A dissertation submitted to the Department of Physics, University of Surrey, in partial fulfilment of the degree of Master of Science in Radiation and Environmental Protection



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Figure 13

In October 2006, following recommendations made by the Independent Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM), the Government published a response accepting CoRWM’s recommendations that geological disposal, preceded by safe and secure interim storage, was the best available approach for the long-term management of higher activity radioactive wastes.

CoRWM was set up to investigate and recommend long-term options to deal with higher activity radioactive waste. CoRWM enlisted the help and advice from scientific experts to produce a wide-ranging report focussed on public and stakeholder engagement. [12]

After further consultation, the Government published a White paper on Managing Radioactive Waste Safety: A Framework for Implementing Geological disposal on June 12th 2008. This paper looked at views on the technical aspects of developing a disposal facility along with engaging with communities that may have potential interest in hosting the facilities. It encourages potential hosts to initiate discussion but without commitment.

The Government plans to find a safe solution to deal with higher activity radioactive waste which;

~ promotes the long-term protection of people and the environment

~ is scientifically based

~ spends public monies effectively

The construction and operation of a geological disposal facility will be a multi-billion pound project, providing employment for hundreds of people over a long period. [12]

In 2006, 39 countries, including the UK had significant arisings of radioactive waste. 25 of these countries had made final decisions on a long-term policy, all opting for geological disposal. Finland, France, Sweden, Japan and the USA have already characterised preferred sites. [12]

All countries have interim storage, but no country has decided to use indefinite storage as a long-term management policy. International consensus that LLW and short-lived Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) can be safely disposed of in near-surface facilities, for example Drigg. [12]

LLW and ILW can also be disposed of in mines at a depth of about 100 metres. Finland has disposal facilities at its two nuclear power station sites and Sweden has a repository at the Forsmark nuclear site.

Countries that have High Level Waste (HLW), spent fuel and long-lived ILW generally agree that deep disposal (below 300m) in geological formations is a scientifically acceptable option.

Only the USA has an operating facility for long-lived ILW, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Carlsbad, Mexico. Yucca Mountain, Nevada has also been extensively investigated and developed as a site. Belgium is researching a HLW disposal in clay at its Mol underground rock laboratory (URL). They have also identified a preferred site for LLW and ILW and are moving towards implementation. Sweden runs an international URL project at Aspo and is investigating two potential sites for a disposal facility at which trial disposal could start in 2012. [13]

A URL has been constructed at Bure, north east France, in the region where a geological disposal facility may be sited. In 2002, Finnish parliament ratified a proposal for spent fuel disposal allowing the construction of a rock characterisation facility in the Eurajoki municipality. Switzerland is investigating disposal of HLW 1200m deep in the north of the country.

Other countries are in the midst of starting programmes too. Germany has the Konrad deep disposal facility which was licensed in 2002. Italy is about to start a siting programme. The Netherlands have a storage facility for LLW and ILW at Vissingen with a facility for HLW under construction. Japan and Canada have recently started siting. Currently, Spain and the Netherlands, among some other countries, do not have an active deep repository site selection programme.

A community Siting Partnership will need to be set up to work alongside the NDA, working with other interested parties toward agreement objectives.

Geological and characteristic surveys would need to be carried out for impact assessments on a potential host site, along with producing a Strategic Environmental Agreement, Sustainability Appraisal, Environmental Impact Assessment and also adhering to the necessary planning requirements.

The Government suggests that it may take around 2-3 decades from the beginning of site selection to a facility becoming operational.

The Government has made the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority the implementing organisation, responsible for planning and delivering the geological disposal facility. [12]

It is part of the NDA’s duty to engage with communities and other state holders.

The NDA’s Radioactive Waste Management Directorate is responsible for the programme delivering the geological disposal facility. Future ownership may be opened up to competition, in line with other NDA sites. [12]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have expressed confidence in a geological repository and it is an option that has gained support from the Royal Society, the Royal Society of Chemistry and the Geological Society.

An ideal repository would need to be in a geological area which allowed enough depth, which protected against surface erosion and climatic changes, earthquakes (which are very unlikely at depth) and human intrusion. The geological formation needs to be impermeable, sedimentary salt or clay layers are suitable formations.

Reliable waste packaging and engineered controls will compliment the security of the geological barrier.

The stability of the geological area can be understood by considering the plate tectonic movements. The plates are induced by convection currents originating in the mantle with very slow movement, such that the plate stability could be predicted over a period of several hundred to millions of years.

There is a growing interest in designing repositories that provide the option of retrieval so that waste can be moved when a better, safer solution is found in the future.

Convincing the public that the use of a geological repository is a safe solution will be an arduous task as this solution gives people the impression that waste is being buried and forgotten about for future generations to deal with.



Safety can be demonstrated if a stable, impermeable geological formation can be found. The waste would be stored passively which would provide long-term protection for future generations. [13]
Radiological Data

Existing Activity Doses




Dose (mSv)




Risk of Death (per year)

Activity Description

Operator

Other Worker

Public




Operator

Other Worker

Public

























NUB

0.76

<0.0004

<0.0002




1.62E-06

-

6.36E-09

























CPWTP






















Max

0.324

-

0.1µSv




2.61E-07




3.01E-06

Mean

0.064

-








































Effluent Receipt and Transfer






















Max

0.55

negligible

negligible




-

-

-

Mean

0.4

-

-





































Active Jet Vacs

1.5

-

0.0004




-

-

-

























Movement of Radioactive and






















Contaminated Items on the NLS



















Max

1.5

negligible

negligible




-

-

-

Mean

0.6

-

-





































Nuclear Transfer Route

0.41

0.01

0.00038




2.74E-07




7.72E-08

Table 4
Table 4 gives some example doses of existing activities on the Devonport site. These activities are included so as to show a baseline set of doses which can then be scaled-up to accommodate any additional process.
Details of RSV Contents




RSV Number

C-14 Solid

C-14 Liquid

H-3 Solid

H-3 Liquid

Fe-55

Co-60

Ni-63







MBq

MBq

MBq

MBq

MBq

MBq

MBq

Total activity per RSV MBq

























46349

1

1435

3

194

580

84

44034

19

50242.29

5

36197.2




90.46




3190.59

9187.94

1576.1

9059

6

695




72




3356

4480

456

4824.65

8

1843.55




2312.68




71.21

368.54

228.67

24949

10

702




109




12655

10560

923

15716

11

27




142




5409

9861

277

18654.11

12

8604.42




6653.95




1628.01

1293.06

474.67

159785

19

133




100




66329

86794

6429

54281

23

130




45




672

48769

4665

27055

24

29




123




4608

21150

1145

26104

25

113




13




11

25921

46

23303.23

27

1854.75




18869.92




1502.94

1064.39

11.23

315137

30

65




158




72800

235993

6121

165759

32

403




4644




469

160021

222

392

33

57




46




61

218

10

1519.29

35

17.9




51.1




372.76

998.31

79.22

54302

36

5948




54




34651

12519

1130

191219

37

42




160




1342

189594

81

12509.74

38

990.7




741




939.7

9778.74

59.6

18311.46

40

97.8




35.4




1364.43

15840.85

972.98

1219471.77




59385.32

3

34614.51

580

211516.64

888445.83

24926.47


Table 5
Table 5 gives details on the radionuclide content of the 20 RSV’s which have been used consistently throughout this project. This data has been supplied from the NUB and is current at the time of writing.




Dose rate calculated using Microshield

RSV No

Bq of Co-60

Build-up Source







mSv/Hr

µSv/Hr

1

4.40E+08

2.02E-02

20.18

5

9.20E+06

4.22E-04

0.42

6

4.50E+06

2.06E-04

0.21

8

3.70E+05

1.70E-05

0.02

10

1.10E+07

5.05E-04

0.50

11

9.90E+06

4.54E-04

0.45

12

1.30E+06

5.96E-05

0.06

19

8.70E+07

3.99E-03

3.99

23

4.90E+07

2.25E-03

2.25

24

2.10E+07

9.63E-04

0.96

25

2.60E+07

1.19E-03

1.19

27

1.10E+06

5.05E-05

0.05

30

2.40E+08

1.10E-02

11.01

32

1.60E+08

7.34E-03

7.34

33

2.20E+05

1.01E-05

0.01

35

9.90E+05

4.54E-05

0.05

36

1.30E+07

5.96E-04

0.60

37

1.90E+08

8.72E-03

8.72

38

9.80E+06

4.50E-04

0.45

40

1.60E+07

7.34E-04

0.73

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