisms to protect and advance human rights in the 21st century. Its absence from key forums and debates has created space for spoilers who seek to vitiate existing human rights norms and prevent new ones from taking hold.¶ In 2005 the UN adopted a new norm, the "responsibility to protect", affirming the duty of states to protect their own populations, and the obligation of the international community to step in when they won't do so. But the new norm has flunked its first test in Darfur, where the government has suborned rampant human rights abuses and the international community has failed to intervene effectively. Working with allies to build broad-based support for rigorous human rights enforcement is a long-term project that needs to start right away. Necessary steps also include re-engaging with the international criminal court, a body that has begun to prove itself as a vital instrument of international accountability for war crimes. ¶ Building US credibility on human rights will be a long-term project requiring a steady hand against the buffeting forces of foreign policy reality. Done right, the wider human rights agenda could make closing Guantánamo look like the easy part.

Soft Power Fails (Legitimacy Doesn’t Matter)

Soft power doesn’t cause action-multiple reasons


Cull, USC public diplomacy professor, 2013 (Nicholas, “Why projecting soft power is so hard to do”, 6-14, http://russia-direct.org/content/why-projecting-soft-power-so-hard-do)

The theory of soft power, as articulated by Joseph Nye, rests on the notion that admirable culture and attractive values can be harnessed to the ends of foreign policy as power. His book "Soft Power" (2004) was subtitled “The Means to Success in World Politics.” The problem is that the quest for success is not itself value neutral: a nation that is too obvious in the way it uses soft power to advance its own ends can end up repelling rather than attracting. Countries too eager to embrace soft power can come off like the stereotypical Don Juan, whose powers of attraction eventually taught women to be wary. Others, overconfident in their positive qualities, choose the wrong aspect to emphasize and end up the butt of jokes. In the context of soft power, this mockery is leveled against countries whose public diplomacy degenerates into propaganda. A further problem stems from a divergence in tastes in what is considered attractive. Soft power – like beauty – is in the eye of the beholder. The same tactics don’t work in every context. For example, the soft power of the United States is rooted in an identification of its culture with the sovereignty of the individual; in contrast, Russia presents itself as guardian of the principle of the sovereignty of the nation-state. Both sets of values have their admirers, but seldom in the same location. Already powerful states attempting to deploy soft power face an additional challenge – public empathy and admiration naturally adheres to those who have suffered. Global outpourings of support for the Dalai Lama or the United States in the days after 9/11 are examples of this. Nations that hope to trade on their success are often met with increased skepticism or mistrust. What, then, does this mean for countries – the United States and Russia included – that wish to harness soft power in their dealings with the world? First, they must acknowledge that a nation’s soft power is not kept in a vault at the White House or Kremlin, but lies in the mind of every one of the billions of people around the world who has an opinion about the country. Secondly, they must realize that when attempting to deploy soft power, your opinion isn’t important; your audience’s is. Therefore, those working on soft power campaigns must be able to step outside their own cultural context and look at their country from a foreigner’s perspective. Third, what works for one country isn’t guaranteed to work for another. India is able to leverage soft power in the form of Bollywood movies, which are loved by millions around the world. China has no cultural equivalent; Chinese calligraphy and ceramics will never be sufficiently relevant to a large enough number of people. Efforts focusing on promoting China’s development projects or spectacular scientific discoveries would likely have more success. And finally, while there are few moral perceptions around the world that are universally accepted, a near ubiquitous mistrust of power exists. Promoting a soft power narrative that emphasizes success and dominance in a field or organization might not be as effective as one that focuses on a disadvantaged city, region or group – which exist in every country. In the final analysis, soft power lies in the allure one person feels for another. And this is why the most enduring soft power strategies have been those founded on people-to-people exchanges. Despite all the efforts of a state government to control its image through a soft power campaign, in the end it comes down to winning the hearts and minds of individuals – something that cannot be ordered from the top down.

Soft power doesn’t lead to cooperation to solve problems.


Drezner, Tufs international politics professor, 2011 (Daniel, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?”, July/August, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/67869)

What went wrong? The administration, and many others, erred in believing that improved standing would give the United States greater policy leverage. The United States' standing among foreign publics and elites did rebound. But this shift did not translate into an appreciable increase in the United States' soft power. Bargaining in the G-20 and the UN Security Council did not get any easier. Soft power, it turns out, cannot accomplish much in the absence of a willingness to use hard power. The other problem was that China, Russia, and other aspiring great powers did not view themselves as partners of the United States. Even allies saw the Obama administration's supposed modesty as a cover for shifting the burden of providing global public goods from the United States to the rest of the world. The administration's grand strategy was therefore perceived as promoting narrow U.S. interests rather than global public goods.


Nations make decisions on an issue-by-issue basis-soft power doesn’t matter.


Ogoura, Japan foundation president, 2006 (Kazuo, “The Limits of Soft Power”, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=7&paper=3076)

One blind spot in the soft power concept is the confusion over the source of this power. For Nye and many others, the power of soft power lies in "attraction." The problem with this idea, however, is that it views things from the perspective of the party exercising power. Seen from the viewpoint of the party being influenced by the power, the question of whether accepting the power accords with this party's own interests is likely to be a far more important consideration than the attraction of the power. Here we must keep in mind that sovereign nations in the international community act not on the basis of likes and dislikes but in accordance with their own interests. No matter how attractive a given country may be, other countries will not accept its attractive power if it obstructs their freedom of action or adversely affects their economic interests. Hollywood movies, for instance, are often cited as a source of American soft power, but in France they have been subject to partial restriction precisely because of their attractiveness. The justness and legitimacy of the exercise of power is often an issue in relation to the source of soft power. However, legitimacy is bound to be an issue regardless of whether the power is hard or soft. The fact that hard power is sometimes exercised without legitimacy stems from a peculiar way of thinking about the use of hard power, and this is a great problem. It is important to note that within the international community the exercise of military and nonmilitary power is basically the same - or, rather, it is when the power is military in nature that there is a need for strict legitimacy in its use. (But whereas military power can exert a coercive influence however vague its legitimacy, when the justification for the use of soft power is tenuous this can prompt the party on the receiving end to resist or refuse the power, preventing the party exercising the power from achieving its aims.) The other side of this problem is the need to consider just what the international justification for military action might be. Leaving this issue to one side, though, it is certainly problematic to regard the legitimacy of soft power as the source of its clout.


No Impact to Hegemony

No impact to hegemony – best data goes neg.


Fettweis, Department of Political Science at Tulane University, ‘11 [Christopher, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO]

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. 51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.” 52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

Reject their vague assertions for conflict scenarios absent hegemony – their authors overestimate the importance of the US - star this card.


Fettweis, Department of Political Science at Tulane University, ‘11 [Christopher, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO]

Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return to Europe and the Pacific Rim are usually rendered in rather vague language. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “the world will become a more dangerous place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 From where would this danger arise? Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace? With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon theworldwould witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed Chin a is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination. Overestimating Our Importance One of the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we perceive them to be. A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore states) tend to overrate the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both ofwhichwould seem to be especially relevant in theU.S. case. 55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States. Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers and strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, we are probably not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

Numerous empirical examples point to the limitation of US power.


Walt, American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, ‘11 [Stephen, “The End of the American Era”, The National Interest, November-December 2011, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037, RSR]

The rise of new powers is bringing the short-lived “unipolar moment” to an end, and the result will be either a bipolar Sino-American rivalry or a multipolar system containing several unequal great powers. The United States is likely to remain the strongest, but its overall lead has shrunk—and it is shrinking further still.¶ Of course, the twin debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan only served to accelerate the waning of American dominance and underscore the limits of U.S. power. The Iraq War alone will carry a price tag of more than $3 trillion once all the costs are counted, and the end result is likely to be an unstable quasi democracy that is openly hostile to Israel and at least partly aligned with Iran. Indeed, Tehran has been the main beneficiary of this ill-conceived adventure, which is surely not what the Bush administration had in mind when it dragged the country to war.¶ The long Afghan campaign is even more likely to end badly, even if U.S. leaders eventually try to spin it as some sort of victory. The Obama administration finally got Osama bin Laden, but the long and costly attempt to eliminate the Taliban and build a Western-style state in Afghanistan has failed. At this point, the only interesting question is whether the United States will get out quickly or get out slowly. In either scenario, Kabul’s fate will ultimately be determined by the Afghans once the United States and its dwindling set of allies leave. And if failure in Afghanistan weren’t enough, U.S. involvement in Central Asia has undermined relations with nuclear-armed Pakistan and reinforced virulent anti-Americanism in that troubled country. If victory is defined as achieving your main objectives and ending a war with your security and prosperity enhanced, then both of these conflicts must be counted as expensive defeats.¶ But the Iraq and Afghan wars were not simply costly self-inflicted wounds; they were also eloquent demonstrations of the limits of military power. There was never much doubt that the United States could topple relatively weak and/or unpopular governments—as it has in Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq and, most recently, Libya—but the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that unmatched power-projection capabilities were of little use in constructing effective political orders once the offending leadership was removed. In places where local identities remain strong and foreign interference is not welcome for long, even a global superpower like the United States has trouble obtaining desirable political results. Nowhere is this clearer than in the greater Middle East, which has been the main focus of U.S. strategy since the USSR broke apart. Not only did the Arab Spring catch Washington by surprise, but the U.S. response further revealed its diminished capacity to shape events in its favor. After briefly trying to shore up the Mubarak regime, the Obama administration realigned itself with the forces challenging the existing regional order. The president gave a typically eloquent speech endorsing change, but nobody in the region paid much attention. Indeed, with the partial exception of Libya, U.S. influence over the entire process has been modest at best. Obama was unable to stop Saudi Arabia from sending troops to Bahrain—where Riyadh helped to quell demands for reform—or to convince Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to step down. U.S. leverage in the post-Mubarak political process in Egypt and the simmering conflict in Yemen is equally ephemeral.¶ One gets a vivid sense of America’s altered circumstances by comparing the U.S. response to the Arab Spring to its actions in the early years of the Cold War. In 1948, the Marshall Plan allocated roughly $13 billion in direct grants to restarting Europe’s economy, an amount equal to approximately 5 percent of total U.S. GDP. The equivalent amount today would be some $700 billion, and there is no way that Washington could devote even a tenth of that amount to helping Egypt, Tunisia, Libya or others. Nor does one need to go all the way back to 1948. The United States forgave $7 billion of Egypt’s foreign debt after the 1991 Gulf War; in 2011, all it could offer Cairo’s new government was $1 billion worth of loan guarantees (not actual loans) and $1 billion in debt forgiveness.¶ America’s declining influence is also revealed by its repeated failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. It has been nearly twenty years since the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993, and the United States has had a monopoly on the “peace process” ever since that hopeful day. Yet its efforts have been a complete failure, proving beyond doubt that Washington is incapable of acting as an effective and evenhanded mediator. Obama’s call for “two states for two peoples” in his address to the Arab world in June 2009 produced a brief moment of renewed hope, but his steady retreat in the face of Israeli intransigence and domestic political pressure drove U.S. credibility to new lows.¶ Taken together, these events herald a sharp decline in America’s ability to shape the global order. And the recent series of economic setbacks will place even more significant limits on America’s ability to maintain an ambitious international role. The Bush administration inherited a rare budget surplus in 2001 but proceeded to cut federal taxes significantly and fight two costly wars. The predictable result was a soaring budget deficit and a rapid increase in federal debt, problems compounded by the financial crisis of 2007–09. The latter disaster required a massive federal bailout of the financial industry and a major stimulus package, leading to a short-term budget shortfall in 2009 of some $1.6 trillion (roughly 13 percent of GDP). The United States has been in the economic doldrums ever since, and there is scant hope of a rapid return to vigorous growth. These factors help explain Standard & Poor’s U.S. government credit-rating downgrade in August amid new fears of a “double-dip” recession.

NSA Doesn’t Hurt Legitimacy

NSA surveillance doesn’t hurt legitimacy – our allies don’t care.


Watkins, ’13 [Marshall, Senior Staff Writer at Stanford Daily, “NSA ‘Scandal’ Remains Laughably Overblown”, The Stanford Daily, http://www.stanforddaily.com/2013/11/15/nsa-scandal-remains-laughably-overblown/, RSR]

That such surveillance is simply the norm is reinforced by the reaction of policymakers. Public anger in Europe and elsewhere has been pronounced, certainly, but remains largely superficial, the result of contrived attempts at nationalism and equally shallow concerns about governmental impotence. Even in the case of American relations with Germany, supposedly riven asunder by Angela Merkel’s anger over the invasion of her privacy, more important aspects of the relationship will continue to dominate its current conduct and future path. Those policymakers are equally well aware of their own role in furthering such programs through domestic intelligence agencies. Some of the most “egregious”—from a certain perspective—practices undertaken by the NSA, such as mass intercepts of foreign communications, were actually conducted by partner intelligence agencies who then passed the information onto their American counterparts. Excessive protesting may jeopardize the future of such mutually beneficial collaboration, an outcome desirable to no one. In any case, the extent to which the various NSA programs actually constitute any credible breach of privacy is equally overblown. While 39 percent of Americans believe that the NSA data surveillance program features intercepts of the content of calls and other communications, in fact it merely compiles minimal data about the timing and location of calls. That information—hardly intrusive to anyone but the most paranoid—can subsequently be used to develop a firmer understanding of terrorist and communications and networks, but only upon meeting legally upheld standards of reasonable suspicion. In other words, intelligence services are hardly running amok.

Spying doesn’t cause concrete damage to our alliances.


Marcus, ’13 [Jonathan, “NSA spying allegations: Are US allies really shocked?”, BBC News, 10-26-13, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24676392, RSR]

If the US National Security Agency really has been listening in to Angela Merkel's cell phone, as the Germans believe, then, courtesy of the fugitive US intelligence analyst Edward Snowden, the Americans have broken a cardinal rule in the espionage play-book. Put simply, they have been caught. There has, over recent days, been a flurry of reports indicating the reach of US surveillance activities - to France, Germany and Italy. European governments friendly to the United States are somewhat upset and the Obama Administration is somewhat embarrassed. I say "somewhat" because, as much of the commentary in the wake of these disclosures has indicated, there is a kind of shadow game going on here. It is a bit like that moment in the classic film "Casablanca" when the police chief expresses his shock that gambling is going on in an establishment he well knows is a casino, only moments before being handed his own winnings by a clerk. Almost all governments conduct surveillance or espionage operations against other countries whose activities matter to them. Some are friends; some are enemies; some may just be in interesting locations or have ties to other countries that are of interest. 'Stuff happens' What differs is the scope and scale of these operations. This depends upon the motivation and resources available. Not surprisingly the United States, with its global sense of mission; its constellation of different security agencies; and its technical abilities, has a much longer reach than most. Governments may express surprise when such activities are opened up to the full light of day. Sometimes there can be serious consequences. Israel and the US are close allies but they each try to get the inside track by collecting information about each other. But when in 1985 a civilian US naval analyst, Jonathan Pollard, was revealed as an Israeli spy - something the Israelis were slow to acknowledge - he was put on trial and still languishes in prison. For a period, intelligence ties were severely strained. At other times surveillance can be unmasked but no culprit can definitively be identified. Back in May 2012 various "back-doors" were found into computer software in the innermost offices of the Elysee Palace - the French president's residence. The French strongly suspected the US National Security Agency, though the Americans firmly deny any responsibility. Did that stop the new French President Francois Hollande standing four-square with the Americans and backing military action against Syria? No - no more than the fact that Israel and the US got over the Pollard Affair and retain close military and security ties. So "stuff happens" as the former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once put it. When such episodes are revealed the wronged party, in this current case the French, German, Brazilian and Mexican governments (and the list will only grow) are annoyed. They have protested. They are saying all the things their own electorates would expect them to say in such circumstances. France and Germany want to go further and extract some kind of document from Washington certifying that it will "behave itself" in the future. Other than an act of public contrition, such a document will probably not be worth the paper it is written on.. Very soon the spies will be back in business as usual

These foreign countries work with the NSA – no risk of damage to the alliance.


Schwarz, ’13 [Peter, “NSA, European intelligence agencies work closely together”, WSWS, 7-9-13, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/07/09/nsae-j09.html, RSR]

The claim by European governments that they were unaware of the extensive wiretapping undertaken by the US National Security Agency (NSA) is simply a lie. In fact, various European intelligence agencies, and in particular Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), work closely with the NSA in the surveillance of electronic communications. This is clear from an interview with former NSA contractor Edward Snowden published in the latest issue of the news magazine Der Spiegel . To the question: “Are the German authorities and German politicians involved in the monitoring system”, Snowden answers: “Yes, of course. They [the NSA] are in cahoots with the Germans, as with most other Western countries.” The interview is based on written questions submitted by encryption specialist Jacob Appelbaum and documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras in mid-May to Snowden, before he went to Hong Kong and began revealing the monitoring activities of the NSA and Britain's GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters). In the responses from Snowden, now published for the first time, he suggests that such international intelligence cooperation also serves to bypass national legal restrictions and shield political leaders. Intelligence agencies that exchange information never ask where it originates, he explains. “In this way, they can protect their political leaders from the backlash if it should come out how massively people's privacy is being violated worldwide.” According to Snowden, the NSA has its own department for managing the collaboration with foreign intelligence agencies, the Foreign Affairs Directorate. Among others things, the NSA developed the Stuxnet Internet virus together with Israeli intelligence, which was then used to sabotage Iranian nuclear facilities. The NSA collaborates particularly intensively with Germany's BND. Der Spiegel lists a variety of already known and new information, exposing claims by the German government that it was surprised and outraged by Snowden's revelations as sheer hypocrisy. As early as 2001, the European Parliament published a 200-page report on the Echelon surveillance programme, which was jointly run by the US, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The report came to the conclusion that “within Europe, all communications, such as emails, phone and fax traffic, are regularly monitored by the NSA.” As long as the system was used "solely for intelligence purposes," this was not a breach of EU law, the parliamentary committee found at the time. If, however, it was abused for economic espionage and to gain competitive advantages, “this stands in stark contrast to the obligation of member states to loyalty to the concept of free competition in the common market.” In 2004, an important part of the Echelon programme, the wireless monitoring system in the Bavarian town of Bad Aibling, was officially closed down on the recommendation of the parliamentary committee because it was mainly used for industrial espionage. As Der Spiegel now writes, the site where the listening devices were housed was never released for civilian use. Instead, signals traffic was intercepted and routed via a cable to the Mangfall barracks, just a few hundred metres away. There, the BND, "in close cooperation with a handful of NSA wire-tapping specialists" analysed "telephone calls, faxes, and everything else transmitted via satellite." According to Der Spiegel, the banking metropolis of Frankfurt is "something like a nerve centre" for spying on data that travels via fibre optic cable. It is here that fibre optic cables from Eastern Europe and Central Asia meet the data lines from Western Europe. International providers such as the US company Level 3 and Germany's Deutsche Telekom maintain their digital hubs. As Snowden has revealed, in Frankfurt and at other German hubs, the NSA captures half a billion communications every month. The BND also eagerly helps itself to data here, working closely with the American secret services. In this way, the BND circumvents the so-called G-10 law, which governs the constitutionally protected privacy of post and telecommunications. Foreign intelligence agencies, on the other hand, work “largely uncontrolled on German soil”, Der Spiegel notes. The NSA provides the BND with special tools to analyse data from the Middle East, the news magazine reports, asking: “Does the US service receive access to the data in return?” Given this close collaboration, it is totally implausible that the German secret services and government knew nothing about the NSA's wiretapping activities, as they repeatedly claim. Just last week, the French newspaper Le Monde revealed that the French foreign intelligence service DGSE (General Directorate of External Security) was systematically spying on data traffic. “The whole of our communications traffic is being spied upon,” the newspaper wrote. The DGSE collects metadata of millions on telephone calls, emails, SMS, faxes and all Internet activities on Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple and Yahoo, thus building up a huge database. When it comes to the protection of privacy and the defence of basic democratic rights, the European governments have no more scruples than their counterpart in the United States. They become nervous only when the collected data is used for industrial espionage or political blackmail against them. Faced with growing social tensions, European governments regard their respective populations as potential enemies which must be monitored. This is why not a single European government is prepared to grant Edward Snowden asylum, despite their feigned outrage.

Impact Turn -Prolif



Heg causes prolif – leads to nuclear war


Monteiro 12 (Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale, Nuno, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40)

To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons.73 In so doing, they seek to be- come major powers. Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands be- cause of the threat they pose to those states’ security.74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue. In the second causal path to war, recalcitrant minor powers test the limits of the status quo by making small revisions—be they territorial conquests, altered international alignments, or an increase in relative power—evocative of Thomas Schelling’s famous “salami tactics.”75 The unipole may not, how- ever, accept these revisions, and instead demand their reversal. For a variety of reasons, including incomplete information, commitment problems, and the need for the minor power to establish a reputation for toughness, such demands may not be heeded. As a result, war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers emerges as a distinct possibility.76 Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conflict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons. At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including major power wars. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the first war, its ability to manage confrontations between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility.

2NC Prolif

Heg causes prolif—minor powers will acquire nukes in any attempt to balance against the US—this causes the rise of potential balancers that leads to preventative wars that escalate to superpower conflict—that’s Monteiro.

And, prolif ensures global nuclear war—miscalc means the turn outweighs


Sokolski 9 (Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S. Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, June-July 2009, “Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd,” Hoover Policy Review, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)

So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners” (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk), “non-nato allies” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.

And, that independently turns their offense


Monteiro 12 (Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale, Nuno, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40)

What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”




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