Nuclear materials module – Backlines

A-to “Aff Science = epistemology wrong”

( ) no epistemological bias. Scientists practicing different marine disciplines have all reached the same conclusion as the Aff.

(Internally quoting the International Programme on the State of the Ocean. IPSO is a not for profit company registered in the United Kingdom. IPSO is a unique consortium of scientists and other Ocean experts, including those from the legal, communications and political arenas, created to identify the current problems affecting the global ocean. John Hartz – reporter for the website Skeptical Science – “Ocean In Critical State from Cumulative Impacts” – This article is a reprint of the press release, Latest Review of Science Reveals Ocean in Critical State From Cumulative Impacts, posted by the The International Programme on the State of the Ocean (IPSO) on Oct 3, 2013. It is reposted on the website Skeptical Science – http://www.theconsensusproject.com/Ocean-In-Critical-State-from-Cumulative-Impacts_IPSO.html)

Our paradigm of the precautionary principle inverts their epistemology arg. It’s okay to act before the science is 1000% settled.

Marr ‘3

Dr Simon Marr works at the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety where he is in charge of climate policy matters of the European Union. The Precautionary Principle in the Law of the Sea: Modern Decision Making in International Law –

p. 9-11
The precautionary principle, however, requires environmental action at an earlier step: It provides a tool for dealing with situations where there is a potential hazard, but scientific uncertainty as to the impact of the environmentally sensitive activity does not allow a clear prediction of the degree of the hazards to the environment. Thus, its core characteristic feature is environmental action in the face of scientific certainty. To this end a number of different formulations exist,31 such as "absence of adequate scientific information",32 "no scientific proof,33 "no conclusive evidence",34 or "lack of full scientific certainty"". For some authors, precautionary measures go even further by requiring the "reduction and prevention of environmental impacts irrespective of the existence of risks".36 This approach, however, seems difficult to achieve since one of the premises for triggering precautionary action is the notion that the desired activity could be somehow hazardous to the environment. Hence, as Gerd Winter has already noted, "risks by definition37 cannot be excluded because there will always remain a small probability of possible minor harm". Moreover, this notion seems to find no support in the various legal formulations in international agreements which establish a threshold for justifying environmental action, for example, "threats of serious or irreversible damage",39 "reason to assume",40 or "reasonable grounds"41 for an environmental hazard.42 It remains true, however, that the precautionary principle does not only call for evaluating the different risks, but also implies that we should do more about some types of risk than others. Daniel Bodansky argues that in a situation of a similar risk - for example, where there is a 50 per cent risk that two dolphins will die and a situation of a one-to-a-million risk that a million dolphins will die - a risk neutral person would be indifferent to the decision whether to take extra precautions to prevent the environmental impact.43 In contrast, the precautionary principle requires action in order to avoid the risk to the lives of the million dolphins. The idea that even in the absence of scientifically proven risk protective measures should be taken also rejects the so called "assimilative capacity" approach to environmental policy, thus signalling a shift in paradigm. This approach is based on the notion that the ocean has the capacity to assimilate or absorb a certain amount of environmental pollution.45 States - for example, Finland and the Soviet Union in 1964 - have concluded treaties to enhance the capacity for assimilative pollution. The problem with the assimilative capacity approach, however, lies in the fact that it cannot protect the environment until harm is evident. Thus, as Alan Boyle noted, this shift is marked by "a movement away from concentration on the transboundary impact of pollution on neighbouring states and the emergence of a broader concern for the global environment, in which its intrinsic value and its intergenerational implications are given much greater significance than before".47 Starting from the assumption that the precautionary principle provides a tool for preventing harm to the environment, one has to ask whether it requires policy makers to take action. Since the precautionary principle operates with various different versions in international agreements, two rough differentiations can be made: the action- and the deliberation-guiding versions.48 In the face of scientific uncertainties the action-guiding approach requires action to prevent possibly damaging effects of human practice that may be damaging the environment.49 The deliberation-guiding approach does not expressly call for action but stipulates that lack of evidence shall not be used as a reason to postpone action against a potentially damaging practice.50 Whereas the action-guiding version directly calls for a response to environmental risks the deliberation-guiding version docs not. It simply places "constraints on what can be considered in the course of deliberation about whether to undertake this sort of action".51 The latter is thus less stringent than the former.

( ) Epistemology K comes 2nd and assumes zero foresight. At worst, we’re just a little off.

Cowen ‘4

Tyler, Department of Economics at George Mason University, "The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism," November 2, http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/Tyler/Epistemic2.pdf, p. 14-15

The epistemic critique relies heavily on a complete lack of information about initial circumstances. This is not a plausible general assumption, although it may sometimes be true. The critique may give the impression of relying more heavily on a more plausible assumption, namely a high variance for the probability distribution of our estimates concerning the future. But simply increasing the level of variance or uncertainty does not add much force to the epistemic argument. To see this more clearly, consider another case of a high upfront benefit. Assume that the United States has been hit with a bioterror attack and one million children have contracted smallpox. We also have two new experimental remedies, both of which offer some chance of curing smallpox and restoring the children to perfect health. If we know for sure which remedy works, obviously we should apply that remedy. But imagine now that we are uncertain as to which remedy works. The uncertainty is so extreme that each remedy may cure somewhere between three hundred thousand and six hundred thousand children. Nonetheless we have a slight idea that one remedy is better than the other. That is, one remedy is slightly more likely to cure more children, with no other apparent offsetting negative effects or considerations. Despite the greater uncertainty, we still have the intuition that we should try to save as many children as possible. We should apply the remedy that is more likely to cure more children. We do not say: “We are now so uncertain about what will happen. We should pursue some goal other than trying to cure as many children as possible.” Nor would we cite greater uncertainty about longer-run events as an argument against curing the children. We have a definite good in the present (more cured children), balanced against a radical remixing of the future on both sides of the equation. The definite upfront good still stands firm. Alternatively, let us assume that our broader future suddenly became less predictable (perhaps genetic engineering is invented, which creates new and difficult-to-forecast possibilities). That still would not diminish the force of our reason for saving more children. The variance of forecast becomes larger on both sides of the equation – whether we save the children or not – and the value of the upfront lives remains. A higher variance of forecast might increase the required size of the upfront benefit (to overcome the Principle of Roughness), but it would not refute the relevance of consequences more generally. We could increase the uncertainty more, but consequentialism still will not appear counterintuitive. The remedies, rather than curing somewhere in the range of three to six hundred thousand children, might cure in the broader range of zero to all one million of the children. By all classical statistical standards, this new cure scenario involves more uncertainty than the previous case, such as by having a higher variance of possible outcomes. Yet this higher uncertainty lends little support for the view that curing the children becomes less important. We still have an imperative to apply the remedy that appears best, and is expected the cure the greater number of children. This example may appear excessively simple, but it points our attention to the non-generality of the epistemic critique. The critique appears strongest only when we have absolutely no idea about the future; this is a special rather than a general case. Simply boosting the degree of background generic uncertainty should not stop us from pursuing large upfront benefits of obvious importance.

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