Afghanistan wave 4
AT: Regional Cooperation Counterplan (this is also neg vs. SCO advantage)
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AT: Regional Cooperation Counterplan (this is also neg vs. SCO advantage)Even if the US and Pakistan cooperate on counter terrorism other converging goals prevent broader cooperation Tellis, 10 is a senior associate in Carnegie’s South Asia Program (2010, Ashley, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, “IMPLEMENTING A REGIONAL APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/regional_approach.pdf) The foregoing summary does not by any means suggest that Pakistan and the United States are hopelessly divided on all issues: the partnership between the two countries has been particularly close on counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda and the indigenous rebellion mounted by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. The United States also continues to rely heavily on Pakistan for the transport of dry cargo for coalition military operations in Afghanistan. But, on balance, the tension between U.S. and Pakistani goals is so acute on some critical issues that it could make the difference not only to the success of U.S. operations in Afghanistan but also to the viability of any regional approach intended to induce greater cooperation within the region. Regional cooperation fails--- multiple reasons Tellis, 10 is a senior associate in Carnegie’s South Asia Program (2010, Ashley, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, “IMPLEMENTING A REGIONAL APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/regional_approach.pdf) CAN THE REGIONAL APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN SUCCEED? As the analysis of national aims in the previous section suggests, there is considerable disparity between regional interests and the objectives pursued by the United States in Afghanistan. If a deeper analysis of the convergence between U.S. and Afghan aims themselves were undertaken, the same conclusion would again obtain: the fact that there is a considerable diversity of opinion inside Afghanistan about the coalition, its presence, and its campaign; the fact that the Karzai regime seeks to protect its power over and above contributing to domestic stability; and the fact that different political factions within Afghanistan are aligned with different regional patrons, all contribute, among other things, to the inference that U.S. and Afghan objectives too may not be perfectly aligned. These factors all undermine a regional approach. This inference suggests that implementing a regional strategy on the presumption that there exists substantial convergence between U.S. and regional goals (even if the divergence between U.S. and Afghan goals themselves is disregarded) will prove to be extremely challenging. Competing goals prevent regional cooperation Tellis, 10 is a senior associate in Carnegie’s South Asia Program (2010, Ashley, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, “IMPLEMENTING A REGIONAL APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/regional_approach.pdf) Second, the difficulties enveloping the core quadrangle of states— Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Iran—also implicate other countries that lie further afield, for different reasons. The U.S.–Pakistan relationship experiences significant stress with regard to the Afghan Taliban: Washington’s political and military strategy is directed at defeating the group, whereas Islamabad’s is oriented toward preserving it. The Taliban are also an opportunity for two different dyadic rivalries to play themselves out, albeit in conflicting ways: the intense ideological and geopolitical competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which manifests throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, finds Iran strategically opposed to the Taliban in the face of Saudi sympathy for the group; but Iran’s truculence vis-à-vis the United States places it in the awkward situation of becoming a tactical supporter of the Taliban merely because the insurgency serves the useful purpose of ensnaring the United States. U.S.–Russian competition mercifully does not play out with the same intensity in Afghanistan, but it does prevent Russia from supporting the American military endeavor with the wholehearted support that might otherwise have materialized. Other latent rivalries that cannot be wished away include Russian and Central Asian discomfort with Pakistan, and Russian and Indian concerns about China. Although these mutual suspicions do not dominate the politics of cooperation in Afghanistan today, they dampen the prospects for meaningful cooperation. AT: Regional Cooperation Counterplan (this is also neg vs. SCO advantage)Any action a state takes has positive and negative effects on regional states-- regionalism is destined to fail Tellis, 10 is a senior associate in Carnegie’s South Asia Program (2010, Ashley, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, “IMPLEMENTING A REGIONAL APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/regional_approach.pdf) The intense and cross-cutting nature of the security competition among various dyads, highlighted in Table 2, affirms the critical conclusion that while Afghanistan is important to many of its neighbors, its importance usually derives from how it impacts other strategic goals. Because these goals are often competitive, the success of a regional approach is inevitably impeded. This reality is manifested by the fact that any action undertaken either in or with respect to Afghanistan by one state ends up affecting many others positively or negatively because of its impact on their own interests or fortunes. Table 3 summarizes the character and intensity of the impact of various national actions on the relevant neighbors. Thus, Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan inside Pakistan yield important but moderate benefits for U.S. counterinsurgency operations inside Afghanistan. Pakistani support for other terrorist groups, such as the Haqqani network, the Hezb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin), the Afghan Taliban, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba, has a high negative impact on U.S., Afghan, Indian, and Iranian interests in different ways. Similarly, India’s investments in Afghan reconstruction significantly impact U.S. and Afghan national goals in positive ways, but these same actions, though consistently encouraged by Washington, unnerve Islamabad greatly and to that extent have a highly negative impact on Pakistan. Iran’s engagement with and aid to Afghanistan, currently standing at some $280 million in reconstruction projects, may be judged as having a significant positive impact on Kabul’s fortunes. Tehran’s willingness to oppose the Taliban’s return to power and its willingness to provide India with physical access to Afghanistan yields positive benefits to both Kabul and New Delhi. By that very measure, however, Iranian actions end up having a moderately negative impact on Pakistan. Similarly, its efforts to simultaneously support some Taliban military operations against the coalition have a moderately negative impact on the United States. All the other states’ actions characterized in Table 3, insofar as they pertain directly to their other peers and to Afghanistan, amplify the general point: even if there is some disagreement about how precisely various national actions in Afghanistan are to be characterized, both in terms of their impact on others and the intensity of such impact, the fact remains that all national actions have diverse impacts on different stakeholders, some positive and others negative, with varying intensity. That the critical actions of key states happen to undermine, in many cases, the interests of other important partners—as reflected in this table—provides the final reason for skepticism that a regional approach to Afghanistan is likely to succeed in the near term. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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