A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

Kennedy saw the French ambassador, Hervé Alphand, in Palm Beach right after Christmas. The British ambassador, Kennedy's friend David Ormsby Gore, remembers Alphand emerging from his meeting with the president "like a 'cock-of-the-walk.'" "He could smell warheads at the end of the road," maybe British warheads, Gore went on, "which would have been all right" from the British point of view.¹³⁴⁴ And indeed Macmillan, now that he had in effect received America's blessing, felt free at this point to move ahead with a policy of nuclear cooperation with France as part of his general policy of taking Britain into Europe. There would be talks with France on the issue. The French were to be asked what nuclear assistance from Britain "would in fact be helpful to them."¹³⁴⁵ Kennedy, for his part, explained the new thinking in person to Charles Bohlen, now ambassador to France. According to Bohlen's formal instructions from Rusk, nuclear assistance to France would depend on de Gaulle's acceptance of the "multilateral principle." But Bohlen knew what Kennedy wanted, and when he met with de Gaulle on January 4, he took the presidential and not the State Department line. He made it clear that the door was open, that American policy had undergone a "major shift," that Nassau was just a beginning, that the U.S. government was now "prepared to discuss any aspect of the atomic question." Under the Nassau agreement, of course, the British Polaris force was to be part of a NATO multilateral force, but the "multilateral principle" had no precise meaning and exactly how it would be applied, Bohlen told the French leader, "was a matter for further discussion."¹³⁴⁶

De Gaulle seemed interested. Perhaps a bilateral arrangement with the Americans, perhaps a deal involving the British as well, could somehow be worked out. He certainly very much wanted nuclear assistance from the United States, but not at the price of French independence. He therefore needed to find out what the U.S. government meant when it referred to the "multilateral principle." Were the Americans still pushing their old idea of a mixed-manned force which would make independent use on a national basis impossible, or had they really abandoned that policy and were now willing to accept as "multilateral" some sort of knitting together of national forces within the NATO framework--arrangements for consultation on use, for coordinated planning and targeting, and so on? If American policy had really changed, and "multilateral" now meant simply "multinational," then maybe something could be worked out.
The Climax of the NATO Crisis

For Kennedy and McNamara at Nassau, "multilateral" meant simply "multinational." In their view, a system of national forces assigned to NATO qualified as "multilateral," and this was obvious even from the text of the Nassau agreement. But the MLF lobby in Washington refused to accept the hijacking of the concept. Indeed, these officials refused to accept the legitimacy of what the president had done at Nassau. For people like Henry Owen, missile help for France and Britain was simply not an option; the mixed-manned multilateral force still had to be the fundamental goal of American policy. And although they considered Nassau a disaster, their basic tactic was to pretend that the Nassau agreement had changed nothing of substance--that Kennedy could not possibly have meant to alter fundamental policy in such an offhand way, that he must have gotten carried away by immediate concerns, that American policy needed to be saved from such impetuous actions. The use of the term "multilateral" in that agreement gave these people the opening they needed, and although they knew better, they now claimed that the United States still supported the "multilateral concept" as they interpreted it.¹³⁴⁷

George Ball, the highest-ranking official in the MLF group, now set out to undo the damage the president had supposedly done at Nassau. Ball initially supported the idea of talks with the French, but for purely tactical reasons. In his view (as Neustadt paraphrased it), a negotiation with the French "might entangle them in such a way as to assure complaisance toward the British at the coming round of talks on EEC." "But once the British had got into 'Europe,'" Ball thought, "we should modify that formula as fast as possible, and work our way back to the safe ground of a 'truly' multilateral solution--MLF." On reflection, however, he evidently considered this tactic too risky, and decided that the MLF and the "attack on national forces" could not be abandoned, even momentarily. In early January, he flew to Europe and told Adenauer and Couve, in separate meetings, that "the whole emphasis of Nassau's multilateral arrangements was on the mixed-manned force." Couve was surprised. The president had opened the door, but now Ball was slamming it shut. De Gaulle would obviously have no interest in the arrangement as Ball described it.¹³⁴⁸

Ball had effectively sabotaged the president's policy.¹³⁴⁹ As far as de Gaulle was concerned, the carrot had been dangled and was now being yanked away. It is not hard to imagine his reaction. Did the Americans even know what they were doing? Was he dealing with a government that actually had a policy, in any real sense of the term? How could the Europeans put their fate so totally in the hands of such people? This, of course, was not a view that had emerged overnight. De Gaulle had spent many years taking his measure of America, and his experience with Eisenhower on the tripartism issue in 1959-60 undoubtedly played a certain role in shaping his opinion.¹³⁵⁰ But this was the final straw. He had now had it with the United States, and on January 14, 1963, he rose up in open revolt.

On that day, the French president announced at a famous press conference that France was vetoing Britain's admission to the Common Market. The move was aimed as much at America as at Britain. De Gaulle wanted to create a "European Europe" with a policy of its own, a Europe that was something more than an American protectorate. To let Britain in would prevent that kind of Europe from coming into being. If Britain and the other countries in her trading bloc were admitted, the whole nature of the EEC would be utterly transformed. The continental countries, he declared, would eventually be absorbed into a "colossal Atlantic community dependent on America and under American control," and this France would not permit.¹³⁵¹

Indeed, in de Gaulle's view, the Americans had wanted to prevent the kind of Europe the six continental countries had been trying to create from ever taking shape, and this was why they were now such fervent supporters of British entry into the Common Market. Britain was an American "satellite," "stuffed" with American nuclear weapons, but incapable of using them independently. If admitted into Europe, Britain would be a kind of Trojan Horse, an instrument through which America could prevent a unified Europe from acting independently. The British had shown their true colors. The nuclear issue was the ultimate test of how "European" they were. They could have joined with France in revolt against the American policy of getting the European nations "out of the nuclear business," a policy which if successful would have made Europe utterly dependent on America. British Gaullists like Thorneycroft had in fact been attracted to the idea of joining hands with France in the nuclear area, defying America and building Europe on the basis of a new Anglo-French entente; indeed, some Americans wanted to slam the door on the British during the Skybolt affair--that is, to give them nothing as a substitute--in order to push them in that direction. But Macmillan had refused to take the anti-American road. The "special relationship" with the United States still lay at the heart of British policy.¹³⁵²

Did this mean, however, that an Anglo-French arrangement was entirely out of the question? It seemed for a few days after Nassau that the issue might not have to be so sharply drawn, that the British might be able to share their nuclear know-how with France with America's blessing, that Britain might not have to choose between the United States and Europe, and that France therefore could work out some kind of arrangement with the "Anglo-Saxons." But after Ball's visit, it was quite clear to de Gaulle that this had been a mirage. At Nassau, as he now saw it, the British had accepted the MLF in its original form--that is, they had agreed to place their nuclear force under effective American control. That meant that Britain really was an American satellite, and thus had no place in the kind of Europe de Gaulle intended to build.¹³⁵³

The Kennedy administration wanted Britain to join the EEC. In purely economic terms, Kennedy believed that America would have to pay a certain price if Britain went in; by definition, the members of a customs union discriminate in favor of each other and thus against all outsiders. But the political benefits would, in the American view, greatly outweigh the economic disadvantages.¹³⁵⁴ Britain would be able to help "steer" Europe in the right direction. (This, of course, was the "Trojan Horse" argument in reverse.) A Europe that included the U.K. would be less parochial, more open, more "Atlantic," and friendlier toward the United States than one which was built on a kind of Franco-German axis.¹³⁵⁵ But now de Gaulle was saying that Europe could not include Britain, that Europe had to be independent of America and therefore had to be constructed on a purely continental basis.

American leaders were livid. Kennedy had tried to mend fences with France. In fact, as he himself pointed out, "a sizeable part of the Nassau arrangement was designed to please the French."¹³⁵⁶ And now, without the slightest attempt to engage the Americans in a dialogue, there was this sudden, unexpected slap in the face. The assumption was that de Gaulle's anti-Americanism was so deep-seated that with him evidently anything was possible. De Gaulle might be acting in accordance with a long-term, step-by-step plan; he might soon try to organize the six continental countries in the EEC into a grouping with its own nuclear force; Kennedy thought he might even be "trying to run us out of Europe by means of a deal with the Russians."¹³⁵⁷

The great question now was whether the Germans would go along with de Gaulle. Adenauer seemed to be throwing in his lot with the French leader more clearly than ever before. He agreed with de Gaulle that Britain was to be kept out of the Common Market, and the U.S. government was quite aware of his views on the subject.¹³⁵⁸ And just eight days after de Gaulle's January 14 press conference, Adenauer came to Paris to sign a treaty of friendship with France, an event the Chancellor viewed as his crowning achievement.¹³⁵⁹ It seemed that a Franco-German entente, an alignment with a distinct anti-American coloration, was on the verge of taking shape.

[Put Figure Twelve about here]

The Americans, already angered by de Gaulle's veto of British admission into the Common Market, were enraged by the Franco-German treaty.¹³⁶⁰ The political meaning of the treaty, especially coming when it did, was clear enough. Adenauer was falling in with the Gaullist policy of creating a strong, continental bloc, independent of America, able to chart its own course in world affairs. That general goal implied that the continental countries would develop a nuclear force of their own, since there could be no political independence in the nuclear age without such a force. That in turn implied that France and Germany would collaborate in this area, and thus that the Federal Republic would be able to acquire a nuclear force under her own control.

French officials often denied that France would ever help Germany build a nuclear force. But they sometimes qualified this by pointing out that unless the United States cooperated with France in the nuclear area, the French might be forced to work together with the Germans.¹³⁶¹ The Americans took this possibility quite seriously, and indeed in the spring 1962 nuclear sharing debate, one of the strongest arguments for nuclear assistance to France was that unless the U.S. government liberalized its policy, the French would end up cooperating with Germany on a joint program, whereas U.S. help for France could be made conditional on a French promise not to cooperate with the Federal Republic.¹³⁶²

These arguments in turn had been inspired by indications in February 1962 that France and Germany were about to begin working together in this area. And throughout 1962 there were certain signs that a joint Franco-German nuclear program, or a program undertaken by the six EEC countries, had by no means been ruled out. There was a good deal of talk about the possibility of a European nuclear force under the control of the Six, about Europe needing to become a strategic and not just an economic entity, and about the importance of France and Germany coming together to form a political and military unit.¹³⁶³ De Gaulle himself, in a speech he gave in Hamburg on September 7, called for a policy of "organic cooperation" between the two countries on defense issues.¹³⁶⁴ It was not perfectly clear what he had in mind, but at the end of the year U.S. officials had learned from Blankenhorn that the German government "had offered to bear some of the cost" of developing the French nuclear force, and Bundy, in January 1963, referred to "secret French feelers for nuclear cooperation" with Germany.¹³⁶⁵

By this time de Gaulle was coming to talk about a German nuclear capability as "inevitable" in the long run.¹³⁶⁶ Germany, he declared at his January 14 press conference, had the same right as any other country to decide whether to have a nuclear force.¹³⁶⁷ And when he met with Adenauer on January 21, he made it clear that in his view Germany would sooner or later build such a force, that he sympathized with German nuclear aspirations, that he knew that this development would have far-reaching consequences, but that France would do nothing to prevent Germany from developing a nuclear capability.¹³⁶⁸

The U.S. government probably had no way of knowing what de Gaulle had told Adenauer, but the meaning of the Franco-German treaty seemed clear enough. Perhaps the two countries would begin working together in the nuclear area. Something of that sort seemed quite possible, and to Kennedy this prospect underscored the seriousness of what was now going on.¹³⁶⁹

And the president was not going to just sit back and take it. The Franco-German treaty was aimed at the United States, he said, and if the Europeans were no longer interested in working with America, the time had come for a fundamental reappraisal of American policy. The United States had to take a "cold, hard attitude." If the Europeans wanted to go their own way, it had to be made clear that America could also turn away from them. The Americans, after all, could "take care of ourselves" and were "not dependent on European support." The United States, he said, should begin to think now about how to use her "existing position to put pressure on the Europeans if the situation so demands." De Gaulle might be about to propose "a European defense system in which we would have no part." The United States would have to be prepared to fight back: "we should get ready with actions to squeeze Europe." The U.S. government had to be ready to reduce its commitment to Europe, and especially to scale back on its troop presence there. If the Europeans were "getting ready to throw us out of Europe," he said, "we want to be in a position to march out." The "threat of withdrawal" in his view was in fact "about the only sanction we had."¹³⁷⁰

This was no mere fit of pique. These feelings had, in fact, been building up for some time. In May 1962, for example, during an earlier quarrel with de Gaulle and Adenauer, Kennedy had cabled the ambassador in Paris that "if Europe were ever to be organized so as to leave us outside, from the point of view of these great issues of policy and defense, it would become most difficult for us to sustain our present guarantee against Soviet aggression. We shall not hesitate to make this point to the Germans if they show signs of accepting any idea of a Bonn-Paris axis."¹³⁷¹

The Americans thus understood that their efforts needed to focus on Germany. There was "not much we can do about France," Kennedy said in January 1963, "but we can exert considerable pressure on the Germans." (One look at the map and one could see why.) The Germans had to be told that "they can't have it both ways." They had to choose between France and America. If they chose to align themselves with de Gaulle and if they backed the policy of an independent Europe, they could not count on the United States to defend them. If they wanted American protection, they would have to follow the American lead on political and nuclear questions.¹³⁷²

So a line was being drawn in the sand. The Americans did not disguise their anger over the Franco-German treaty, and made it clear to the Germans that if they ratified the treaty in its present form, they would be putting their relations with the United States at risk. "Unless we make clear our opposition to the Franco-German treaty," Kennedy said, "we would not be able to make clear to the Germans that they faced a choice between working with the French or working with us." The ambassador to West Germany then outlined how this could be done. The Germans should be kept "nervous about our relations with them," "uncertain as to how we would react" if they did not do what the Americans wanted. Vice Chancellor Erhard should be "discreetly" encouraged to insist that the treaty could only be ratified with reservations that would reflect the Federal Republic's continuing loyalty to America and to NATO.¹³⁷³

This in fact was the policy which the U.S. government now followed. In a multitude of ways, the Germans were made to feel American displeasure and made to understand that they had to make a choice. The campaign began even before the Franco-German treaty was signed. On January 21, the well-known columnist James Reston published a widely-noted article in the New York Times, which obviously reflected the way U.S. leaders were now thinking. What kind of people, Reston asked, do they think we are? How could de Gaulle and Adenauer possibly think that America would defend them while they pursued an anti-American policy? "If they are asking us," he said, "to defend a Europe which questions American good faith; to cooperate in the spread of national nuclear weapons first to France and inevitably, on de Gaulle's thesis, to Germany; if they expect that we will cooperate with a Gaullist Europe that rejects and humiliates Britain and is contemptuous of all 'maritime powers'; if they believe we will cooperate with a protectionist, inward-looking Europe which puts the continent before the Atlantic--then they are asking and expecting things that have never been and never will be." Adenauer in particular had to choose not just between the Common Market as it was and a wider community that included Britain. He had to choose "in the end between France and the United States."

The Germans were left in no doubt whatsoever about how American leaders felt. Kennedy was angry, Rusk told the German ambassador. "We have to know where you stand." He pointed out that given Germany's geographical position, it was absurd to think she could choose France with her fifty atomic bombs over America with her 50,000 [sic] nuclear weapons. Clay warned that if the treaty were ratified unchanged, it would mean "the end of Berlin." Acheson's reaction was the sharpest of all. He decided "not to mince words with the ambassador." The German argument that the treaty was simply aimed at promoting Franco-German reconciliation, and did not have anything like the meaning the Americans read into it, was, Acheson said, "an insult to my intelligence." The German government was not run by fools. They certainly knew exactly what they were doing.¹³⁷⁴

U.S. representatives made it quite clear that the kind of anti-American policy de Gaulle and now Adenauer had embraced would, if unchanged, lead the American people to turn against Europe and end the U.S. military presence there. The ingratitude of the Europeans was galling. Given all the United States had done for western Europe since 1945, the "hostility of certain European leaders," Adenauer was warned, was bound to cause deep resentment in Congress and in the public and would lead many Americans to feel that a more isolationist policy was in order.¹³⁷⁵ Other American leaders argued along similar lines. The danger of the de Gaulle press conference, Rusk told Brentano in March, was that the American people might get the idea that the "American connection" was no longer wanted in Europe, and this "would make it impossible" to keep U.S. troops there.¹³⁷⁶ If Europe was to be independent, he told the allied leaders at Ottawa in May, then "the United States would be independent too."¹³⁷⁷ The message was that the Europeans, and above all the Germans, had to choose between independence and cooperation with America.¹³⁷⁸

And if they chose cooperation, it would have to be on American terms. The Americans had made it clear, even in 1962, that they intended to lead Europe, but the two major events of January 1963, the de Gaulle veto and the Franco-German treaty, led to an even more assertive American policy.¹³⁷⁹ The time had come for the United States to play hardball with the Europeans. "We have been very generous to Europe," the president told the NSC on January 22, the very day the Franco-German treaty was signed, "and it is now time for us to look out for ourselves, knowing full well that the Europeans will not do anything for us simply because we have in the past helped them."¹³⁸⁰ Top American officials made it clear that they intended to take the lead and that Europe, and especially Germany, would have to follow. In particular, if Soviet policy softened to the point where there was a real chance of a general settlement, the United States would not be held back by the allies. As Bundy told Sulzberger in June, "if we thought we could get a major settlement, we would not be deterred from bilateral discussions with Russia. We would not make allied representation a precondition to such talks." This, Sulzberger noted, was "a most important statement."¹³⁸¹

The new tough line led to a major American intervention in internal German politics. Key political figures in Germany were urged to oppose Adenauer's foreign policy, and to insist that the treaty with France not be ratified without reservations or changes. In accordance with Ambassador Dowling's suggestion, Erhard was encouraged to act by American and British officials, and on February 5 he openly attacked the Adenauer policy. The SPD also asked the Americans for advice about the line they should take on the treaty.¹³⁸² The issue became tied up with the question of how long Adenauer would continue in office and who would succeed him as chancellor. Germany was now divided into two camps, the German Gaullists headed by Adenauer and the Atlanticists headed by Erhard. The Atlanticists were clearly in the majority, even within Adenauer's own party. Forced to choose, the Germans chose America--and that meant following the American line in return for American protection. The Franco-German treaty was ratified, but only after it had been altered by the Bundestag. Mere reservations would no longer suffice. Instead, a new preamble was added unilaterally, affirming the Federal Republic's continuing loyalty to NATO. And Adenauer was removed from office--in effect (as he himself said) dismissed by his own party. The key decisions were made by the CDU in April, and Erhard replaced him as chancellor six months later.¹³⁸³