Afghanistan wave 4
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- AT: Bilateral Defense CP---Commitment
AT: Taliban NegotiationsNegotiations increase terrorism and would result in Pakistan collapse Moore, 10 - served with the US departments of Defence and State in the 1990s and worked in a number of humanitarian and development assistance roles in Afghanistan since 2002 (7/29/10, John, The Austrailian, “Taliban talks shoot allies in the foot,” lexis) A key factor in the Taliban resurgence is the failure of the international community and Afghan government to gain ground in the political battle for hearts and minds. When the local elite and broader population see a willingness of the Karzai administration and the international community to open talks with the Taliban, the message conveyed is that the Taliban has political momentum and Afghanistan is on the verge of being abandoned yet again by the West. Thus they are less willing to support military and civilian efforts and are increasingly susceptible to insurgent pressure. This does not mean efforts to divide and fracture the Taliban and associated insurgent and terrorist networks should not continue, as such efforts are also critical. The issue is that treating the Taliban as being a legitimate, monolithic actor -- even if only rhetorically -- transfers to the insurgency a political power they have never actually held. As the voices of those supporting discussions with the Taliban grow, there is an apparent move to cut deals at an individual and group level as they prepare for the eventual withdrawal of the West. Even the likes of the eminent Pakistani scholar Ahmed Rashid seem to be calling for a default back to a Pakistani-dominated approach, given the apparent paucity of alternatives -- and political will -- remaining. Meanwhile, one can only assume that actors in the northern and western parts of Afghanistan are building new links to traditional external powers such as Russia and Iran in preparation for the perceived post-American period. Talking with the Taliban with the intent to grant them political power would only accelerate further the legitimacy gap of the international community and Afghan government and open the door for a regression to 1990s-era dynamics, fraught with fragmentation and civil war. As pointed out by the Australian thinker and Afghan specialist William Maley, there is a danger of creating a strategic cascade wherein deterioration occurs quickly -- potentially in days or weeks -- should the sense of Taliban momentum and combat prowess advance. Another set of points is missing from the discussion. In engaging with the Taliban, the international community and Karzai government would give credibility to the claim of radicals within the Muslim world that, yet again, a group of mujaheddin has defeated a superpower. Such sentiment after the Soviet withdrawal of 1979 inspired the rise of al-Qa'ida and a network of affiliated terrorist organisations that continue to look for new recruits in a global jihad. Also of key concern is that the legitimising of the Afghan Taliban would see a greater integration of them with their Pakistani kinsmen, thus creating the potential for further radicalisation of a nuclear-armed state and introducing new destabilising pressures throughout the region. Taliban negotiations are impossible--- ideologies and unpopularity O’Hanlon and Shejan, 10- Michael O’hanlon, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues, and Hassina Sherjan, president of Aid Afghanistan for education, (2010, “Toughening it out in Afghanistan,” p.70-72) CRITICISM 7: "We Should Negotiate with the Taliban" To be sure, we should negotiate with local affiliates of the Taliban. And as time goes on, if we gain battlefield momentum, we may even be able to persuade some of the Taliban leadership to negotiate-largely on our terms. But the notion of a compromise today with the central Taliban leadership is flawed for two reasons. First wars do not usually end through negotiation. They end when someone wins.14 Second, as argued earlier, the Taliban as such are not interested in negotiation and are not the sort of organization with whom we should want to negotiate-meaning compromise. Their extremist ideology is misogynous, intolerant, and ruthless. Their history in Afghanistan has been brutal and barbaric. They are extremely unpopular among Afghans, particularly in non-Pashtun areas, where their public support is virtually nil, but even in places like Kandahar, where despite recent strides, the Taliban garner only a 25 percent favorability rating (compared with a 75 percent rating for the government, despite years of failed efforts there). The Taliban are on a roll, but their success is based more on a combination of intimidation and a general perception among Afghans that they are winning {"Nothing succeeds like success," as the saying goes, and Afghans know how to pick the winning side}. That momentum is not based on a fundamental appeal to most Afghans, however, and we should be able to reverse it with a more successful strategy. AT: Bilateral Defense CP---CommitmentBilateral defense treaties do not change the perception of commitment or alter the insurgency O’Hanlon and Shejan, 10- Michael O’hanlon, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues, and Hassina Sherjan, president of Aid Afghanistan for education, (2010, “Toughening it out in Afghanistan,” p.102-103) Plan for an Alliance with Afghanistan Senator Joseph Lieberman, scholar Ashley Tellis, and others have argued that the United States should establish a formal alliance with Afghanistan to clarify the resoluteness of its security commitments. They believe such an alliance would take away any doubt-from tribal leaders in southern Afghanistan, from the lSI in Pakistan, and from others who continue to hedge their bets-about the country's long-term future. This could make them more inclined to support the central government in Kabul and the NATO security mission.23 This argument is generally persuasive, though it is still a bit early to act on it. For one thing, the United States has had formal security commitments in this part of the world before, most notably to Pakistan through the CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) alliance early in the cold war era, and they turned out not to be particularly decisive commitments. The United States, for example, did not directly intervene militarily to support Pakistan in the 1971 war against India. We do not mean to criticize past U.S. policy here; rather, the point is to underscore that entering into a treaty does not automatically create a perception of complete and firm commitment by the United States. Second, at this point it is premature to ask the American citizen, taxpayer, and soldier to commit to the long-term security of a country that needs to prove its own steadfastness first. Afghanistan needs to improve its governance and its security forces and continue to establish order within its own state before a security accord makes sense. And formal alliances do not necessarily help much in defeating insurgencies; the Vietnam war is a case in point. As such, we would favor such an accord but only after the tide has begun to turn on the battlefield.
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