Afghanistan wave 4



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AT: Intelligence Turn



Intelligence gathering is shot in the status quo--- wikileaks

Riedel, 10 Senior Fellow, Foreign PolicySaban Center for Middle East Policy (7/28/10, Bruce, “WIkileaks make intelligence gathering harder in Afghanistan harder,” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0728_afghanistan_wikileaks_riedel.aspx)
In the wake of 9/11 there was an enormous shift in the way that counterterrorism intelligence was shared. No threat goes unreported now and intelligence goes to the maximum number of potential consumers because nobody wants to be blamed for a second 9/11; for having the piece of information about the guy who wanted to learn how to take off in an aeroplane but not how to land it.

But the Afghanistan leak is likely to lead to more controls to prevent self-proclaimed whistleblowers from gaining access to this kind of information. Things are unlikely to revert entirely to the way they were, but there will be an effort to groom distribution lists and to monitor consumers. WikiLeaks may find themselves having made such leaks less, rather than more, likely in the future. 


The second big ramification will be with friends and allies of the United States, particularly the Pakistanis, who are going to look at this and say: "We may be duplicitous, but at least we can keep a secret." 

On the ground in Afghanistan, the story is likely to be widely spread that if you tell the Americans anything, it will show up on a computer somewhere with your name on it and the Taliban can come after you. That's going to have a chilling effect on intelligence gathering in Afghanistan. It will make very tough intelligence channels even more difficult. It may also lead to less sharing with allies. 
Once you begin to protect the dissemination list, the first to fall off are foreigners. That makes the Afghan situation even more difficult for the 40 countries with troops on the ground. 
Intelligence sharing is absolutely critical, but if there are doubts as to who can keep a secret, there will be pressure to pool information more closely. The torture of detainees, the secret prison camps and the whole litany of assaults on civil liberties which followed 9/11 brought a predictable public backlash. 
People now don't trust their governments' handling of the whole "war on terror" and want to put a spotlight on intelligence communities which they think are out of control. 
That is understandable given the abuses that have taken place, but it's still not for individuals to decide on their own that they should be the ultimate declassifiers of secret information.



AT: Domestic terrorism is a greater threat



COIN increases domestic terrorism in the U.S.

Sageman, 9 - adjunct Associate Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs and former case officer for the CIA (Marc, “Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan,” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 3 n.4,

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=92&Itemid=54)

8. The decrease of global neo-jihadi terrorism in the last five years is testimony to the effectiveness of international and domestic intelligence as well as good police work. The timeline analysis of global neo-jihadi terrorism shows that the major threat to Western homelands is al-Qaeda inspired homegrown networks. Disrupting such homegrown plots has always been a domestic counter-terrorism mission through domestic intelligence and law enforcement. Indeed, there is a strong probability that the proposed counter-insurgency military surge may result in moral outrage in young Muslims in the West, who would take it upon themselves to carry out terrorist operations at home in response to the surge – just as the invasion in Iraq resulted in a dramatic increase in terrorist operations in the West. So, far from protecting the homeland, the surge may actually endanger it in the short term. After going through a learning process, Western law enforcement agencies, in coordination with their foreign counterparts, have done an effective job in protecting the homeland.


Afghanistan key to US foreign policy credibility



Afghanistan is the litmus test of US foreign policy credibility

Fernholz, 10 – writing fellow at the American Prospect and Research Fellow at the New America Foundation (Tim, The American Prospect, “The Ultimate Test Case,” March, 2010,  lexis) Katulis = security policy analyst at the Center for American Progress
"If the administration really wants to demonstrate that their global vision, which emphasizes all components of American power, including diplomacy and development assistance, they're going to have to make that actually achieve results in both Afghanistan and Pakistan," Katulis says. "Afghanistan and Pakistan are the ultimate test case of everything the president has been talking about when he discusses his national-security strategy as smart power."

The Obama administration is finding all of its challenges in one country. Afghanistan combines the task of developing a corrupt, failed state; the scourge of extreme political Islam; the dangers of terrorism and insurgency; the threat of nuclear proliferation and destabilization in nearby Pakistan; and a delicate diplomatic portfolio as the U.S. seeks to balance power between everyone from local militias and a corrupt government to a belligerent, nuclear-weapon-seeking Iran, a shaky frenemy in Pakistan, and its rival, the emerging economic superpower of India.

Seven years of neglect under the Bush administration created a problem of such complexity that immediately imposing a clear vision for Afghanistan was nearly impossible. The situation was complicated by the domestic political debate in the U.S., which quickly settled into a familiar groove: How many troops would be sent to Afghanistan or taken away? Conservatives hammered Obama for not immediately acquiescing to McChrystal's troop request, and many on the left argued it was time for the U.S. to leave this expensive distraction behind altogether. Other experts, like Gilles Dorronsoro, who were echoed by Vice President Joe Biden, advocated for a reorientation of American forces in Afghanistan without an increase in troop levels, which would buy time to demonstrate a new approach. While the military pressured Obama for a larger commitment, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry (himself the former coalition commander in Afghanistan) sent cables imploring Obama not to commit to troop increases in order to provide additional leverage over Karzai.





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