The Taliban currently has the technology to create undetectable IEDs – this is crucial to the amount of casualties in the Middle East
DMG 10 (Dawn Media Group, 2/9/10, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/07-taliban-develop-new-bomb-called-omar-ha-06) GAT
The biggest killer of Western troops in Afghanistan are home-made bombs, known as improvised explosive devices or IEDs, which the Taliban deploy to wide effect in their eight-year insurgency and detonate by remote control. Western military intelligence officials have said most foreign troop deaths, which hit a record 520 last year, are caused by IEDs. But the Taliban claimed – ahead of a major assault by foreign troops on the southern Taliban stronghold of Helmand province – to have created a new IED using materials that make them undetectable. The network’s spokesman, who identified himself as Yousuf Ahmadi, said the new bomb had been named after Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar Mujahed, believed to be based in Pakistan. “Omar is our latest weapon in the war against the invaders,” he told AFP by telephone from an undisclosed location. “It’s a very effective bomb, it can’t be detected by mine-sweeping vehicles and it causes more deaths,” he said. He refused to provide more details, saying “it’s our military secret” but added that each Omar cost around 100 dollars to make. “With a 100-dollar mine we are able to destroy the enemy’s multi-million-dollar anti-mine vehicles,” he claimed, referring to heavily armoured vehicles used in Afghanistan by US and other NATO troops. Ahamdi charged the “Omar bomb” had already been used in attacks on Western forces, but his claim could not be verified immediately. Around 113,000 foreign troops are deployed to Afghanistan under US and NATO command fighting a Taliban insurgency that increasingly relies on IEDs and suicide bomb attacks as its tactics have morphed into guerrilla warfare. So far this year 62 foreign soldiers have died in the Afghan theatre, according to an AFP tally based on the independent icasualties.org website.
A2 Consult JCS CP
Say No
The military would say no – their goals are incompatible with pulling out
QDR 2010 (Quadrennial Defense Review, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf) GAT
The mission of the Department of Defense is to protect the American people and advance our nation’s interests. In executing these responsibilities, we must recognize that first and foremost, the United States is a nation at war. In Afghanistan, our forces fight alongside allies and partners in renewed efforts to deny Al Qaeda safe haven, reverse the Taliban's momentum, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces. In Iraq, U.S. military personnel advise, train, and support Iraqi forces as part of a responsible transition and drawdown. Above all, the United States and its allies and partners remain engaged in a broader war—a multifaceted political, military and moral struggle—against Al Qaeda and its allies around the world. Furthermore, as a global power, the strength and influence of the United States are deeply intertwined with the fate of the broader international system—a system of alliances, partnerships, and multinational institutions that our country has helped build and sustain for more than sixty years. The U.S. military must therefore be prepared to support broad national goals of promoting stability in key regions, providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common good. With these realities in mind, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review advances two clear objectives. First, to further rebalance the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces to prevail in today’s wars, while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats. Second, to further reform the Department’s institutions and processes to better support the urgent needs of the warfighter; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and responsibly. The strategy and initiatives described in the QDR will continue to evolve in response to the security environment. Using the QDR as its foundation, the Department will continually examine its approach—from objectives to capabilities and activities to resources—to ensure its best alignment for the nation, its allies and partners, and our men and women in uniform.
Say No
The JCS would say no to withdrawal of troops stationed for non-combat presence in every topic region
Schwalbe 5 (Stephen R., Director of the Air War College’s Regional Studies Program, prof. of Global Security at Air War College, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/schwalbe2.html) GAT
Congress legislated a defense review every four years, called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which includes an assessment of the US overseas military posture. Shortly after President George W. Bush took office, another QDR was required (the final report was due to Congress by September 2001). Dr. Michele Flourney was tasked by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to organize a small working group at the National Defense University (NDU) to provide the intellectual underpinnings of the 2001 QDR. Flourney’s subsequent book, QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, covered the military posture in chapter five (cowritten with Col Sam Tangredi), “Defense Strategy alternatives: Choosing Where to Place Emphasis and Where to Accept Risk.”9 Professor Flourney broke the book up into sections covering the three major regions of the world: Europe, Middle East, and Asia-Pacific. In Europe, the NDU working group determined that Russia was still a potential threat to the security of the U.S., even though it had a democratically-elected president and was aligned with the West. As such, they recommended no major force changes in Europe in order to maintain peace and stability (more of the Cold War mantra: keep America in, Germany down, and Russia out). This included keeping the combat-heavy forces in place. They admitted their recommendation left the Cold War force posture pretty much intact, meaning it was positioned to fight in place; not to be deployed outside the region. To counter such criticisms, they recommended DOD develop new weapon systems that were more easily deployable. In the Middle East, the NDU working group recommended an increase in naval presence, primarily because the Arab governments of these countries wanted the American security, but being sensitive to their Islamic citizens, wanted to keep US forces out of sight. As such, the US presence in the Middle East remained small, but supported by a significant amount of pre-positioned weapon systems and supplies (enough to field 11 Army brigades). In the Asia-Pacific region, the group considered China to be the next peer competitor to America. So, once again, no change in the US military posture in this region was recommended. In fact, they recommended that the facilities in Guam and Diego Garcia be upgraded just in case. (Note: of all the recommendations the NDU working group proposed, this may have been the only one actually implemented.)
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