A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

But by the same token, countries like France and Germany--in particular if they cooperated with each other, and especially if they received help from the United States--would be able to build nuclear forces which could in theory counterbalance the Soviet nuclear threat. If a relatively small Soviet nuclear force was able to balance off a much larger American force, then, by the same logic, the Europeans would, given enough time, be able to build forces which could serve as effective counterweights to Soviet nuclear power. Relative size was not the crucial factor. All the European countries had to do was to build a survivable force of a certain absolute size, and to Kennedy it was clearly not beyond their ability to do so. "If the French and other European powers acquire a nuclear capability," he said in January 1963, "they would be in a position to be entirely independent and we might be on the outside looking in."¹¹⁵⁶

So if U.S. leaders claimed that European nuclear forces had no deterrent value, this was not because such claims reflected their real thinking. If they pressed arguments of this sort, it therefore must have been for political reasons. If they argued for a strategy of controlled nuclear war that they did not really believe in, this must have been because that strategy served an important political purpose. The Europeans were to be convinced or pressured or cajoled into getting out of the "nuclear business" and accepting a system in which power was concentrated in Americans hands: this, by 1962 at any rate, was the real purpose of the new American strategic doctrine.¹¹⁵⁷

This policy of centralizing control in American hands, however, had not been adopted because the United States wanted to dominate NATO Europe as a kind of end in itself. Nor had it been adopted because people like Kennedy and McNamara were opposed in principle to the idea of nuclear forces under national control--and most notably under British or French control. The real issue had to do with Germany: the fundamental goal, as Kennedy himself said, was "to prevent nuclear weapons from coming into the hands of the Germans."¹¹⁵⁸ The Germans, however, could not be discriminated against too directly. Hence the great premium placed on achieving that goal by means of more general policies, by policies which applied to Britain and France as well as to Germany and which had a formal and plausible strategic rationale.

But the fact that the U.S. government now felt so strongly about that fundamental goal--so strongly that it had adopted a whole series of basic policies rooted in that fundamental objective--meant that a basic settlement with the USSR might now be possible. The Soviets were deeply interested in keeping Germany non-nuclear, and now the idea that nuclear weapons needed to be kept out of German hands was also a central element of American policy. A reaffirmation of Germany's non-nuclear status might therefore be an important element of a Berlin settlement. But if Germany was to be kept non-nuclear, U.S. forces would have to remain on German soil. American power would continue to balance Soviet power in central Europe; the Germans could then accept their non-nuclear status because their security would be guaranteed by the United States. A non-nuclear Federal Republic and a permanent American troop presence in Europe would thus be the twin pillars on which a settlement might be built. If in addition everyone made it clear, in one way or another, that they were willing to live with the status quo in central Europe--with a divided Germany and with West Berlin under the military protection of the western allies--then the threat of war would disappear. A stable peace might thus be within reach.

This was the vision that was taking shape during the early Kennedy period. It remained to be seen, however, whether the Soviets, and the European allies as well, would accept the kind of arrangement the U.S. government now had in mind.

When Kennedy met with Khrushchev at Vienna in June 1961, he in effect laid out the terms of a general east-west settlement. Both sides would live with things as they were. The Soviets would respect western rights in Berlin, and the United States in return would respect the USSR's most vital interests. The American government, the president said, was not interested in challenging Soviet hegemony in Russia's own sphere of influence in eastern Europe, and he also understood Soviet concerns about Germany. The American government, he told the Soviet leader, was against a buildup of German power that would threaten the USSR. The implication here was that as part of a general settlement the United States would keep the Federal Republic from developing a nuclear force under national control.¹¹⁵⁹

But Khrushchev was not interested in a deal of this sort. Instead, using the most violent language that a Soviet leader had ever used with an American president, he threatened war over Berlin. Unless the western powers agreed by the end of the year to make West Berlin a "free city," the USSR would sign a "peace treaty" with East Germany. Western rights in Berlin would be "annulled" and "eliminated." The Communists would then block access to the city. Indeed, the USSR considered "all of Berlin to be GDR territory." If the western powers tried to maintain their rights through military action, "force would be met by force." If the United States wanted war, he said, "that was its problem." The USSR had made an "irrevocable" decision and if the West used force, she would have no choice but "to accept the challenge."¹¹⁶⁰ It was as though the Berlin crisis had taken on a life of its own, as though Khrushchev was no longer mainly interested in getting an agreement that would protect basic Soviet security interests.

The Soviet leader, it seemed, was out to humiliate the United States, but how was the American government to react? On the one hand, Kennedy made it clear that the United States was not going to surrender to the Soviets on this issue. On July 25, he outlined America's Berlin policy in a major televised speech. West Berlin, he said, was the "great testing place of Western courage and will," and it would not be abandoned. If necessary, the United States would fight to defend it. A series of steps would be taken to strengthen the U.S. military position, and America's civil defense program would be beefed up significantly. The message was that war--general nuclear war--was a real possibility. Negotiations were of course possible, but they could not be one-sided. The "legitimate security interests of all nations" had to be taken into account. "We cannot negotiate," he said, "with those who say 'What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable.'"¹¹⁶¹

Khrushchev had perhaps thought at Vienna that his bluster would intimidate Kennedy, but if that had been his assumption, it now appeared that he had miscalculated. The Soviets were alarmed. Events, it seemed, might be spinning out of control. Their reaction to the Kennedy speech was anything but belligerent. The last thing they wanted was to see the crisis develop into a full-blown military confrontation. So Khrushchev soon shifted course. The change was not immediate. When he met with Italian prime minister Fanfani at the beginning of August, the Soviet leader was still trying to bluff his way through the crisis. Khrushchev, Fanfani told Rusk, had said "that he would not fire first if the Western powers attempted physical access to Berlin, but that they would have to pass 'over his dead body' and that if they fired first he would retaliate. He had also said that if the West attempted an airlift he would resist this as 'spying overflights,' and would then fire first using nuclear weapons. The Secretary asked whether Fanfani understood that he would use nuclear weapons in the area of Berlin or in general war, and the Prime Minister replied that it was his understanding that it would be in the framework of general war."¹¹⁶²

But just a few days later there was a dramatic change in the Soviet line. Khrushchev now declared that he wanted to ease what he saw as a growing "war psychosis." "War hysteria," he said, would "lead to nothing good. There must be a sense of proportion and military passions must not be fanned. If the feelings are let loose and they predominate over reason, then the flywheel of war preparations can start revolving at high speed. Even when reason prompts that a brake should be put on, the flywheel of war preparations may have acquired such speed and momentum that even those who had set it revolving will be unable to stop it." He would take no new military measures of his own, at least not for the time being. And the substantive Soviet position also became more moderate. At Vienna, in direct response to a question from Kennedy, he said that the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany would "block access to Berlin," but now on August 7 he declared: "we do not intend to infringe upon the lawful interests of the Western Powers. Any barring of access to West Berlin, any blockade of West Berlin, is entirely out of the question." And that same day, the top Soviet commander in the area, Marshal Konev, reiterated the point in a meeting with the western military authorities in Berlin: "Gentlemen, you may be reassured, whatever is going to happen in the near future, your rights will not be touched."¹¹⁶³

Just a few days later, East Berlin's border with West Berlin was sealed off. On August 13, the East German authorities began to construct what would eventually become a wall dividing the two parts of the city. The refugee flow, which had been draining East Germany of many of its most skilled inhabitants, was now suddenly cut off. Khrushchev had previously resisted East German pleas to seal the border. The ending of the refugee exodus and even the internal stabilization of the East German state were not his most fundamental goals. He had had more far-reaching objectives, having to do with the German question as a whole, and in particular with West German policy and West German power. He had therefore wanted to keep the Berlin question alive. But now, confronted with the specter of war, these broader goals were put on the back burner.¹¹⁶⁴

The sealing of the border took the western countries by surprise, but the events of August 13 did not lead to a crisis in east-west relations. It was out of the question that force would be used to prevent the Communists from doing whatever they wanted on their side of the line of demarcation. The use of force was only conceivable for purely defensive purposes, to hold onto what the western side already had. What then was the point of making a fuss? Why put the prestige of the western powers on the line if everyone knew they would have to back down in the end and acquiesce in what the Communists were doing in the part of Berlin they controlled? Macmillan decided not to interrupt his holiday in Scotland. Couve de Murville also saw no reason to get excited about what the Communists had done. There was no need, he said, for immediate consultations with the Americans: "a note would be prepared, and that would be it" ("on fait une note et puis voilà"). Adenauer, worried about the possibility of an uprising in the east, and about the horrible prospect of the western countries standing by helplessly as the Communists crushed it, deliberately took a very mild line. As for the Americans, their view all along had been that force would be used only for the defense of West Berlin, and American officials immediately agreed that the "closing of the border was not a shooting issue." For the U.S. government, "the problem was essentially one of propaganda." And in substantive political terms, the Communist move was not viewed in a purely negative light. The ending of the refugee flow meant that the Soviets would find it easier to live with the status quo, and that they would be more ready to accept an arrangement that would safeguard the West's basic interests. As Rusk put it at the time, while "the border closing was a most serious matter, the probability was that in realistic terms it would make a Berlin settlement easier."¹¹⁶⁵

[Put Figure Eleven about here]

It would be a mistake, however, to say that western leaders were relieved by what the Soviets had done. The Americans in particular were afraid that unilateral action of this sort might foreshadow a more aggressive Soviet policy on the Berlin question as a whole. Kennedy and McNamara therefore sought to speed up military preparations. But at the same time, the episode also underscored the importance of efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. The Americans were worried that if nothing were "put into the works," the Soviets might well soon sign their "peace treaty" with East Germany and force a showdown with the West.¹¹⁶⁶

Kennedy had in fact already decided to see whether some sort of agreement to settle the crisis could be worked out with the USSR. Acheson had opposed the idea of serious talks with the Russians on Berlin. To press for negotiations, he thought, would be taken as a sign of weakness; if the Soviets were to be made to back down, the West would have to take a very tough line.¹¹⁶⁷ But even before Acheson presented his report on Berlin, this view was coming to be seen as too dogmatic. Bundy, for example, spoke with the famous political columnist Walter Lippmann about the Berlin problem, and then wrote a memo to the president outlining the differences between the Acheson and the Lippmann approach. Those differences, he said, turned "on whether there is any legitimate Soviet interest to which we can give some reassurance." Acheson did not think so, but in Lippmann's view there might be "ways of meeting what he thinks may be the fundamental Soviet impulse--a need for security in Eastern Europe and the fear of what the post-Adenauer Germany might be like." Bundy was laying out for Kennedy what he saw as the range of responsible opinion. His own view lay between the two extremes he described. Firmness on access to Berlin was fundamental, but that did not mean a negotiated settlement was out of the question: "What we might later be willing to consider with respect to such items as the Oder-Neisse line and a de facto acceptance of a divided Germany is matter for further discussion, and we ourselves might indeed have new proposals at a later time."¹¹⁶⁸

This turned out to be the president's view as well. He had no great interest in German reunification, nor was he fundamentally opposed to dealing with the East German authorities. When Rusk on July 17 brought up the question of America's "eventual position toward the DDR," Kennedy "made plain his belief that since we shall have to talk with representatives of that regime at some stage, we should not now take so strong a line that these later talks will look like a defeat."¹¹⁶⁹ By mid-July, the administration intended to "lean forward on negotiation."¹¹⁷⁰ What really mattered, Kennedy thought, was "our presence in Berlin, and our access to Berlin."¹¹⁷¹ Other issues were not nearly so important. What would the West actually be giving away if it moved toward a more formal acceptance of the status quo in central Europe? If the Oder-Neisse line was given some kind of official recognition, would the West be sacrificing anything of substance? Everyone knew it was more or less permanent in any case. As even Acheson recognized, a recognition of the border "would probably be in the West's interest in any event, as a potential means of eventually weakening Soviet-Polish ties."¹¹⁷²

And how important was it to maintain the fiction that the East German state did not exist? The division of Germany did not result from anything the western powers had said. A refusal to deal with East German officials on the access routes or elsewhere would not bring reunification any closer. There was a certain aura of unreality surrounding this whole complex of problems. These were not the kinds of issues that one could imagine fighting a nuclear war over. This had been true under Eisenhower, and it was even more true under Kennedy. If "concessions" in this area, concessions of an essentially theoretical nature in any case, could be traded for Soviet acceptance of the status quo in Berlin, wouldn't such an arrangement be very much to the interest of the West as a whole?

So Kennedy had by now parted company with Acheson. The president now had to take charge of policy himself. His advisors were divided on the fundamental issue of how far America should go, and he was the only one who could determine the substance of the negotiating position.¹¹⁷³ And he decided on a very active policy. To Kennedy, the whole Berlin situation was not satisfactory, even for America. He wanted to clean up this "mess" if he could. There was no point to just standing on the status quo, or rehashing old and obviously non-negotiable proposals about reunifying Germany through free elections.

He now pressed for the development of a negotiating position based on the idea of a stabilization of the status quo in central Europe. On August 21, he laid out some basic guidelines. America, he said, should make a fresh start. The new policy should "protect our support for the idea of self-determination, the idea of all-Germany, and the fact of viable, protected freedom in West Berlin." The "option of proposing parallel peace treaties" with the two German states should be considered carefully; with regard to Berlin itself, occupation rights were not essential "if other strong guarantees can be found." It was clear that the president was thinking in terms of a recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and "de facto acceptance of the GDR." As Bundy pointed out, "the main line of thought among those who are now at work on the substance of our negotiating position is that we can and should shift substantially toward acceptance of the GDR, the Oder-Neisse line, a non-aggression pact, and even the idea of two peace treaties."¹¹⁷⁴

Kennedy wanted a "real reconstruction of our negotiating proposals."¹¹⁷⁵ In particular, the goal of reunification would be put on the back burner, a mere "idea" which one would have to continue to support. But the freedom and viability of West Berlin were of fundamental importance. A more secure West Berlin was what the West would be getting in exchange for the concessions it would be willing to make. The president was determined to push forward with this policy, on a unilateral basis if necessary. America, he wrote, could "not accept a veto from any other power." The three main European allies "must come along or stay behind."¹¹⁷⁶

The new U.S. policy had another major component. As part of a Berlin settlement, the Federal Republic would be kept from acquiring an independent nuclear capability. Under Eisenhower, the American government had not been willing to make a concession of this sort. Only as part of a deal providing for German reunification would the Soviet Union be given security guarantees in this area. But now the Federal Republic's non-nuclear status would be part of an arrangement that would settle the crisis and secure the status quo in Berlin and in Central Europe as a whole--that is, an arrangement based on the division of Germany. The USSR, it was felt, might have legitimate concerns about a resurgence of German power. If so, the "general security situation in central Europe" could be discussed, and it might be possible in the Berlin talks to make "some headway" in this area. In other words, the American government was ready to include some limitation on West Germany's nuclear status in an agreement that would end the crisis.¹¹⁷⁷

It seemed in fact that a deal of the sort Kennedy had in mind might be within reach. There were talks between Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and American leaders in late September and early October. Gromyko made it clear that the German nuclear weapons issue would be a central part of an agreement. This, he told the president, was a matter of fundamental importance for the USSR.¹¹⁷⁸ It seemed to some high-ranking U.S. officials that western concessions on "certain all-German matters," including an arrangement preventing West Germany from getting control of nuclear weapons, might be traded for a "Soviet agreement on Berlin."¹¹⁷⁹ This was exactly what Kennedy wanted. For him, a Berlin settlement would be tantamount to a settlement of the German question as a whole, and if that issue were settled, any other problems the two sides had would prove manageable. A settlement of the Berlin crisis would therefore lay the basis for a fairly stable international system.

The emergence of this new U.S. policy scarcely went unnoticed in Europe. Indeed, it seemed that American thinking had been utterly transformed. Even the British foreign secretary, Lord Home, thought as early as August 6 that the Americans were "almost too keen" on negotiations.¹¹⁸⁰ "One continues to be staggered," one of his chief subordinates noted in late September, by the lengths to which the Americans seemed prepared to go on such matters as the "Oder-Neisse line, de facto dealings with the DDR," and also on "security measures in Europe," a term which referred above all to the question of nuclear weapons in German hands.¹¹⁸¹ The French were also "astounded" by the new American policy, and their misgivings ran a good deal deeper. Kennedy seemed ready to accept the East German regime. How would the West Germans react? Was the U.S. government really prepared to move ahead without them?¹¹⁸²

And the Germans were of course deeply upset by the new thrust of American policy. By early October, the new U.S. line had become clear from press leaks. The German ambassador came to see Acheson on October 11. He was "disturbed and depressed" by the recent shift in U.S. thinking. The German government, he said, was being told that it was a "waste of time even for negotiating purposes to talk about reunification." The Americans seemed ready to accept the Oder-Neisse line and "were moving toward something which was indistinguishable from de facto recognition of East Germany." In all his years of working with the U.S. government, he had never "felt so depressed about its policy."¹¹⁸³ To Adenauer, it seemed that the Americans were willing to give away practically everything.¹¹⁸⁴

And in fact Kennedy was out to demolish what a British diplomat later called that "edifice of illusions and shibboleths which the German politicians have erected around their hopes of reunification."¹¹⁸⁵ If the goal was to save Berlin without a war, then one could not allow oneself to be locked into positions that had little basis in reality. The division of Germany was a fact of life. If the freedom of Berlin could be preserved by recognizing things for what they were, how could there be any real justification for holding back? But the German government found it hard to break away from the "illusions and shibboleths" of the past. And that meant that the United States had to carry on the struggle on two fronts. The Soviets had to be made to accept the fundamental American condition: that the settlement effectively guarantee the freedom of West Berlin. And the Federal Republic would also have to accept the arrangement Kennedy had in mind.

But could the German government be brought into line? It was evident, as one of Kennedy's closest advisors told the British, that a degree of "arm-twisting was in fact required."¹¹⁸⁶ The Americans made it clear that they found the basic German posture unacceptable. The Germans were not only unwilling to risk war but they were even unwilling to take the sort of vigorous military measures which might convince the Russians that the West would go to war rather than capitulate over Berlin. At the same time, however, they would not agree to the sort of political concessions which might make a negotiated settlement possible. As Acheson told their ambassador when he came to complain about the new American policy, they "could not have it both ways." Kennedy himself disliked the German attitude and was not going to defer to the German government in these matters. Although unwilling themselves to accept a real showdown with the USSR, the Germans had the nerve to claim that the American government was too weak. Kennedy resented the charge that he was an appeaser, and resented the carping of the West German government, which felt free to attack American ideas, but had nothing serious of its own to offer as a possible basis for negotiation.¹¹⁸⁷