Afghanistan wave 4
AT: Condition on the Taliban Not Housing Al Qaeda
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- Bilateral Defense CP---ANA Solves Nationalism
AT: Condition on the Taliban Not Housing Al QaedaCP fails--- threatens Pakistan and doesn’t win hearts and minds Haass, 10- president of the Council on Foreign Relations (7/18/10, Richard, Newsweek, “We’re not winning it’s not worth it,” http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/18/we-re-not-winning-it-s-not-worth-it.html) This idea has its drawbacks as well as appeal. A self-governing “Pashtunistan” inside Afghanistan could become a threat to the integrity of Pakistan, whose own 25 million Pashtuns might seek to break free to form a larger Pashtunistan. Any partition would also be resisted by many Afghans, including those Tajik, Baluchi, and Hazara minorities living in demographic “islands” within the mostly Pashtun south, as well as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and others elsewhere in the country who want to keep Afghanistan free of Taliban influence. And even many Pashtuns would resist for fear of the harsh, intolerant rule the Taliban would impose if given the chance. Another approach, best termed “decentralization,” bears resemblance to partition but also is different in important ways. Under this approach, the United States would provide arms and training to those local Afghan leaders throughout the country who reject Al Qaeda and who do not seek to undermine Pakistan. Economic aid could be provided to increase respect for human rights and to decrease poppy cultivation. There would be less emphasis on building up a national Army and police force. ***CounterplansBilateral Defense CP---Population Protection KeyEven if some casualties are inevitable---overall population protection is key Barker, 10- national security analyst based in Washington DC (7/12/10, Alec, “The Bogus Debate over Counterinsurgency,” http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/12/the_bogus_debate_over_counterinsurgency) A war of restraint. The fourth fact means that protecting the people is much more than a tenet of counterinsurgency dogma, it is an inviolable pre-condition that facilitates our continued access to Afghanistan's territory, no matter the concept of our operations. True, doing no harm (or as little harm as possible) to civilians is an unavoidable and indisputable -- if occasionally inconvenient -- aspect of the conflict in Afghanistan, not to mention a norm worth upholding regardless. The suggestion that more liberal rules of engagement might lead to success is problematic because it implies that civilian casualties abroad should somehow become more tolerable to the U.S., its allies, and to the people of Afghanistan. Although there is a moral argument here, the practical and political reasons for protecting civilians in Afghanistan are also significant. Too many civilian casualties will drive non-combatants to support our opponents and jeopardize the relationship with the host government as described above. Even if the strategy were one of all-out pacification by force, civilian casualties would still be a central problem and source of criticism. This is not an argument for the COINdistas. These facts hold true no matter what idea is implemented, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism-plus included, making this debate a bogus one. There are other knowledgeable people with similar opinions. Critics of the current concept rarely offer a cogent alternative (Austin Long being an important exception) and instead seem to snipe out of frustration or a desire to hedge. Coping with these realities creatively, directly, and effectively is now General Petraeus's challenge. Bilateral Defense CP---ANA Solves NationalismTraining the ANA solves nationalism O’Hanlon and Shejan, 10- Michael O’hanlon, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues, and Hassina Sherjan, president of Aid Afghanistan for education, (2010, “Toughening it out in Afghanistan,” p.90-96) SECURITY POLICY PROPOSALS Some of the following ideas are already being actively debated by Afghan and NATO officials. Others should be. Further Enlarge and Properly Equip the Afghan Security Forces Recent NATO and Afghan strategy has emphasized increasing the size of available security forces of all major types. American forces now number 68,000 troops, headed toward a total of around 100,000 in 2010; all together international military personnel exceed 100,000 in all and will probably reach 140,000. Within another year, the Afghan army is projected to reach about 134,000 and the national police, 96,000, for a total security force of 230,000. But this leaves combined forces at just 60 percent or so of the totals recommended by counterinsurgency doctrine-admittedly a rough guide, but still an important one. Afghan officials themselves, including Defense Minister Wardak, have already argued for an Afghan national army of at least 200,000.2 The figures of 240,000 army and 160,000 police, as calculated by ISAF, make sense and should be adopted until the insurgency is defeated. Getting more southern Pashtun into the force is important, too.3 Establishing force goals of this size would allow foreign countries to plan their security aid appropriately.4 General Petraeus estimates the cost of Afghan National Security Forces at $10 billion a year, so serious planning is needed. Setting such force goals also would allow recruiting efforts to be properly scaled within Afghanistan. If it is determined that necessary recruiting targets for a larger security force cannot be met, then the government can turn to consideration of military conscription instead. Proper force goals also send a message that we are collectively serious about this mission and doing all that it takes to succeed. Any increase in army (and police) personnel needs to be accompanied by a parallel effort to strengthen the ministries that oversee them. It is these ministries that monitor possible corruption, ensure prompt payment and other good treatment of personnel, create logistical support, and maintain the command chain. Strengthening these ministries will require embedding more mentors within them.s Whenever possible, the mentors should be Afghans themselves-perhaps from abroad where possiblealthough a certain number of properly chosen Western mentors may be useful too. (This is particularly so if committed individuals can he found who might be willing to do more than a single tour in Afghanistan, paralleling General McChrystal's emphasis on establishing dedicated country experts among his top advisers-individuals who remain focused on the mission even when on rotation back home, and who return to the same part of Afghanistan tour after tour when deployed abroad.) The quality of the Afghan police also matters. Many police today are illiterate, among their other weaknesses. As salaries and benefits are improved, making service in the army and police more appealing (with monthly pay starting around $240 in combat zones), demands can be increased too, so that a higher-quality force is built over time. Obligatory literacy training is one such requirement that should be introduced as soon as practicaL Indeed, emphasizing literacy would presumably have substantial appeal to many Afghans, giving them additional skills needed for the future. As such, it would represent an additional benefit as well as a quality enhancement tool. Ideas like this-which treat the security forces as an elite institution, the way some other nations in the region do, which take care of committed personnel for the duration of their careers and indeed their lives-can also help greatly with the quality of personnel who join and stay in the army and police. Improvements in the quality of the security forces can also be one example of a way in which Afghan national confidence, so damaged after thirty years of war and dependency, can be gradually restored-by giving the nation signature institutions that all can view with patriotic pride. Some scholars ask whether the U.S. political system is reliable enough to commit funds to an enlarged Afghan security force over an extended period. The answer is yes. The United States has proven as much over the years in funding Egypt, Greece, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey for multiple decades when core U.S. security interests dictated it. Certainly Afghanistan, where al Qaeda once had its main home, is worth a comparable financial investment. Reform the National Police and the Justice Systems The police force is one of the key weaknesses of Afghanistan today, and one of the key sources of vulnerability in the current strategy for stabilizing the country. Some of the problems involve top-level policy. Others involve reforms and replacements of specific individuals. There are limits to what the international community can do in promoting reform in this, and other, Afghan institutions. Much must be done by Afghans themselves, and that represents a key vulnerability in our strategy, given the weaknesses of the Karzai regime. But there are some things we can do. Under the right circumstances, a national police force could avoid the kinds of corrupting influences that currently characterize most of the Afghan police today, where local police are often tied in with local drug runners and other illicit elements of the economy. But the only organization with such a role, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, with welltrained multiethnic units, had only 2,500 trained personnel as of early 2009. Citizens reportedly prefer to deal with this national force because it is not corrupt, but it is badly undersized and needs strengthening as well as enlarging. 6 Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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