A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

Military leaders disliked this kind of thinking, and Norstad was particularly critical. The NATO commander thought that the new political leadership was just kidding itself about how much control would be possible. The idea of moving "easily and by prepared steps" from one stage of a military confrontation to another--the idea that the development of the crisis would be "within our own control"--struck him as unrealistic. Escalation, he told the president, was "apt to be explosive."¹⁰⁴⁶ The western allies could not afford to wait too long before acting, in part because NATO nuclear strike capabilities would be degraded during a period of conventional fighting.¹⁰⁴⁷ A degree of flexibility was of course essential, but the new administration wanted to go too far. Norstad was sorry, he told Kennedy, that he had ever introduced concepts like "pause" and "threshold" into strategic discourse, given the "rigid and misleading" way they were now being used.¹⁰⁴⁸

And Norstad's critique was by no means limited to an argument about the dynamics of escalation. He attacked the new thinking at an even more basic level. Kennedy's top civilian advisors, most notably McNamara and Rusk, were willing to accept "some unbalanced losses," including losses of nuclear capability, while the fighting was going on at the non-nuclear level. They were even willing to discontinue military operations, at least for a certain period of time, after the Soviets had "destroyed" an allied probe force. The whole philosophy was to avoid escalation unless the Soviets insisted on it. Norstad was deeply opposed to this whole approach. "Once major forces were engaged," he told the president, "the United States must be in a position to use whatever forces were necessary." He would not use nuclear weapons if there were any alternative, but "when you have started a serious ground action, you cannot afford to get thrown back." The defense of Europe rested ultimately on nuclear deterrence, but "the deterrent has no meaning except in the context of the readiness to use atomic weapons." And the West had to be ready to escalate quickly, as soon as a major force got into serious trouble. The plan to use limited force, possibly eventually involving the use of a relatively small number of nuclear weapons, had a political and not a military objective. The aim was to test the Soviet response. These actions, in Norstad's view, would serve their purpose very quickly, "probably within hours." Either the crisis would be settled quickly, or a full-scale nuclear war would break out.¹⁰⁴⁹

Norstad's basic argument here was that nuclear deterrence was the heart of western strategy, and it was therefore vital that nothing be done to reduce the risk that the USSR would be running if the crisis came to a head. The Soviets could not be given a free ride; they could not be given control over the escalatory process. "The credibility of the deterrent," he argued, "can be destroyed by emphasizing a policy that could be construed by the Soviets as permitting them to become involved, and then, if they decide the risks are too great, to disengage." The Soviets had to be "forced to act and move at all times in full awareness that if they use force they risk general war with nuclear weapons." More generally, the whole strategy that the civilians were calling for, especially the increased emphasis they placed on conventional capabilities, no matter how cleverly this was rationalized, was bound to come across as reflecting a growing reluctance on America's part to use nuclear weapons, no matter what happened in Europe. The United States, whatever its real motives, would be seen, not just by the Soviets but by the Europeans as well, as running away from nuclear deterrence. The results, Norstad thought, might well be disastrous.¹⁰⁵⁰

In this dispute Kennedy's instinct was to side with his civilian advisors and to put more distance between himself and the terrifying prospect of nuclear war. But he was anything but doctrinaire on these issues, and he certainly did not dismiss the military view out of hand. As the president saw it, there obviously was something to what Norstad now argued. It was, for example, by no means evident that a conventional buildup would "convince Khrushchev of our readiness to fight to a finish for West Berlin." The president wondered whether it might in fact "have the opposite effect."¹⁰⁵¹ His mind was open. And he had to think these extremely serious issues out for himself--not on an abstract level, but in as concrete a context as possible. He and his top advisors therefore pressed hard for information. What was likely to happen once military operations began? Why exactly did military leaders think that escalation was "apt to be explosive"? If escalation was virtually inevitable after a certain point, should the United States try to limit damage to herself and to her allies by striking first? How effective would such an attack be in eliminating the USSR's ability to retaliate?

Kennedy discussed these issues repeatedly and in considerable detail with top military leaders. And the basic conclusion to emerge was that once serious fighting had begun, the pressure to escalate really would be enormous. It might be possible for the enemy to prevent a relatively small force from moving, and if that force got into trouble it might be possible to send in a larger force to bail it out. But if an American force, especially a relatively large force, was attacked and was in danger of being wiped out, the president could hardly stand by and allow that force to be destroyed. He would probably have little choice but to authorize the use of nuclear weapons locally to save that force. And indeed the main plans for large-scale ground operations in connection with the Berlin Crisis provided for possible nuclear support.¹⁰⁵²

The whole point of a major ground operation,in fact, was to create a situation which would force the enemy to see "that if the fighting continues, nuclear weapons will be used."¹⁰⁵³ The idea was in effect to burn America's bridges, to sacrifice a degree of control, to make escalation almost automatic as soon as the Soviets attacked the American force. The ball would be in their court; it would be they and not the Americans who would have to make the terrible decision to start what would almost certainly end up being a full-scale nuclear war; the hope was that they would draw back and agree to settle the crisis on terms the U.S. government could accept.

And Kennedy basically accepted this view. He agreed that once the battle was joined, that once the Soviets began to kill Americans on a major scale, the president could no longer hold back. "I suppose if we get involved in a war in Europe," he remarked during an August 1962 briefing on Berlin contingency plans, "we will have no choice but to use nuclear weapons."¹⁰⁵⁴ And as soon as nuclear weapons started to be used, the level of violence would almost certainly escalate very rapidly, as each side sought to destroy the enemy's nuclear forces, and to destroy them as rapidly as possible. The president had been advised, as he himself noted, "that if I ever released a nuclear weapon on the battlefield I should start a pre-emptive attack on the Soviet Union as the use of nuclear weapons was bound to escalate and we might as well get the advantage by going first."¹⁰⁵⁵ As he told de Gaulle in June 1961: "in nuclear warfare, the advantage of striking first with nuclear weapons is so great that if Soviets were to attack even without using such weapons, the U.S. could not afford to wait to use them." If war broke out and the Soviets "threatened to overrun Europe," America, he said, would have to "strike first with nuclear weapons."¹⁰⁵⁶

The assumption was thus that if a sizeable American force were attacked and threatened with destruction, the fighting would probably escalate rapidly, and that from that point on a full-scale war was quite likely. It followed that major military operations should be undertaken only if the United States was prepared to accept the risk of nuclear escalation, and indeed, if necessary, to engage in general nuclear war. Acheson, now back in power as a top Kennedy advisor, argued in June 1961 that if the American government were to undertake any military action at all, it had to be prepared ultimately to go to war with Russia. He had earlier felt that the West might be able to bluff its way through the crisis, but that if the Soviets forced the issue, the western powers would ultimately have to give way. Nuclear weapons, he had argued in April, should under no circumstances be used, and indeed he had thought the United States "should make plain by its preparations that it did not intend to initiate the use of nuclear weapons." But by June he had concluded that a strategy of bluff could not work. Military operations should only be begun if the United States was willing, in the final analysis, to go to war rather than to capitulate in the crisis. "If we were not prepared to go all the way," he said, "we should not start."¹⁰⁵⁷

The key factor therefore was whether the United States could indeed contemplate going "all the way." Would it make sense for America, in extreme circumstances, to launch a major nuclear attack? If the United States could essentially wipe out the Soviet retaliatory force--that is, if the attack the Soviets would be capable of mounting with whatever they had left would not cause really heavy destruction--then a preemptive attack would in the final analysis be a possible option. This was an option only if America had her back to the wall, only if the alternative was a massive American military and political defeat in central Europe; but if the Americans did have that capability, that fact would condition both sides' behavior at every stage of the crisis. The USSR would be more likely to back off in the end, and the Americans would know it. They would therefore be in a position to take a relatively tough line, and indeed, if necessary, to escalate the conflict; the Soviets would in such circumstances be reluctant to push things too far. From the U.S. point of view, the risks would be relatively low: American strategic superiority could support the western position in Berlin.

But was the United States in a position to execute a preemptive attack of this sort? Even among Kennedy's top civilian advisors opinions on this issue varied.¹⁰⁵⁸ The president therefore had to decide the issue for himself, so he pressed hard for information about the war plans, alert procedures, and so on. He wanted to make sure, for example, that if he had to order a nuclear attack, the effectiveness of the action would not be compromised by measures that would tip off the Soviets about what was being prepared and allow them to take countermeasures. In a July 1961 meeting with the JCS, he "talked about the difficulty in Central Europe with a conventional war and stated that he felt that the critical point is to be able to use nuclear weapons at a crucial moment before they use them. He inquired as to our capabilities of making such a decision without letting the enemy know what we are about to do it." What did his government know about the "Soviet capability to detect and to react" to an American attack once it had been launched? The effectiveness of the attack might depend on how quickly the Soviets were able to respond and launch their own missiles before they were destroyed, so he wanted to learn what he could about the "reaction time required by the Soviets to launch an attack with currently available medium and intercontinental range ballistic missiles."¹⁰⁵⁹

And he reached a number of very important conclusions. The first was that a preemptive strike was, for the time being at least, still a viable option. Kennedy obviously had no wish to start a nuclear war, but if the alternative was a massive American defeat in Europe and thus the collapse of America's whole position in the world, a preemptive attack might be his best--or, more precisely, his least bad--option.¹⁰⁶⁰

By January 1962 he had in fact come to the conclusion that a preemptive strike might indeed at some point be necessary, and he wanted to be certain that if he had to order an attack, that order would be executed without delay. On January 18, he told the NSC that the Berlin Crisis was probably going to become more acute, that military plans had to be studied carefully, and that in particular it was important "to think hard about the ways and means of making decisions that might lead to nuclear war."¹⁰⁶¹ He had just met with top military officers to discuss these matters in some detail. A recently declassified document gives some sense for the sort of question he wanted answered:

Assuming that information from a closely guarded source causes me to conclude that the U.S. should launch an immediate nuclear strike against the Communist Bloc, does the JCS Emergency Actions File permit me to initiate such an attack without first consulting with the Secretary of Defense and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I know that the red button on my desk phone will connect me with the White House Army Signal Agency (WHASA) switchboard and that the WHASA switchboard can connect me immediately to the Joint War Room. If I called the Joint War Room without giving them advance notice, to whom would I be speaking?

What would I say to the Joint War Room to launch an immediate nuclear strike?

How would the person who received my instructions verify them?

All this was based on the premise that the United States still had the upper hand in strategic terms, and this in fact was Kennedy's assumption. "As of now," he pointed out in January 1962, "the credibility of our nuclear deterrent is sufficient to hold our present positions throughout the world," even in places "where our strength on the ground does not match what the Communists can bring to bear."¹⁰⁶³ America, in other words, was still strong enough to maintain her position in Berlin. This was not just his personal view: many key U.S. policy makers shared this basic belief. Charles Bohlen, for example, now special assistant to the Secretary of State, thought in October 1961 that since the USSR's strategic position was so weak, there had to be "a large area of bluff" in the Russian political position, and that therefore there was a "very large area of Soviet give which must be fully exploited."¹⁰⁶⁴ Paul Nitze, at that point a top Defense Department official, also felt that the strategic balance made it possible to take a tough line in the Berlin conflict.¹⁰⁶⁵ And indeed, as the British noted, U.S. officials involved in Berlin Crisis planning generally believed "that their nuclear superiority allowed them to adopt a forceful position on Berlin."¹⁰⁶⁶

So the basic conclusion was that the U.S. government really could in the final analysis go all the way over Berlin. Given this assumption, the frequent expressions of American resolve--of American willingness to go to war if necessary over Berlin--should probably be taken at face value, a point underscored by the fact that American leaders, and in particular Kennedy himself, took this kind of line not just in public speeches and in meetings with allied leaders but even in internal discussions.¹⁰⁶⁷

But Kennedy understood that this kind of posture could not be sustained indefinitely. From the start, he had been very interested in the question of how the strategic balance was changing over time and how those changes were likely to affect the behavior of both sides in the crisis.¹⁰⁶⁸ It quickly became evident that America's strategic superiority would soon be a thing of the past. The United States, as Bundy put it in January 1962, was "headed for a nuclear stalemate."¹⁰⁶⁹ The president himself had pointed out the previous month that in two or three years "the possibilities of devastation would be so equal that neither side would be prepared to use nuclear weapons."¹⁰⁷⁰ It was clear that America's window of strategic advantage was closing, probably forever.

This very important conclusion had a number of major implications as far as the Berlin Crisis was concerned. In 1961 and 1962, the United States might still be in a strong position in strategic terms and could therefore in the final analysis feel relatively free to use force if the crisis came to a head. But since this situation was not going to last much longer, it made sense to try to settle the crisis while America was still in a relatively strong position, rather than to put things off to a time, just a year or two away, when nuclear escalation would be far more difficult and nuclear threats could be discounted far more readily.¹⁰⁷¹ There was nothing particularly new about these conclusions: when the CIA and the JCS had analyzed the issue in 1959, the same basic points had emerged.¹⁰⁷² The only difference now was that since the end of American strategic superiority was so clearly in sight, the basic argument was somewhat more compelling than it had been in 1959.

The closing of the window had a second major implication, which in a sense pointed in the opposite direction: perhaps the United States should try hard to bring about a negotiated settlement, but if the Soviets turned out to be totally intransigent, if they refused to accept the very moderate terms the Americans were prepared to offer, then it might make sense to bring matters to a head with them before it was too late, while America still had the upper hand, and while a nuclear war was in the final analysis still fightable. By October 1962, as will be seen, the president had come to view the situation quite explicitly in these terms--and this, in fact, is a key to understanding the Cuban missile crisis, the great climax of the confrontation over Berlin.

It was clear from the start that Kennedy was going to have to deal with a whole complex of difficult issues centering on the Berlin problem. There was the military problem of what action should be taken if access to Berlin were cut off, and this involved a series of questions, relating to the dynamics of escalation, the effectiveness of an American preemptive strike, and the value (and cost) of large conventional forces. There was also the political problem of the sort of settlement the West should try to work out, and the tactical issue of whether a turn toward a more flexible political position would be taken as a sign of weakness and thus might actually make a political settlement harder to reach. And then there were the problems resulting from the fact that this was not simply a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. America's three main European allies all played important roles. Could they be brought along on both the political and the military issues? Should America ultimately be prepared to act alone, if the allies were unwilling to go along with U.S. policy? The real issue here was how much power the United States should exercise within the western alliance, and this issue was intimately related to the question of the control and possession of nuclear weapons. Should America insist on retaining full control of the West's nuclear forces in her own hands--if only as a way of keeping the Germans from getting nuclear weapons of their own, something which might be particularly important as a key part of a general understanding with the USSR?

These issues were all tightly intertwined. They therefore could not be parcelled out to the executive departments; the various organs of government each saw only part of the picture, and the policies they advocated often had a certain parochial quality. So policy, Kennedy and his main advisors came to feel, had to be worked out at the center. The president personally needed to play a very active role--to take hold of the reins, to absorb as much information as he could and to set policy for the government as a whole. The Berlin problem was the central issue and thus the main case in point: it was vital, Bundy wrote Kennedy, that the president put himself "in immediate, personal, and continuous command of this enormous question"--and that applied to both its military and its political aspects.¹⁰⁷³

And Kennedy gradually did take control of policy. In early 1961, he had asked Acheson--then not a government official, but just an advisor--to take the lead in setting Berlin policy. But by July the president himself had taken charge. At no point did the State Department play a fundamental role. On basic political issues relating to Berlin, policy was set at the top. On NATO questions--and that meant above all questions relating to the control and possession of nuclear weapons within the alliance--the president was slower to impose his views. Here again the basic policy was initially worked out by Acheson, and the line he set was supported by an energetic group of officials based in the State Department. Kennedy went along with that policy in 1961, but in 1962 became increasingly disenchanted, finally breaking with the Acheson line at the very end of the year. By early 1963, on the whole cluster of issues relating to NATO and the control of nuclear weapons, the president had taken direct control of policy making.

On military issues, it was a rather different story. Here the clash was more fundamental: this was a period of great strain in civil-military relations. The president made it clear that he wanted to be deeply involved in war planning, especially on issues relating to the Berlin Crisis and general nuclear war. He and his civilian advisors felt that the control of military operations--not at a very detailed level of course, but when major issues were involved--had to rest with the political authorities in Washington. They were thinking above all in terms of the Berlin Crisis, where the key decisions were political at their core, not least because they involved a judgment about how the political authorities on the other side would respond, and so could not be made on the basis of narrow military criteria.

What this implied, in particular, was that the predelegation arrangements that had taken shape under Eisenhower were much too loose. As Bundy explained to Kennedy very early on, under the arrangements they had inherited, "a subordinate commander faced with a substantial Russian military action could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you (by failure of communication at either end of the line)."¹⁰⁷⁴ This system was not at all to the liking of the new leadership, and in 1961 the control problem received a great deal of attention. As one official study put it, "no subject consumed more time and effort in the highest levels of the government, within the DOD, USAF and SAC during 1961 than command and control of US nuclear forces."¹⁰⁷⁵ The administration very much wanted to tighten up on command and control. The letters delegating authority over nuclear use to top military commanders were not withdrawn, but civilian officials became more involved in war planning and in the details of military, and especially nuclear, operations.¹⁰⁷⁶

All this was deeply resented in military circles. The civilians did not respect the authority of the military leadership in what was traditionally its own domain. They had no business, it was felt, getting involved in what were considered purely military matters. General Lyman Lemnitzer, the JCS Chairman, complained, for example, about the "constant hounding and harassment" to which the military authorities were now subjected.¹⁰⁷⁷ The new strategic thinking that had taken hold among the civilians in the Pentagon cut against the grain of certain basic military values. Military leaders disliked an approach which "tended to over-emphasize control of military forces, avoidance of casualties and damage, defense, survival, without comparable concern for combat effectiveness, the offensive, or the will to succeed." They disliked a philosophy which would lead to the disappearance of the "all-important will to win."¹⁰⁷⁸