A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

So there was no viable alternative to the alliance with America. The Germans had to be realistic. Their dependence on America placed limits on how far they could go and on how independent their policy could really be. They could not assume that America's hands were tied, that U.S. leaders knew that they had no choice but to defend Germany because of the decisive effect the loss of that country would have on the global balance of power, and that the Federal Republic therefore had a relatively free hand.¹⁴⁶³ There was no guarantee that American policy would be shaped in such a cool and unemotional way by power political considerations of that sort. Indeed, the Americans might be tempted to pull out of Europe. Even someone as committed to the alliance as Eisenhower, the Germans noted, was now talking in public about a radical scaling down of the American military presence in Europe.¹⁴⁶⁴ And then there was the obvious fact that the U.S. government was increasingly concerned with America's balance of payments problem. Overseas military spending placed a considerable burden on the balance of payments; in fact, that burden was of the same order of magnitude as the payments deficit itself. Since military spending was the one major component of the balance of payments under direct government control, there was a standing temptation to deal with the payments problem by cutting back on America's military presence abroad--or by using the implied threat of a withdrawal to get the allied governments in general, and Germany above all, to assist America on international economic issues.¹⁴⁶⁵ An American withdrawal was thus not entirely out of the question. Germany therefore could not take the American security guarantee for granted. This meant that Germany's freedom of action was a good deal more limited than it would otherwise have been. If the Americans now wanted détente, how could the Federal Republic resist? If the Americans insisted that Germany remain non-nuclear as part of the détente policy, the Federal Republic had little choice but to accept that status.

This was now the dominant view within Germany. Adenauer did not agree with it, but he was on the way out, in large part because he had stood for a very different kind of policy. Gerhard Schröder's views were more in line with mainstream German opinion. Schröder had been foreign minister since late 1961. Adenauer had been forced to accept him as part of the process of coalition-building after the September 1961 elections, and Schröder's appointment reflected the weakening of Adenauer's hold on power, itself the result of the growing gap between the old chancellor's thinking and opinion in the country at large. Schröder's policy was more nuanced and more balanced. On the one hand, he understood that Germany could not move too far from the American line, and in particular felt that the Federal Republic had little choice but to sign the test ban treaty.¹⁴⁶⁶ But this did not mean that Germany would be a mere puppet of the United States. The Federal Republic needed a policy of her own, one which ultimately might lead to reunification. The Adenauer line had not brought reunification any closer, and it was perhaps time to try a fresh approach. The Americans wanted a policy of détente, and Germany could accept that, but the goal of that policy, Schröder insisted, could not be to "bury" the German question or to put it in the "icebox." The ultimate goal was to change the status quo. The new policy, which Schröder called the "policy of movement," was thus in line with fundamental long-term German national goals.¹⁴⁶⁷

So it was not as though the Germans were simply forced, against their better judgment, to toe the American line--that the Germans, as Adenauer's followers complained, had become the "victims of America's détente policy."¹⁴⁶⁸ The situation was a good deal more complex. The American attitude was certainly a major factor in German political calculations, but the new policy was not out of line with what one could reasonably argue were basic German national interests. The Germans were of course making major concessions, above all in the nuclear area, but none of this was purely one-sided. In particular, the Americans were under a certain obligation to give the Federal Republic an effective security guarantee; if Germany was to remain non-nuclear, the United States more or less had to agree to provide for German security. And the commitment was not long in coming: the U.S. government now promised (in Rusk's Frankfurt speech of October 27, 1963) to maintain a sizeable force in Germany on a more or less permanent basis.¹⁴⁶⁹
The Cold War Political System

By 1963 it seemed that the period of great danger had ended. Things had settled down. The risk of a Soviet attack on western Europe, Kennedy thought, was now "minimal." "Europe was quite secure militarily now," he said. That continent was "probably about eighth on our list of dangers." Even West Berlin was now relatively secure.¹⁴⁷⁰ Other key figures had the same impression. Couve, for example, agreed in May that the Berlin problem was "more or less liquidated."¹⁴⁷¹ Indeed, Khrushchev himself assured Harriman that Berlin was "no longer a source of any trouble."¹⁴⁷²

It was not that a final settlement had been reached or that the Cold War was completely over. It took a while before the structure that had taken shape by 1963 was accepted as definitive. The whole question of the American troop presence in Europe remained on the international agenda, certainly throughout the 1960s; the commitment made in the Rusk Frankfurt speech was not taken as sacrosanct; the issue was kept alive by the ongoing balance of payments problem. Even the question of a German nuclear force did not vanish entirely; Ludwig Erhard, Adenauer's successor as chancellor, in fact told President Johnson in late 1965 that it was "impossible to assume that Germany will go forever without a nuclear deterrent."¹⁴⁷³ And Berlin, of course, did not immediately disappear as a problem; it was only in 1971 that this issue was settled by a four-power treaty.¹⁴⁷⁴ But although there were incidents on the access routes after 1963, there was no new Berlin crisis. The sense people had that year that a major threshold had been crossed turned out to be justified. The period of high drama, of truly heroic decision-making, had come to an end. The threat of general nuclear war, which had loomed so large in 1961 and 1962, now faded into the background. The Cold War had become a different kind of conflict, more subdued, more modulated, more artificial, and, above all, less terrifying.

A relatively stable system had, in fact, come into being. This system was built on three main pillars: a general respect for the status quo in central Europe, and in particular for the status quo in Berlin; the non-nuclear status of West Germany; and a continuing, large-scale American military presence on German soil. All these things were closely bound up with each other; in particular, the American presence and the non-nuclear status of Germany were two sides to a coin. If Germany was to remain non-nuclear, the Americans would have to remain in central Europe to provide the necessary counterweight to Soviet power. Indeed, if the Germans were to accept their non-nuclear status, they were entitled to something substantial in return: they had the right to expect the Americans to provide for their security. The existence of this web of linkages tended to tie everyone into the status quo. If the Soviets wanted to keep Germany non-nuclear, they had to accept the NATO system--the system based on American power, and on the American military presence in Europe. The status quo in Berlin was tied to the NATO system and to West Germany's non-nuclear status. If the Soviets pressed too hard on Berlin, even if there were no war, the result might be quite unpleasant from their point of view. The NATO structure might collapse; they might end up having to deal with a nuclearized Germany; it was better, therefore, to accept things as they were. The same sort of linkage also tied the western countries to the status quo. If the West wanted to protect Berlin, the Federal Republic needed to kept non-nuclear, so as to avoid provoking the Russians, and so that the threat of Germany going nuclear could be maintained intact as a means of deterring the Russians from putting pressure on the city. In other words, the stability of the system did not result from a simple balance of military power in central Europe. It was not simply a question of the presence of American forces having a certain deterrent effect, even on Soviet behavior around Berlin. The political effects were more subtle and wide-ranging, and were of fundamental importance; by the end of 1963, a political system had come into being, and this system was not based on nuclear deterrence alone.

This basic structure was rounded out and reinforced by developments in other areas. Certain financial arrangements, for example, were worked out between the United States and Germany. If American forces were to guarantee German security, it seemed only fair that the Germans should help offset the foreign exchange costs the United States incurred by deploying a large force in Europe; indeed, it was essential that this be done, given the severity of America's balance of payments problem and the nature of the international monetary system in place at the time. The arrangements in this area thus helped make it possible for the United States to maintain a sizeable army in Europe. The mutual hostage relationship that had developed between Cuba and Berlin also tended to tie both America and Russia into the status quo, and was thus another--albeit relatively minor--girder in the structure.¹⁴⁷⁵ The shift in American nuclear doctrine--the move away from counterforce, the acceptance of the view that nuclear superiority was neither a feasible nor (more importantly in this context) even a desirable objective--was another important element in the picture.¹⁴⁷⁶ And the emergence of China as a serious problem for both Russia and America tended to bring those two powers together, and thus helped in a general way to stabilize their relations with each other. But the heart of the system was the series of arrangements and understandings that related to the situation in central Europe: the non-nuclear status of Germany, the continuing American military presence in Europe, and respect for the political status quo in this area, especially in Berlin.

This was a system that could work because it safeguarded everyone's most basic interests. For the USSR, it meant that German power was contained in a structure dominated by the United States--that is, the Federal Republic was dependent on a country which was determined not to use force to change the status quo. As Rusk told Gromyko in July 1962, the presence of both America and Russia in central Europe was a "stabilizing factor," and would keep both Germanies from indulging in "adventures."¹⁴⁷⁷ In August 1963, he told Khrushchev much the same thing: a U.S.-Soviet presence in Germany, and the acceptance by those two major powers of "substantial responsibility" for handling the German question, was at present "an element of stability and not instability."¹⁴⁷⁸ And the Soviets did not fundamentally disagree: their goal was not to eject the United States from Europe, but to make sure that the Federal Republic did not pose a threat to their control of the east.¹⁴⁷⁹

As for the Germans, their most basic interests would also be protected in a system of this sort. First and foremost, their own territory would be defended, and West Berlin would remain free, even after American nuclear superiority had vanished. The system also meant that Germany would be part of the West, with all that implied in terms of the political transformation and moral rehabilitation of the country. And, for increasing numbers of Germans, détente also implied that fundamental change in Europe, perhaps even reunification, might be possible in the long run.

Finally, the system was in line with America's most fundamental interests. It was not that the United States wanted to dominate western Europe as a kind of end in itself: the U.S. government had never sought to make the NATO area into a kind of American empire. The United States, in fact, was paying a price for its involvement in Europe, and one that was not to be measured simply in economic terms: the fact that U.S. power was engaged meant that Americans were in the final analysis willing to put their own cities at risk for the sake of western Europe. But what the Americans were buying was a stable political order in Europe, a system in which free nations could live in peace.

The sort of system that had taken shape by 1963 was by no means inevitable. Things could have developed in many different ways. Even general war was not entirely out of the question. It certainly was not obvious in 1945 or 1949 that the world would end up with the kind of arrangements that had come into being by 1963. Even as late as 1959, Eisenhower could scarcely conceive of a situation where American forces were permanently stationed in Berlin: "Clearly we did not contemplate 50 years in occupation there." But American troops ended up remaining in Berlin for almost exactly fifty years, and left only after the Cold War had ended and Germany had been reunified.¹⁴⁸⁰

The fact that a particular path was followed had to do with the specific policy choices that were made. Those choices were not easy, and the process that led to a more or less stable system was not one that anybody would want to go through a second time. And that simple fact should have a certain bearing on how we think about basic foreign policy issues today.

In 1997, Soviet armies are no longer on the Elbe; indeed, the Soviet Union no longer exists. West Berlin is not an isolated outpost in the middle of Communist East Germany. That state has been absorbed into the Federal Republic, the Communist system there has been swept away, and the western troops have left Berlin for good.

But the other half of the Cold War system remains in place. American troops are still in Europe, and Germany still has no nuclear weapons of her own. Germany's non-nuclear status was reaffirmed in the September 1990 Treaty of Moscow, the so-called Two Plus Four treaty, which established the legal framework for German reunification. NATO still exists, and in fact the final settlement with the Soviet Union provided for the unified Germany's continuing membership in NATO. Even in 1990 the Americans took it for granted that both Russia and the western countries had a common interest in making sure that German power would be contained within the western system--that inclusion in NATO would keep Germany from ever posing a threat, and that greater risk would "come from a neutral Germany that becomes militaristic."¹⁴⁸¹ The Russians saw things much the same way. When Secretary of State Baker asked the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, whether he would really prefer "an independent Germany outside of NATO, with no U.S. forces on German soil," Gorbachev made it clear that he understood the advantages of the present system: "We don't really want to see a replay of Versailles, where the Germans were able to arm themselves. . . . The best way to constrain that process is to ensure that Germany is contained within European structures. What you have said to me about your approach and your preference is very realistic."¹⁴⁸² The assumption was that America and Russia had a common interest in the maintenance of the fundamental structure that had come into being during the Cold War period. Neither wanted Germany to reemerge as a fully independent great power; both understood that a continuing American troop presence in Germany, and the maintenance of the NATO system, went hand in hand with that basic objective.

The Cold War may have ended, but the Cold War political system remains largely intact. Whether it can, or should, be kept intact is bound to be one of the great political issues of the twenty-first century.

ABBREVIATIONS

Note: Abbreviations used in the footnotes are indicated (in brackets) in the bibliography.

ABC Atomic, Biological and Chemical (weapons)

AEC Atomic Energy Commission (US)

BNSP Basic National Security Policy (US)

CDU Christian Democratic Union (FRG)

CINCEUR Commander in Chief, Europe (US)

CSU Christian Social Union (FRG)

DDR (or GDR) German Democratic Republic

DOD Department of Defense (US)

EDC European Defense Community

EEC European Economic Community

FIG France-Italy-Germany (nuclear cooperation agreement)

FRG Federal Republic of Germany

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)

JCAE Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (US)

MLF Multilateral Force

MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile

NESC Net Evaluation Subcommittee

NIE National Intelligence Estimate (US)

NSAM National Security Action Memorandum

NSC National Security Council (US)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PAL Permissive Action Link

SAC Strategic Air Command (US)

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe

SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan (US)

SPD Social Democratic Party (FRG)

USAF United States Air Force

WEU Western European Union

The bibliography given below does not include every work cited in the footnotes. It is meant to serve mainly as a finding aid for those books and articles cited at least once in abbreviated form in the text; a number of the more important works cited only once are, however, also included. Abbreviations used in the references are given (in brackets) in the footnotes the first time a source is cited, and again (also in brackets) with the sources listed below. The basic principle was that to keep the footnotes from becoming too unwieldy, the references should give the reader only the minimum information needed to find a document without too much trouble.

Archival references contain at least some of the following information, but always in the following order: description of document, date, collection, series, subseries, box or volume, folder, record group, repository, and location of repository. The description is sometimes the title found on the document, but it is more often a description I give it ("briefing paper on NATO strategy") whether it is found on the document or not. In the case of records of meetings or memoranda of conversations, a reference to the most important participants in the discussion is generally all that is given (e.g., "Kennedy-Adenauer meeting," even when other people took part); terms like "notes of" or "record of" are not used. The date is the date of the meeting itself, not the date when the record was made. Certain information is deleted when it is easy to find a document without it: it is obvious, for example, to anyone working in the Kennedy Library that the documents in the President's Office Files there are in the Kennedy Papers, so there is no point noting the collection in any of the references. The same point applies to folder titles: sometimes the particular folder a document is in will be so obvious to anyone using the box that no folder title need be given; sometimes only an abbreviated title is all that is necessary.

Most of the unpublished documents cited here--that is, documents that have been neither printed nor published on microfilm or microfiche--are available on the Internet Supplement [IS] I made up and which I intend to maintain for at least ten years following the publication of the book. The IS can be found at the following location: http://www . This collection includes information and commentary about variant versions of some of the documents included here, which have been sanitized differently at different times and places. This information (about what has been, and still gets, sanitized out) allows the researcher to get some insight into the nature of the bias introduced into the corpus of available evidence by the fact that declassification is a highly politicized process; once the bias is identified, one can control for it when an interpretation is being worked out.

The internet supplement also includes a number of appendices, which deal with detailed subjects or with issues only marginally related to the main thrust of the argument in the book:

Appendix One: The Potsdam Agreement and Reparations from Current Production

Appendix Two: The German Threat as a Pretext for Defense against Russia

Appendix Three: The United States, France and the German Question, 1953-54

Appendix Four: The Politics of the Nuclear Sharing Question

Appendix Five: The Question of East German Control of Access to Berlin

Appendix Six: The U.S. Assessment of German Nuclear Aspirations

Appendix Seven: U.S. Arms Control Policy under Eisenhower

Appendix Eight: Kennedy and the Israeli Nuclear Program

The IS contains some other unpublished material which may be of interest to some readers, including, in particular, a practical guide to doing research in this general area.

United States:

Harry S Truman Library [HSTL], Independence, Missouri

President's Secretary's Files [PSF]

Dean Acheson Papers [AP]

State Department and White House Advisor [SDWHA]

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [DDEL], Abilene, Kansas

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President (Ann Whitman File) [AWF]

Administration Series [A]

Ann Whitman Diary Series [AWD]

Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Series [DDED]

International Series [I]

National Security Council Series [NSC]

Dulles-Herter Series [DH]

White House Office. Office of the Staff Secretary Files [SS]

International Series [I}

International Trips and Meetings Series [ITM]

Subject Series [S]

Alphabetical subseries [A]

Department of Defense subseries [DoD]

Department of State subseries [DoS]

White House subseries [WH]

Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Files [OSANSA]

National Security Council Series [NSC]

Policy Papers subseries [PP]

Subject subseries [S]

Special Assistants Series [SA]

Presidential subseries [P]

Subject subseries [S]

John Foster Dulles Papers [DP]. (A copy is at the Seeley Mudd Library in Princeton.)

General Correspondence and Memoranda Series [GCM]

Subject Series [S]

Telephone Conversations Series [TC]

White House Memoranda Series [WHM]

Special Assistant's Chronological Series [SACS]

Norstad Papers [NP]

John F. Kennedy Library [JKFL], Boston, Massachusetts

National Security Files [NSF]

President's Office Files [POF]

United States National Archives [USNA], College Park, Maryland

Record Group [RG] 59: Department of State

Central Files

Decimal Files (1945-62)

Subject-Numeric Files (1963) [DOSCF for 1963]

Lot Files

Policy Planning Staff [PPS] records

Conference Files (cited by CF number)

Files relating to Disarmament

Records relating to atomic energy

Records relating to State Department participation in the National Security Council, 1947-61

Record Group 200

McNamara Papers [MP]

Record Group 218: Joint Chiefs of Staff

Central Files

Chairman's Files [CJCS]

Record Group 273: National Security Council

Record Group 319: Army Staff

Library of Congress [LOC], Washington, D.C.

Averell Harriman Papers [HP]