Aff Answers to Counterplans 1 A2 Afghanistan Corruption cp 2

Lie Perm Card

Jennifer, Great expectations: Obama will have to deliver, Associated Press, http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2008/11/great_expectations_obama_will.html

Consult Bad Theory

A) Conditional solvency – the plan becomes contingent on a yes. Its not reciprocal, allowing them to spike out of arguments
B) Artificially competitive Textual competition is best – it’s the least arbitrary, guarantees good counterplan competition and causes careful plan writing. Artificial competition makes permutations impossible and justifies intrinsic permutations like plan plus consult on another china policy. We can go for it.



C) There’s an infinite number - can consult countries, alliances, groups of countries, infinitely regresses to consulting individuals and NGO’s. Makes it impossible to predict

NATO Weak Now

NATO is becoming increasing weak and ineffective in the 21^st century

Sieff 9 (Martin, UPI Sr News Analyst, April 17, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/04/17/21st-century-NATO-a-weak-hollow-giant/UPI-99071239994461/) LL
WASHINGTON, April 17 (UPI) -- The NATO alliance that confronted the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989-91 really had teeth. Today, a far larger but also far weaker NATO resembles a 1930s airship -- huge, slow, unwieldy, vulnerable and filled with nothing more than hot gas. Many military analysts believed that as late as the early 1980s, the Soviet Union and its satellite allies in the Warsaw Pact still had an overwhelming superiority in conventional forces, particularly in artillery and main battle tanks, over the assembled forces of NATO, especially on the expected main battlefield area between them of the North European plain. However, the decision of NATO leaders to push ahead with the deployment of their small, highly mobile, nuclear-armed U.S.-built Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles changed the strategic equation. The Pershings gave deployed NATO forces in Western Europe a far more lethal and credible deterrent than anything they had previously fielded. Even at its time of greatest relative weakness in the face of the Red Army and its Soviet allies, there was no question during the Cold War that NATO was first and foremost a defensive military alliance. Its member states agreed that the military forces they put under the command of NATO at alliance headquarters outside Brussels were meant to defend their territories, not to project power outside them, however worthy the cause was. Therefore, the U.S. commitment in the 1950-53 Korean War, with allies such as Britain and Turkey sending military contingents to fight alongside U.S. forces, was never a NATO operation. Neither was the long U.S. military commitment in Vietnam. Nor was the 1991 Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, although NATO allies, primarily Britain and France, sent significant forces to fight alongside U.S. troops. However, in the years following the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the nature of the alliance gradually changed. It eventually grew to its present size of 28 member states -- one more in number than the 27-nation European Union. All the former member states of the Warsaw Pact eventually joined NATO. So did even three former Soviet republics, the small Baltic nations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia that had been swallowed by the Soviet Union against their will in 1940. Successive U.S. presidents, both Republican and Democratic, enthusiastically backed by British governments, welcomed the new NATO member states one and all. There was a happy, almost universally shared agreement across the political spectrum in Washington that expanding the alliance was a good thing that would spread peace and security, as well as democracy and free markets, throughout Central and Eastern Europe. However, all the new member states were net consumers of NATO and U.S. security; they could not add to it themselves. This was dramatically demonstrated after the al-Qaida terrorist attacks on the United States of Sept. 11, 2001, that killed 3,000 Americans. To the astonishment of U.S. and European leaders alike, the first time the Article 5 clause for mutual defense in the alliance's founding 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Washington, was ever activated, it was for the Europeans to help America rather than the other way around. But this support, while emotionally important and welcome, was symbolic rather than practical. In the 21st century, the United States remained the single military giant on whom the defense of an ever-increasing number of much smaller and weaker NATO member states rested.

NATO Weak Now

Structural weaknesses prevent NATO from acting effectively

Afghan Voice Agency 10 (February 24, http://www.avapress.com/vdcfxmdy.w6dvja7riw.txt?PHPSESSID=5092ea07059843556defb256f9b88html&PHPSESSID=8abbe5a888a8ab4a9e42bb4c3a3ddhtml&PHPSESSID=457ca2dbdd0cbc9f55b7aab2310292b0) LL
With the war in Afghanistan as his guide, Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Tuesday called for sweeping changes in the way NATO prepares for and fights nontraditional conflicts. (AP)_ Citing a "crisis" in the alliance, Gates said Afghanistan has exposed fundamental NATO weaknesses — shortcomings that he said can undermine the viability of NATO as it faces future security threats. He cited a money shortage within NATO — a perennial problem that successive American administrations have tried and failed to fix. That, in turn, is a "symptom of deeper problems with the way NATO perceives threats," assesses its defense needs and sets spending priorities, Gates said. Gates tempered his stern message with words of praise for NATO allies, saying they had demonstrated in just the last three months an "unparalleled level of commitment" to the war effort by increasing their troop contributions from 30,000 last summer to 50,000 this year. "By any measure that is an extraordinary feat," he said. He did not mention, however, that even NATO members who have shared the combat burden in Afghanistan are finding it hard to sustain. In the Netherlands, for example, the coalition government collapsed this month over the issue of troop contributions; the 2,000-strong Dutch troop contingent is to begin withdrawing in August. Another stalwart, Canada, plans to remove 2,800 troops by next year, even as some other nations send more. NATO's budget squeeze reflects a larger cultural and political trend within an alliance, Gates said. After decades of success in preventing a catastrophic eruption of conflict on the European continent, NATO member countries have failed to modernize their militaries — instead relying on superior U.S. firepower. Afghanistan, however, has shown that a superpower cannot succeed alone in a conflict that requires not just traditional military strength but also civilian expertise and the clout of international support. "The demilitarization of Europe — where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it — has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st," he told a National Defense University audience filled with uniformed military officers from many of NATO's 28 member countries. The danger, he added, is that potential future adversaries may view NATO as a paper tiger. "Not only can real or perceived weakness be a temptation to miscalculation and aggression, but, on a more basic level, the resulting funding and capability shortfalls make it difficult to operate and fight together to confront shared threats," Gates told a forum on rewriting the basic mission plan of the NATO alliance. "All of this should be a wake-up call that NATO needs serious, far-reaching and immediate reforms to address a crisis that has been years in the making," Gates said. If NATO simply rewrites its basic agenda — officially known as its "strategic concept" — without changing the practices and the mindset of alliance members, the result "will not be worth the paper it is printed on," he added.

Directory: files
files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2
files -> Integer programming and game theory
files -> 4 Integer Programming
files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective
files -> Pop Warner History
files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose
files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d
files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal
files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations

Download 0.88 Mb.

Share with your friends: