Aff Answers to Counterplans 1 A2 Afghanistan Corruption cp 2



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Solvency Deficit – Delay


CP delays solvency –huge beauracracy, large numbers of new nations, and consensus based decision making mean that consultation takes forever

REUTERS 4 ( 3/31, Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2004/03/31/2003108563
Forty percent of NATO will now be former communist states, and Washington has welcomed them as a counterweight to the "old Europe" of France and Germany, who opposed the Iraq war.

A Russian parliamentary deputy dismissed the Washington ceremony as a "show."

Konstantin Kosachev, representative of a Russian parliamentary committee on international affairs, said a NATO plan to patrol Baltic airspace was an "unfriendly" move. Estonia and Latvia border Russia, while Lithuania has a frontier with Moscow's Kaliningrad enclave.

"It can not be ruled out that Russia ought to look at the possibility of taking corresponding measures," he sai Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said, "The main thing that could improve the state of European security is a fundamental change in the very nature of NATO ... including a joint fight against new and real threats and challenges." Monday's expansion has brought NATO nearer to the Balkans, the south Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia, all potential breeding grounds for the West's post-Sept. 11 enemies: terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But the expansion could hinder NATO's ability to respond quickly to such threats because of its consensus decision-making.


Consultation Non-Unique


Lack of consultation has been a problem since NATO formation
Slocombe 10 (WALTER B. SLOCOMBE June 2010 PERSPECTIVE Towards A New NATO Strategic Concept A View from the United States http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07299.pdf)

NATO remained at the center of American foreign and security policy throughout the Cold War. The transat-lantic relationship was not – despite a good deal of recent misplaced nostalgia – always an easy one. US and European views diverged on relations with the Soviet Union, on Ostpolitik and arms control, on the relative role of nuclear and conventional weapons in alliance strategy, and on »burden sharing«. The allies resisted American proposals to extend NATO’s scope beyond geographically defined defense of alliance territory, and complained of American domination of NATO decision-making and lack of consultation on matters, such as arms control, where essentially unilat-eral US actions affected their interests. For all these differences – which still persist in new guises – the Alliance retained broad support in the US. That continues to be the case, with opinion polls consis-tently showing more support for US security relation-ships with NATO and its members than with other partners.




NATO Weak on Terrorism


Empirically, NATO is useless in efforts to combat terrorism

Gordon 2 (Philip H., Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy Foreign,

The Brookings Institution, Summer of 2002, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/summer_globalgovernance_gordon.aspx) LL
SUMMER 2002 — Less than 24 hours after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, America's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came together to invoke the alliance's Article 5 defense guarantee—this "attack on one" was to be considered an "attack on all." When it came time to implement that guarantee, however, in the form of the American-led military campaign in Afghanistan, NATO remained on the sidelines—by U.S. choice. The Americans decided not to ask for a NATO operation for both military and political reasons—only the United States had the right sort of equipment to project military forces halfway around the world, and Washington did not want political interference from 18 allies in the campaign. In light of these decisions, some observers have begun to wonder whether NATO has any enduring role at all. And there are, in fact, serious reasons for concern about the future of the alliance if leaders on both sides of the Atlantic do not take the steps necessary to adapt it to changing circumstances. The Afghanistan campaign revealed large gaps between the war-fighting capabilities of the United States and its allies and reinforced the perception in some quarters in Washington that it is easier to conduct operations alone than with allies who have little to offer militarily and who might hamper efficient decisionmaking. Moreover, the U.S. decision to increase its defense budget by some $48 billion for 2003—an increase larger than any single European country's entire defense budget—will only make this capabilities gap worse. To the extent that the war on terrorism leads the United States to undertake military operations in other distant theaters, and to the extent that the Europeans are unwilling or unable to come along, NATO's centrality will be further diminished.
NATO lacks the infrastructure to effectively participate in the war on terror

De Nevers 7 (Renee, President and Fellows of Harvard College and MIT, International Security, 2007, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.4denevers.html) LL
Moreover, several of NATO's current activities, such as its missions in Afghanistan and the Mediterranean, are closely linked to the war on terror, with other NATO missions also contributing to this fight. These activities have led NATO's secretary-general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, to declare that "more than ever, NATO is in demand, and NATO is delivering."1 This apparent vibrancy, however, may not accurately reflect NATO's true condition. Although its missions have expanded dramatically since the end of the Cold War and alliance members agree on the threat posed by terrorism, NATO's actual role in the multifaceted struggle against terrorists is minor. This could have long-term implications for alliance unity. This article investigates how the United States has worked with NATO in prosecuting the war on terror. The U.S. government conceives of this struggle broadly, with counterinsurgency and efforts to constrain the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as essential elements. NATO is the United States' premier alliance, and most of Washington's closest allies are members. But how does NATO contribute to this war on terror? To be sure, NATO is not simply a "tool" of U.S. policy. The war on terror is a U.S. creation, however, and NATO has been forced to adjust to this fact. The United States perceives [End Page 34] terrorism as the key national security threat it will face in the coming years. Just as the United States is working to transform its strategies in response to this threat, we would expect it to evaluate key alliances and security relationships with this measure. I argue that NATO is playing a largely supportive role in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The focus of both the European "fight against terrorism" and the U.S. "war on terror" lies elsewhere, leaving NATO's contribution to efforts to quell terrorism somewhat tangential. NATO is conducting a defensive mission in the Mediterranean in response to the terrorist threat, and it has adopted strategies ranging from new technology development to consequence management to prevent or mitigate terrorist attacks. In Afghanistan the alliance has assumed a frontline role in seeking to deny terrorist groups a foothold there, making this NATO's first de facto combat operation ever. But many of the essential elements of the fight against terrorism, such as intelligence sharing, occur outside NATO. Afghanistan aside, NATO members participate in offensive efforts to respond to terrorism outside NATO through bilateral activities or loose coalitions of the willing. There are three main reasons for NATO's limited role: shifts in alignments and threat perceptions caused by systemic changes, NATO's limited military capabilities, and the nature of the fight against terror.



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