Aff Answers to Counterplans 1 A2 Afghanistan Corruption cp 2
Download 0.88 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- NATO Weak on Terrorism
NATO Weak on TerrorismUS does not need NATO support in the war on terror De Nevers 7 (Renee, President and Fellows of Harvard College and MIT, International Security, 2007, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.4denevers.html) LL NATO's military guidelines are more defensive and reactive than those of the United States. NATO places greater emphasis on reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing capabilities to respond quickly to potential attacks. In contrast, the United States seeks to keep terrorists from striking the homeland or U.S. interests abroad. And, whereas NATO's military guidelines suggest that its forces could play either lead or supportive roles in offensive operations against terrorists, more planning is recommended before NATO-led offensive operations are undertaken, while the recommendations for support missions are more practical. This indicates the alliance's greater comfort and experience with its support role. The goals of NATO and the United States as outlined in these strategies do overlap in important ways. For example, each recognizes the usefulness of multilateral actions and seeks to prevent attacks before they occur. In addition, NATO's counterterrorism strategy shares with U.S. policy the recognition that [End Page 38] preventing attacks may require offensive action against terrorists or states that support them. As NATO's Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism states, "Allied nations agree that terrorists should not be allowed to base, train, plan, stage, and execute terrorist actions, and the threat may be severe enough to justify acting against these terrorists and those who harbor them."14 The overlap notwithstanding, U.S. strategy documents suggest that NATO's deeply institutionalized, consensus-based model is not the United States' preferred approach for multilateral cooperation in the war on terror. Moreover, NATO appears to be less central to U.S. policy and planning. Both the 2002 and 2006 NSS documents promote the formation of coalitions, both within and outside NATO, to address a range of threats.15 More critically, the 2006 NSS makes explicit the U.S. preference for a looser form of cooperation, citing as a model the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an activity designed by the George W. Bush administration to constrain the spread of WMD-related technology. The 2006 NSS states as a goal "[the] establish[ment of] results-oriented partnerships on the model of the PSI to meet new challenges and opportunities. These partnerships emphasize international cooperation, not international bureaucracy. They rely on voluntary adherence rather than binding treaties. They are oriented towards action and results rather than legislation or rule- making."16 The 2006 NSS also states that "existing international institutions have a role to play, but in many cases coalitions of the willing may be able to respond more quickly and creatively, at least in the short term."17 Similarly, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlights the distinction between "static alliances versus dynamic partnerships" and the Pentagon's preference for the latter.18 Some Pentagon officials insist that the apparent disdain for existing alliances is aimed not at NATO, but at bodies such as the Organization for American States, which, for example, has resisted U.S. efforts to revise its charter in an attempt to isolate Venezuela's president, Hugo Chavez, to punish his anti-U.S. stance. Although NATO's European members are less concerned now that the United States would use NATO as a "toolbox" than they were immediately after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003,19 they may not be reassured that the United States strongly supports the alliance. [End Page 39] NATO Weak on TerrorismThe US could check terrorism more efficiently without NATO De Nevers 7 (Renee, President and Fellows of Harvard College and MIT, International Security, 2007, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.4denevers.html) LL Second, the United States and its European allies have diverging views about the role of military intelligence. From the U.S. perspective, military intelligence [End Page 42] is an increasingly important component on the battlefield. The Department of Defense emphasizes that military intelligence is no longer just a staff function, but rather a war-fighting function that soldiers on the battlefield will be actively engaged in at all times. In addition, as part of its broader interest in network-centric warfare, the Defense Department is pushing to establish a fully "networked battlespace," with the goal of "information dominance" in any conflict.30 NATO's European members do not place the same degree of emphasis on real-time military intelligence. Third, the capabilities gap that has presented a chronic problem for NATO is increasing in the intelligence area, which suggests growing problems for interoperability. Already in the 1990s, the U.S. military had to maintain "legacy" communications systems to enable it to operate with other NATO members, and allied forces depended heavily on U.S. communications and intelligence during the 1999 Kosovo bombing campaign.31 One reason the United States rejected some European offers of military assistance in its intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 was the difficulties presented by different levels of technological sophistication. The United States spends far more on research and development than its allies; the Defense Department's budget request for research and development for FY 2007 is $57.9 billion. In contrast, the entire defense budget for the United Kingdom, NATO's next largest spender, was $50.2 billion in FY 2006.32 The United States also has a more robust domestic high-technology industry than does any of its European allies. To be sure, alliance members agree on the need for improvements in intelligence capabilities and interoperability. NATO adopted an initiative on developing new capabilities, particularly in areas such as intelligence and surveillance, in November 2002. In addition, some alliance members are working to improve their information warfare capabilities.33 That better intelligence [End Page 43] capabilities continue to be problematic is evident in repeated references to the need for improved intelligence sharing both among national agencies and internationally.34 The problem, however, is deeper than merely the need for better intelligence capabilities; NATO's members have developed diverging operational concepts because their military capabilities differ. Differences in their views on the role of information in war fighting are one example of this divergence. The United States approaches the use of force differently than do most European militaries, which means that cooperation on the battlefield could be increasingly difficult.35 Although joint exercises may highlight these differences, they do not necessarily resolve them. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.88 Mb. Share with your friends:
|