Aff Answers to Counterplans 1 A2 Afghanistan Corruption cp 2
A2: Solvency – Reunification
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- A2: Solvency – Reunification
A2: Solvency – ReunificationLeads to partition – the CP causes ethnic violence and negative effects for everyone involved Morelli 10 (Vincent, Congressional Research Service, Section Research Manager, Apr. 1 2010, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41136.pdf)IM The inability of these two pro-solution leaders to reach an acceptable accommodation has led some observers to question whether a settlement can actually be achieved at all. In fact, the International Crisis Group (IGC), in a report published in the fall of 2009, suggested that after all the fits and starts of the current round of negotiations, “the island may be accelerating a slide toward permanent partition and that some elements in both communities given 36 years of futility and the wide differences of opinion over each item on the table from property rights to Turkish settlers to governance, may be willing to concede the possibility of a permanently divided island.”18 Such a final outcome is one many observers feel would be a disaster for all sides on the island, as well as those with direct interest in a solution, such as the EU and Turkey. In his March 18 speech to the nation, Christofias referred to such talk and stated that abandoning the negotiations “would be a disastrous mistake ... and that he would not seek reelection to a second term as President if there was no solution to the Cyprus problem by 2013.”19 Some say the lack of a final settlement would not necessarily affect the benefits enjoyed by the people of the Republic of Cyprus as a member of the European Union and thus there is less of an incentive to negotiate away parts of their authority and power to govern. Yet, without a settlement, it would seem that potential economic opportunities and growth across the entire island may not materialize. In addition, Greek Cypriots will be less likely to reclaim contested property in the north or at least receive fair compensation for it. A recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to recognize the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) in the north means that all efforts to settle claims for compensation or restitution by Greek Cypriots who fled to the south as a result of events in 1974 and lost their property would have to be exhausted in the IPC before claims could be filed with the ECHR. This decision by the ECHR, however, could force many Greek Cypriots who had hoped to avoid dealing with Turkish Cypriots or Turkey in seeking compensation or restitution for their property, to now demand a political settlement that includes remedies for property claims. Finally, the failure to reach a settlement would mean that Greek Cypriots may forever face a large and powerful Turkish army just a few kilometers away from infamous “green line.” Reunification talks have already failed – if these leaders couldn’t do it no one can Morelli 10 (Vincent, Congressional Research Service, Section Research Manager, Apr. 1 2010, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41136.pdf)IM As March 2010 began, little progress had been achieved or, at least, had been acknowledged by both sides. In a March 19, 2010, speech to the citizens of Cyprus, President Christofias admitted that “the negotiations had not yet produced the anticipated result ... and that while the convergences have been achieved in the governance chapter, fewer have been achieved in the economy and EU chapters and even less in property.”17 And, with only a few negotiating sessions remaining before the April 18 elections in the north, few observers expected much to happen between then and the agreed final formal negotiating session before the break for the elections, which was scheduled for March 30. The election of President Christofias in 2008 ushered in a period of higher expectations for a settlement than at any time since 2004, when the Annan Plan was considered by both Cypriot communities. The personal relationship between Christofias and Talat and their personal commitments to finding a solution to the Cyprus problem suggested that if these two leaders could not achieve a negotiated settlement, not perfect for either side but acceptable to both, then it might take a long time before two like-minded leaders would again find themselves in a position to find a way to unify the people of Cyprus. Yet, after 18 months and more than 60 meetings and despite the strong commitment, good intentions, and warm relations between the two leaders, progress in the talks seems to have fallen victim to the harsh realities of almost four decades of separation, mistrust, misunderstanding, and in some cases, indifference to the need for a final settlement and unification of the island. Even a possible change in leadership in the north, and thus perhaps a different negotiating strategy and more uncertainty for the future, did not appear to be enough of an incentive to overcome the differences to find a final solution. A2: Solvency – ReunificationNo reunification – Greek Cypriots oppose Morelli 10 (Vincent, Congressional Research Service, Section Research Manager, Apr. 1 2010, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41136.pdf)IM Turkish Cypriots have always been wary about federal reunification with the more numerous and historically dominant Greek Cypriots, who number roughly four fifths of the island’s million people. At the same time, the closer Greek Cypriots look at a federal reunification deal, the more it seems to them unfair, disruptive and risky to share a new republic so equally with the Turkish Cypriots, who are half as rich and a much smaller group.60 Federal reunification has, therefore, long been a distant second-best option for both communities.61 It bodes ill for reunification that it would be the younger segments of both communities that would vote “no” in the largest numbers in any referendum on the UN-mediated settlement plan. The idea of settling for a confederal or two-state solution is rarely publicly debated among Greek Cypriots and is strongly opposed by the archbishop of the powerful Orthodox Church.62 Nevertheless, private discussion about whether or not to formalise the current partition has become more common as Greek Cypriots have be- gun to realise that the present talks are the last chance to opt for a federal settlement, or, more importantly, that choosing a federal settlement might risk losing their relatively homogenous, prosperous, well-functioning, EU-member state. Nearly four fifths of the community rejects the idea of negotiated unification. No reunification – Turkish Cypriots oppose Morelli 10 (Vincent, Congressional Research Service, Section Research Manager, Apr. 1 2010, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41136.pdf)IM Turkish Cypriot ideas about a settlement are increasingly moving away from federal reunification to debates between nationalists, who would like to see two fully independent states side by side, and those who want to retain a multi-ethnic Cypriot identity and support a light confederation.69 The negative mood on both sides has discouraged even one of the most important coordinators of Turkish Cypriot strategy, a leader of the “yes” cam- paign for the Annan Plan: “We don’t talk about ‘B’ sce- narios. [Talat] wouldn’t want to utter those words … but now more and more I am hearing talk of partition. As I get more and more frustrated, I think we can’t live without a fall-back position. What did we get when the Annan Plan failed? Nothing! Somebody has to think of a Plan B”.70 A senior official, firmly committed to reunification and trying hard to create a workable federation, said that he is only helping design the cumbersome apparatus because Greek Cypriot objections make it the sole practical and internationally acceptable solution.71 A former member of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating team put it this way: Only 23 per cent of Greek Cypriots support this idea. Even when Cyprus was mixed, we had separate in- stitutions, from coffee shops to football teams. There was no intermarriage. It was never an integrated so- ciety. Why are you trying to force this marriage? We squabbled, quarrelled and shed blood, and we had a divorce. Can permanent division be worse than what we have today, particularly in terms of our isolation? And is Kosovo more or less independent than us? Should this set of negotiations be the end? Absolutely. Everyone knows the parameters of a deal, so if it hasn’t happened since negotiations started in 1968, then there is a lack of will. The Greek Cypriots are just too comfortable, and we are the ones carrying the burden of the lack of a settlement. This is the end of the road. It’s either the swallowing of these bitter pills or accepting the division of Cyprus. 72 Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.88 Mb. Share with your friends:
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