Aff Answers to Counterplans 1 A2 Afghanistan Corruption cp 2



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NATO Weak in Iraq


National caveats, lack of funding, and lack of consensus have prevented effective NATO handling of Iraq

De Nevers 7 (Renee, President and Fellows of Harvard College and MIT, International Security, 2007, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.4denevers.html) LL
In 2004, at U.S. urging, NATO agreed to play a central role in training Iraqi security forces. NATO's training effort has several elements: mentoring of Iraqi military officers by NATO personnel; creation of an officer training facility in Iraq; and training of Iraqi officers in NATO facilities. NATO's target is to train 1,000 officers inside Iraq annually, and 500 outside the state; by September [End Page 52] 2006, NATO had trained 650 Iraqi officers in European facilities and roughly 2,000 officers overall.71 NATO has also donated military equipment to Iraq's security forces. This equipment comes primarily from former Warsaw Pact countries that have become NATO members, and it is compatible with Iraq's Soviet-supplied military hardware.
NATO's training mission has faced significant difficulties, however. First, the need to gain consensus on all decisions hamstrung efforts to get the mission up and running and greatly slowed the process; residual bitterness over the U.S. decision to invade Iraq contributed to this problem. Some members objected to the precedent set by taking on the training mission, which also slowed decisionmaking.72 Second, as in Afghanistan, some troop contributions have operated under national caveats, which has hindered commanders' efforts to coordinate NATO's activities. Third, funding for the mission has been a serious problem. Countries contributing troops are expected to cover their own costs. NATO set up a "trust fund" to pay for the establishment of a defense university in Iraq, but contributions to the fund have thus far been insufficient. As a result, although the Iraqi government has stressed its preference for in-country training to help gain popular trust and support for the new security forces, more officers have been trained outside Iraq.73
NATO Peacekeeping in the West Bank fails – Caveats
Diker et. al 10 (Dan Senior Foreign Policy Analyst, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs; Adjunct

Fellow, Hudson Institute Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs ISRAEL’S CRITICAL SECURITY NEEDS FOR A VIABLE PEACE http://www.jcpa.org/text/security/fullstudy.pdf



Even in a robust NATO deployment in Afghanistan, which is not a peacekeeping mission, European states have insisted on “caveats” for the employment of their forces, restricting their use for only the safest missions. There were national caveats banning nighttime operations and restricting the geographic deployment of forces to specific areas which were known to be more secure. Some caveats required consultations between commanders in the field and national capitals in Europe before tactical decisions could be taken. Most importantly, there were national caveats that excluded the use of certain forces that were part of the NATO alliance in counterterrorism operations.1 General John Craddock, the former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, admitted in 2009 that NATO forces were burdened with 83 national caveats, which were reduced to about 70.2 NATO remains a cumbersome organization. Given its track record in Afghanistan, it is difficult to imagine the efficacy of similar forces in the West Bank. NATO remains a cumbersome organization, especially when it comes to decisionmaking and processing urgent operational requirements from commanders. In counterterrorism operations, it is precisely the ability to act quickly and decisively that keeps the peace and prevents attacks. Given the track record of NATO in Afghanistan, it is difficult to imagine the efficacy of similar forces in the West Bank

NATO Fails – Generic


NATO lacks cohesion and organization

Rupp 4 (Richard, International Studies Association, Mar 17, fromhttp://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73714_index.html) LL
Despite substantial internal reform, collaborative missions, membership enlargement, and consistent public pronouncements of allied unity, NATO’s days as a coherent, effectively functioning, military alliance are drawing to a close. The states that established the Alliance in 1949 confronted a common threat to their survival. Though NATO’s member-states have made considerable efforts to identify new threats and missions since 1991, no unifying set of priorities has surfaced. Though many dangers to Western security have emerged in the post-Cold War period--the rise of the Al-Qaeda arguably the most significant--these issues have not unified the NATO members in significant common purpose. In the absence of a menace to their vital interests, and with fundamental political, economic, and environmental differences dividing the United States from Canada and Europe since the early 1990s, NATO will prove less and less valuable to its members with each passing year. This assertion is certainly provocative in light of the reforms and military operations that NATO has undertaken since the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the adoption of the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept, to the design of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), Partnership for Peace (PFP), membership enlargement, and military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, NATO has consistently endeavored to adapt to the changing security and political terrain of the post-Cold War era. Scholars and policy makers who endorse NATO’s value and utility, acknowledge the array of challenges continuing to confront the Alliance. However, NATO advocates argue that those challenges are manageable and with the right set of reforms and policy initiatives, the Alliance will function effectively well into the future.


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